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
Publications

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Small Versus Large-Scale Agriculture

Iwao Ishino and John Donoghue *

Introduction

The promulgation of the Japanese land reform program in 1948 established several important policy decisions which, according to different viewpoints, are hindering or aiding the growth of Japanese agriculture. One of these decisions is related to the size of farm operations. In its attempt to provide the landless peasant with a more tangible stake in his future, the government, in effect, leveled the size of farm plots down to an essential minimum size. According to this law, owners of land having more than a given number of acres were required to sell their "surplus" land, preferably to tenants who were actually operating the land. This acreage restriction varied according to region, but for the most of Japan, it was limited to about three acres per farm household. Among the reasons for establishing such a restriction on farm size was the belief that the Japanese method of cultivation, derived from a long tradition, was highly efficient and labor intensive. Many Japanese were rather proud of the comparatively high yields they achieved from a small, almost garden-sized plot. Indeed, their production ranks among the highest in the world when measured in terms of rice production.

Ever since the land reform law was passed, however, numerous sectors of the Japanese population have questioned this reasoning. Some criticisms of this belief in the efficacy of small-scale farming were motivated by the self-interested, ex-landlord groups who wished to recoup land they were forced to give up. But there were many others who desired a change in the policy of small-scale farming for more objective reasons. Some, for example, argue that the present scale of operations prevents the farmer from utilizing the available labor force efficiently and hinders the rational use of farm machinery and other technological improvements. Others argue that the small productive capacity of the farmer weakens his position in the total economy, and therefore tends to demoralize him. Such a farmer, they say, is at a distinct disadvantage when it comes to obtaining agricultural credit, marketing his small harvest, and making rational marketing decisions. Still others argue that the present policy of small-scale farming exerts a drag on the national economy, especially in the light of the accelerated industrial development of the last decade, because it encourages inefficient methods of production and distribution.

In this article, we would like to consider the ramifications of this debate. To reiterate, the controversy pivots on this question: Should Japan continue its policy of small-scale farm production, or should she shift to a policy of large-scale, mechanized farming?

We believe this question is important not only because it may have long-run consequences in the social development of rural life, but also because it has bearing on the problems of economic development in Asia and elsewhere.

In the current literature on economic development, one finds a great deal of discussion on the need for land reform and what this might mean for increasing agricultural productivity in food-deficient countries. At the same time, there is the thesis which claims collectivization and nationalization of farms will yield greater productivity. Communist China, for example is moving toward the collectivization of agriculture. The reasoning is

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that collectivization permits large-scale farm operations and therefore leads to more rational utilization of scarce resources and greater productivity.

In the controversies taking place in Japan over the small-scale vs. large-scale issue, one finds a tendency for this debate to polarize toward one extreme or the other. We find that those who favor small-scale farming in Japan do so because they believe rice production and other forms of Japanese agriculture are peculiarly suited for intensive hand labor. On the other hand, those who favor increasing the scale of farm operations argue that the current policy is out-moded, even archaic, and economically untenable. The present authors believe there is a third position. It is the explication of this third position to which this article is devoted.

However, before we explain this alternative, we would first like to provide a more detailed explanation of the position held by the proponents of the large-scale agriculture.

A village agricultural expert we interviewed in December, 1959 described his conception of the future of Japanese farming as follows:

> For the average farmer, the ideal is to continue running his farm in the traditional way, not as a business enterprise. But my idea is just the opposite. Agriculture should be seen as a business and run accordingly, not as a way of life. Factories and merchants are both using corporation techniques now, and next it will be the farmers who will form corporations. But for the individual farmer, this is impossible. It will require several farm households joining together to form a single corporation. In a place like this, all farmers in the village should work, live and harvest together and get a salary for their labor. A big apartment building should be constructed and it, as well as the farm land, should belong to the corporation—for example the village agricultural association. Farmers would go to the fields in the morning and return to the apartment building in the evening. They would get a salary at the end of each month. This would enable the corporation to buy more agricultural machinery. As it is now, the average farmer cannot afford a single machine because it costs more than 300,000 Yen. The land and machines they have now would form the capital to organize the corporation. This will probably take about 50 years, but it will eventually be realized.[1]

Here is a person
Japanese method of farming should be rationalized. His recommendations for rationalization include: 1) a need to change from the philosophy of farming as a way of life to farming as a business; 2) that farmers should pool their resources—including land, labor, and capital—by establishing themselves as a formal corporation; and 3) that such an agricultural corporation would be capable of implementing economies which would result from large-scale operations and more efficient use of farm machinery.

That such ideas were not original with our informant is indicated by a story in the *Japan Times* of March 31, 1959. A family in Tottori prefecture had formed a joint stock company in 1952 to keep its land from being fractionated, and to take advantage of tax benefits which could be secured if they were defined as a corporation rather than as a farmer. The government's Tax Administration agency heard of this and carried out an investigation to see how many others were enjoying reduced tax payments as a result of such maneuvers. The investigators found 628 farmers were organized as corporations in 1958. The *Japan Times* article also quotes Professor Tohata of Tokyo University as favoring the formation of such joint stock companies. His reasons were that the small amount of land cultivated by the Japanese farmer and the associated low per-capita productivity is

> a major stumbling block to the modernization of the nation's agriculture.

A recent study by Professor Iichiro Takahashi of Kyushu University tends to affirm Professor Tohata's hypothesis if we use labor input and farm income as a measure of efficiency. Professor Takahashi sampled 144 farm families dividing them according to the size of their farm holdings: below 0.5 cho, 0.5 to 0.9 cho, 1.0 to 1.4 cho and 1.5 cho and over. (See chart). Professor Takahashi concludes that the larger the farm size, the greater the farm income per unit

Put more concretely, for every 5,000 hours of family labor, the farm income increased from 212,000 yen to 344,000 yen as the size of the farm plot increased from less than 0.5 cho to 1.5 cho or more. This increase in efficiency is explained by the better utilization of farm machinery on the large holdings. The extent to which the Japanese must be mechanized can be indicated by these statistics. According to a U.S. government report, it takes 72 man-days to produce an acre of rice in Japan as opposed to only 2 man-days per acre in the United States.

Based on such reasoning as this, Ishino[2] argued for the point of view that the Japanese government should change its present agricultural policy:

> The solution to increasing the farmer's share of national income is to reduce the number of farm households and to increase the size of farm acreage per farming unit. It is the solution toward which American farmers are moving. Some suggestions in this direction were made by our informants in

1. Unpublished field notes.

2. I. Ishino, "Ten Years After the Land Reform," in Richard K. Beardsley and Robert J. Smith (eds.), *Japanese Culture: Its Development and Change*, Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, 1962.

Farm Income

(Thous. Yen)

Input of Family Labor*

(Thous. Hours)



Farm income: Cash receipts, plus receipts in kind, plus products of the farm inventory, minus cash expenditures, minus payments in kind, minus board for hired workers, minus depreciation of fixed assets. Farm income is what is left to pay for the labor of the farmer and his family, and for the use of invested land and capital.

Family farm labor input: Total farm labor input, minus hired labor input.

* Iichiro Takahashi, "Principles of Farm Labor Input on Family Farms in the Kyushu District, Japan," *The Council on Economic and Cultural Affairs, Inc.*, n.d., p. 3.

Japan. One agricultural consultant in Iwate prefecture suggested the move toward farm corporations. Another even suggested "vertical integration." Whatever the special directions taken toward solving this problem, the principal decision involves something more than economics. It involves a question of values, and as such it has implications for Japanese politics, economy and society. It also means that the Japanese farm family system will have to socialize its children for urban types of occupation. The idea that the Japanese farm is an ideal "seedbed" for tomorrow's generation needs to be given up because such an idea is simply not true. Japanese urban families are providing a more alert and realistic approach than are farm families to problems the next generation will face as adults.

The Case for Reticulated Organizational Structure

The foregoing discussion is intended to state the case for those who believe large-scale operation is not only desirable for Japan, but also feasible. It must be noted that this movement toward large-scale operations is not directed at collectivization and nationalization, but generally toward consolidation of private holdings.

But the problem does not rest here. Those who favor large-scale production units in Japanese agriculture believe production will be improved. The fact is, however, Japanese agriculture has been transformed progressively despite the maintenance of small-scale agriculture brought about by the land reform program. Rice yields have increased steadily, and despi
about 16 percent of the land is arable, Japan produces more than 80 percent of her total food requirements. Dairying and livestock enterprises have flourished; new seed strains have readily diffused; scientific agriculture has been learned and accepted. New techniques, such as the use of vinyl covering in nursery seed beds to hasten growth rate of small seedlings, have been eagerly adopted by Japanese farmers. A wide variety of farm machinery has been absorbed in farm operations reducing some of the tedious and enervating features of farm work. Farmers have been sensitive to market conditions and their decisions to plant crops have shifted with the shifting markets in more or less rational directions. These and other features of the current business-like posture of the Japanese farmer have been described elsewhere by the present authors and others.

These remarks are not meant to substantiate either the position that small-scale farming is practiced with optimum efficiency in Japan, nor that it could not become more efficient. Rather, we repeat these facts in order to establish the hypothesis that there is something more to the issue at hand than the simple small vs. large-scale problem.

One answer to this apparent dilemma is what we call *reticulated organizational structure.* We came at this notion of reticulated structure, or organizational network in a roundabout way. Our initial hypothesis was somewhat as follows:

Based on readings in general economics, we came upon the hypothesis that larger scale enterprises are generally more efficient than comparable small-scale enterprises. This is sometimes referred to as "economy of scale." That is, because large enterprises have access to greater resources, both capital and human resources, they tend to be more rational in the utilization and allocation of scarce commodities. The generalizing of this principle to the case of farm operations in Japan led Ishino to advocate a policy of increasing the average size of holding for the Japanese farmer. Farm operators in the United States are generally more efficient and more scientific in their management practices than are their brethren operating smaller farms.

However, faced with the fact that Japanese farmers increased their efficiency and productivity *without* increasing the scale of their operations, we questioned the hypothesis that larger-scale operations are more rational.

Accordingly, we searched for an explanation for this improved efficiency which came about without an increase in the scale of operations.

We concluded that there were at least two dimensions to this "economy of scale" notion. One, the scale of the basic factor of production—in the case of farming-land; the other, the size of managerial groups—the social structure. Our understanding of the increasing efficiency was that, although the Japanese farmers maintained ownership of small parcels of land, they at the same time formed social and communication linkages which no longer left them "small-scale" farmers. Each Japanese farm household was inextricably linked into a vast information-disseminating network. This, in effect, made it one with hundreds of other farm households in obtaining consensus and in making decisions concerning farm technology, farm management, and marketing.

Thus, when an agricultural experiment station discovered a new seed strain or found a new technique to increase crop yields, this information was easily diffused through the *reticulated* organization. The agricultural extension agents understood this organization and readily "plugged into" this network. In Japan, this reticulation facilitates the rapid flow of technical information to the common farmer much more so than in underdeveloped rural communities where each farm household is not linked to such an inter-organizational structure. In Japan, diffusion of new ideas generally takes place in a year or two. In the United States, by contrast, diffusion may take many years. For example, the diffusion of alfalfa took eleven years in Michigan alone.

How this reticulated organization was established in Japan seems a worthwhile topic for a paper because one of the aims of technical assistance missions to developing nations should be to establish, if possible, such reticulated organizations suited to local conditions. To explain the development of reticulated organizations in Japan would require a reconstruction of the history of agricultural practices since the Meiji period (1868). In this paper, we can only suggest a few of the important historical events which aided establishment of this organizational network. Among recent events, the most significant was the establishment in 1948-49 of national, prefectural, and local land commissions responsible for carrying out the provisions of the land reform law. These tri-level commissions networked into an active communication system with more than two million farmers benefiting directly from land transfers. In addition, there were 36,000 paid officials from the national and prefectural government, 115,000 paid members of the local land commissions, and more than 225,000 volunteers who aided the program in a wide variety of ways. Behind these statistics lies a reticulated system of close interpersonal relationships and friendships hammered together during the crisis period in which a very difficult governmental program was successfully promulgated.
uated form, this particular network continues to function.

Extending over the same period of time was another kind of reticulated organization, the vast agricultural extension system and its associated home demonstration teams. Beyond these were the networks of cooperatives of all kinds, women's associations, youth groups, hobby groups, formal local government units, PTA, various religious organizations, and other such groups which maintained both formal and informal liaison among one another. Most of these groups have developed within the past forty years. The formation and viability of these many associations were facilitated by the development of communications devices, all the way from special bulletins produced by each organization to radio, telephone, TV, popular magazines, and intra-village intercom systems.

Thus, we conclude that while the Japanese farmer did not increase the scale of land holdings in order to become more proficient, he was incorporated into a vast interpersonal and interorganizational communications network. He became part of a huge corporate enterprise devoted to the advancement of farming. In sum, while farm operations were limited to three-acre plots, farmers were organizationally joined into an effective large-scale communication system that transcended neighborhood, village, and even prefectural loyalties. It is our belief that if economic development in the rural areas of India, Viet Nam, Ceylon, and elsewhere is to take place, conscious attention to the establishment of a comparable reticulated organizational structure will pay high dividends.

Motivational Factors in a Japanese Labor Supply Organization

Iwao Ishino

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Motivational Factors in a Japanese Labor Supply Organization

*Iwao Ishino**

In late 1949, while working as a member of the Japan Occupation's sociological research unit, the writer was assigned the task of investigating the motivational factors that blocked the Occupation's attempts to eliminate the so-called "labor boss system." The Occupation's Labor Division, insistent upon a more rational and more democratic labor program for Japan, claimed that between two and three million workers were controlled by an anachronistic "boss" system. These officials charged that the labor boss required "kickbacks" of from 10 to 50 percent of the workers' wages; that he prohibited them from changing their jobs at will; and that he blocked any attempt by workers to exercise their rights. The problem of the Division, then, was how to free this sizable bloc of Japan's labor force from the yokes of the bosses.

Beginning in 1946, the officials supported legislative measures designed to eradicate the system, but their early attempts did not seem to yield the desired results. They wanted to know if the Research Division could investigate the factors motivating the workers to cling to their traditional ways of labor recruitment and organization. While the subsequent events indicated that efforts at reform were not totally in vain, it took considerable research to reach an understanding as to why the workers in the early part of the program did not take advantage of a less feudalistic labor recruitment plan. To illustrate some of the complex factors that condition the motivation of workers in clinging to their traditional system of labor recruitment, a case in point is given below.[1]

The Matsui Labor Supply Business

In the summer of 1946, the heydey of the labor boss system in Kanagawa, one man by the name of Kaemon Matsui directed a prefecture-wide labor supply organization that was one of the first to dramatize, for the Occupation Forces, the need for reform of the labor recruitment practices. Matsui's organization was known as the Romu Kyodo Kai, which in this discussion, will be abbreviated as the RKK. This organization controlled about 124,000 common laborers and many types of skilled workers, including nearly one-fourth of all laborers supplied to the Occupation Forces. The manifest purpose of the RKK was to furnish employers with laborers such as stevedores, dock maintenance men, warehouse workers, ditch diggers, carpenters, and even cooks. As a rule Matsui's organization concerned itself with the supply of seasonal or casual workers, the permanent types of employment being handled directly between the employers and the job-seekers. The organization's profits came principally from fees charged the employers and from what it could withhold from the wages of the workers that were supplied. In order for his organization to prosper, then, Matsui had to satisfy two basic requirements. One was the need to have a constant flow of specific information about employers seeking large groups of laborers, and the other was to be in a position to supply on demand the workers having the requisite skills.

The problem of gaining access to information about employers was aided by a special relationship the RKK had with the Kanagawa Employment Exchange Office, a governmental agency. It was the practice of private companies and governmental agencies to seek workers through this employment exchange. The Exchange, however, did not serve an individual laborer. Instead, the employers were furnished laborers by means of this special relationship established between the Exchange and the RKK. Thus the latter's problem of procuring business was taken care of by the Exchange.

The other basic requirement—that of being in a position to obtain laborers—involved two subsidiary problems: 1) how to get in touch with such workers, since there was no effective public employment office which might render this service, and 2) how to maintain internal control, since the workers in the labor pool were not employees of the RKK and were nominally free to work or not as they wished. The usual sanction of firing a recalcitrant worker in such a case was obviously not operative here. To understand how this organization met these problems, we need to look into the organization of the RKK.

The Formal Structure. Kaemon Matsui's labor supply empire had its central office conveniently located in front of the prefectural government's office building. As far as buildings go, these headquarters were extremely modest, but from here a line of communications extended down through three

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1. For many basic facts on this case, the author is indebted to Richard Deverall, Edgard C. McVoy, Dudley D. Davis, and Sterling D. Collette, all formerly of SCAP's Labor Division. Deverall's 1946 field reports to the Chief of the Labor Division were most helpful to the present case description.

levels of organization eventually to each of some 124,000 workers. On the second level of organization, 26 district associations were strategically located in various wards of large cities and in several towns of the prefecture. These associations had offices, usually no more than crudely constructed shacks, which employed a dozen clerical workers and one or two "office managers." These offices were essentially coordinating units for the several quasi-independent labor supply companies or *kumi* of the district. The *kumi*—varying in number from 5 to about 25 in each district—constituted the important cog in the RKK machinery. Its leaders made decisions on such questions as the division of labor procurement orders and the allocation of commissions and other income of the association. In brief, they were the "executive council" of the district association. Within a given *kumi,* at least one more status distinction was found. Since it typically had more than 300 casual workers of various qualifications registered with it, the *kumi* had to be divided into smaller administrative units which we designate here as "work teams," each composed of about 10-20 workers, and headed by a foreman or "straw boss." It was the responsibility of the straw boss to know his men: where they lived, how they could be contacted, and what skills they had.

This cursory description of the major elements in the formal structure of the RKK omits the informal relations and other interesting details, but it is a sufficient basis to begin discussion on how this labor supply business was supposed to have worked.

First of all, as already noted, the daily or weekly work orders were sent from the employment exchange office to the nearest district association of the RKK and from there to the local labor supply companies. Each company which received a labor requisition assigned to its foremen the number and qualifications of laborers they were to recruit and supervise. If the work order was routine and specified no experienced workers, the foreman picked his crew from a crowd of laborers waiting in one of several places, usually in front of the district offices of the RKK or at other favorite spots like outside the larger tramway stations. Here, a kind of "shape-up" system operated. There was no system of allocating jobs to workers on an equitable basis; neither did the "first come, first served" principle operate here. The straw boss gave preferential treatment to the men he knew best. However, if special kinds of workers were required, runners were sent ahead of time to laborers' homes requesting them to report to work at the specified time.

The system of wage payments was also rather simple. Slips of paper or chits were given to each worker and these chits could be exchanged at the end of the day for wages, or at the end of the pay period, depending upon the practice of the particular *kumi.* The flow of wages from the employer down to the individual laborer differed only slightly, according to whether the employer was a private company or a government agency. In the case of private companies, the foremen or the *kumi* was paid in lump sum the wages of all workers furnished. The *kumi,* then, after pocketing its "commission," and paying its fees to the RKK treasury (about one or two percent of the gross wages) distributed the remainder to the laborers. The "commission" probably amounted to about 15 percent or more of the gross wages paid to the workers supplied by the *kumi.* Where the client was the Occupation Forces, the system of payment was slightly more complex, but the *kumi* was paid, in addition to the wages of the workers, a flat 15 percent commission and an additional nine percent purportedly for covering the income tax it was to have paid the national government.

