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JAPAN:
SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES

by

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FOREWORD

During the war, a series of publications by American cultural anthropologists on the general subject of Japanese national character attracted considerable attention in both academic and official circles. Directly and indirectly, these writings can be regarded as products of the unique research conducted by Ruth Benedict and others in the Foreign Morale Analysis Division of the Office of War Information. Dr. Benedict's own book, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, may be taken as typical of these materials on national character. The problems and hypotheses about Japanese social behavior raised in that work have been recognized by all scholars, Japanese and American, as fundamental and provocative. However, as Dr. Benedict herself observed, further research and systematic comment made by persons in direct contact with the subject matter will be necessary to establish the validity of her conclusions.

The present manuscript represents one of the first professional comments on Japanese behavior by a Japanese psychiatrist to be written in English. While it is not technically a research report, it does represent the careful reflections of a doctor who has practiced psychiatry for 24 years in Japan. First-hand data are provided for many of the problems raised by Benedict and others, and fresh interpretations of aspects of Japanese social and emotional behavior are offered.

Dr. Muramatsu's manuscript has been made available to members of this Headquarters in the belief that it is of considerable value for general information and orientation purposes. In the United States, the paper will be published in the volume, World Tension: The Psychopathology of International Relations, edited by Dr. George W. Kisker of Cincinnati University. Its reproduction and distribution in this Headquarters has been made possible by the kind permission of Dr. Kisker.

Dr. Muramatsu is at present Superintendent of the Konodai National Hospital, in Ichikawa City, Chiba Prefecture, and is a professor of psychiatry at the Tokyo Medical College. He graduated from Tokyo University Medical School in 1925, and studied psychiatry at Harvard Medical School under the auspices of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1933 to 1935. He carried on further studies in psychiatry in Germany before returning to Tokyo, where he has lived since 1936.

JAPAN: SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

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Needless to say, it is a very difficult task to determine psychological trends characteristic of an entire nation. Although Japan is small in territory, her long history and her internal social differentiation have created many group differences in tradition and outlook. Ruth Benedict has suggested that Japanese culture may be regarded as relatively homogeneous when compared with the heterogeneous patterns of the Western nations, but to the insider, especially the psychiatrist, homogeneous aspects are less apparent and perhaps less important than the evident differences.

Since the writer is Japanese, and except for two years abroad, has lived his entire life in Tokyo, a purely detached and objective judgment of Japanese psychology is not an easy matter. Against this very possible ethnocentrism can be placed the writer's 24 years experience, during which time he has worked with students, nurses, physicians, and emotionally disturbed persons from all parts of Japan. He feels competent, therefore, to make at least a cursory survey of the psychological situation at the present time.

It is not the writer's privilege to know the extent of the average American reader's knowledge of Japanese history and social development. Assuming that many readers of this book will not have a close acquaintance with the facts in these areas, the writer has included a fairly long historical section. This sets the stage for the consideration of contemporary trends.

I. Social and Family Life in the Tokugawa Era

To understand character traits of the contemporary Japanese, it may be useful to summarize the more conspicuous differences between developmental trends in Japanese and American social and family life.

While Western peoples were seeking for and establishing national independence and individual freedom, and while Protestant pioneers colonized and organized America, the Japanese were still living in a medieval, feudal, hierarchal family system and society. This condition persisted until the Meiji "Revolution" of 80 years ago. During the Tokugawa Era, for about two and a half centuries preceding the Meiji Restoration, an extremely rigid, stratified type of society and family were characteristic of Japan.

In this system, status in the family as well as in social life was determined at birth. One was educated and trained from early childhood to adjust to the prescribed and appropriate way of life in an authoritarian atmosphere. To the extent that the individual was obedient and faithful to his allotted position, and was content with his lot in family and society, he could have personal security.

The standards of life were strictly stratified by class: the kind of clothes and their colors, the size and types of houses, the kind of language, when and how to bow, and in general, how to behave. All these were prescribed for the bun or status in society, which was calculated on such criteria as the individual's position in the family, economic condition,

and marital status. Conventional morality and traditional restraints were so stringent that the violation of these unwritten laws subjected one to ridicule (the so-called waraware mono), or even to exile from the community or family.

The family or ie (house) was the most important symbol in life. Preservation of the family line and its dignity was regarded as the most important duty to the ancestors. Consequently, a wife who could not bear children was sometimes divorced and dishonored. Members who disgraced the family were often expelled. Loyalty to the ie, and, if necessary, sacrifice in the interests of the ie, were routinely demanded of all members of the family. The status of the family, ie gara, was determined by the community. Ordinarily, the first son was the heir of the head of the main family, honke. In place of direct inheritance, the other sons were established as branch houses, bunke, with subordinate positions.

During this same period, Americans were emphasizing individuality, spontaneity, efficiency, progressivism, rationalism, and mutual cooperation in a "gesellschaftlich" or "contractual" relationship between individuals. In contrast, the Japanese were still stressing the concept of society as a unity under the direction of a single authority, uniformity in each defined status, the insignificance of the individual, with conservatism, conventionalism, traditionalism, and loyalty in a "gemeinschaftlich" or "family" relationship between individuals. Thus Japanese society as a whole took on the type of unity and solidarity characteristic of the kin group, plus a special Oriental stress on parental authority and filial duty.

This type of heirarchal structure demanded obedience to superiors and elders, uncomplaining acceptance of one's own status, devotion to and self-sacrifice for authority, and acceptance of the priority of group or family interests to those of the individual. Conservatism preserved traditions, and an archaic spiritual perspective was encouraged.

This intense emphasis on in-group characteristics in feudal Japan resulted in exclusiveness, cliquism, and hostility toward outsiders. For example, the samurai (warrior) was set against samurai of other daimyo (lords); the villager against strangers; and family members against persons outside of the family. Elaborate rules were set up to govern necessary out-group relations. From these developed those elaborate patterns of etiquette which are often regarded as characteristically Japanese.

In respect to governmental administration, the common people were kept in a state of virtually absolute ignorance and dependence, a condition which has been symbolized by the famous three monkeys (see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil). An amusing play on words is connected with this symbol. The word for monkey (saru) is phonetically equivalent to the general negative suffix zaru (because in Japanese the sound "s" may become "z" under certain conditions of combination with other words). As a consequence of this phonetic similarity, the words mi-zaru, kika-zaru, and iwa-zaru which mean respectively "not seeing," "not hearing," and "not speaking," can also be understood to refer to the three monkeys.

The major religious strains that have influenced Japan have tended to support the ethics of the in-group social structure. Confucianism, which teaches benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and sincerity, emphasized obedience to parents and self-control. Ancestor worship was stressed by the indigenous Shinto (Way of the Gods). Buddhism, which has been very influential, stressed the view that one cannot exist without the good will or help of other people and of all things in nature. Therefore, one must be appropriately grateful for the on (debt of gratitude) one owes to everyone and everything. Further, according to Buddhist teaching, one should not "sacrifice" any animal for eating except fish. One must be satisfied with a modest and simple life, and not aspire beyond that. These religious influences possibly helped to confirm the Japanese people in their conservative and static approach to life.

Neither Buddhism nor Shinto preached a doctrine of original sin. Therefore, rather than sin, a sense of shame was aroused in consequence of the violation of religious prohibitions, traditional morality, or the regulations of the group or family. The consequences of shame were primarily the loss of "face" or deprivation of group protection. In this fact lies the great importance of giri (obligation) to the Japanese people. Failure to observe giri to family or society at large, as well as to individuals, resulted in serious deprivations. Giri, then, as a system of unwritten law, bound individual to individual and individual to group in a tight network of obligations, without regard for individual "right" or desire.

In such an atmosphere, it could be expected that suppressed energies would find an outlet in pursuits which anyone might take up, regardless of class position. For example, growing chrysanthemums or dwarf trees, arranging flowers or gardens, and similar rarefied pursuits were common. Hokku or haiku, a simplified type of poem with 17 syllables, and the waka with 31 syllables were also popular. Standards of taste, color, and form were exquisitely refined and reduced to a deliberately underplayed simplicity.

II. Post-Meiji

After the Meiji Restoration, Japanese eyes were first opened to the outer world. They were enthusiastic in adopting new objects and ideas from Western nations, and discarded or modified many of their old customs. The individual was released from feudal restraint, but at the same time, the necessity for inter-personal competition arose. Modernization and industrialization developed rapidly, and the growth of industrial monopolies was marked. The population increase that occurred was primarily an urban phenomenon; rural population remained fairly static. Living became more expensive, its pace more rapid, economically more unstable, and emotionally more tense and insecure.