Aside from the obvious administrative duties connected with this type of operation, the officers of the RKK, i.e., those of *kumi* chief and above, devoted much time to promoting good relations with the prefectural labor officials and with outside agencies which hired the laborers RKK procured. Potentially, then, this formal structure of the RKK was a bureaucratic organization. Given certain conditions, it can be readily seen that the laborers, the straw bosses, and the rest of the organization could have developed into an impersonal machinery based upon economic self-interestedness and rational standards of organizational efficiency.

Informal Aspects. The foregoing discussion deliberately omitted a critical dimension of the RKK organization. This had to do with the *oyabun-kobun* system, or a fictitious kinship system, which was interwoven into the organizational structure. This system has to do with an aspect which the RKK workers shared in common with a million or more other casual laborers throughout the nation and with other labor groups, including many fishery workers, street-stall merchants, organized gamblers, and even *sumo* wrestlers. The strength of this institutional system was quite evident in the wartime period when tens of thousands of "labor bosses" or *oyabun* became quasi-government officials and served as "patriotic" mobilizers of casual and seasonal workers. The following generalized description of the *oyabun-kobun* system is necessary to the understanding of the discipline and solidarity of Matsui's RKK organization. It should also help to convey some of the non-rational aspects and the so-called human side of the potentially impersonal and bureaucratized structure of the RKK.

The *oyabun-kobun* system is basically a pattern of group relations which is modelled after the Japanese family. The chief of a group is known as *oyabun* or *oyakata,* which, roughly translated, means "a person who takes the role of a parent." By the same token, the follower is designated as a *kobun,* or "one who assumes the role of a child." But this title is not merely a linguistic convention. The Japanese terms are reinforced with many practical considerations.

One old codger and a retired labor boss, told us how he was chosen by a *kumi* chief some forty years previously when he was jobless and had no relatives to turn to for help. This benefactor treated him to a meal, put him up in a boarding house, and told him where to report to work. Soon this man was formally and ceremonially initiated into the *kumi.* As he learned the argot and as he gained experience in the various kinds of dockwork around Yokohama, he was promoted to a "straw boss" position, designated as *anikibun* (or elder brother) status. Eventually he earned the right to establish a *kumi* of his own. He claimed that when he achieved this status, he tried to show the same kindness to other apprentices as his former chief did to him.

This case is not unusual, for many have professed similar experiences. Moreover, other labor bosses made explicit a number of mutual obligations existing between a ritual par-

ent and son. The *kumi* chief's obligation of course was to see that his followers had employment, but in addition they were given "pocket money" in times of unemployment and on special holidays. They were expected to care for their ritual sons when they were sick, to help defray hospital expenses, and to make funeral arrangements in the case of death. The chief even intervened in arranging marriages for his ritual sons. Conversely, the ritual son had diffuse obligations to fulfill, including menial tasks like running errands. In some groups the obligations were so great as to require these sons to engage in such nefarious activities as knifing "unfair" competitors in the labor supply business. One or two such cases were reported in the summer of 1946.

It was this kind of symbolic relationship, augmented by a pseudo-*samurai* code of behavior and a system of obligations that Ruth Benedict discussed,[2] that made for the inner solidarity of the *kumi*. Since, as we have noted, the number of laborers controlled by a *kumi* was as large as 300, not everyone affiliated with a *kumi* was a member of this fictitious family (or *oyabun-kobun*) unit. In general these para-kinship ties existed only between the *kumi* chief and his subordinate staff of foremen and not the ordinary casual laborer. Among the foremen themselves, the relationship was that of a *kyodaibun,* or ritual brotherhood. Status distinctions among these ritual sons of the chief were usually made according to length of service in the *kumi* and designated by terms corresponding to younger-older brother statuses in the true family system. However, the principle of primogeniture of the true family system was absent and the ritual son who showed the most promise succeeded to the *kumi*-headship. Thus, unlike the true kinship structure, the succession system was not ascriptive or "hereditary," but based upon achievement.

And speaking of succession, we should understand that the retirement of the chief meant not only a shuffling of the power structure and human relations in the organization, but also an allocation of business "rights" called *nawabari*. These rights, established by general agreement or by force, gave each labor supplier a priority in supplying his own workers at least to specified employers, if not to all employers of casual laborers in a given district or ward. The retiring head could assign his rights intact to a single successor, divide it among several "heirs" or allow them to fall into the competitor's hand by default. When these assignations were made to his *kobun,* such acts were symbolized by having the successor assume the head's para-kinship name. For instance, if the "boss" used the surname, Sakai, for business purposes, the heir may be designated as "Sakai, II," symbolizing the latter's line of descent and *nawabari* rights in the business.

As for the non-succeeding *kobun,* however, they had a choice of either continuing as followers of the new chief or quitting the group. In the latter case, such persons might attempt to establish their own labor supply business with the loyalties and followings they could muster from their former associates. Such jockeyings for position gave rise to quarrels and some would be forced to leave the labor supply business altogether, perhaps to join some gangster outfit.

2. Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword,* Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1946.

It should be obvious that a change in command and the reshuffling of the membership of a group would be of some interest to other labor supply companies as well as to the general community of casual laborers. Indeed, to solemnize and make public these changes in command, a special ceremony was usually held in which the ritual of *sake*-drinking and gift giving were the central features. Where a large company was involved, representatives of many *kumi,* even from distant prefectures, were invited to witness the ceremony and to participate in the drinking party that followed. Other functions of such a get-together, of course, included the exchange of gossip and news among the *oyabun-kobun* society.

This process of reshuffling the members of the company and the reallocation of proprietary rights should help us to understand the many personal ties existing between nominally independent labor supply companies. The significance of these previous associations and personal ties was particularly evident in 1946, when several construction firms from Tokyo had contracted for the building of some 500 large housing units in Yokohama for the Occupation Forces' personnel. What puzzled some Occupation officials was that the carpenters, plumbers, roofers, and similar workers were being recruited from such distant places as Nagano, Yamanashi, and Toyama prefectures. In other words, the RKK labor supply companies had personal and particularistic ties with *kumi* people in those districts.

As for the *oyabun-kobun* relations at the higher levels of the RKK, the data are much more scanty. However, there is evidence to suggest that the *kumi* chiefs in any given district association entered into a *kyodaibun* or brotherhood compact and they symbolized this by the usual ritual exchange of *sake*-drinks and gifts. At the very top level, we may presume that Kaemon Matsui's followers who were placed in the various district offices were also his *kobun* or ritual sons. Furthermore, with respect to some of the *kumi* chiefs, Matsui, no doubt, had established pseudo grandfather-grandchild (*o-oyabun-magobun*) relations. This implied something more than mere business association.

To summarize, the *oyabun-kobun* system contributed to the total RKK organization by making the human relations in this situation more personal and particularistic than it would have been otherwise. It linked the members of the organization closely together, particularly the individuals within the *kumi* groups, by promoting a set of familial obligations which defined a meaningful existence. At the same time the system sacrificed certain values of "fair play" and often led to personal abuses, nepotism and favoritism.

The Implications of the Study

We may now return to the general problem with which this paper began: the motivational factors that prevented the workers in the labor boss system from shifting to a more democratic and less traditional method of labor recruitment. The foregoing description of the RKK organization will be used to illustrate some of the general features of the incentive system considered here. But first a broader perspective on the problems of incentives needs to be considered.

While there seems to be consensus among most behavioral scientists that motivational factors in concrete human situa-

tions are *relative* to the prevailing cultural and social conditions, administrators and practical men in human affairs often assume a more uniform and monistic conception of motives, particularly economic. For instance, industrial sociologists find that American management personnel often assume a relatively simple, almost universal, structure of human motivations. Such people believe that their conception of "human nature" applies universally and therefore that the Japanese dockworker, the Mexican farm hand, and the American engineer are driven by the same basic incentives as high wages, profit motive, and self-interestedness. But, as the yet incomplete cross-cultural datum suggests, such incentives are not universal.[3] They seem to be a function of the specific institutional and cultural systems in which they are found. Where high wages and the profit motive seem to be an adequate incentive, such as in the "rationalized" sectors of American economy, specific institutional devices support such an incentive system. Where these supports are lacking, other types of concrete motives are found to be operative.

Typically in peasant and folk societies non-economic incentives are as important as purely economic motives. Moreover, as Malinowski and other anthropologists have shown, in primitive societies economic relations cannot be simply and arbitrarily divorced from the total network of social relations in which these economic relations take place. Only when we approach the highly industrialized society with its ideology of capitalism, monetary exchange system and universalistic, functionally specific role definitions, do we find a more "rationalized" monetary system of incentives prevailing. But even here, as the case of Japan illustrates, not all sectors of the labor force operate under such an incentive system.

In the opinion of this writer, Occupation officials generally failed to appreciate the complexity of the motivations of boss-controlled workers and by the same token tended to overemphasize the role of wages.[4] These officials did not seem to take into account the fact that the institutionalization of industrial development was not uniform thoughout the economy and that some segments of the labor force still had one foot in the tradition-bound folk society. Some Occupation administrators took cognizance of this fact in academic discussions, but when faced with the practical problem of trying to pull the workers away from the domination of the "bosses," they seemed to focus their attention on such "rational" appeals as "higher take home pay," "no more kickbacks to the bosses," and "greater freedom to move from job to job."

The idea that motives are relative to the institutional setting is important to an understanding of the workers in the labor boss system like the RKK. Let us, therefore, consider some relevant aspects of the social and cultural background that affect these workers.

In sharp contrast to what is found in the United States the Japanese government, both at the local and national levels, has traditionally played a minor part in the development of general welfare and social security programs. Until the time of the Occupation-sponsored national welfare programs, much of the unemployment, disability and old age problems were assumed by the members of the extended family, by individual employers sensitive to such obligations, and, to a more limited degree, by the Japanese labor unions. But of course the welfare measures of the industrial enterprises and trade unions applied only to permanent or "inner group" members of the respective organizations.

A number of writers have noted the primary group orientations and general paternalism of Japanese industrial management so we need not go into detail here. But in a recent article, Levine suggests the importance of this paternalism—or patriarchalism, as he calls it—for the development of employee morale and motivation. Levine notes that Japanese management:

> ". . . established a wide variety of welfare programs and especially structured management to carry them out. Thus one administrative approach was to maintain close personal contact with employees on a face-to-face, day-by-day basis. Another was to increase communication channels through the use of loyal staff assistants and routinize welfare activities by assigning specific responsibilities to these assistants. In some instances, it was desirable for the workers to form their own organizations . . . primarily to facilitate communication. If there were elements of protest in these organizations, they were directed not at the patriarchal system *per se,* but at management failures to serve all the welfare needs for which the employer was held responsible."[5]

It should be obvious that such kinds of management-labor relations would be feasible only so long as business and industrial organizations are essentially small-scale enterprises.[6] But as some of these organizations grew with the industrial development, it became increasingly difficult to maintain face-to-face relationships and patriarchal organization. Other than to reject the traditional ideology altogether, one of the common techniques worked out by the management of a growing enterprise was to limit further growth in the internal structure by several alternative methods of sub-contracting. One example found among manufacturing enterprises was the Japanese putting-out system which utilized home craftsmanship both in the city and in the country. In other kinds of enterprises where laborers were the basic ingredients in the expanison program, such as in building and construction works, the bulk of a company's labor requirements was placed in the hands of labor contractors. Such contractors developed the pattern of organization that we referred to previously as the labor boss system. The

3. Wilbert E. Moore, *Industrialization and Labor,* Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1951.

4. *Cf.* the case study of labor procurement in Hiroshima as described by John D. Montgomery in "Administration of Occupied Japan: First Year," *Human Organization,* Vol. VIII, No. 3, pp. 11-13.

5. Solomon B. Levine, "Management and Industrial Relations in Postwar Japan." *The Far Eastern Quarterly,* Vol. XV, No. 1, November 1955, p. 63.

6. Pelzel notes: "As late as 1937, when the country had already been converted to heavy industry, 90 percent of all industrial establishments employed 100 workers or fewer and 70 percent of all industrial laborers were at work in these plants." See John C. Pelzel, "Some Social Factors Bearing Upon Japanese Population," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. XV, No. 1, Feb. 1950, p. 21.

labor bosses not only functioned as recruiters but assumed responsibility to train and supervise their workers and to provide a modicum of welfare measures such as those described in the RKK case.[7] Thus, from the employer's standpoint, it was no longer necessary to maintain for these workers the expensive welfare program and other traditional perquisites established for the "inner core" of the company's membership; neither was it necessary to support a special staff organization to facilitate face-to-face communications. The management worked through the labor bosses on a contractual basis.

Thus, the handling of welfare problems by kin groups and employers and the particular growth pattern of Japanese industrial enterprises are two of the basic institutional factors against which the motivation of such laborers as those found in the RKK organization must be evaluated. More specifically, such factors explain why money income *per se* was only one concrete motive among many. Although for many sections of the Japanese labor force good wages served as important incentives and as symbols of prestige, they did not function in this manner for the millions of common and semi-skilled laborers. The income of those outside the family of a well-established trade union or of a company was uniformly low as judged by the standards of almost any industrial nation because institutionalized means for attaining high wages and social security were indeed rare. Among the few available, the labor boss type of organization was the principal recognized means for attaining at least a token measure of employment security, group recognition, social solidarity and even occupational mobility within the system. It is this rigidity—or lack of alternative means to satisfy such needs in the institutional structure of Japan as a whole—that needs to be taken into account for an understanding of the motives of boss-controlled workers.[8]

With this rough sketch of the motivational structure before us, we can now examine briefly the results obtained by the reform program. Was the attempt to eliminate the boss system successful?

Evaluation of the Reform Program

Completely reliable statistics on the number of workers freed from boss-domination were difficult to obtain because the system was outlawed. But the Japanese Government, basing its statistics on the labor inspectors' field reports, stated that approximately 42,000 labor bosses terminated their operations by July 1950 and, as a consequence, 1,113,000 laborers disassociated themselves from the boss system.[9] The best informed sources in the Labor Division did not independently collect a comparable set of statistics, but they acknowledged that "notable progress" had been made in manufacturing industries as well as in service industries, the various trades, and stevedore companies. These industries, incidentally, held the bulk of boss controlled workers in 1946-47 before the laws prohibiting the system were promulgated.

The information given above is not entirely satisfactory, but no one can deny that some noteworthy developments took place in the labor boss institution. What, then, accounts for these changes?

It is the writer's opinion that the Occupation's attempt to eradicate the labor boss system was successful to the extent it was, not because it understood the incentives which kept the laborers attached to their bosses, but primarily because the Occupation achieved greater flexibility in the Japanese institutional structure through the successful promulgation of many of its general reform programs. It was able to initiate certain institutional changes which directly or indirectly affected the motivational system of boss-controlled workers. Aside from the punitive measures that "purged" leaders in the labor boss movement and outlawed the practice of labor supply business of this type,[10] the Occupation sponsored measures that established public employment centers in all major cities and towns, instituted a national unemployment insurance program, extended the facilities and services of public welfare agencies, and developed a farsighted social security system.

Though perhaps more indirect than other measures just cited, the influence of the institutional changes attempted outside the field of labor supply business must be acknowledged. Some of these new developments or at least new orientations might be mentioned: The closed system of many industrial enterprises was being gradually opened up and the employer's traditional notions about patriarchal obligations to his employees were changing. The trade union movement was being strengthened numerically and politically and it was demanding that social benefits be provided more uniformly and systematically throughout the labor force. Educational reforms were fostering not only a more liberal ideology, but bode well for the opening up of new channels of

7. It is interesting to note that American foremen and craftsmen in the building trades act as hiring bosses for large contractors not unlike those of the Japanese boss system, as has been suggested to me by Dr. Leonard Sayles. Richard R. Myers ("Inter-personal Relations in the Building Industry," *Applied Anthropology,* Vol. 5, No. 2, 1946, pp. 1-7) notes: "The technologcial and organizational requirements of building produce highly individualized employment patterns. As a result, interpersonal relations in the industry are for the most part informal and unstandardized. . . . The opportunity for personal choice, particularly on the part of the foreman, in terms of the factors of religion, race, ethnic identification and the more subtle but nevertheless highly significant criteria of 'sociability,' 'good judgment,' and 'initiative,' creates primary group situations which possess considerable internal stability" (p. 7). One important trait which seems to distinguish this case from the Japanese case is that in the latter the primary group relations are typically patterned on the *oyabun-kobun* or family system. Hence, to this extent, the primary groups in Japan are standardized and formalized. For an elaboration of this point, see the author's "The *Oyabun-Kobun:* A Japanese Ritual Kinship Institution," *American Anthropologist,* Vol. 55, No. 5, 1953, pp. 695-707.

8. The general institutional rigidity of Japan has been outlined by a number of writers, but some of the contributing factors are the limited mineral resources, land shortage, rapid population growth, and late entry into the field of colonial expansion.

9. Personal communication from Mr. Dudley Davis in 1951 when he was a member of the Manpower Branch, Labor Division, GHQ, SCAP.

10. The ineffectiveness of these punitive measures was suggested early in the program by the skill or trickery of the labor bosses and their "employers" in circumventing the intent of the law. For example, "labor bosses" carried on their supply business by becoming nominal employees of the companies that utilized their laborers.

social mobility and broadening the base of older ones.[11]

While few of these measures were intentionally directed at the elimination of the boss system *per se,* they nevertheless had their effect in the replacing of some of the basic functions provided the workers by that system.[12] In other words, the Occupation-sponsored social legislation and its outcome changed a boss-controlled worker's scale of values and motivations by providing alternative means by which he might satisfy his occupational and personal needs.

This interpretation of the workers' incentive system is essentially the same as that given in the SCAP research unit's report to the Labor Division. That this analysis was accepted by the Labor Division is suggested by this paragraph from a late 1950 progress report on the reform program:[13]

> "Although many bosses remain in business, their power of exploitation and control is being slowly whittled down, as much by general circumstances as by prohibitory legislation and enforcement measures aimed specifically against them. The sentiment of loyalty of workers to their boss is declining. In some instances workers in the boss-dominated fields have organized unions. Even a few of the boss-controlled workers have unions not all controlled by the bosses. An increasing number of workers and employers are finding that they can dispense with bosses and depend on a free referral service offered by the Public Employment Exchange. Unemployment insurance has been extended to casual workers, offering them as a public right some of the protection which they formerly obtained only from bosses. Newspaper and radio articles against bosses are helping arouse a new sense of resistance among some workers against boss exploitation."

Cursory as this examination of the reform program during the Occupation period is, it seems sufficient to suggest that the more flexible[14] the general institutional structure is with regard to the attainment of employment opportunities, social security, and social mobility, the more likely the incentive system of workers will focus on wages and the "profit motive." Conversely, given a more rigid institutional structure, the more likely the labor force will consider factors other than wages *per se* as incentive to work.

Summary

In the foregoing presentation of a case study of Japanese labor organization and the interpretations that followed, the attempt was made to illustrate the relativity of worker motivation to the institutional and cultural setting in which the workers are involved. The analysis suggested that the motivations of boss-controlled workers reflected the perceived and/or actual modifications established in the Japanese institutional structure. These changes in motivations were not demonstrated by reciting a representative sample of opinions, but were suggested by alluding to the decline of boss-controlled laborers in the latter part of the Occupation period. Finally, it was hypothesized that a more flexible institutional structure with multiple channels for social security and social mobility would provide the kind of cultural setting necessary for the creation of an incentive system that approximates "rationality" and approaches the classical "wage theory" of motivations.

11. Some observers have felt that such SCAP-sponsored reforms did not penetrate deeply into the roots of the society, while at the same time others were fearful that the Japanese were changing too much and too fast. It is too soon to evaluate the net effect of these broad reforms. In any case, the fact that such institutional changes were attempted with considerable vigor suggests that workers in a labor boss system could not help but compare their own plight against the cultural background of a former period with that of the contemporary one. The latter offered more promise.