The Western political party system was formally adopted soon after the Restoration. Several political parties were organized, and the Diet and the House of Peers were established as the legislative organ. However, the intellectual and cultural Renaissance, which required four centuries in Europe for final consummation, has had only three-quarters of a century to develop in Japan. A complete Western-type Renaissance was out of the question. Thus, the newly established constitution made the Emperor the all-powerful and sacred ruler, even though this was essentially in name only. Many basic feudal conventions have continued relatively intact in family, school, and office, and especially in rural areas.

Moreover, members of the conservative British aristocracy were brought in as advisers, and students eagerly studied German philosophy, law, and science. The authoritarian German military system was adopted as a model by the army.

Governmental administration and education were completely centralized. Respectful emphasis on the government (kanson) and disrespect for the people (mimpi) continued to be very strong. The Government was and still often is called okami, which means the top or the above. Young men of intelligence and ambition aspired to entrance into a governmental school, and many looked forward to becoming governmental officials.

Authoritarianism was most conspicuous in the army and in the governmental bureaucracy. It has been customary in Japan for lower-rank officials to conduct governmental business. Because of their general arrogance, as well as their inefficiency, they have been unpopular with the people. This arrogance may possibly have developed from the general tendency, noted by Erich Fromm, for people who are extremely submissive to superiors to enjoy the exercise of power over powerless inferiors. In spite of the hostility toward authority, there was little widespread protest or revolt; in general, people were passively resigned. This attitude has been expressed in a popular proverb which says: "Contending with authorities is like trying to quiet a crying baby". Most of the people felt that government was a matter for superiors, and consequently they had virtually no participation in administration, foreign affairs, or even in matters which affected them directly, like the expenditure of taxation receipts.

In Japanese family life, the authority of the father, the parent-child relationship, relationships with grandchildren, and the relation between husband and wife tend to resemble those in the German family, as described in Bertram Schaffner's Father Land, A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family. An old Japanese proverb states that "Fearful things in the world are four: earthquake, thunder, fire, and father." However, in this author's generation, authoritarianism and child discipline have not been as rigid as those of the German family, as described by Dr. Schaffner. Also, Japanese women seem to be much less aggressive than German women.

From the end of the Tokugawa Era until the present only four generations. The writer's grandparental generation was trained to the lifeways of a samurai, of the strict feudal family and societal type. After the writer's grandfather lost his position as a warrior because of the reform, he became a government official. When he retired, in the middle of the Meiji Era, he continued to read books about Confucianism, old Japanese and Chinese literature, and refused to acquaint himself with Western ideas. He lamented the neglect of the traditional culture, and the eager imitation of Western fashions. He governed his behavior in accordance with the old samurai code, and when he visited the grave of his lord, he made obeisance as of old. Nevertheless, he never tried to interfere with his children's desire to become Westernized, and even mocked his own stubbornness.

The writer's father's generation became remarkably liberal and individualistic, and seemed to be much more ambitious and competitive in respect to fame and wealth than either the grandparental or the writer's own generation. The writer's own generation seems to be more liberal, and also more skeptical.

The writer's children's generation seems to be considerably different from his own. This is especially true for boys and girls between 20 and 25, who were educated under the strong pressure of militaristic and nationalistic concepts. They were forced to make an adjustment to war, and to imperialistic and ultra-nationalistic ideology. All of this pressure is now gone.

The development of industrialization has led to a gradual decline of the extended, patriarchal large-family system. The number of smaller families has increased. The rate of divorce has decreased, and the standard and level of living have been raised to some extent. Three conditions.-- family size,

economic circumstances, and size of dwelling -- affect the relations between the members. The larger the family, the more difficult is their economic situation, and the smaller the dwelling, the more complicated become the social and emotional relationships between the members. Moreover, most Japanese houses are constructed with much less individual privacy than the Western type. The rooms are separated from each other by no more than paper screens, or thin walls of wood and mud plaster. The whole family lives face-to-face almost all day long, and in many small houses they all sleep in one or two rooms. Often the father or mother bathes together with the younger children.