12. Merton's statement is apropos here ". . . any attempt to eliminate an existing social structure without providing adequate alternative structures for fulfilling the functions previously fulfilled by the abolished organization is doomed to failure." Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure,* Glencoe Free Press, 1949, p. 79.

13. GHQ, SCAP, ESS, Labor Division memorandum from D. D. Davis to E. C. McVoy, dated 22 August 1950, p. 5.

14. The term "flexible" is interpreted to mean that there are several alternative channels by which an individual may achieve certain ends as occupational satisfaction, personal advancement, social recognition, and economic security.

SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN RURAL JAPAN: CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES*

IWAO ISHINO

IN WRITING this paper, I found most difficult the matter of establishing the proper frame of reference for evaluating the change that has taken place in the Japanese farming communities. Writing in 1959, Thomas C. Smith (1959, p. lx) states that there has been very little change in Japanese agriculture:

> In the course of its long history, Japanese agriculture has in some respects changed remarkably little. Farming is scarcely less a family enterprise now than it was a thousand years ago; holdings are still tiny and fragmented, tools simple, and rice the main crop. Although a Heian peasant would no doubt be perplexed by many things about contemporary farming . . . the main operations of planting, tilling, and harvesting he would understand.

Somewhat the same general point has been made by a geographer, Peter Gosling, who is a specialist on rice cultivation in Southeast Asia. He maintains that contemporary Japanese agriculture is basically no different from that found in China two thousand years ago. The machines, chemical fertilizers, and metal tools used today are mere extensions of the farming principles established centuries ago and involve no departure from the fundamental pattern of rice cultivation found throughout Southeast Asia.

On the other hand, most sociologists and anthropologists doing research in contemporary rural Japan have emphasized the progress and change that have taken place, especially in the postwar years. Changes in tenancy patterns, in mechanization, in farm technology, in family relationships, in neighborhood co-operative efforts, and in living standards are only a few of the aspects of the contemporary rural scene that have been researched and duly described.

Obviously, then, the writers who claim that little or no basic change has taken place and those who claim that much change has taken place hold different frames of reference for evaluating change. One way to resolve this is to obtain agreement on the appropriate base line from which to measure change. I wish to return to this discussion of selecting the base line for change after a brief summary of the investigation that John Donoghue and I conducted in 1958 and 1959.

* The author gratefully acknowledges the critical reading given his paper and the improvements made in it by Robert J. Smith. He also wishes to acknowledge the partial support provided by a grant from the Office of International Programs, Michigan State University.

When we began this field investigation, we were not concerned with the question of establishing a proper base line for studying change. We assumed a more or less common-sense basis. There was available the rather detailed body of data collected by the members of the Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division ten years earlier during the Occupation of Japan. Our aim was to revisit the same villages and to cover the same general topics investigated by them. The general objective of the original survey was to measure the human consequences of the land-reform program that was in the process of being completed. While Donoghue and I did not conduct an attitude survey, as was done in the first study, we interviewed many of the same village leaders who participated in the first survey. We also discussed our findings with some of the Japanese ethnologists who participated in the first research operation.

We had to schedule our visits to the villages as they conformed to the vacation periods in the academic year. This meant that we could not spend any extensive period in the field—our visits to each of the original twelve communities varied from two days to four days. But most of the ethnographic details that we required had been obtained by the first survey. Our task was made easier in that we concentrated on the change features.

To get some depth in our research materials, we selected three communities for more intensive study. Fifteen students in cultural anthropology at the University of Tokyo assisted in this phase. They were divided into three teams and spent two weeks during the spring vacation in three different communities selected for more intensive investigation. I took a team to Yoshida-mura, a mountain community in Shimane Prefecture, Professor Seiichi Izumi led a team to Nikaido-mura in Nara prefecture, and Donoghue a team to Aioi-mura in Kagawa Prefecture on the island of Shikoku. Following these more intensive investigations, the combined teams held a week-long seminar, where notes were compared.

To fill gaps in our data, letters were written to co-operating people in the various villages, and five of the villages were revisited for supplementary data. The thirteenth community, Ebetsu in Hokkaido, was covered later by Donoghue.

Unknown to us until we were well into the research was a series of studies conducted in 1954 by David E. Lindstrom, a rural sociologist at the International Christian University's Rural Welfare Research Institute. He and his colleagues there had surveyed five of the communities in our sample. These were Ebetsu, Yokogoshi, Karako, Obie, and Honami. Because his data relied heavily on opinion questionnaires, they supplemented our material rather well. While we had to rely on the statements of a more limited sample of informants for attitudinal material on change, he provided a more gross public-opinion type of data.

Our findings were not as neat and as consistent as we hoped they would be. The various measures of change that we established for this study did not move in the same direction or to the same extent for the ten-year period covered by the survey period. Some communities increased in a given index, while other villages remained the same or even decreased in this same index. Thus, to take a simple example, we found in one village that the number of dairy cows in-

creased from 2 in 1948 to 130 in 1959, while in another it decreased from 3 to 2 in the same period. Similarly, with respect to the number of power cultivators, much variation from village to village was found. The village of Aioi had a most spectacular increase from 43 units to 322; while Obie, a few miles across the Inland Sea from Aioi, showed a modest rate of increase, from 278 to 358 units. A third village, Yokogoshi, which started with 18 units in 1948, did not show any gain during the decade.

These differential rates of change present a special problem for the researcher who includes a dozen or more representative communities in his sample. In the case of a researcher who puts all his research eggs into one village basket, any change he finds in his village can be interpreted as a modification of the previous stage of development. But when a researcher adds more villages to his sample, the interpretation of changes and trends becomes more complex, because the particular circumstances of each village intervene to make a given change index very different from those of other villages.

Nevertheless, I think the data indicate that some very significant and widespread changes are taking place in our sample of Japanese villages. While the details differ somewhat from village to village, at the highest level of generalization we found a consistent trend toward change and this was the trend toward reducing the uncertainties and insecurities related to the occupation of farming.

In every village we asked the standard questions of what were the primary problems concerned with farming in their village and what solutions had been attempted in the last ten years. The answers we received touched most frequently on problems of land, water, crop yields, climate, markets, and transportation. On the problem of land, there was nearly unanimous agreement that the land reform has done much to encourage the proper care and use of land, especially for those who were former tenants. More than ever before, the pride of ownership that has resulted from the land reform has encouraged a more rational approach to land usage. At the same time, every village emphasized the shortage of land and those which had many repatriates from Manchuria and other former overseas areas were especially concerned with the shortage of land. On the other hand, some progress had been made toward a more efficient utilization of the available land. Where possible, land was being reclaimed, and experiments were being tried with new crops, such as tobacco and tomato, in regions where they had never been grown before. Though the new Japanese Constitution nullified the primogeniture system, the pressure on the land was too great to make practical the further fractionization of the land implied in the new law.

After land, water was designated as the most important problem facing the villagers in the past decade. Here again, thanks to government subsidies, considerable progress has been made in a majority of the villages. Dams were constructed and irrigation canals straightened in areas where water was needed, and tile drainage pipes were laid in areas where too much water was the problem. Such man-made controls over the water supply not only made possible some of the reclamation projects just alluded to but also ended long-standing feuds be-

tween hamlets over water rights. Also, as the result of the so-called amalgamation program, in which several independent villages were annexed into a single administration unit, a more equitable distribution of water supply was possible. Where formerly several villages fought with one another for the water from the same river, they now were able to handle the allocation of water through a single administrative agency. The same kind of co-operative spirit was possible for handling flood conditions where too much water could be equally damaging to the crops. Thus, in most villages we found that some basic improvement had been made to insure a better supply or control of water in the ten-year period.

In addition to these age-old problems of farming, there was the concern about ways of improving the yield of specific crops. Here we found a veritable chemical and biological revolution taking place. While not every farmer was taking advantage of them, practically all farmers were aware of the contributions of chemical and biological sciences to farming. In chemicals, the new commercial fertilizers were replacing human manure because it was more reliable and yielded greater results. Weed-killers, insecticides, and soil conditioners of a wide variety were being used not only to reduce possible crop damage but also to reduce the labor required in farming. Knowledge of plant and animal biology was being rapidly diffused. While the farmers did not understand the intricacies of recent biochemistry and genetics, the majority appreciated the advantages to be gained from the new strains of seeds and livestock. For example, in rice, strains with early or late maturation, with resistance to cold weather and to special kinds of disease, were being utilized. With poultry and livestock, care in diet, inoculations, and sanitary measures was being exercised. Incidentally, there was a noticeable increase in milk cows for most villages. The number of draft animals declined, however, probably in response to the increase of small cultivators and single-axle tractors. Thus there was general agreement in the villages not only that the quality of the crops had improved over the past ten years but also that the yield per acre had increased.

The problems associated with crop production are only one side of the coin. The other side of the coin deals with marketing and obtaining a fair price. The villagers were concerned with the marketing of their produce and livestock. They were not only production oriented; they were also becoming market oriented. The national government had established a compulsory crop-insurance system, improved dissemination of marketing news, and a compulsory delivery-quota system for rice. A wide variety of marketing co-operatives, often for such specific products as milk, oranges, or tea, has been organized to provide the individual with a greater control than formerly over the price of their commodities. Transportation to the markets has also been a recent theme in our investigations. A particular case is that of the Shimane village, which has been lobbying for the construction of a national highway that would traverse a mountain range separating the Japan Sea coast and Hiroshima Prefecture. If such a highway were built, this Shimane village could send its produce to the Hiroshima markets, where prices are better than the village's present markets for produce. In every village

in our sample, roads have been widened and truck and bus transportation has been improved.

To summarize briefly, our investigations suggest that a good deal of the more obvious changes taking place in the villages can be viewed as contributing toward a reduction of some of the basic sources of insecurity that face every Japanese farmer. In a word, these modifications in land tenureship, farm technology, and marketing were intended to reduce the uncertainties inherent in the occupation of farming. As an occupation, it is in this regard little different from urban trades, where union and other labor associations attempt to seek immunity from certain risks inherent in their employment.

There is, of course, more to a Japanese village than its agricultural production. There is the complex aspect concerned with human relationships and cultural transmission. In this latter aspect, too, some innovations have been noted. But here again we need to discuss these changes at the most general level, for each was unique because of its particular historical and situational circumstances.

One of the most obvious changes was the general proliferation of partly functional, partly social, organizations, such as the women's clubs, the P.-T.A., the 4-H youth clubs, and the like. In most villages we visited we found such organizations active in purely social activities as well as serving as channels of communication for new ideas concerning home improvement, health and sanitation, self-improvement, local history, and to a lesser extent political and economic ideology. These organizations also sponsored lectures often given by specialists from the government farm-extension service, sight-seeing tours, and even work projects that would "uplift" and raise the social horizon of the members. They also served informally for discussion and helped to establish social norms concerning issues in their changing world. For example, in several villages it was claimed that young married women used such meetings to plot strategies to educate their mothers-in-law to the changing times. Mothers-in-law, in turn, were saying that it was becoming impossible to control and discipline their sons' wives because young mothers wanted more freedom and greater independence with regard to raising their own children and with regard to division of labor in the farm household.

Other changes were less obvious. One concerned the slight tendency noted toward a decline in the strength of the larger kinship group and extended family. Many have commented that young people, in particular, were becoming more self-centered, independent, and individualistic. The elders claimed that the young were in need of learning and observing the traditional ethics (obligation system). Exchange labor for agricultural functions as well as for ceremonial occasions was frequently said to be on the decline, though communal service for road repairs, cleaning of streets, and the like was still maintained. When extra help was needed, most informants stated that they would prefer to hire someone rather than be obligated under an exchange labor system.

There was no question that the standard of living had increased in the past

decade, as indicated by a number of indices. Most villages had five or six television sets. Sewing machines, washing machines, electric rice cookers, and other appliances were on the increase. Certain basic house improvements, such as tile baths (in place of wooden baths), piped-in water systems, improved cooking stoves, and wide glass windows in the kitchens are examples of this. The diet has been generally improved, and fish and meat are increasingly consumed. Taxi and bus service to nearby towns was generally available, and youths in particular availed themselves of the movies in town. Motorcycles were purchased by some of the wealthier farmers' sons. Clothes, even the farmer's work clothes, were no longer made at home but were purchased readymade. The village stores carried a varied stock of canned foods, appliances, sporting goods, and other so-called luxury items. In short, the gap in living standards between the villagers and the urbanites was being reduced even though the urban population in the postwar years was enjoying an unprecedented prosperity.

So far, I have described the more obvious and directly observable aspects of change in the thirteen rural communities of our sample. Much more detail could be given, but I would like to shift to a discussion of whether or not the rural communities are undergoing a more fundamental reorientation and to raise the question whether the improvements in farm technology, the rising standards of living, and the modifications in social relationship mean a significant change in rural life from the past. I would like to ask whether the attitude toward the future is changing in some significant way and whether the younger generation of farmers is being socialized in the same attitudes toward life and farming held by the older villagers.

My answer to these questions is that "it depends." It depends upon one's frame of reference and what one takes as the base line for measuring these changes. If we compare the contemporary village situation with conditions found in the years between the two world wars, especially in the 1930's, then I would say the change is considerable. On the other hand, if our base line is the Meiji period and the beginning of Japan's modernization, then, paradoxically as it might seem, I would say that the present trends are a continuation of the traditions of the past and that they constitute no significant departure from the past. From this perspective the years between the two world wars seem to be a brief deviation from the trends established earlier.

To explain this, a brief review of the history of modern agriculture is necessary. For convience, this history can be divided into two periods. The first, covering the years from the Meiji Restoration to 1917 at the beginning of World War I, was the period of initial industrialization for Japan. The other period covers the years in between the two world wars, and it represents a "coming-to-term" period of economic development.

The First Period. In their concern for modernization of their society, the Meiji leaders rightly saw the necessity for increasing agricultural production. As a consequence of their efforts and the response given by the farm villages to these efforts, agriculture played a key role in the early phase of Japan's march

toward industrialization and urbanization. The agricultural village provided the essential manpower and population resource for the growing urban areas and industries, it developed the food surplus necessary to sustain the growing cities, and it created the initial capital resources for Japan to begin her industrialization.

During this fifty-year period of early industrialization, Japan's population nearly doubled. It expanded from an estimated 30 million to about 58 million in 1918. The Japanese farmer, in spite of such rapid growth, was able to produce sufficient agricultural surplus to keep the demand and the supply for food in balance. Though land had been cultivated intensively for many centuries before, the arable land was increased some 35 per cent in the Meiji period, from 4½ million to 6 million hectares. The productivity of land also expanded, so that by 1918 it had increased 80 per cent over its base period. Each year during this initial phase of modernization, the food supply was increased at an average rate of 2 per cent. Moreover, the contribution of agriculture to the expansion of foreign trade was not insignificant. "Export surpluses" in silk were produced to enable Japan to purchase necessary foreign goods.

During this period, also, agriculture constituted the main source of saving and capital formation. One necessarily crude index of this can be gleaned from tax revenues collected by the central government. The land tax, most of which came from farm lands, constituted more than 85 per cent of total revenues in 1882–92. Other forms of tax revenue, such as income tax and customs duty, did not substantially increase until the end of the Meiji period. As late as 1913–17, the land tax amounted to nearly 38 per cent of the total government revenues.

Obviously, in order for agriculture to play such a key role in the initial industrialization phase and to increase its productivity, some changes in agricultural technology was necessary. Ronald Dore (1959, 1960) describes how the Meiji government and the progressive farmers, particularly the landlords, cooperated to achieve this significant increase in agricultural yields. He describes experimentation with European seeds and tools, how successful innovations in one farm region would be diffused to other regions of the country, how experimental stations were established, how agricultural bulletins were published and disseminated, and how local agricultural associations and study groups were encouraged. Farm exhibitions were held, new seed strains were exchanged, model villages were described, and a general enthusiasm for improvement in agricultural technology was established.

The most important innovators during this period were the large landlords, many of whom were ex-samurai and literate men, who actively promoted experimentation in new seeds, new fertilizers, and new weeding methods. They appreciated the fact that such innovations served their own economic interests, but they also encouraged among their tenants and fellow villagers a positive attitude toward novelty, science, and progress. The establishment of the public school system during this period reinforced the same attitudes. In short, the landlords during this period were production oriented and actively engaged in

the business of farming. Very few absentee landlords were present at this time, but they were to appear later.

While the improvements in fertilizer, seed, tools, and techniques of farming were the most important factors in expanding agricultural productivity, improvements in land use were also made. These required capital and were therefore generally beyond the means of small farmers and tenants. The Meiji government, with the assistance of some private landowners, reclaimed additional land, constructed irrigation works, and improved drainage facilities.

It is difficult to convey the spirit of the times in such impersonal terms. Perhaps some biographical data will help. Ronald Dore (1960, p. 82) characterizes the accomplishment of Karasawa Annin in this manner:

> A samurai of Aizu, a fief scholar and official, he was imprisoned for anti-Imperialist activity at the time of the Restoration. Released, he set off, in 1873, to start a ranch in the northern tip of Honshu. He was given a government subsidy, employed two Englishmen for five years as advisors, and by 1876 was able to show the Emperor on a visit 180 head of cattle of mixed Western and indigenous breeds, and 24 horses. He also experimented with various new crops and carried out afforestation schemes. By 1889 he had created a village as an appendage to his ranch which he then left to his son. He himself moved to Tokyo to establish selling outlets for the ranch's products. He became founder of the Japan Livestock Association before he died a few years later.

The innovations and the spirit of the Meiji times just alluded to reminds one of the conditions that we found in our village survey. We found progressive farmers like Karasawa Annin, we found a healthy respect for scientific methods in agriculture, and we found ample evidence for the successful diffusion of new agricultural practices and tolls. These are the reasons for my suggestion that, if we take the Meiji period as the benchmark for measuring change, the intensified activity in the contemporary farm villages represents no basic change in patterns. If anything, there were only style changes. The Meiii farmers did not use electric pumps and gasoline-powered cultivators, of course, but these are mere "stylistic" changes and not changes in "basic" patterns—to use Kroeber's designations. These machines have not changed the sequence or the nature of operations in the agricultural cycle. They and other improvements of the 1950's were refinements built upon the Meiji base.

Both the Meiji period and post–World War II farmers carried out their occupation within the traditional framework. Farming is still a small family operation, each household averaging about one hectare. The work still requires an inordinate amount of human labor. Primogeniture is still the rule of succession, and other sons leave the farm for other occupations. Rice is still the sacred crop, and paddy fields are the most desirable. Kinship relations and community solidarity are still vital to the daily operation of village affairs.

The Inter-War Period. Now let us look for a moment at the next period, the years covering 1918 to the beginning of World War II. World War I saw a spurt in the industrial development of Japan and a steady increase during the

rest of this period. Agricultural production, while it increased also, did not develop at the same rate. If we divide the economic factors into the usual primary, secondary, and tertiary industrial sectors, the primary or agricultural sector increased in net output from an index of 119 to 156. The index for the secondary or manufacturing sector increased from 123 to 477; for the tertiary, from 138 to 397. Thus, in relative terms agricultural output declined vis-à-vis the other sectors of the economy.

Another indication of the relative decline of agriculture is the statistics on real income for the three sectors of the economy. By 1939–42, the real income per gainfully occupied person in primary industry (agriculture) rose to ¥220. In secondary industry it climbed to ¥928, and in tertiary industry to ¥838. The farmer's share of the national income declined sharply in this period between the two world wars.

Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1960, pp. 56–57), who provided these statistics, comment that such figures represent a "shift from the period of agricultural 'balanced growth' to the period of agriculture as a retarded or depressed sector."