In order to keep inter-personal relationships in such a family at least superficially peaceful and smooth, the concept of enryo, or reserve, is invoked. This implies obedience to superiors and elders, with a minimum of complaints and no "back-talk". Strong emotional tension, frustration, and hostility in some individuals frequently result from the consequent repression. A few cases exemplifying this will be described in the next section. More specifically, enryo (en -- further, ryo -- consideration) means the restraint of free expression of one's own wish or opinion, in consideration of the feelings, dignity, or face of others; and at the same time, the protection of one's own status or face in social or family life. Thus enryo in practice often brings about a hesitation to express oneself frankly, to behave freely, or to assume initiative. Enryo behavior, with its silence and its smile, may cause misunderstandings even among the Japanese, not to mention the difficulties that arise between Japanese and Westerners.

Another related mechanism, which serves to prevent the emotional complication of inter-personal relationships is the go-between, a method which is used not only in arranging marriages, but also in transacting business.

Enryo is not only a mode of behavior toward superiors; superiors themselves are expected to behave to some extent with enryo toward inferiors. They must not be too frank, they must avoid hurting feelings, they must not demand too much, and they are also expected to be sensitive enough to penetrate the enryo of their inferiors and ascertain their real desires and opinions. Otherwise, the inferiors might accumulate hostilities toward them and develop disobedient or even aggressive and explosive behavior. In this system, since a frank argument with superiors is generally viewed as disobedience, a repressed disagreement may often be expressed by "yes" in words and "no" in act.

Generally speaking, because the Japanese are not accustomed to discuss things frankly, they are not trained to form definite opinions about a subject, to express them clearly, to listen to the ideas of others calmly, and argue with them critically. The Japanese are often very timid in frank expressions of their own ideas, very sensitive to criticism, and very apt to become excited by objections to their views when discussion does occur.

Enryo behavior is not only characteristic of inter-personal relations, but also of the relations of an individual to a group. The group solidarity which is emphasized by enryo behavior and by obedience to the person in authority (who guarantees the security of all members), forms the basis for the establishment of the so-called "boss" system in Japanese social life. Such "boss" systems appear everywhere, in all kinds of groups and organizations, local, professional, school, office, governmental, and criminal. This tendency provided a foundation for the authoritarian and disciplined organization of totalitarian, ultra-nationalist, and fascist groups.

The parent-child prototype relation, which carries over into the "boss" system, is also carried over easily into ordinary work relations of office and factory. Workers often transfer this attitude toward parents to their boss or employer. The boss, who is called oya-bun (oya means parent, bun means position or role) or oya-kata (oya -- parent, kata -- side) is expected to have a parental feeling, oya-gokoro (oya -- parent, gokoro -- heart) toward his employees, who are called ko-bun (ko-- child, bun -- position or role) or ko-kata (ko -- child, kata -- side). Workers often look upon their work in terms of a personal emotional relationship with the boss rather than in terms of simple employee-employer relations. The most striking example of this is found in the so-called craftsman spirit (shokunin katagi). Again, it is often found that workers will put forward their best efforts, even when they are not paid, for a boss who shows appreciation of their skill, or inspires them with spirit (iki), or to whom they are under obligation (on). But for an employer whom they do not like, for whom they do not have this personal feeling of obligation and relation, they will often fail to work hard, no matter how high their wages. Of course, these tendencies are diminishing with the gradual spread of modern capitalistic technology and industrial organization, but the general attitudes underlying them are still widespread in all layers of the population.

Hostility toward the father, and sometimes ambivalence toward the mother, commonly develops in many young people as a result of the oppressive psychological atmosphere of family and social life. Research of the writer and others has indicated that the first age of rebellion is usually at four to five years, and the second from 13 to 18 years. Individual expression of hostility differs -- some suppress it, some develop guilt reactions, while others express their hostility openly.

As an adjustment to the oppression of convention and to real poverty, the common character traits of the Japanese tend to be industrious, but inhibited, dependent, more or less pessimistic, and rather masochistic. Commonly, human existence is considered as full of unhappiness, sorrow, and pain. For many Japanese, happiness is merely a dream or an illusion, and the individual is insignificant and powerless. A movie or drama with a happy ending appears unreal to Japanese audiences, especially those above middle age. The writer has often examined hysterical women who seem to enjoy playing the role of the unhappy tragic heroine who is torn by the dilemma of giri (obligation) and ninjo (human emotion).