Throughout the entire period, the number of farm households did not change and the farm labor force remained constant, between 14 and 16 million. The acreage under cultivation did not change to any appreciable extent. Meanwhile, the birth rates were high and the nation was producing during this period a population almost equivalent to the entire population in Tokugawa times. It was clear that the agricultural sector of the economy was producing a surplus population that was not being absorbed in the non-farm sectors. Increasingly, the villages were being characterized by low productivity and overemployment. Food production also lagged behind population growth. To feed the population, vast quantities of rice and other products were imported from Korea and Taiwan. Such imports drove downward the price levels of farm products.

The principal change of the period was in the landlords' role. With the depression of the 1930's and the declining price of farm products, many owner-cultivators lost their lands and absentee landlordism increased. Tenants had a difficult time feeding and clothing their families. The landlords as a class shifted in their orientation from production to the market. No longer were they the innovators and progressive elements in rural development.

Symptomatic of the changing orientations of the landlords and the general poverty prevailing in the villages, the so-called rice riots set the tone for the countryside. Numerous farmers' movements developed, sectionalism between the city and the countryside was expressed in slogans, and a general regressive attitude toward farm problems was expressed by the Ministry of Agriculture and echoed by the landlord. For instance, in 1934 one bureau chief in the Ministry addressed a national conference in these terms:

> "What the village needs is not so much people skilled in agricultural techniques or the theory of management, as a peasant who can wield a mattock and experience a sense of joy in doing so. In the depth of distress which our villages have reached the creation

of 'peasants of the soil' in the true sense of those words offers the only possible road to rehabilitation" [Dore, 1959, p. 101].

In line with the rise of nationalism, the conservative position in agriculture was fostered by the famous *nōhon shūgi* movement. This movement spread with religious zeal that contradicted many of the progressive gains made in the Meiji period. The *nōhon shūgi* movement promoted the ideology that agriculture was the principal base of nationhood; that the farmers were therefore serving both a sacred and a patriotic duty; that poverty and other economic problems of the farm could be solved by diligence, thrift, and personal sacrifice; that the farmers were to eschew the life of the urban culture and to center their own social and cultural life within the framework of a self-sufficient village community. *Nōhon shūgi*'s answer to the farmer's question, "Why am I so poor?" was, "You don't work hard enough; you don't have the proper spiritual attitude; and you forget that agriculture is a way of life, not a business."

Perhaps the real problem in this phase of Japan's economic growth and urbanization process was that the non-agricultural sectors were not able to absorb more of the surplus farm-labor force than they did. The world-wide depression, the rise of nationalism, and the traditional methods of agricultural production also contributed to the problems. In any event, where agriculture played a dominant role in the previous history, it now played a passive and limiting role. Where it had contributed substantially to the flow of investment capital, it now exerted a drag.

Given these conditions as a benchmark by which to measure postwar changes, we can see that the present farm situation can be considered as both a change and a departure. Instead of a moralistic or religious orientation toward solving the economic and technical problems of farming, the present trends clearly suggest a strong scientific, rational, and empirical approach toward their solution. In place of Confucian moral principles, the contemporary ideology recommends closer attention to the latest genetic and biochemical facts obtained from the government experimental stations. Instead of subscribing to a belief that agriculture is the sacred base of the society, the present outlook is to treat it as an occupation and enterprise, albeit honorable, but not one charged with nationalistic overtones. Instead of encouraging a tightly knit and self-sufficient community social structure, the mid-twentieth century trend is to bring the village in closer contact and a sense of interdependence with the larger region and especially with the urban society. The industrial culture of the urban community has all but shattered the isolationism of the villages.

In conclusion I would like to present one more benchmark for evaluating the current changes we have observed in the village. If we stake out a benchmark that is oriented to the future, we may be able to see to what extent the present developments can be considered as basic and significant trends for the future.

In spite of the rosy picture that seems to prevail in the current agricultural

situation, the future does not look bright for the average Japanese farmer. His morale may be good and his enthusiasm for technological innovations may be high, but the fact remains that his income is not keeping pace with the increased incomes of other sectors of the economy. An awareness of this was indicated in our interviews when we asked about income. The majority we interviewed stated that their relative income was the highest during the few years following the end of the war. Since that time, they said, they have been feeling the pressure of the high price of goods. With the pressures for them to buy materials for home improvements and for mechanized farm tools, the farmers are feeling the "price squeeze." The price of agricultural products is being reduced relative to the inflated cost of manufactured foods upon which they have come to be so dependent.

One way to increase his income would be to obtain more land, but under the present laws this is virtually impossible for the average farmer. The prospects are poor for the farmers to continue receiving the large government subsidies for improving agricultural lands, irrigation works, and the like. From the standpoint of the nation, it seems that the economic rewards would be greater if the government invested in sectors of the economy other than agriculture. While the farmer might, as is done in the United States, form a strong political organization and lobby for greater benefits from the government, this in the long run would seem to be uneconomical and merely a stopgap measure. He might also attempt to exert through improved organizational means a better position in the marketing of his products. But the fact that many of the domestic crops can be purchased on the international market at lower prices than he can produce them suggests some sort of limitation on this score. Co-operatives and government price support have no doubt helped in this regard, but the village leaders we interviewed were pessimistic about it.

The relative decline in the farmer's income is being accentuated by a number of features in the contemporary rural scene. One is the effect of various mass media, such as radio, newspapers, and TV, which entice the rural folk into trying to keep up with their city cousins. Both adults and children are aware of the latest fads in diet, clothes, hair styles, and other costly items. The schools play a role in the farmers' aspirations for a higher standard of living. As part of the indoctrination program of the schools to train children to be forward-looking, progressive, and more hospitable to change, they encourage more expensive tastes in entertainment, recreational activities, and hobbies like photography.

The Japanese farmer, like the American farmer, is caught up in this dilemma:

> On the one hand the farmer participates in the larger society in which he must compete with people who have ready access to specialized knowledge, who are highly organized, and who enjoy the material benefits and leisure time of a highly developed economy. On the other hand, he is bound by the limitations of a relatively inflexible land-based enterprise, subject to the uncertainties of natural forces, of a lack of organization for effective market bargaining, of a lack of leisure pursuits, and of the carryover

of values and a social structure more appropriate for the model T Ford than for the fin-tail car [Wilkening, 1958, p. 36].

In light of these facts, it would seem that the only assured way of increasing the farmers' share of the national income--about 40 per cent of the labor force are farmers, and their proportion of the national income is about 17 per cent—would be to increase the farm holdings of each farm household. This in turn means that the number of farm households needs to be sharply decreased. Large-scale farming would make possible a greater mechanization of the farms. The number of farmers with little managerial ability will be reduced (even with present conditions of rapid spread of farm technology, these are a problem), and the more efficient farmers will remain.

A not unrelated development would be the greater encouragement of livestock and dairying. Experts from the World Bank have suggested both the latter and expansion of landholding size.

Thus if we view them from the standpoint just suggested, the attempts at change over the ten-year period seem feeble indeed. The so-called changes seem merely to be refinements of past tendencies and traditions. The land-reform program and the government subsidies have done much to raise the standard of living and to rationalize the farm economy, but the basic problem remains unsolved. The farmer is receiving a *decreasing* share of the national income and to continue to do so would be to keep some 30–40 percent of the population in a depressed condition.

The solution to increasing the farmer's share of national income is to reduce the number of farm households and to increase the size of farm acreage per farming unit. It is the solution toward which American farmers are moving. Some suggestions in this direction were made by our informants in Japan. One agricultural consultant in Iwate Prefecture suggested the move toward farm corporations. Another even suggested "vertical integration." Whatever the special directions taken toward solving this problem, the principal decision involves something more than economics. It involves a question of values, and as such it has implications for Japanese politics, economy, and society. It also means that the Japanese farm family system will have to socialize its children for urban types of occupation. The idea that the Japanese farm is an ideal "seedbed" for tomorrow's generation needs to be given up because such an idea is simply not true. Japanese urban families are providing a more alert and realistic approach than are farm families to problems the next generation will face as adults.

In conclusion, let me return to the theoretical issue with which I began this paper. It was a question of the frame of reference for evaluating culture change taking place in the Japanese farm villages. We have seen that if the Meiji period is taken as the base line, then the present conditions seem to be a logical development of the trends foreshadowed in that period. If, on the other hand, we use the regressive period between the two world wars, then the present village situation

can be viewed as a renaissance and therefore a distinct change. Or, if we look to the future development of the total Japanese society, we find that the Japanese villages are still conservative, tradition-bound social structures, and therefore unchanging.

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FUTOMI: A CASE STUDY OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS OF A MARGINAL COMMUNITY IN JAPAN*

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ABSTRACT

In a situation of great population concentration and few resources, the Japanese rural community must exploit every feature of the environment—natural and man-made—which might offer possibilities of economic return. The case of a typical Japanese coastal community is analyzed, to show how the economic base of the community is highly varied, and how the people respond quickly and efficiently—with modified social and technical procedures—to changing ecological conditions, in order to keep income levels adequate at least for subsistence needs. The case also illustrates how the general linkage in American attitudes between poverty and lack of desire to produce does not apply in the Japanese case, where poverty is accompanied by extremely active, energetic, and efficient economic processes. It is also shown how rural Japanese concepts of welfare and the role of the family are adjusted to this particular combination of dense and high population, poverty, and efficient economic activity.

From the standpoint of Americans, Japanese rural life may seem to epitomize the conservatism and traditionalism of the Orient. Despite the rapid westernization and the city dwellers' eagerness to acquire technological proficiency, the Japanese peasants and fishermen seem at first glance to be slaves of custom and followers of traditional methods of production. These impressions, however, may be exaggerated. The writers of this paper believe that certain demographic and economic realities restrict the Japanese villages from taking advantage of the technological advances regarded as natural in rural communities of the West. Within the limitations of excess population and scarce natural resources, the Japanese village displays a remarkable ability to adjust to changing economic and ecological conditions. It is extremely sensitive to the vicissitudes of the market, to new government regulations, and to natural disasters, and adapts to these situational exigencies readily. In brief, then, the Japanese village displays a high degree of economic pragmatism, versatility, and progressiveness, within the limitations of meager resources.

The community of Futomi used for illustration here was originally surveyed, along with 12 other villages, as a part of a research program to assess the effects of the Occupation-sponsored land-reform program. The basic statistics and descriptive materials on Futomi are available in a published report, *The Japanese Village in Transition.*[1] However, since this published

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[1] Arthur Raper, Tamie Tsuchiyama, Herbert Passin, and David Sills, *The Japanese Village in Transition*, GHQ, SCAP, Natural Resources Section Report No. 136, Tokyo, 1950. The actual field work in Futomi was conducted by a team of Japanese rural sociologists under the direction of David Sills, now of Columbia University and the Bureau of Applied Social Research. The principal field worker and data analyst was Katsunori Sakurada, now a member of the staff of the Attic Museum in Tokyo. One of the present writers, John Bennett, visited Futomi several times in 1949 and 1950. A different version of the study of thirteen villages, emphasizing certain analytical differences between communities, has been

[footnote continued on next page]

report focused on the consequences of the agrarian reform, many intimate details of village organization were necessarily omitted. The present writers have made much use of the unpublished data on Futomi. This village was selected for discussion in preference to other communities investigated in the land reform survey, because it seemed to represent best a typical Japanese marginal-subsistence community, where the available resources just barely meet the minimum needs of the population.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VILLAGE

Futomi, located on the Pacific seacoast in Chiba Prefecture just 80 miles southeast of Tokyo, is typical of hundreds of small communities found on the rocky Pacific side of the central island of Honshu. The placement of the dwellings, tightly packed together along narrow valleys and roadways or on the sandstone cliffs, permits the maximum utilization of land for raising crops and animals. The closeness of the communities to the seashore makes possible the exploitation of marine life by means of locally built, wooden fishing boats. The scenic, but agriculturally nonproductive, beach is littered with nets drying in the sun or in various stages of repair. Further back from the shore every inch of open space is covered with meticulously tended fields which reach the foothills of the mountains. Not so meticulously kept, however, are the man-made objects: the clothing is ragged, the houses shabby, the yards dirty, and the agricultural implements crude. But one soon realizes that, despite these items in general disrepair, the American maxim that "poverty begets laziness" does not apply here; rather he finds a general air of "bustling poverty."

At the time of the survey, in December, 1948, the total land area of Futomi was 1,171 acres, but only 284 acres (roughly 24 per cent) were fit for cultivation. The remaining 76 per cent was taken up by forested hillsides (52 per cent), beach and cliff wastelands (19 per cent), pasture (2 per cent), and building sites (3 per cent). Moreover, not all the soil in the 284 cultivable acres was of the best quality; for only a little more than half (about 164 acres) could serve as rice-producing paddy or irrigated fields. The remainder, made up of nonirrigated upland fields, was used for growing cereals and vegetables. After considerable effort in 1947, under the aegis of the Occupation-sponsored "land reclamation" program, the village had succeeded in adding 12 acres of sloping, rocky soil to the meager supply of land. Most of this soil, however, could be used only for raising flowers and vegetables rather than high-yield, lucrative crops like rice.

On this land, about 105 households (19 per cent of the village total) were fully dependent for their livelihood, while another 152 (27 per cent) were partially dependent on it but had supplementary occupations, chief among which was fishing. Thus, approximately 46 per cent of all households were wholly or in part engaged in farming. Fishing, the second occupation of Futomi, provided the only means of support for 16 per cent of the households, in addition to those that combined fishing and farming. The significance of livelihood gained from fishing, however, should not be underestimated by these crude figures because, in addition to providing part-time employment for dozens of fishery laborers, the industry also employed (according

issued by the Research Program in Japanese Social Relations: Iwao Ishino and John W. Bennett, *Types of the Japanese Rural Community: A Preliminary Study of Variation in Demography, Economy, Society,* Ohio State University Research Foundation and Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology, "Research in Japanese Social Relations," Interim Technical Report No. 6, Columbus, 1953.

to the statistics of the cooperative fishery association) members of some 39 households in processing the marine products. In all, an estimated 80 per cent of the households were primarily dependent upon farming and fishing occupations. The remaining 20 per cent had no one employed, or were supported mainly by keeping small shops, producing home-manufactured items, and doing clerical work. There were three "professional" households, those of a school teacher and two physicians.

The outstanding fact about Futomi, then, is that it is a land-hungry village. A careful examination of the economic activities of this village revealed that, in the face of land scarcity, Futomi had worked out a rather complex ecological adjustment, made possible only by exploiting fully the limited resources and by manipulating the human factors to conform to these economic necessities. In the utilization of the scarce land, the best soils were devoted to high-yield rice crops and the less desirable ones to sweet potatoes, wheat, barley, and a few varieties of vegetables. Multiple-cropping, crop rotation, and seedbed farming were practiced to increase the yields even more. To take advantage of the relative nearness to the Tokyo markets and simultaneously of the marginal hillside lands, Futomi raised flowers and engaged in dairy production and animal husbandry (hogs, goats, and chickens). The higher lands unsuited for terracing were forested with rather quick-growing trees. The beach and the offshore waters were nearly as important as all the land combined, in that a wide variety of shallow-water fishing produced clam, lobster, cuttlefish, octopus, sardine, mackerel, tuna, and a host of other commercial sea products.

On the human side of the picture, much was done also. Consciously or unconsciously the population growth was controlled so that the competition for scarce resources would be lessened. Not only was the rate of natural increase (births over deaths) modest when seen against the background of other Japanese rural villages, but also a regular emigration of young people in their teens to the Tokyo-Yokohama urban centers helped to reduce the population. To assist in the marketing of its products and the purchase of equipment and supplies, the village organized various economic cooperatives. Finally, the various occupations were carefully adjusted so that seasonal variations in farming, fishing, floriculture, forestry, and home industries could result in greater rather than less income and employment. It was obvious that this plain and peaceful village of Futomi had devised elaborate and sensitive machinery to fight the problems brought about by land scarcity and poverty of natural resources.

In the paragraphs to follow, some of the principal types of social and economic adjustments necessitated by the scanty resources nature provided are described in greater detail. Special attention is paid to the adjustments resulting from natural disasters and from social changes stemming from forces outside the village, such as the change in markets for Futomi products, revisions in government tax policies, and the effects of the land reform program.

ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS

A major economic adjustment made by Futomi took place in the inflationary postwar period. In the prewar and wartime periods, the village subsisted fairly adequately on a combination of small-scale farming and fishing; there was a regular pattern of out-migration of excess population. In the postwar period, however, inflation and increased taxes resulted in considerably lower real income, and the out-migration that could take place was not adequate to alleviate economic burdens.

Consequently, as has always been the case in most Japanese communities in times of economic difficulty, a series of special economic adjustments appeared. The efflorescence of these in the postwar period accounts in large part for the extremely diverse economic picture of present-day Futomi.

The principal industries developed by Futomi residents as a response to economic crisis were three: raising flowers for the Tokyo florist industry, dairying, and lumber milling on a small scale.[2] Some reasons for selecting these three are discussed below.

In several places on the coast where Futomi is located, villages have gone into flower raising because the combination of light soil and regular rains permits flowers to grow unusually well. Because the industry was already established in the area, distribution centers were available. Futomi actually had little land to devote to large-scale floriculture, but every available patch that could be so used (including much of the "reclaimed" land) was put into flowers in the postwar period. Often these patches may be no more than five or six square yards in area; in these marginal Japanese communities, the small amount of cash obtainable from such crops is sufficient to provide incentive for their cultivation.

Dairying, like raising flowers, was made possible because of the proximity of Tokyo with its large milk consumption (milk is used commonly only in the largest Japanese cities) and established milk-collecting routes. Then too, milk cows were about the only way to exploit the steeper, stonier meadows between Futomi and the mountains.[3]

Both floriculture and dairying were marginal occupations, and no family derived the major portion of its income from either or both of them. The obstacles to further profitable development of these industries were as follows: First, while collection and distribution facilities did exist, the output of flowers and milk in Futomi was so small (owing to the limited amount of land available) that the Tokyo companies sending trucks through the village were willing to pay only the lowest prices. Moreover, milk production was a high-risk venture, and capital could not be accumulated fast enough to install the needed improvements. Fodder for cows was difficult to obtain (by itself, the grazing on the sloping meadows was inadequate) allegedly because of discriminatory practices on the part of the Prefectural government.

Lumber milling began when, in 1948, about ten families organized a mill on a cooperative basis, to provide extra employment for the villagers and to take advantage of the increased price of lumber brought about by the urban reconstruction needs in the postwar period. The number of trees cut was considerably in excess of good forestry-management standards; but these were difficult times for the villagers and the returns were relatively high.

Thus far in the discussion of the economic adjustments made by the Futomi residents, the examples have re-

[2] A rice-polishing cooperative also had been established during the period of study, but detailed information upon it is lacking.

[3] However, there had been an increase in all livestock owned by villagers in the postwar period: between 1947 and 1948, dairy cows increased from 113 to 137; hogs, from 8 to 17; goats, from 8 to 11; fowl, from 478 to 707; rabbits, from 42 to 82. The value and productivity of livestock other than dairy cattle was insignificant from the standpoint of total income, but furnished, for many families, the vital difference between subsistence and slow starvation. It was also interesting to note that increases in livestock occurred only in those families possessing livestock previously; no new families shifted emphasis from some other occupation to livestock.

lated to the short-term adjustments of the postwar period. Adjustments of broader scope can be illustrated by changes made in the fishing enterprises. In 1923, the famous earthquake which reduced the Tokyo metropolitan area to shambles also disturbed the sea bottom along the coast on which Futomi is located. At Futomi, the chief damage was the raising of the submerged rocks above sea level, so that the harboring of large fishing boats close to the shore became dangerous and impracticable. To some extent, also, the quakes disturbed the balance of marine life in the immediate area of Futomi.