For a majority of the Japanese, life is a hard struggle for existence; they are unable to think of it as "enjoyable". Before and during the war, militarists constantly stressed the harsh pressure on Japan for bare existence. They pointed out that little Japan, with her large and still increasing population, could not exist without emigration or expansion. Their purpose, of course, was to justify the claim that the urgently necessary emigration and expansion were being blocked by larger and richer countries that were her very existence. The authoritarian nationalists added that Japan, as the leader of Asia, had to liberate the peoples of the Far East from the present situation, and at the same time defend them against communism.

Critics were overwhelmed by the traditional prestige and power of this group. The people followed an old proverb: "Be wrapped by a long thing," which means: "Do not struggle in vain when you are completely enveloped." But even during the war, the professional military and higher bureaucracy seemed to be unpopular among a majority of the common people. It was commonly said, "This is a good time only for the Star (symbol of the army), and the Anchor (symbol of the navy),

and the Face (people with prestige)." Because of the lack of war materiel, "spiritual" force or power was emphasized very often by the leaders, who were accordingly criticized by the people as dominated by kami gakari (divine obsession or possession). The uprightness and justice of the Japanese army and navy and the contrasting cruelty of the enemy were reiterated so strongly that the people were made to think in terms of "either victory or death, with no other alternative."

The feudal spirit of bushido (way of the warrior) was strongly emphasized along with patriotism and Shintoism. Young boys were trained, almost hypnotized, to deem it a great honor to die for the emperor or for the country of their ancestors.

III. The Postwar Period

The lack of fanatic and last-ditch resistance to the entry of the Occupation Forces in August and September 1945 was a great surprise to many Japanese. It appears to be the case that the command of the Emperor was effective in ending resistance, but it should also be remembered that people had already come to the realization that they were losing the war.

To be resolute is considered a virtue among the Japanese. They have been trained by repeated earthquakes, typhoons, floods, conflagrations, and other natural disasters not to complain too much or too long about past misfortunes, and to begin immediate reconstruction. Not to be a good loser is considered cowardly. But, a loser sometimes easily becomes an obedient and at the same time very dependant follower of the victor. Thus a victor may sometimes be considered as a new "boss" who has a real obligation to look after the weaker followers. In an old popular story, a giant attacked a boy on the Gojo bridge in Kyoto to rob him of a sword; but, as soon as the giant discovered that the boy was much stronger than he, he decided to become the boy's faithful follower.

Furthermore, generally speaking, the Japanese often seem to feel inferior in the face of modern Western civilization. Since the beginning of the Meiji Era, the Japanese and industry. Imported objects and ideas are commonly considered better and more reliable than the corresponding Japanese products. Japanese self-confidence often seems to be weak, and this attitude was exceptionally apparent with the end of the war.

After surrender and occupation, most people appeared to be in a stupor. They did not know what to do, and seemed not to know what would happen to them next. They were frightened by the Occupation, but at the same time they were very much impressed by the humanity and generosity of the Occupation Forces.

With the promulgation of the new Constitution, there has been extensive formal reorganization along democratic lines. The widespread changes in attitude and in receptivity toward democratic ideas which have taken place are truly notable, but it would be a mistake to assume that the democratic renovation of Japanese thinking is complete. It is obvious that complete psychological reorganization will take much more time, because democracy, in its fullest sense, requires independence and maturity of the individual.

The postwar food, clothing, and housing shortages combined with a sharply rising inflation have driven most people to devote all their time and thought to such immediate concerns as preserving a minimal level of existence. The total caloric count of the daily food ration in the city of Tokyo during the last four months of 1945 was around 1,200 — far less than the bare minimum requirements. People became physically exhausted, uneasy, and demoralized. Criminality — mainly larceny — increased rapidly, especially among young people and children.

Many parents and school teachers, under the stimulus of new ideas, have become skeptical of the old authoritarian principles of training and education, since authoritarianism has been formally abolished and democracy put in its place. But "democracy" is a new concept, and it is surrounded by uncertainty. Consequently, there are wide differences in the interpretation of "democratic behavior."

Among many young people there is a strong feeling of having been deceived by their leaders, teachers, and even by their parents. This is particularly true for the 20-25 year age group, which had been oriented toward an authoritarian, imperialist, ultra-nationalist ideology before and during the war. They were, so to speak, poured into a war-like mental mold from their primary or secondary school days. Told how to think, feel, and behave, how to live, and how to die, they were not trained to think critically or to behave independently. They were given much less of a general cultural education than older people. With the Occupation, this convenient and rigid frame for their life vanished. They were consequently disorientated and confused. Conventional morality lost much of its authority and along with Confucianism, Shinto, and Buddhism, seems to have little to offer confused young people. The number of Christians is still small, although conversions appear to be increasing in very recent months.

Consequently, many young people seem to have lost their conventional hopes and ideas and have not formulated new ones to replace them. Some give the impression that they will never trust authority again, and will strongly resist any attempt to make them do so. Others are pessimistic, or even nihilistic. Sporadic suicides among college students are reported, and recently the group suicide of several nurses was reported. Some young people seem to be simply hunting for pleasure and enjoyment, and relations between the sexes is considerably freer in many areas. Others are extremely egotistic, and do not seem to care about their family, society, or even nation. Some are seeking new philosophies, ideologies, or religions, and some have become fanatics. Thus, the number of both Christians and communists seems to be increasing among college and university students. There has been a rash of new "religions," the founders of some of which apparently being paranoid cases.

Such characteristic Japanese traits as neatness, cleanliness, and politeness have been less apparent in urban areas since the air raids. People were in no position to observe these virtues, and carelessness and impoliteness have tended to become habitual concurrently with weariness and poverty. An increase in teen-age amateur prostitution -- the pan-pan girls -- is one of the striking postwar social phenomena. The pan-pan girls give a striking impression of real enthusiasm and enjoyment -- perhaps from a feeling of emancipation and release from traditional restraints surrounding the role of women in Japanese society. Many of them, of course, come from war-broken and impoverished families, but some are of middle class origin. According to the writer's examinations some of those girls are mentally subnormal and have unstable personalities.

At the present time, the economic situation has improved considerably as a result of the generosity of the Americans. Production of all kinds of goods as well as foreign trade have effected a not inconsiderable recovery. The general interest in public health and welfare, in social work, and in prevention and rehabilitation of delinquency, has risen considerably in the last two years, owing to the encouragement and guidance given by the Occupation.

It can be said that the Japanese generally have been very diligent students of democracy. They seem to have learned much, and have done their best under very difficult circumstances. New leadership has emerged, especially from the ranks of farmers and workers.

The development of the labor movement has been remarkable. After the right of labor to organize was given by the Occupation, the idea of union organization was accepted with enthusiasm. Unions appeared everywhere -- even in hospitals. Hospital unions usually took on a closed shop vertical form and included all physicians and nurses except the director, the assistant-director,

and the chief clerk. These latter were regarded as the "management" class according to the new Union ideology. Moreover, "Patients' Unions" were organized in many hospitals for the purpose of inspecting the entire hospital administration, including the distribution of their rations. These examples illustrate typical postwar insecurity, hostility, suspicion, and defensiveness. Many such "unions" remain. However, after the first enthusiastic phase, many of them disappeared or had been modified.

Superficial, verbalistic imitations of democracy and imitations of American fashions and mass-cultural elements are to be found everywhere. These phenomena are in part due to the loss of self-confidence and to the vacuum created by the disappearance of simple submissiveness to those in power. On the other hand, the old oyabun-kobun organizations remain prominent. Even a street girl cannot pursue her trade unless she gets permission from the boss of one of these guild-like group

In families, traditions like the on of parents, the giri between individuals, and the skenoi (face, or appearance before the world) seem to remain very important. Such deeply rooted ways of thinking cannot be expected to vanish overnight.

A few recent and typical individual cases may now be described briefly.

1. A girl, 25 years old, adopted by her uncle at the age of five, was reared by her foster-parents, who gave her full parental affection. At the age of seven, the adoption was explained to her. She is rather schizothymic, very "enryo-ful" to everyone, and feels a deep obligation to her parents-in-law. After graduation from a girls' secondary school, she helped her foster-mother keep house. Two years ago, when her foster-parents recommended a boy for her to marry, she agreed obediently. After repeated contacts with him she neither liked nor disliked him. But, when the engagement was cancelled recently because of the boy's illness, she felt a loss of social face. She decided to remain unmarried, and work instead, and to take care of her foster-parents for the rest of her life.