Before the 1923 earthquake, the community possessed a number of large fishing boats, some of which were operated cooperatively, some on a "shares" system, and others as part of the activities of large "extended families." Fishing had distinctly "feudal" characteristics in those days, with the boat owner having rights and obligations of a "particularistic" sort over and toward the fisherman.[4] During the height of the fishing season, more than a hundred men from other villages were imported to cover the labor shortage in Futomi.

Following the changes in the sea bottom, fishing declined and the prosperous offshore fishing, done with motor trawlers (the only profitable large-scale type of fishing remaining), was no longer found in Futomi. Within a period of only about three years following the quake, fishing changed from a large, commercial enterprise to small boat operations manned by individual family groups.[5]

This change was accompanied by important shifts of emphasis in the social structure. In the heyday of fishing, the extended family structure and hierarchical relations between families in the village were very strong. The owners of fishing boats assumed the role of *oyakata* (parent), or patrons,[6] toward the men who worked for them, and toward their families. And with the greater wealth provided by rich fishing, most families were able to establish, in the community, branch houses which preserved strong solidaristic ties. Once the economic base of these social forms was moved, the system changed toward emphasis on the individual nuclear families. Japanese rural sociologists have observed similar developments in other coastal communities.[7] The former wealthy, boat-owning families were broken up, and the economic level of the village families became highly uniform.

SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

The economic adjustments described above relate only to one broad category of factors which have been manipulated to fit the changing circumstances. Equally important are the social adjustments, or adjustments in human factors. In this section, three

[4] See Herbert Passin, *Aspects of the Fishery Rights System in Selected Japanese Fishing Communities*, GHQ, SCAP, Civil Information and Education Section (Tokyo, 1948).

[5] However, in the postwar period a slight boom in fishing activities took place, largely as the result of a general improvement of close-to-shore, commercially feasible, marine life and of the increasing demands for these products in the Tokyo fish markets. In the three years between the end of the war and 1948, the number of boats (mostly without engines) in operation increased from 132 to 197. Various crustaceans (clams, lobsters, crabs), edible seaweeds, special marine delicacies like squid and octopus, and numerous varieties of small fish, because of their good price, became a valuable source of supplementary income for many Futomi families.

[6] See Iwao Ishino, *"Oyabun-kobun:* A Japanese Ritual Kinship Institution," *American Anthropologist,* Vol. 55 (1953), pp. 695-707.

[7] The most extensive research on this shift of the socio-economic base of fishing in Japan has been done by K. Sakurada. (Katsunori Sakurada, *Gyojin* [fishermen], Rokuninsha, Tokyo, 1942.)

of the more striking social adjustments are described: (*1*) the control of population growth; (*2*) the organization of social groupings, especially the family; and (*3*) the handling of welfare cases.

There were 2,752 persons in Futomi in 1948. The number had fluctuated slightly, but had averaged 2,600 for the ten years preceding 1948. Between 1947 and 1948, the population declined by 3 per cent, a figure which represented the return to the city of the few refugees from bombing who had managed to find shelter in this crowded community. But in the ten-year period taken as a whole, the population was remarkably static.

In 1948, a total of 132 infants were born in Futomi; the yearly average for the ten years preceding 1948 was 90. In 1948, 43 persons died, which is lower than the annual average of 55 for the decade 1938 through 1947. For the 10-year period, then, there was an excess of births over deaths averaging about 35 persons per year. This being the case, the fact that the population remained static requires further explanation.

Futomi is one of many Japanese communities with an institutionalized system of out-migration. There are established patterns for girls and for boys. In the case of the girls, the majority leave their households between 18 and 20 years of age to work as maids in the city. They remain away from home about six years, after which they have saved enough to return to Futomi and marry (a dowry system is standard, and a necessity), or to marry city men and remain permanently away from home. In 1948, a total of 58 girls were working as maids in the city. Out of 72 village girls marrying in 1948, only 8 married Futomi men; 16 married men in distant cities and towns; and the remainder, 48, married residents of nearby villages and towns. The great majority, 64, thus married out of the village.

Young men and boys, particularly those from farming families and those who are the younger sons,[8] may leave home after finishing primary school and spend their entire lives away from the village. The younger sons of families who engage in fishing leave when they are 18 or 20 years of age to work in fishing companies in the Tokyo Bay area and usually return to the village to fish with their fathers after a few years of work. In 1948, 170 village boys were working as fishermen in other communities and an additional 50 were working at various other occupations away from the village. Nearly all of the fishermen return to the village for the winter, thus permitting the village population to fluctuate considerably by season. On the basis of past figures, from a fourth to a third of these will eventually remain away from home permanently.

To summarize, during 1948 a total of 308 young male and female residents of Futomi were away for most of the year, working in other communities and cities. While some of these departures were permanent and others temporary, the long-term trend, for the period 1938-48 at least, was to permit a near-balance of additions to the community population with departures and deaths. Although seasonal fluctuation was marked, due to the employment arrangements of many of the boys, and while yearly and periodical fluctuation of the population was noted, the average remained markedly consistent. This suggests that the out-migration pattern is a stable and neces-

[8] Because of primogeniture, they will not inherit. Villagers state that primogeniture in Futomi is largely a matter of necessity, rather than simple "custom," since a man's land and property holdings are usually so small that to divide them among a group of relatives at his death would be ruinous. In the Occupation period, national legislation was passed forbidding primogeniture; but in villages like Futomi the law is generally ignored.

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sary part of the community socio-economic adjustment, and is not a short-term change due to inflation or "abnormally" difficult economic circumstances. Perhaps the point is that, from any Western perspective, the economy of Futomi is permanently "abnormal," and to this the community has worked out adjustments of considerable refinement.

Another major social adjustment lies in the area of family relations. It has become a matter of convention in Western (and much Japanese) sociological literature to view the "family" as the basis of Japanese social life, and as the model for social relationships in all institutional matters. Japanese rural communities are "familistic," if by this is meant that families play a somewhat more important role than they do in many Western communities. In general, the poorer a community, the larger the role of the family. This need not be seen necessarily as the consequence of exotic Japanese culture patterns or values, but perhaps more simply as a response to economic insecurity in a society with a modern industrial economy but lacking a centralized, universalistic system of credit and social welfare. In the absence of such institutions, the family, the immediate group of relatives, becomes a means of spreading scarce resources and cushioning against economic shock.

The classic form of the rural Japanese family is the *dozokudan*, or "same kin group," which ordinarily consists of a *honke*, or "main house," and one or more *bunke*, or "branch houses." "Ritual kin" relatives, or nonrelatives treated as relatives for economic reasons, are common.[9] Relationships between members of the *dozokudan* are often "hierarchical," that is, graded according to prestige and authority on the basis of age and patrilineal seniority. This type of organization tends to be strongest in Japan in the remote communities. In such cases, the *dozokudan* serves two major functions: (*1*) the economic, in the sense that the group is the center of cooperative activities productive of income, and that the available income is spread throughout the group; and (*2*) the solidaristic, in the sense that the group is the center of all ceremonial and mutual-aid activities which absorb the insecurities of a marginal existence.

As one departs from such isolated communities and approaches more economically inflexible regions, the functions of the *dozokudan* tend to diminish. The economic functions become much less important, and are given over to various types of "voluntary" associations—e.g., cooperatives, neighborhood labor-exchange groups, and the like. The solidaristic and mutual-aid functions tend to remain constant.

In the case of Futomi, these developments have taken rather extreme forms in the postwar period, with members of individual family households following several different occupations. This, plus the change in fishing arrangements, has led to a stress on the household or individual nuclear family which is in the extreme range for Japanese rural communities. Thus Futomi remains a case of "familism," but the group which possesses such implied broad functions is the nuclear family rather than the *dozokudan*, or "extended family."[10]

[9] See Michio Nagai, *Dozoku: A Preliminary Study of the Japanese 'Extended Family' Group and Its Social and Economic Functions,* Ohio State University Research Foundation and Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology, "Research in Japanese Social Relations," Interim Technical Report No. 7 (Columbus, 1953).

[10] With reference to this, T. Takeuchi, one of the members of the original field party and now of Tohoku University, observed in summary: "In this village the *dozokudan* (called "*jimyo*") is a small group, consisting of only three or four families at the most, who help one another in time of need. However, there is no hierarchical arrange-

[*footnote continued on next page*]

The importance of the individual family is shown by the fact that changes in situational economic adjustments followed the household pattern; that is, rarely in Futomi did a household enter an occupation—particularly one of the more important ones—which was absolutely new to that household. Although fishing was (in 1948) an auxiliary occupation, the families who carried on fishing were, by and large, the very ones who engaged in fishing in the "old days"—though in different social and economic arrangements. Farmers have always been farmers, and with the "land reform" fixing ownership in the hands of the operator, they will remain farmers indefinitely. Thus, while there is considerable variation in sources of income in households, the general balance remains constant, and occupations tend to be "traditional" for the given household.

The formation of "voluntary" groupings, like cooperatives, was found not to be impeded by the strength of the individual family, but rather aided. A strong hierarchical, *dozokudan* system meant "death" to such organizations; but they could develop and exist with much less difficulty in a community where the "extended family" retains its solidaristic and mutual-aid functions, yet abandons many of its economic functions. This has been the case because individual family members can act as free agents in an economic sense, without fear of extensive familial complications resulting from commitment of a large kin group to an involved, extra-familial enterprise. The large enterprises of the Japanese villages with strong *dozokudan* tendencies tend to be *oyabun-kobun* organizations—"feudal" groupings where the employees or followers owe loyalty to the patron. This was the case with Futomi in the past, when fishing was the major village enterprise.

If the family is important in societies which lack national, institutionalized means for cushioning against economic shock and the hazards of high-risk enterprise, it would be expected that there has been built up a configuration of values in the rural family expressing these facts. This was the case in Futomi.

In 1947, as a result of an Occupation-sponsored law, Futomi was required to establish a Social Welfare Commission, entrusted with the responsibility of providing various forms of relief and social aid to needy families. The activities of this commission were studied in some detail, with the following findings:

In 1948, some 23 households were under the care of the commission, 13 of these being regular village families and 10 being newly arrived families, mostly repatriates. In the light of the poverty and insecurity of economic life in Futomi, this would appear to be a small number. An investigation revealed that there was tremendous resistance in the village to the idea of "charity," and only under extreme circumstances would a family apply to the commission for help. Newly arrived families, being totally destitute

ment among the families. The economic strength of each family is equal—or better, they are all equally poor. In some *jimyo* groups one even finds that the members no longer recall which of the families is the *honke* (the main, original, and usually prestigeful line of descent). The economic conditions which might create a basis for strong, hierarchical extended families are lacking in Futomi. All households (individual nuclear families) are small economic enterprises. There is family sentiment and mutual aid, but economic life is not organized around the *dozokudan*, and hierarchical relations are absent. These tendencies also have their effect upon marriage. If a family is leading a normal life in Futomi, it is eligible to contract marriage with any other family—there are no special desires to match young people according to occupation or social position of spouse's family."

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Officials of the agency reported that they were having extreme difficulty in convincing needy families that it was not a disgrace to accept aid. Even though the national law clearly defines livelihood as under the protection of the state, families in need were convinced that they were a "nuisance" to the community, and, rather than impose upon public responsibility, they should work out their economic problems by themselves. In their opinion, economic support was entirely a matter of the family, and any modification of this idea was met with considerable resistance.

The commissioners stated that this situation creates a serious dilemma in Futomi; on the one hand, the economic situation is insecure and productive of genuine need; on the other, the prevailing values keep individuals and families from accepting public support. The commissioners estimated that at least half the families in Futomi not only were eligible for aid, but would suffer considerable hardship and injury if it were not accepted. Yet, out of more than 560 households, only 23 have applied or have been persuaded to accept help; of these, 10 are repatriates.

This situation highlights some of the basic problems of Japanese rural society. Japan is probably a permanently "poor" country, given no marked changes in the pressure for arable land and no decrease in population growth. It is doubtful that she can expect to develop social security systems which are permanent and predictable, because such systems depend upon a steady national income and an economic surplus. In the absence of such schemes, or in the face of their possible unreliability, the "family system" type of security is perhaps to be encouraged. In rural areas this reliance upon the family is an advantage, but the economic insecurity of urban areas can never be fully absorbed by familial means. In a period of crisis, however, national aid could flow to urban areas, with the rural communities taking care of their own.

This would suggest that a program of rural economic aid based entirely upon universalistic criteria would involve a misconception of the nature of Japanese rural socio-economic adjustment. The development of what Japanese rural economists have called "invisible employment" (i.e., the presence of side-income occupations of all kinds) leads to a unique balance or adjustment for each community. The status of any given occupation, like farming, will vary considerably, depending upon local conditions. The close margin of subsistence and surplus requires flexible arrangements. Local economic cooperatives seem a desirable answer, and these are developing with government help.

In general, the people of Futomi are deeply aware of the need for collective action in the solution of their welfare problem. The first Futomi Youth Association, founded in 1946, had disappeared by 1948, and another organization had taken its place—for the reason that the original group was a purely "social" club, lacking economic-assistance and mutual-aid functions. The later group reorganized along these latter lines, making itself useful in disaster emergencies, special collection of seaweed for sale, installation of needed public utilities, and the like. This group was immediately successful. Cases like this, and the problems of the Welfare Commission, illustrate the deeply ingrained habits of collective action and mutual aid which have come to characterize societies with a delicate balance between population and resources. While considerable fluctuation in the specific organizations

and economic patterns may be found, as seen for Futomi, the substratum of concepts and modes of interpersonal relationships remains constant, ready and available to the villagers for meeting recurrent crisis situations. Fundamental changes in these adjustmental mechanisms could take place only with a drastic reduction in population and/or a vastly strengthened system of national credit and social security. In the face of Japan's generally difficult international economic position, it is unlikely that sufficient national capital could ever be amassed to raise such programs above the present levy of only partial and supplementary support.

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The *Oyabun-Kobun*: A Japanese Ritual Kinship Institution*

By IWAO ISHINO

THIS paper[1] will consist of a brief, illustrative analysis of certain fictitious kinship relations in Japan known collectively as the *oyabun-kobun* institution.[2] A short history of the institution and a case example of a group organized according to its patterns will be presented to illustrate the structure and operation of the system. A brief discussion of the major social and economic functions of the system will conclude the paper.

OYABUN-KOBUN AND RITUAL KINSHIP

There are today probably more than a hundred books and technical papers published in the English language on various aspects of Japanese social life and customs, but none has yet been devoted exclusively or even predominantly to a study of the *oyabun-kobun* system, an institution with which—according to a public opinion poll conducted in 1947—the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people were intimately familiar.[3]

Yet there is ample reason to believe that the study of this institution may have some general significance, first, because it is important to acquire practical knowledge about a system which is implicit in many social groupings found in Japan[4] and, second, because it is pertinent to a recent trend of interest in anthropology: the phenomenon of ritual kinship. This latter point deserves some preliminary comment.

The interest in ritual kinship has probably been prompted by the change in the type of societies studied by contemporary anthropologists. So long as isolated, aboriginal societies were objects of research, "biological" kinship constructs were probably adequate to describe the central aspects of their social organization. But with attention being turned to more complex, yet non-industrialized societies—such as those represented by communities in Middle and South America, and in the Near and Far East—anthropologists are finding that kinship is not overly significant in describing the fabric of social relationships in these societies. The manifold relations among the peasants, landlords, workers, tradesmen, and other social categories in these newly-studied communities are not simply a matter of kinship relations. They also include relationships that bring together strangers and other unrelated persons into close cooperative and purposive action. Interestingly enough, however, though these individuals may be unrelated, current studies reveal that quite often the purposive action is institutionalized in a form which clearly imitates kinship relations. These patterns of simulated kinship ties are found so commonly that Paul (1941) and others have designated this phenomenon "ritual kinship."

* Article chosen by the Central States Anthropological Society as the outstanding paper presented at its annual meeting held May 1953 in Urbana, Illinois.

OYABUN-KOBUN: A DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY

The *oyabun-kobun* institution is one in which persons usually unrelated by close kin ties enter into a compact to assume obligations of a diffuse nature similar to those ascribed to members of one's immediate family. The relationship is formally established by means of a ceremony involving many of the expressive symbolisms of birth and marriage. Both the terms of address and the assignment of roles within the group are patterned on the Japanese family system: the leader becomes a ritual parent and his followers, symbolic children. These "children," in turn, are ritual brothers to each other and seniority among them is formally recognized by terms which imply elder brother–younger brother distinctions (Fig. 1).



FIG. 1. Terms of Reference in *Oyabun-kobun* Relationships.

This ritual family can, like the true family, be extended so that several "generations" of ritual kinsmen may be observed. Such cases occur among certain traditional professions and occupational groups having communally-held property or other vested interest that is recognized more by custom than by legal codes and acts of legislation. Thus a racketeer *oyabun*, having gained control in a given territory where many street-stall merchants operate their business, may subdivide his territory and transfer direct control over a part of his domain to one or more of his trusted and favored *kobun*. The *kobun*,

upon "inheriting" this right, will recruit new ritual children and thereby become an *oyabun* in his own right. When this occurs, an extended ritual family is automatically established and a ritual grandfather-grandchild (*o-oyabun-magobun*) relationship between the original *oyabun* and the newly acquired ritual children of the former *kobun* comes into being. Interestingly enough, in such cases the fiction of the extended family is maintained by the "descendants" who use the professional or ritual family name of the original *oyabun*. This pattern of extending ritual kin ties generation-wise stems, no doubt, from pre-industrial Japan when it was the practice for apprentices to become at the same time *kobun* of their masters and, upon successful completion of their training, to receive the right to carry on the trade in the name of their master.

In order to clarify the differences between the ritual kinship system and the "biological" system, a few additional comments are needed. In the first place, roles are prescribed differently in the two systems, though they have certain common terminological elements. The true or "biological" kinship role is one which is automatically *ascribed* to a person by the sheer fact of his being born into a particular network of relatives. By contrast, a ritual kin role is always one which is *achieved*. A person is assigned a ritual kin role because he earns the right to membership or because he is appointed to membership by others.

In the second place, the primary functions of the two systems are quite different. In Japan, the ritual kin system provides the framework for integrating the activities of a group of people engaged in a common activity (e.g., occupational, political, economic) which cuts across or extends beyond the range of affiliations based upon true kin ties. In some cases—as it will be shown by the case study—ritual kin and true kin roles overlap. But since both systems are institutionalized more or less independent of each other, the potential conflict in roles is not any greater than, say, the possible conflicts of a member of American society whose occupation interferes with his familial roles. Priorities as to the amount of time spent and obligations stipulated for each role are, within broad limits, adjusted so that conflicts are minimized. Take a concrete case: among the previously mentioned racketeer *oyabun-kobun* groupings found among street-stall merchants, a retiring *oyabun* is expressly forbidden to transmit his economic interests and his sphere of influence (*niwaba*) to his true son, since such interests must be passed on to his ritual son or *kobun*. Severe sanctions are brought to bear upon anyone who violates this code. The specific kind of code which each *oyabun-kobun* group establishes on a customary basis, of course, varies according to the instrumental goals of the group and the particular tradition it has socially inherited. Similarly, other codes and rules are devised presumably to avoid conflict in roles between "biological" and ritual kin systems.

Finally, the two systems differ in respect to the terminologies used in designating status. The ritual kin terminological system is, of course, based upon true kin cognates, but there are a number of interesting variations. In general,

ritual kin terms are distinguished from true kin terms by means of *-bun* or *-kata* suffixes which are added to the cognates. For instance, the true kinship term for elder brother is *aniki*, but the ritual kinship term might be *aniki-bun*, or *anibun*. Moreover, in the ritual kinship terminology, sex differences are ignored in certain cases as, for example, instead of using the sex-distinguishing term "father" (*chichi*) the corresponding ritual kin term is "parent" (*oya-bun* or *oya-kata*). The wife of the *oyabun* is most often called "elder sister" (*anego*). Also, certain kinship terms are often ignored in the ritual kinship system. Though a case might be made for using the true kin term "grandfather" (*jiji* or *sofu*) in the ritual kinship system, the term "great father" (*o-oyabun* or *o-oyakata*) is generally used. Similarly, a kinship term for "cousin" (*itoko*) is rarely found in the ritual kin terminologies. It must be clear from this discussion that while the true kinship terminologies are standardized, the terms for the ritual kin system are somewhat variable from group to group. The ritual kin terms used in the present paper are those which are believed to be the most common.

Anthropologists will recognize this institution as a case of ritual kinship. Those who have examined studies of the *compadrazgo* and *cofradia* types of ritual kinship in medieval Europe and the new world will note some interesting parallels (as well as differences) not only in the previous statement of the structural features, but also in the historical development of the institution.[5]

Though ritual or fictitious kinship customs are known to have been practised since the beginning of Japan's history (cf. Asakawa 1903: 61–62, 63–67, 75–76, etc.), the *oyabun-kobun* pattern seems to have developed in the late feudal period (*circa* 1700) and reached its peak in the early industrial period (*circa* early 1900). In varied forms it continues to exist in the modern society and was especially manifest during the recent Japan Occupation. In the feudal Tokugawa period, artisans, merchants, peddlers, and others of the commercial class organized their guilds along the lines of the *oyabun-kobun* system, while among the *samurai* and upper classes, lord-vassal relations took on similar configurations. This principle of social relationship continued through the Meiji restoration of the Emperor and it was particularly important in structuring clique formation among the political leaders of the time. The institution was observed in rural districts not only as a way of structuring landlord-tenant relations, but also as a kind of godparent system in which ritual fathers were ceremonial sponsors at name-giving, marriage, and other locally important crisis events.

In the modern period, as nationalism took hold, and as industrialization gained a foothold, new forms of social relationships were required. At the turn of the twentieth century, the *oyabun-kobun* system became one of the most significant means by which these new social relationships were formed. Modern political movements and party organizations were often patterned along these lines. Employment organizations for the recruiting of peasants for factory work, various types of business associations, and labor organizations—especially among miners, stevedores, construction workers, and casual labor-

ers—were typically organized on *oyabun-kobun* patterns. Some of these groupings continued to be so organized during the recent Occupation period. Under the pressure of the conqueror's programs—such as the establishment of national unemployment insurance, the creation of employment exchange systems, the encouragement of labor unions, the prohibition of certain kinds of monopolistic trade practices, the redistribution of land holdings, and the general improvement of economic conditions—many of these *oyabun-kobun* relationships disappeared from the Japanese scene. The principal groups in which this institution continued to be important were the racketeers and hoodlums, neo-fascist political movements, and labor suppliers in certain specific industries, and in the remote areas of Japan.

A CASE STUDY: THE *SANO GUMI*

As a member of the Japan Occupation's Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division, the writer became interested in *oyabun-kobun* phenomena when he was assigned to the task of investigating some of the sociological factors involved in the occupational role of stevedores in Yokohama—an occupation purported to be organized on *oyabun-kobun* principles. The initial request for this investigation came from the Japan Occupation's Labor Division, which was attempting to find reasons for its apparent inability to eliminate these so-called "feudalistic" and "undemocratic" forms of labor organization. There was considerable justification for this point of view because it was evident that these "labor bosses" used the institutionalized forms of *oyabun-kobun* relationships as a means of exploitation of their workers. However, the present paper is not concerned with these socially problematic features of the institution.

The particular group studied by the writer in 1950 was in the process of change from an *oyabun-kobun* system to a more impersonal and "bureaucratically" organized system, this change being largely due to SCAP's reform and surveillance programs. Thus, in order to illustrate how the system works in its purer form, a more traditional case has been selected for presentation—though even here changes were evident. This case concerns a group of construction workers in Fukushima Prefecture in northern Japan.[6] In reading the description of this case the reader might keep in mind the fact that many details have been simplified in order to provide a clear and elementary image of the *oyabun-kobun* pattern in its essential dimensions. It should also be remembered that while the structural features of the system—the "formal" and "informal" organizations—are as sharply delineated as genealogical diagrams, the actual relationships between the individuals concerned possess flexibility, richness, and psychological complexity of role behavior in almost any society, in almost any institutional context.

THE "KOGYO COMPANY." Toward the end of 1946, the "Kogyo Company" was commissioned to dig a series of tunnels as part of a large drainage and irrigation project in northern Japan. For this purpose, the company's local branch manager, who shall be identified here as "Mr. Sakai," brought together six

labor contractors or "bosses" to recruit and supervise some 500 workers. The *formal* or work organization of this local branch of the company was a relatively simple affair (Fig. 2). It consisted of Sakai as the general superintendent, an office staff including accountants, clerks, and messengers, a technical staff



FIG. 2. Formal or Work Organization of the Branch Office of the "Kogyo Company."

of engineers, supply officers, and other technical specialists, and the six "work crews," each of which was supervised by the above-mentioned "labor bosses" or contractors.

In addition to this formal organization, there was a special *"informal" relationship of the oyabun-kobun* type between the branch manager, Ichiro Sakai, and the six foremen (Fig. 3). Sakai, the branch manager, was the *oyabun* and the six formen were his *kobun* or "ritual children." The senior *kobun*



FIG. 3. Informal or *"Oyabun-kobun"* Organization of the Branch Office of the "Kogyo Company."
Note: Sakai is *oyabun* or *oyakata* to all the others. Individuals (1) through (6) are *kobun* of Sakai. The numbers indicate the status of each *kobun.*

referred to the junior *kobun* as "younger brother" (*ototobun*) and the junior to his senior as "elder brother" (*anikibun*).

It is interesting to note in this respect that, though the company entrusted thousands of dollars worth of equipment and supplies to these six labor contractors to carry on the actual construction work, and though much of the actual success **or** failure of the project depended upon these foremen, *there was no legal contract signed by these men.* There was much evidence that the *oyabun-kobun* relationship established between the branch manager and the labor contractors was considered a sufficient guarantee that these men would carry out their contractual obligations.

THE KUMI. This dual type of organization at the top level of the company's organization also was followed at the lower echelon, that is, for the internal organization of each of the six work crews. The Japanese term for this type of work crew is *kumi*. As an illustration of a *kumi* organization, then, the group supervised by Jiro Sano (see Fig. 3), a man of 46 years of age, may be described.

Sano, the eldest son of a poor farmer from Akita Prefecture, began his career in construction work at the age of fifteen. After some twelve years of apprenticeship, he became an independent labor contractor. Inasmuch as this type of occupation in Japan is traditionally organized in an *oyabun-kobun* framework, this meant that he worked himself up to the status of *oyabun* and, by the same token, had acquired a number of ritual children or *kobun* whom he sponsored and trained in his occupational specialty. His various jobs had also brought him into contact with many other labor suppliers and employers with whom he established a ritual brotherhood or *kyodaibun* relationship. It was primarily because of this latter type of relationship that he was brought to work here by Sakai, the branch manager.

When he was asked to work on this project, Sano had relatively little difficulty in recruiting a group of some eighty workers because he was in a position to utilize his ritual kin group for this purpose. The fact that only *twelve* out of the original eighty workers came to work *without* any previous acquaintance or ritual kinship connections with him attests to this.

THE WORK ORGANIZATION. Jiro Sano had contracted with the company to excavate two tunnels, which may be called A and B. Other than a small administrative staff (discussed later), Sano organized the remainder of the labor force into four teams (Fig. 4). Two teams operated in shifts in tunnel A and the other two in tunnel B. Each team had four specialists or *kofu* who drilled the holes in the forward wall of the tunnel and set off the dynamite which was placed in them. In addition there were about 15 common laborers or



FIG. 4. Formal or Work Organization of Jiro Sano's *Kumi*.

Key: Kumi-Gashira—"foreman"; Chozuke—"ass't. foreman"; Sewayaki—"team leader"; Kofu—"driller"; Nimpu—"common laborer."

nimpu who removed the debris after each blast. As compensation for this work, Sano collected an amount of money from the company once a month, the amount being determined by the number of cubic meters of dirt actually excavated by his *kumi* during that period. With this money, he paid the operating expenses of the *kumi* (which included the cost of dynamite and the upkeep of the dormitories), kept a certain amount for himself, and distributed the remainder in the form of piece-rate wages, bonuses, incentive payments, gifts of clothing, and other benefices to his *kumi* workers. Because of this complicated pay system, he had ample opportunity to "exploit" his workers.

The administrative staff of the *kumi* may be described next. In Figure 4 it can be seen that only the administrative staff has been given personal names enclosed in parentheses. At the top of this diagram appears the box for Jiro Sano. His formal occupational role was designated as that of a *kumi-gashira*, or literally, "the head of the *kumi*." Next in line of command was Sano's assistant who is called Matsuno. Matsuno's title was *dozuke*, which roughly translated means one who keeps the books. He kept records of all time sheets, pay schedules, and supplies and equipment drawn from the company. But more important was the fact that he acted as the foreman's advisor and representative. His status in this formal organization was the second highest, but his *oyabun-kobun* status, as will be seen later, was considerably lower. Why this was the case will become apparent as the remaining four members of the administrative staff are discussed.

These four men were the "straw bosses" (*sewayaki*) of the four teams. They directly supervised the work teams, but their responsibilities were relatively minor except for one, Mizuno, who was a man about Sano's age and had considerable experience in the trade. The other three of these four (S. Sano, Y. Sano, and Maeno) were respectively a son, a younger brother, and a brother-in-law of the foreman.

THE OYABUN-KOBUN RELATIONSHIP. Thus far the roles of the important members of the *kumi* have been described in the context of their formal or work relationships. Where, then, does the *oyabun-kobun* system enter into the picture? First of all, it enters because Jiro Sano established an *oyabun-kobun* relationship with his "key" men before he assigned them the duties described previously. These ritual kin ties, it should be noted, are not established with everyone in the *kumi* because the establishment of an *oyabun-kobun* relationship means that the ritual relatives receive preferential treatment over other *kumi* associates. The *kobun* and others in the ritual kin group expect such special considerations as getting extra pocket money, extra food and clothing allowance, occasional gifts, care in times of illness, extra time off from work, and sometimes special parties. These heavy obligations tend to restrict the number of ritual kin ties an *oyabun* can successfully maintain within a given *kumi* organization. Hence Sano kept the size of this group down to eight persons, the five individuals already mentioned in the administrative staff and three others—apprentices—in whom he was personally interested. In Figure 5 it can be seen that Matsuno, the assistant foreman in the work organization,

ranked lower than the four team leaders in this *oyabun-kobun* system. In other words, by means of this system, Sano gave due recognition to the fact that S. Sano, Y. Sano, and A. Maeno were his relatives and that H. Mizuno was a man of nearly his own age and experience. But in the assignment of technical or work roles, he did not let nepotistic considerations interfere with assigning the key position, in his judgment, to the most qualified person (that is, Matsuno). Be that as it may, all eight of the men chosen for this *oyabun-kobun* group were people whom Sano was either most dependent upon to carry out



FIG. 5. Informal or *Oyabun-kobun* Organization of J. Sano's *Kumi*.
Key: Oyabun—ritual father (ego is *kobun*); Ojibun—ritual uncle (ego is *kobun*); Kobun—ritual child (ego is *oyabun*).

his contractual obligations to the company or individuals in whom he had a deep personal interest. According to the customs of his trade, he formalized this relationship by means of a special induction ceremony.

INDUCTION CEREMONY. On the wall of the room of Sano's quarters where the ceremony was held hung a picture of the patron deity of the trade, and in the middle of the room was a low Japanese table around which the participants sat. On the table were small wine cups (*sakazuki*), two containers of ceremonial rice wine, two cooked fish laid stomach-to-stomach, a dish of salt, and a large diamond-shaped Shinto ceremonial paper. An intermediary from another *kumi* began the ceremony with a brief speech explaining the purpose and the meaning of the gathering. He then poured wine into the *sake* cups, added a pinch of salt and a piece of fish. This drink represented blood. Next the *oyabun* accepted the cup and drank the wine in three distinct motions and passed it on to the *ojibun*. Each *ojibun*, in sipping this concoction in a similar manner, indicated that he was pledging himself as a ritual brother to Sano. After the *ojibun* finished, the four *kobun* drank the wine and thereby became ritual children of Sano. The ceremony was ended by the *oyabun* thanking the go-between, and everyone congratulated each other.

In this ceremony, in addition to the patron deity and the rice wine which represented blood, there were other significant symbolic elements. The drinking of the rice wine in three sips is a typical manner of drinking for the bridal couple in Japanese marriage ceremonies, and the two ceremonial fish laid in the dish in such a manner is said to represent birth. The initiates were also given a new "family" name (really symbolic—not legally or customarily

used). Thus, for example, Hideo Wakano, *kobun* No. 2 on Fig. 5, became Hideo "Sano." Each of the new ritual children was also given a worker's jacket (*happi* coat) with his new ritual name and status sewed on. The workers stated that this simulated a gift of "baby clothes."

THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS. The ceremony just described marked the beginning of a set of mutual obligations established not only between the *oyabun* and his newly acquired ritual children, but also between the latter and the many previously established ritual kin relations of Sano. Inasmuch as Sano had more than 40 former *kobun* who had graduated to the status of independent labor suppliers, this ritual kin group was potentially very large. The obligations of Sano toward his present *kobun* were to assist them to find employment upon completion of the present project, to train them in the technical skill as well as in the particular social customs of the trade, to lend them money when they were in need, and to care for them when they were sick. The ritual child, in turn, was expected to help the *oyabun* in whatever way he could. Not only was he expected to do menial tasks and run personal errands for the *oyabun*, but also to help care for him in retirement, and upon death provide a good funeral for him. However, these latter obligations, it was noted sadly by Matsuno, have not been carried out so faithfully in recent years.

CONCLUSIONS

The description of a concrete case may now give way to some considerations of a more general character. These can be summarized:

First, there are really two systems of organization in an occupational group of the kind just described. The first which was called "formal," or "work," may now be called the *instrumental organization*, and its function is to define the occupational roles of the participants, thereby helping to get the job done. The other, the "informal," or *expressive organization*, is the *oyabun-kobun* system.[7] The latter, in contrast to the former, seems to be designed to take care of the so-called "human side" of occupational or purposive relationships. Thus, it makes use of symbols and rituals which give meaning to the life and experiences of the participants, it defines the in-group in clear-cut terms, and promotes "consciousness of kind." It provides the incumbents with a system of communication by which relationships with strangers may be stabilized, and it establishes continuity with the traditions of the past.

Second, not every worker in the *kumi* belongs to the *oyabun-kobun* system of relationship. To include everyone would, as noted previously, tend to destroy the privileges and the particularistic aspects of the system. In Sano's work crew it was noted that only eight members were so related. And at the higher "company" echelon, the branch manager had as *kobun* only the six foremen; others of the office staff and technical staff were omitted. In general, it may be said that about ten individuals, at any given time, would belong to an elementary *oyabun-kobun* group.

Third, looking at the *oyabun-kobun* relationship of the company as a whole, two overlapping layers of relationships may be seen. Thus, at the lower level,

Sano was the ritual father or brother to eight persons in his crew. But, at the same time, he was, like the other five foremen, a ritual child of the branch manager. Linkages of this kind, like true kinship systems, can be multiplied many times to include within the ritual, extended kin group (as contrasted to the primary group) as many as several hundred persons. Such is the case for many underworld organizations found in Japan during the early years of the Occupation. Some of these latter groups have genealogies of ritual kinship extending back to the Meiji period.[8]

Fourth—and by way of larger implications—it may be concluded that the *oyabun-kobun* system is influential in social mobility and in social security in the industrialized sectors of Japanese society. In the former case, a concrete example is found in the way the system operates to absorb rural people who come to the city looking for jobs. Familiar with *oyabun-kobun* mechanisms in their own localities, they can be approached and recruited for similar types of organizations in the urban area—often by ritual kin relatives of *oyabun* in their own localities. In the latter case, the system provides a means of support for workers and their immediate families when the true kin relatives of the worker are unable to contribute in times of economic need, or in urban areas where kin ties with the original home area are likely to become tenuous. The prevalence of *oyabun-kobun* mechanisms in postwar Japan is in part explainable by the large number of war-broken families and general decay of many aspects of the familial security system.

In the ultimate analysis, *oyabun-kobun* and other forms of fictitious kinship systems existing in instrumental areas of Japanese social relations should be seen as highly functional within a society which faces the problems of overpopulation, scarcity of natural resources and raw materials, and restricted and uncertain markets. Ritual kin groups provide a cushion against economic shock and general psychological uncertainty—they are a vital adjustment in a society which has little flexibility and great potentiality for crisis. If these considerations hold, it may be expected that ritual kinship practices will decline in Japan only if widespread and effective national social security is maintained, alternative channels of mobility are made available, or economic prosperity is predictable and enduring.

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NOTES

[1] The basic research was conducted as part of the writer's official assignment with the Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division of the Japan Occupation, in 1949–1951. Grateful acknowledgment is made to Mr. Koichi Bai who did the original field work on the illustrative case used in this paper. Interpretations as to the structure and dynamics of that case, however, are those of the present writer. The present paper is an attempt to summarize some of the highlights of, and subsequent reflections about, an interim technical report (see Ishino and Bennett 1952) which was prepared for a research program at Ohio State University and supported by the Office of Naval Research and the Rockefeller Foundation.

Anyone who works in large group research programs, as the present writer did both in Japan

and at Ohio State University, cannot claim to arrive at his conclusions and his interpretations wholly independently. Accordingly, acknowledgment is also made to Dr. John W. Bennett, project director of both the research organization in Japan and at Ohio State, to Mr. Herbert Passin, deputy chief of the research in Japan, and to Dr. Michio Nagai of Kyoto University, formerly at Ohio State University. The following persons with whom the writer had personal associations and conversations also must be acknowledged: Keizo Yoneyama, Kunio Odaka, Hiroaki Iwai, Shizuo Matsushima, Koichi Bai, Eiichiro Ishida, Takeyoshi Kawashima, Masao Ikuta, Keigo Seki, Katsunori Sakurada, Susumu Isoda, Seiichi Kitano, Takeyoshi Koyama. This group represents scholars who have made field studies on various aspects of the subject matter discussed here.

[2] The pattern of social relations to be discussed here is also known variously as the *oya-ko* and *oyakata-kokata* institution. But since the term *oyabun-kobun* seems to be the most common, this will be used in the present paper. It may be noted that all of these terms contain the cognates *oya* and *ko* which mean, respectively, "parent" and "child." The suffixes, *kata* and *bun*, in two of the above terms are translatable as "the manner of—," "the role of—," "the status of—."

[3] *Asahi* Newspaper Public Opinion Poll, conducted in December, 1947.

[4] Examples of published articles and monographs in which casual references to the *oyabun-kobun* institution are made are Odaka (1950), Okada (1952), Reischauer (1950), and Farley (1950). A valuable ten-page, unpublished paper written by Herbert Passin includes a brief survey of *oyabun-kobun* relationships in contemporary Japan. Subsequent to the reading of the present paper in Urbana, various members of the Research Project on Japanese Social Relations at Ohio State University have written papers and reports touching upon some phase of the *oyabun-kobun* institution. See Bennett (1953), Nagai (1953), Nagai and Bennett (1953).