Shortly after this incident, she began to suffer from insomnia, tiredness, and congestion. Later she became extremely excited for a period of two days, shouting loudly, violently criticizing her foster-parents, and declaring that she wished to die. Afterwards, because she could remember what she had said at that time, she felt very ashamed and guilty about it. Even during repeated analytical-interviews with her, she would never criticize her foster-parents. The inhibitions due to the giri -consciousness for her parents is extremely strong. She refused to accept any ideas given by the therapist designed to give her some insight into her conflicts. Since she was persuaded to join a discussion therapy group of female patients who have had similar conflicts between giri and the wish for freedom, she has appeared much less inhibited and much more cheerful.*

2. Another woman of 50 had been disappointed in her marriage, which had been arranged by her parents. She did not love her husband, and was treated by his family like a maid. Nevertheless, she could not dream of separation or divorce, because she had been taught by her parents never to return to them after marriage. She gave up her dream of a happy life with her husband, and devoted herself to her children. She has been strongly conscious of her self-sacrifice for her children, and has demanded much of them in return. But, she has experienced severe disappointment when they grew up, because the expected kindness and obedience is not in evidence. Moreover, since her eldest son married, she has become jealous of his wife. She is depressed, and has culti-

* The writer introduced group therapy methods in his clinic after the war, on American models. It is believed that this is the only clinic in Japan utilizing this method for psycho-neurotic patients. The writer has found it very successful in the treatment of strongly inhibited psychoneurotic patients. Japanese women patients are particularly apt to fall into this category.

vated a delusion that her son and his wife were criticizing her and were planning to poison her or remove her from the home. Finally she decided to kill her son's wife and herself. Immediately after the young wife was attacked and injured, the patient was arrested by the police and transferred to the writer's clinic.

3. A third case, a young wife of 24 years of age, has suffered from insomnia, poor appetite, and depression for the past three months. She is the daughter of a principal of a girls' secondary school, a graduate of a girls' secondary school, and a Christian. She used to be sociable and cheerful, and is intelligent, attractive and of a rather "modern" type. Two years ago she was married to a young man whom her parents recommended. Her husband is 31 years old, a college graduate, and a government official. His father, a physician, died while he was still a middle school student. His mother, now 56 years old, brought up him and his two younger brothers alone. She gave special care and attention to the first son, regarding him as the successor to the family headship in the traditional manner. The other two sons were treated as inferior and subordinate to the first son, who was consequently very much spoiled and has become quite dependent on his mother.

During the war the first son served as a naval officer, while the second son was drafted into the army and killed. The first son resumed his former job after he came back. His standards for the choice of a wife required that she must serve and respect his mother. This attitude was praised by his relatives, and the patient was recommended by one of them.

For about ten months after their marriage, her husband treated her very nicely, and was willing to help her with housework, while his mother was living separately at her own home in a distant part of Japan. When the birth of a baby was expected, the mother came to their home to live with them. As soon as

the mother arrived, the attitude of the husband toward the patient changed suddenly and completely. He returned to his role of spoiled son. He refused to help his wife any more and began to treat her like a slave in front of his mother, who was, of course, pleased.

After the baby was born, the grandmother started to raise the baby her own way, and criticized the patient's modern way of rearing a child. After weaning it has become more and more apparent that the development of the baby has been disturbed physically and emotionally due to the irrational treatment of the grandmother. The patient was bitterly anxious over the whole family situation and her child and the psychoneurotic symptoms, mentioned previously, have developed.

In addition to these case reports, it may be of interest to include some brief notes on clinical types familiar to the psychiatrist.

In most cases with a pronounced schizophrenic-paranoid syndrome, patients have auditory hallucinations featuring the voices of their neighbors or friends gossiping about them and criticizing their behavior. Delusions of persecution and spying by their neighbors, friends, police, or Occupation military police are reported. During the war it was not uncommon to find psychotic cases with delusions of being spied upon by enemy agents, or of being suspected by the authorities of conducting espionage. Several cases reported symptoms traceable to hallucinatory "secret weapons," like "wireless electricity."

Before and during the war, "delusions of grandeur" featured the Emperor or Empress and other members of the nobility. Since the end of the war, prominent figures in the Occupation Forces are frequently encountered as delusional subjects.