[5] Examples of comparative studies of *compadrazgo* and *cofradia* institutions include: Paul (1941), Mintz and Wolf (1950), and Foster (1953).

[6] The field study was made in October, 1947, by a group of Tokyo University graduate students. Mr. Koichi Bai, a colleague of the author in the Japan Occupation's sociological research division, was the team leader of this study and it was he who graciously made available these data.

[7] The terms "instrumental" and "expressive" (as types of organizations) are taken from Parsons (1951, especially pp. 79–88). However, no systematic attempt has been made to fit Parsons' instrumental and expressive types to the problem at hand. The necessity for the instrumental-expressive distinction arose primarily from the fact that the *oyabun-kobun* aspect of the total organization was as much a formal organization as the productive (usually designated as "formal organization" by industrial sociologists) aspect. I am also grateful to Dr. Bennett for pointing out that this distinction has much in common with Redfield's contrast of "technical order" with "moral order" (Redfield 1952).

[8] In conjunction with this comment the following observation of Dr. Bennett is valuable: "These considerations suggest a larger and perhaps more accurate meaning for the sobriquet, 'familistic,' applied to Japanese society virtually *ad nauseum* by popular as well as scholarly writers. The important point is not that Japan is one large family, but rather that definitions, names, and other aspects of roles found in the family are capable of use as *models* for many other types of positions and relationships. As models, they do not necessarily mean that attitudes of love, devotion, hate, etc., associated with the family must likewise carry over to non-familial relationships" (personal communication).

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I

SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN RURAL JAPAN: CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES*

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SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN RURAL JAPAN: CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES*

IWAO ISHINO

IN WRITING this paper, I found most difficult the matter of establishing the proper frame of reference for evaluating the change that has taken place in the Japanese farming communities. Writing in 1959, Thomas C. Smith (1959, p. lx) states that there has been very little change in Japanese agriculture:

> In the course of its long history, Japanese agriculture has in some respects changed remarkably little. Farming is scarcely less a family enterprise now than it was a thousand years ago; holdings are still tiny and fragmented, tools simple, and rice the main crop. Although a Heian peasant would no doubt be perplexed by many things about contemporary farming . . . the main operations of planting, tilling, and harvesting he would understand.

Somewhat the same general point has been made by a geographer, Peter Gosling, who is a specialist on rice cultivation in Southeast Asia. He maintains that contemporary Japanese agriculture is basically no different from that found in China two thousand years ago. The machines, chemical fertilizers, and metal tools used today are mere extensions of the farming principles established centuries ago and involve no departure from the fundamental pattern of rice cultivation found throughout Southeast Asia.

On the other hand, most sociologists and anthropologists doing research in contemporary rural Japan have emphasized the progress and change that have taken place, especially in the postwar years. Changes in tenancy patterns, in mechanization, in farm technology, in family relationships, in neighborhood co-operative efforts, and in living standards are only a few of the aspects of the contemporary rural scene that have been researched and duly described.

Obviously, then, the writers who claim that little or no basic change has taken place and those who claim that much change has taken place hold different frames of reference for evaluating change. One way to resolve this is to obtain agreement on the appropriate base line from which to measure change. I wish to return to this discussion of selecting the base line for change after a brief summary of the investigation that John Donoghue and I conducted in 1958 and 1959.

* The author gratefully acknowledges the critical reading given his paper and the improvements made in it by Robert J. Smith. He also wishes to acknowledge the partial support provided by a grant from the Office of International Programs, Michigan State University.

When we began this field investigation, we were not concerned with the question of establishing a proper base line for studying change. We assumed a more or less common-sense basis. There was available the rather detailed body of data collected by the members of the Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division ten years earlier during the Occupation of Japan. Our aim was to revisit the same villages and to cover the same general topics investigated by them. The general objective of the original survey was to measure the human consequences of the land-reform program that was in the process of being completed. While Donoghue and I did not conduct an attitude survey, as was done in the first study, we interviewed many of the same village leaders who participated in the first survey. We also discussed our findings with some of the Japanese ethnologists who participated in the first research operation.

We had to schedule our visits to the villages as they conformed to the vacation periods in the academic year. This meant that we could not spend any extensive period in the field—our visits to each of the original twelve communities varied from two days to four days. But most of the ethnographic details that we required had been obtained by the first survey. Our task was made easier in that we concentrated on the change features.

To get some depth in our research materials, we selected three communities for more intensive study. Fifteen students in cultural anthropology at the University of Tokyo assisted in this phase. They were divided into three teams and spent two weeks during the spring vacation in three different communities selected for more intensive investigation. I took a team to Yoshida-mura, a mountain community in Shimane Prefecture, Professor Seiichi Izumi led a team to Nikaido-mura in Nara prefecture, and Donoghue a team to Aioi-mura in Kagawa Prefecture on the island of Shikoku. Following these more intensive investigations, the combined teams held a week-long seminar, where notes were compared.

To fill gaps in our data, letters were written to co-operating people in the various villages, and five of the villages were revisited for supplementary data. The thirteenth community, Ebetsu in Hokkaido, was covered later by Donoghue.

Unknown to us until we were well into the research was a series of studies conducted in 1954 by David E. Lindstrom, a rural sociologist at the International Christian University's Rural Welfare Research Institute. He and his colleagues there had surveyed five of the communities in our sample. These were Ebetsu, Yokogoshi, Karako, Obie, and Honami. Because his data relied heavily on opinion questionnaires, they supplemented our material rather well. While we had to rely on the statements of a more limited sample of informants for attitudinal material on change, he provided a more gross public-opinion type of data.

Our findings were not as neat and as consistent as we hoped they would be. The various measures of change that we established for this study did not move in the same direction or to the same extent for the ten-year period covered by the survey period. Some communities increased in a given index, while other villages remained the same or even decreased in this same index. Thus, to take a simple example, we found in one village that the number of dairy cows in-

creased from 2 in 1948 to 130 in 1959, while in another it decreased from 3 to 2 in the same period. Similarly, with respect to the number of power cultivators, much variation from village to village was found. The village of Aioi had a most spectacular increase from 43 units to 322; while Obie, a few miles across the Inland Sea from Aioi, showed a modest rate of increase, from 278 to 358 units. A third village, Yokogoshi, which started with 18 units in 1948, did not show any gain during the decade.

These differential rates of change present a special problem for the researcher who includes a dozen or more representative communities in his sample. In the case of a researcher who puts all his research eggs into one village basket, any change he finds in his village can be interpreted as a modification of the previous stage of development. But when a researcher adds more villages to his sample, the interpretation of changes and trends becomes more complex, because the particular circumstances of each village intervene to make a given change index very different from those of other villages.

Nevertheless, I think the data indicate that some very significant and widespread changes are taking place in our sample of Japanese villages. While the details differ somewhat from village to village, at the highest level of generalization we found a consistent trend toward change and this was the trend toward reducing the uncertainties and insecurities related to the occupation of farming.

In every village we asked the standard questions of what were the primary problems concerned with farming in their village and what solutions had been attempted in the last ten years. The answers we received touched most frequently on problems of land, water, crop yields, climate, markets, and transportation. On the problem of land, there was nearly unanimous agreement that the land reform has done much to encourage the proper care and use of land, especially for those who were former tenants. More than ever before, the pride of ownership that has resulted from the land reform has encouraged a more rational approach to land usage. At the same time, every village emphasized the shortage of land and those which had many repatriates from Manchuria and other former overseas areas were especially concerned with the shortage of land. On the other hand, some progress had been made toward a more efficient utilization of the available land. Where possible, land was being reclaimed, and experiments were being tried with new crops, such as tobacco and tomato, in regions where they had never been grown before. Though the new Japanese Constitution nullified the primogeniture system, the pressure on the land was too great to make practical the further fractionization of the land implied in the new law.

After land, water was designated as the most important problem facing the villagers in the past decade. Here again, thanks to government subsidies, considerable progress has been made in a majority of the villages. Dams were constructed and irrigation canals straightened in areas where water was needed, and tile drainage pipes were laid in areas where too much water was the problem. Such man-made controls over the water supply not only made possible some of the reclamation projects just alluded to but also ended long-standing feuds between hamlets over water rights. Also, as the result of the so-called amalgamation program, in which several independent villages were annexed into a single administration unit, a more equitable distribution of water supply was possible. Where formerly several villages fought with one another for the water from the same river, they now were able to handle the allocation of water through a single administrative agency. The same kind of co-operative spirit was possible for handling flood conditions where too much water could be equally damaging to the crops. Thus, in most villages we found that some basic improvement had been made to insure a better supply or control of water in the ten-year period.

In addition to these age-old problems of farming, there was the concern about ways of improving the yield of specific crops. Here we found a veritable chemical and biological revolution taking place. While not every farmer was taking advantage of them, practically all farmers were aware of the contributions of chemical and biological sciences to farming. In chemicals, the new commercial fertilizers were replacing human manure because it was more reliable and yielded greater results. Weed-killers, insecticides, and soil conditioners of a wide variety were being used not only to reduce possible crop damage but also to reduce the labor required in farming. Knowledge of plant and animal biology was being rapidly diffused. While the farmers did not understand the intricacies of recent biochemistry and genetics, the majority appreciated the advantages to be gained from the new strains of seeds and livestock. For example, in rice, strains with early or late maturation, with resistance to cold weather and to special kinds of disease, were being utilized. With poultry and livestock, care in diet, inoculations, and sanitary measures was being exercised. Incidentally, there was a noticeable increase in milk cows for most villages. The number of draft animals declined, however, probably in response to the increase of small cultivators and single-axle tractors. Thus there was general agreement in the villages not only that the quality of the crops had improved over the past ten years but also that the yield per acre had increased.

The problems associated with crop production are only one side of the coin. The other side of the coin deals with marketing and obtaining a fair price. The villagers were concerned with the marketing of their produce and livestock. They were not only production oriented; they were also becoming market oriented. The national government had established a compulsory crop-insurance system, improved dissemination of marketing news, and a compulsory delivery-quota system for rice. A wide variety of marketing co-operatives, often for such specific products as milk, oranges, or tea, has been organized to provide the individual with a greater control than formerly over the price of their commodities. Transportation to the markets has also been a recent theme in our investigations. A particular case is that of the Shimane village, which has been lobbying for the construction of a national highway that would traverse a mountain range separating the Japan Sea coast and Hiroshima Prefecture. If such a highway were built, this Shimane village could send its produce to the Hiroshima markets, where prices are better than the village's present markets for produce. In every village

in our sample, roads have been widened and truck and bus transportation has been improved.

To summarize briefly, our investigations suggest that a good deal of the more obvious changes taking place in the villages can be viewed as contributing toward a reduction of some of the basic sources of insecurity that face every Japanese farmer. In a word, these modifications in land tenureship, farm technology, and marketing were intended to reduce the uncertainties inherent in the occupation of farming. As an occupation, it is in this regard little different from urban trades, where union and other labor associations attempt to seek immunity from certain risks inherent in their employment.

There is, of course, more to a Japanese village than its agricultural production. There is the complex aspect concerned with human relationships and cultural transmission. In this latter aspect, too, some innovations have been noted. But here again we need to discuss these changes at the most general level, for each was unique because of its particular historical and situational circumstances.

One of the most obvious changes was the general proliferation of partly functional, partly social, organizations, such as the women's clubs, the P.-T.A., the 4-H youth clubs, and the like. In most villages we visited we found such organizations active in purely social activities as well as serving as channels of communication for new ideas concerning home improvement, health and sanitation, self-improvement, local history, and to a lesser extent political and economic ideology. These organizations also sponsored lectures often given by specialists from the government farm-extension service, sight-seeing tours, and even work projects that would "uplift" and raise the social horizon of the members. They also served informally for discussion and helped to establish social norms concerning issues in their changing world. For example, in several villages it was claimed that young married women used such meetings to plot strategies to educate their mothers-in-law to the changing times. Mothers-in-law, in turn, were saying that it was becoming impossible to control and discipline their sons' wives because young mothers wanted more freedom and greater independence with regard to raising their own children and with regard to division of labor in the farm household.

Other changes were less obvious. One concerned the slight tendency noted toward a decline in the strength of the larger kinship group and extended family. Many have commented that young people, in particular, were becoming more self-centered, independent, and individualistic. The elders claimed that the young were in need of learning and observing the traditional ethics (obligation system). Exchange labor for agricultural functions as well as for ceremonial occasions was frequently said to be on the decline, though communal service for road repairs, cleaning of streets, and the like was still maintained. When extra help was needed, most informants stated that they would prefer to hire someone rather than be obligated under an exchange labor system.

There was no question that the standard of living had increased in the past

decade, as indicated by a number of indices. Most villages had five or six television sets. Sewing machines, washing machines, electric rice cookers, and other appliances were on the increase. Certain basic house improvements, such as tile baths (in place of wooden baths), piped-in water systems, improved cooking stoves, and wide glass windows in the kitchens are examples of this. The diet has been generally improved, and fish and meat are increasingly consumed. Taxi and bus service to nearby towns was generally available, and youths in particular availed themselves of the movies in town. Motorcycles were purchased by some of the wealthier farmers' sons. Clothes, even the farmer's work clothes, were no longer made at home but were purchased readymade. The village stores carried a varied stock of canned foods, appliances, sporting goods, and other so-called luxury items. In short, the gap in living standards between the villagers and the urbanites was being reduced even though the urban population in the postwar years was enjoying an unprecedented prosperity.

So far, I have described the more obvious and directly observable aspects of change in the thirteen rural communities of our sample. Much more detail could be given, but I would like to shift to a discussion of whether or not the rural communities are undergoing a more fundamental reorientation and to raise the question whether the improvements in farm technology, the rising standards of living, and the modifications in social relationship mean a significant change in rural life from the past. I would like to ask whether the attitude toward the future is changing in some significant way and whether the younger generation of farmers is being socialized in the same attitudes toward life and farming held by the older villagers.

My answer to these questions is that "it depends." It depends upon one's frame of reference and what one takes as the base line for measuring these changes. If we compare the contemporary village situation with conditions found in the years between the two world wars, especially in the 1930's, then I would say the change is considerable. On the other hand, if our base line is the Meiji period and the beginning of Japan's modernization, then, paradoxically as it might seem, I would say that the present trends are a continuation of the traditions of the past and that they constitute no significant departure from the past. From this perspective the years between the two world wars seem to be a brief deviation from the trends established earlier.

To explain this, a brief review of the history of modern agriculture is necessary. For convience, this history can be divided into two periods. The first, covering the years from the Meiji Restoration to 1917 at the beginning of World War I, was the period of initial industrialization for Japan. The other period covers the years in between the two world wars, and it represents a "coming-to-term" period of economic development.

The First Period. In their concern for modernization of their society, the Meiji leaders rightly saw the necessity for increasing agricultural production. As a consequence of their efforts and the response given by the farm villages to these efforts, agriculture played a key role in the early phase of Japan's march

toward industrialization and urbanization. The agricultural village provided the essential manpower and population resource for the growing urban areas and industries, it developed the food surplus necessary to sustain the growing cities, and it created the initial capital resources for Japan to begin her industrialization.

During this fifty-year period of early industrialization, Japan's population nearly doubled. It expanded from an estimated 30 million to about 58 million in 1918. The Japanese farmer, in spite of such rapid growth, was able to produce sufficient agricultural surplus to keep the demand and the supply for food in balance. Though land had been cultivated intensively for many centuries before, the arable land was increased some 35 per cent in the Meiji period, from 4½ million to 6 million hectares. The productivity of land also expanded, so that by 1918 it had increased 80 per cent over its base period. Each year during this initial phase of modernization, the food supply was increased at an average rate of 2 per cent. Moreover, the contribution of agriculture to the expansion of foreign trade was not insignificant. "Export surpluses" in silk were produced to enable Japan to purchase necessary foreign goods.

During this period, also, agriculture constituted the main source of saving and capital formation. One necessarily crude index of this can be gleaned from tax revenues collected by the central government. The land tax, most of which came from farm lands, constituted more than 85 per cent of total revenues in 1882–92. Other forms of tax revenue, such as income tax and customs duty, did not substantially increase until the end of the Meiji period. As late as 1913–17, the land tax amounted to nearly 38 per cent of the total government revenues.

Obviously, in order for agriculture to play such a key role in the initial industrialization phase and to increase its productivity, some changes in agricultural technology was necessary. Ronald Dore (1959, 1960) describes how the Meiji government and the progressive farmers, particularly the landlords, cooperated to achieve this significant increase in agricultural yields. He describes experimentation with European seeds and tools, how successful innovations in one farm region would be diffused to other regions of the country, how experimental stations were established, how agricultural bulletins were published and disseminated, and how local agricultural associations and study groups were encouraged. Farm exhibitions were held, new seed strains were exchanged, model villages were described, and a general enthusiasm for improvement in agricultural technology was established.

The most important innovators during this period were the large landlords, many of whom were ex-samurai and literate men, who actively promoted experimentation in new seeds, new fertilizers, and new weeding methods. They appreciated the fact that such innovations served their own economic interests, but they also encouraged among their tenants and fellow villagers a positive attitude toward novelty, science, and progress. The establishment of the public school system during this period reinforced the same attitudes. In short, the landlords during this period were production oriented and actively engaged in

the business of farming. Very few absentee landlords were present at this time, but they were to appear later.

While the improvements in fertilizer, seed, tools, and techniques of farming were the most important factors in expanding agricultural productivity, improvements in land use were also made. These required capital and were therefore generally beyond the means of small farmers and tenants. The Meiji government, with the assistance of some private landowners, reclaimed additional land, constructed irrigation works, and improved drainage facilities.

It is difficult to convey the spirit of the times in such impersonal terms. Perhaps some biographical data will help. Ronald Dore (1960, p. 82) characterizes the accomplishment of Karasawa Annin in this manner:

> A samurai of Aizu, a fief scholar and official, he was imprisoned for anti-Imperialist activity at the time of the Restoration. Released, he set off, in 1873, to start a ranch in the northern tip of Honshu. He was given a government subsidy, employed two Englishmen for five years as advisors, and by 1876 was able to show the Emperor on a visit 180 head of cattle of mixed Western and indigenous breeds, and 24 horses. He also experimented with various new crops and carried out afforestation schemes. By 1889 he had created a village as an appendage to his ranch which he then left to his son. He himself moved to Tokyo to establish selling outlets for the ranch's products. He became founder of the Japan Livestock Association before he died a few years later.

The innovations and the spirit of the Meiji times just alluded to reminds one of the conditions that we found in our village survey. We found progressive farmers like Karasawa Annin, we found a healthy respect for scientific methods in agriculture, and we found ample evidence for the successful diffusion of new agricultural practices and tolls. These are the reasons for my suggestion that, if we take the Meiji period as the benchmark for measuring change, the intensified activity in the contemporary farm villages represents no basic change in patterns. If anything, there were only style changes. The Meiii farmers did not use electric pumps and gasoline-powered cultivators, of course, but these are mere "stylistic" changes and not changes in "basic" patterns—to use Kroeber's designations. These machines have not changed the sequence or the nature of operations in the agricultural cycle. They and other improvements of the 1950's were refinements built upon the Meiji base.

Both the Meiji period and post–World War II farmers carried out their occupation within the traditional framework. Farming is still a small family operation, each household averaging about one hectare. The work still requires an inordinate amount of human labor. Primogeniture is still the rule of succession, and other sons leave the farm for other occupations. Rice is still the sacred crop, and paddy fields are the most desirable. Kinship relations and community solidarity are still vital to the daily operation of village affairs.