Most depressive cases, now as before, and during the war, carry delusions of subordination, poverty, or guilt, combined with the conviction of worthlessness to family or society. Anxiety over failure to be dutiful to giri is also found. In general, it can be said that neurotic and psychotic reactions centering on the giri configuration take the form of extreme anxiety, often ending in a depressive state.

Epilogue

The physical and mental exhaustion of a majority of the Japanese since the war has not yet been entirely alleviated. Economic difficulties, spiritual confusion, political insecurity, national as well as international, do not admit of immediate solution. Overcrowding is severe, so that many repatriates and the jobless have difficulty in finding refuge even in their home districts. These conditions easily make a majority of the people emotionally insecure, tired, anxious, pessimistic, tense and irritable, whether they are aware of these reactions or not. However, in general, people are willing to work hard with at least overt good humor.

Young people in the 20-25 year age group are now playing the most aggressive roles in the "activist" radical sections of the labor unions movement in Japan. Needless to say, people of this age group are generally the most active ones everywhere in all social movements. But in addition, as mentioned before, this is the generation in Japan which was the most severely victimized by the war.

These young people, having lost the ideological and submissive-aggressive orientation given them by militarist-dominated education, have shown a variety of responses, some of which have been mentioned previously. They may react with helplessness and immaturity, seeking something to depend upon, and for authoritative guidance and direction. Often this particular group is prone to accept any authoritarian ideology like communism which presents itself as attractive and as offering solutions to daily problems. Others seem indifferent to any ideas or to any group, are concerned only about their existence, and often revert to the traditional attitudes and values. Criticism of social change is prominent in this group, though rarely audible publicly.

Often the response of the helpless and immature people to an insecure world takes the form of membership in a rebellious or power-seeking group dominated by a boss. A new generation of young gangsters and black marketeers has appeared. Finally, the resurgence of labor unionism, under strong, though often uncertain, leadership, has provided another vehicle for the hopes and the needs for dependency and security so apparent in the younger groups. There are dangers, of course, in the seizure of these democratic unions by unscrupulous bosses and political leaders.

Whether the response is aggressive and rebellious, or submissive and retreating, a basic authoritarian attitude seems to be present. Certainly those who join revolutionary ideological groups and criminal gangs are merely transferring their former loyalties to Emperor and the military to the new groups. The submissive response, on the other hand, seeks the lost authoritarianism in traditional verities. Aggressiveness and withdrawal behavior may both be expressions of basic insecurity, particularly when the people concerned have a background of repressive training. Such persons require someone to give them orders, because they cannot face responsibility. Correlatively, they need someone to blame for their unhappiness or insecurity, and will join movements which provide targets and a sense of accomplishment. The dynamics are the same; the responses differ.

Many of the intellectuals who were not strong enough either to stop or prevent the war, and who instead criticized the militarists with hopeless cynicism, at present continue weak and inactive. Generally, they show eagerness in developing democracy in Japan, criticizing both the extreme political left and right. However, their attitude seems to be defensive rather than one of trying to convince people of their point of view.

In final analysis, the majority of the Japanese are probably too busy with immediate problems of daily life to participate in ideological discussions, but they seem to show general dislike or distrust of the aggressive policies of the extreme left. They are primarily concerned about security and peace, and their fundamental attitude probably remains very conservative. Thus there is danger of a resurgence of authoritarianism. One example among many that could be cited, is the fact that some ITA's are already criticized as "BTA's" which means Boss-Teacher Associations.

This general passive tendency of the Japanese is, as mentioned previously, historically conditioned. This fact must never be forgotten in any program of social change. It is not difficult to imitate the formal aspects of democracy, and it is not difficult to amend regulations and pass new laws. But it is very difficult to change the forms of inter-personal relations, custom, and emotion in such a way as to conform to the psychological prerequisites of democracy. It may take generations for genuine democracy to appear in Japan.

There is and there will continue to be a danger that aggressive minorities might seize dominant power, and that a majority of the people without open protest, might again revert to the psychology of "being wrapped by a long thing." Social protest appears when one can think independently and critically, and realize the power of his individual opinions. The Japanese must learn that democracy is more than a word, it is a complex way of life, and while one must not expect a Japan re-made entirely in the Western democratic pattern, certain basic reforms in the latter direction are necessary and desirable. Under the guidance of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, most of the basic and preliminary steps have been taken; only the future will tell if the full stride can be made.

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