The Inter-War Period. Now let us look for a moment at the next period, the years covering 1918 to the beginning of World War II. World War I saw a spurt in the industrial development of Japan and a steady increase during the

rest of this period. Agricultural production, while it increased also, did not develop at the same rate. If we divide the economic factors into the usual primary, secondary, and tertiary industrial sectors, the primary or agricultural sector increased in net output from an index of 119 to 156. The index for the secondary or manufacturing sector increased from 123 to 477; for the tertiary, from 138 to 397. Thus, in relative terms agricultural output declined vis-à-vis the other sectors of the economy.

Another indication of the relative decline of agriculture is the statistics on real income for the three sectors of the economy. By 1939–42, the real income per gainfully occupied person in primary industry (agriculture) rose to ¥220. In secondary industry it climbed to ¥928, and in tertiary industry to ¥838. The farmer's share of the national income declined sharply in this period between the two world wars.

Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1960, pp. 56–57), who provided these statistics, comment that such figures represent a "shift from the period of agricultural 'balanced growth' to the period of agriculture as a retarded or depressed sector."

Throughout the entire period, the number of farm households did not change and the farm labor force remained constant, between 14 and 16 million. The acreage under cultivation did not change to any appreciable extent. Meanwhile, the birth rates were high and the nation was producing during this period a population almost equivalent to the entire population in Tokugawa times. It was clear that the agricultural sector of the economy was producing a surplus population that was not being absorbed in the non-farm sectors. Increasingly, the villages were being characterized by low productivity and overemployment. Food production also lagged behind population growth. To feed the population, vast quantities of rice and other products were imported from Korea and Taiwan. Such imports drove downward the price levels of farm products.

The principal change of the period was in the landlords' role. With the depression of the 1930's and the declining price of farm products, many owner-cultivators lost their lands and absentee landlordism increased. Tenants had a difficult time feeding and clothing their families. The landlords as a class shifted in their orientation from production to the market. No longer were they the innovators and progressive elements in rural development.

Symptomatic of the changing orientations of the landlords and the general poverty prevailing in the villages, the so-called rice riots set the tone for the countryside. Numerous farmers' movements developed, sectionalism between the city and the countryside was expressed in slogans, and a general regressive attitude toward farm problems was expressed by the Ministry of Agriculture and echoed by the landlord. For instance, in 1934 one bureau chief in the Ministry addressed a national conference in these terms:

> "What the village needs is not so much people skilled in agricultural techniques or the theory of management, as a peasant who can wield a mattock and experience a sense of joy in doing so. In the depth of distress which our villages have reached the creation of 'peasants of the soil' in the true sense of those words offers the only possible road to rehabilitation" [Dore, 1959, p. 101].

In line with the rise of nationalism, the conservative position in agriculture was fostered by the famous *nōhon shūgi* movement. This movement spread with religious zeal that contradicted many of the progressive gains made in the Meiji period. The *nōhon shūgi* movement promoted the ideology that agriculture was the principal base of nationhood; that the farmers were therefore serving both a sacred and a patriotic duty; that poverty and other economic problems of the farm could be solved by diligence, thrift, and personal sacrifice; that the farmers were to eschew the life of the urban culture and to center their own social and cultural life within the framework of a self-sufficient village community. *Nōhon shūgi*'s answer to the farmer's question, "Why am I so poor?" was, "You don't work hard enough; you don't have the proper spiritual attitude; and you forget that agriculture is a way of life, not a business."

Perhaps the real problem in this phase of Japan's economic growth and urbanization process was that the non-agricultural sectors were not able to absorb more of the surplus farm-labor force than they did. The world-wide depression, the rise of nationalism, and the traditional methods of agricultural production also contributed to the problems. In any event, where agriculture played a dominant role in the previous history, it now played a passive and limiting role. Where it had contributed substantially to the flow of investment capital, it now exerted a drag.

Given these conditions as a benchmark by which to measure postwar changes, we can see that the present farm situation can be considered as both a change and a departure. Instead of a moralistic or religious orientation toward solving the economic and technical problems of farming, the present trends clearly suggest a strong scientific, rational, and empirical approach toward their solution. In place of Confucian moral principles, the contemporary ideology recommends closer attention to the latest genetic and biochemical facts obtained from the government experimental stations. Instead of subscribing to a belief that agriculture is the sacred base of the society, the present outlook is to treat it as an occupation and enterprise, albeit honorable, but not one charged with nationalistic overtones. Instead of encouraging a tightly knit and self-sufficient community social structure, the mid-twentieth century trend is to bring the village in closer contact and a sense of interdependence with the larger region and especially with the urban society. The industrial culture of the urban community has all but shattered the isolationism of the villages.

In conclusion I would like to present one more benchmark for evaluating the current changes we have observed in the village. If we stake out a benchmark that is oriented to the future, we may be able to see to what extent the present developments can be considered as basic and significant trends for the future.

In spite of the rosy picture that seems to prevail in the current agricultural

situation, the future does not look bright for the average Japanese farmer. His morale may be good and his enthusiasm for technological innovations may be high, but the fact remains that his income is not keeping pace with the increased incomes of other sectors of the economy. An awareness of this was indicated in our interviews when we asked about income. The majority we interviewed stated that their relative income was the highest during the few years following the end of the war. Since that time, they said, they have been feeling the pressure of the high price of goods. With the pressures for them to buy materials for home improvements and for mechanized farm tools, the farmers are feeling the "price squeeze." The price of agricultural products is being reduced relative to the inflated cost of manufactured foods upon which they have come to be so dependent.

One way to increase his income would be to obtain more land, but under the present laws this is virtually impossible for the average farmer. The prospects are poor for the farmers to continue receiving the large government subsidies for improving agricultural lands, irrigation works, and the like. From the standpoint of the nation, it seems that the economic rewards would be greater if the government invested in sectors of the economy other than agriculture. While the farmer might, as is done in the United States, form a strong political organization and lobby for greater benefits from the government, this in the long run would seem to be uneconomical and merely a stopgap measure. He might also attempt to exert through improved organizational means a better position in the marketing of his products. But the fact that many of the domestic crops can be purchased on the international market at lower prices than he can produce them suggests some sort of limitation on this score. Co-operatives and government price support have no doubt helped in this regard, but the village leaders we interviewed were pessimistic about it.

The relative decline in the farmer's income is being accentuated by a number of features in the contemporary rural scene. One is the effect of various mass media, such as radio, newspapers, and TV, which entice the rural folk into trying to keep up with their city cousins. Both adults and children are aware of the latest fads in diet, clothes, hair styles, and other costly items. The schools play a role in the farmers' aspirations for a higher standard of living. As part of the indoctrination program of the schools to train children to be forward-looking, progressive, and more hospitable to change, they encourage more expensive tastes in entertainment, recreational activities, and hobbies like photography.

The Japanese farmer, like the American farmer, is caught up in this dilemma:

> On the one hand the farmer participates in the larger society in which he must compete with people who have ready access to specialized knowledge, who are highly organized, and who enjoy the material benefits and leisure time of a highly developed economy. On the other hand, he is bound by the limitations of a relatively inflexible land-based enterprise, subject to the uncertainties of natural forces, of a lack of organization for effective market bargaining, of a lack of leisure pursuits, and of the carryover of values and a social structure more appropriate for the model T Ford than for the fin-tail car [Wilkening, 1958, p. 36].

In light of these facts, it would seem that the only assured way of increasing the farmers' share of the national income—about 40 per cent of the labor force are farmers, and their proportion of the national income is about 17 per cent—would be to increase the farm holdings of each farm household. This in turn means that the number of farm households needs to be sharply decreased. Large-scale farming would make possible a greater mechanization of the farms. The number of farmers with little managerial ability will be reduced (even with present conditions of rapid spread of farm technology, these are a problem), and the more efficient farmers will remain.

A not unrelated development would be the greater encouragement of livestock and dairying. Experts from the World Bank have suggested both the latter and expansion of landholding size.

Thus if we view them from the standpoint just suggested, the attempts at change over the ten-year period seem feeble indeed. The so-called changes seem merely to be refinements of past tendencies and traditions. The land-reform program and the government subsidies have done much to raise the standard of living and to rationalize the farm economy, but the basic problem remains unsolved. The farmer is receiving a *decreasing* share of the national income and to continue to do so would be to keep some 30–40 percent of the population in a depressed condition.

The solution to increasing the farmer's share of national income is to reduce the number of farm households and to increase the size of farm acreage per farming unit. It is the solution toward which American farmers are moving. Some suggestions in this direction were made by our informants in Japan. One agricultural consultant in Iwate Prefecture suggested the move toward farm corporations. Another even suggested "vertical integration." Whatever the special directions taken toward solving this problem, the principal decision involves something more than economics. It involves a question of values, and as such it has implications for Japanese politics, economy, and society. It also means that the Japanese farm family system will have to socialize its children for urban types of occupation. The idea that the Japanese farm is an ideal "seedbed" for tomorrow's generation needs to be given up because such an idea is simply not true. Japanese urban families are providing a more alert and realistic approach than are farm families to problems the next generation will face as adults.

In conclusion, let me return to the theoretical issue with which I began this paper. It was a question of the frame of reference for evaluating culture change taking place in the Japanese farm villages. We have seen that if the Meiji period is taken as the base line, then the present conditions seem to be a logical development of the trends foreshadowed in that period. If, on the other hand, we use the regressive period between the two world wars, then the present village situation

can be viewed as a renaissance and therefore a distinct change. Or, if we look to the future development of the total Japanese society, we find that the Japanese villages are still conservative, tradition-bound social structures, and therefore unchanging.

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

AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE: CHANGING PARADIGMS AND RESOURCES FOR THE STUDY OF JAPAN

by Iwao Ishino

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Of the many factors affecting the development of Japanese studies two will be considered here, research methods and financial support. In reviewing the development of Japanese studies during the past two decades, I find that the research methodology followed has been redundant, repetitious, and has few surprises. At the same time, resources for research in Japan as well as other foreign areas have considerably dwindled (cf. Deutsch 1968). Support for research on Japanese studies, especially in anthropology, psychology and sociology, has not grown to a degree commensurate with the increased numbers of specialists.

A question I would like to raise is whether the dwindling of resources for Japanese studies is in any way the consequence of the methodology and approach. If so, can something be done by our academic community to improve our research methods and will these improved research strategies be rewarded by greater public and foundation support? In this paper I try to consider evidence bearing upon these questions and make some personal evaluations about the total research enterprise, but I do not present any very specific plans—for the setting of plans and programs is one of the purposes of this conference.

Research Methods, Strategies, and Priorities

Before we enter directly into the problem I have posed, a brief over-view of the literature might be helpful. Richard Beardsley's *Field Guide to Japan* (1959), published ten years ago, is still current in many respects and contains helpful hints about the many dimensions of conducting research in Japan. In addition to this basic document, several papers summarize the literature as seen from different disciplinary angles. For a summary of anthropology in Japan, see Sofue (1962); for sociology, Ariga (1965); and for a recent statement on social psychology, Wagatsuma (1969) is helpful.

The papers by Sofue, Ariga, and Wagatsuma concentrate on the contributions by Japanese scholars. To obtain some idea about American contributions, I went to the annual bibliographic issues of the *Journal of Asian*

Studies and tallied the number of books and articles listed each year for the period 1964-1968. There I found an average annual listing of 14.0 books and 54.8 articles under the category "Social Science," the main entry for works in sociology, psychology, and anthropology. The number of entries under Social Science as compared with other categories may be seen from the following:

	1964 — 1968 AVERAGE PER YEAR	
	BOOKS	ARTICLES
Economics	23.6	69.4
Industry and Labor	14.5	55.2
Politics and Government	11.0	60.2
Law and Constitution	18.2	18.8
Language	16.0	15.4
Philosophy and Religion	20.2	48.8
History and Archeology	31.0	57.6
Social Science	14.0	54.8

I think that such numbers of new writings each year indicate that knowledge is increasing and that Japan specialists are very active indeed. Yet, one wonders what the impact of this literature has been on behavioral science as a whole. For example, in the volume edited by Berelson and Steiner (1964), *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings,* only three citations on Japan are given in its index, which includes thousands of entries. Perhaps one can argue that such a limited number of references to studies of Japan reflects the predilections of the editors as much as it does the quantity and quality of the actual contributions made by the Japan specialists in the social sciences. But there are other characteristics of the published research that should concern us. These relate to the theoretical assumptions and value orientations of American social scientists who have worked in Japan.

It seems somewhat ironical that in his introduction to a recent book on the modernization of Japan, Ronald Dore (1967: 3) begins with this statement: "This is an old-fashioned book." He means that most of the papers in the book were framed in terms of concepts and problems first posed by sociologists of the nineteenth century—Maine, Spencer, Durkheim, Weber, Toennies.

I reviewed my own studies of Japan as well as those that have contributed most to my understanding of modern Japan (Embree, Benedict, Abegglen, Dore, Beardsley, Reischauer, Bellah), and could not escape the conclusion that what Dore said of the papers in his volume also applied to most studies of Japan that I am familiar with. Why is this so? During my graduate days at the end of World War II, there was the hope or rather the certainty that the basic theoretical frameworks of sociologists, psycholo-

gists, and anthropologists would converge and foster greater interdisciplinary cooperation (Gillin 1959). At that time various nineteenth-century conceptions as further developed by Wirth, Redfield, and Parsons seemed to be the most likely conceptual schemes to unify the social or behavioral sciences. Moreover, as interdisciplinary orientation was encouraged, so also was a cross-cultural perspective, for it was thought that a truly culture-free framework could develop in no other way. We then held a one-world view, with the atom bomb as the driving force behind that point of view.

Some of us who passed through graduate school in this period now look back upon it as the age of uncomplicated innocence. It was believed that however imperfect our society was, its major thrust would inexorably be in the direction of a just and humane social order. Our own values were oriented toward humanitarian, people-centered goals; individual freedom, permissive leadership, and social justice would prevail as society moved away from the bonds of traditionalism (Pfiffner 1962). Parsons' idea of "pattern variables" was a convenient package for these ideas and provided an essentially rational model of human behavior.

As American social scientists went to Japan to lecture or do research in this postwar period, they framed research problems within this paradigm. Their image of society was of a system moving toward integration. They regarded social conflict and tension as aberration or deviation from the norm. John Hall (1968) informs us that the reaction of some Japanese intellectuals was ". . . to view our approach as the product of insensitivity, affluence or 'bourgeois objectivity.' "

In the United States, our old view of the world is now being challenged, and the challenge is no doubt related to our domestic problems; social issues inevitably threaten the validity of existing paradigms. Frank (1967) argues with considerable cogency that the present American social science paradigms and their associated researchers are empirically wrong, theoretically inadequate, and ineffective for formulating policy. An equally severe evaluation of existing conceptual models is given by Walter Buckley (1967), who argues for another kind of paradigm, a modern systems theory.

The nineteenth-century foundations of our present conceptual schemes have provided American scholars with a more or less common framework to view both the structure and the changes taking place in Japanese society. Boguslaw (MS) refers to this kind of pervasive but subtle control over the direction of research as "paradigm specification." Such paradigm specification has focused the attention of American researchers on continuities with the past which are seen in the present society—we see "familism" in industrial structures, and *oyabun-kobun* relationships in modern contexts; we see *on, giri, ninjo*, and *amaeru* traits as characterizing the dominant

features of interpersonal relations—and such traditional elements have been interpreted as stabilizing forces in the changing society.

But while the paradigm specification has been enormously helpful in aiding us to select specific research designs, data-collecting-and-processing techniques, and modes of interpretation, we are now troubled by the criticism that appears from within the ranks of social science about our theoretical assumptions. Many argue for a new theoretical perspective emphasizing process. Religious organizations, especially the new religions, and various kinds of protest (or revitalization) movements, including campus power struggles, should be understood from this new point of view. An interesting example of this kind of study is provided by Passin's "Sources of Protest in Japan" (1962). The new perspective should also orient research toward understanding problems of public policy. David B. Truman (1968) writes of the paradox that as a social science achieves greater sophistication, it tends to become less involved with issues of public policy. An example is the current literature on the *dozoku* and family structure of Japan. Exceptionally, Fukutake's perceptive analysis (1962: 46-52) relates research to issues of public policy.

Boguslaw's paradigm specification is a convenient way to characterize the manner in which the old view governed our approach to the study of Japanese personality, culture, and society. It is interesting that Boguslaw was led to this idea by Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (1964). Kuhn demonstrates that scientific breakthroughs have resulted from the discovery of new paradigms. Perhaps the new paradigm of which we see only faint outlines at this time may lead to a minor breakthrough in the social scientific studies of Japan.

Resources for Supporting Research on Japan.

So far I have considered the methodological issue or, more specifically, the framework in which research has been designed. The other side of the research equation is the support for research. It includes human resources as well as physical facilities.

In September, 1968, the Social Science Research Council established "The Area and Language Programs Review Committee" for the purpose of examining the role of area studies programs in American universities. The group is asked to look into such complex problems as the role these programs play in higher education, the kinds of training which foreign area scholars receive, and how this training relates to subsequent research and teaching experiences. This series of problems was delineated at the request of the United States Office of Education (AAS *Newsletter,* 1969, p. 16), which suggests that the study of foreign countries is more than an internal problem of the academic community and extends into the national purview. It also suggests there is some unease about inefficiencies in training, mis-

guided allocation of funds, and current conceptions of research priorities. These same issues could be legitimately raised about the training and utilization of the talents of the Japan specialists.

Through the courtesy of Frank J. Shulman of the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Michigan, I have been able to obtain a list of "dissertations in the field of behavior sciences related to Japan." This is an incomplete listing, but it represents an adequate sample for our present purposes. From this list, I have tabulated the following distribution of Ph.D. dissertations categorized according to discipline and year of completion.

	BEFORE 1945	1946-1955	1956-1965	1966-PRESENT	TOTAL
Anthropology	2	10	13	3	28
Sociology	1	3	15	2	21
Psychology	0	0	4	1	5
Other Disciplines	3	2	6	4	15
	6	15	38	10	69

These 69 dissertations presumably represent people trained in a social science discipline who have done research on Japan. Shulman's data also includes 33 other dissertations concerning Japanese living outside Japan (mostly Japanese-Americans). In my opinion, 69 Ph.D.'s is not a very large pool of human resource for research in such a complex society as Japan.

I have also considered the universities that trained these Ph.D.'s. Since the six persons who were trained before 1945 belong to the generation of graduate students before World War II (some going back to the early 1900's), I dropped them from consideration here. This then leaves a sample of 63 persons who received doctorates after the war. Of these, it is interesting to note that 34 (more than half) were trained at four institutions: Harvard University (11), Columbia University (9), University of Michigan (8), and University of Chicago (6). Cornell University produced four, and New York University and Syracuse University each three. The following universities awarded two Ph.D.'s each: Princeton University, University of Washington, University of Southern California, University of California at Berkeley, University of Illinois, and Michigan State University. The remainder of the Ph.D.'s in the sample came from universities which awarded one doctorate each. The fact that universities such as Harvard, Columbia, Michigan, and Chicago turned out the most Ph.D.'s in Japanese studies is not surprising, however, for that is where the important training resources are located.

If we look at this pool of 63 Ph.D.'s to see how many are currently supported by grants for research in Japan, some added measure of productivity is revealed. I regard as disappointing the facts that I have been able to

obtain. For example, only one of the 29 Grants for Research on Asia awarded in 1968-1969 jointly by American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council went for research in Japan to an advanced scholar who represented the social sciences of concern to this conference—anthropology, sociology, and psychology. Seven other grants were for research in Japan, but they represented other disciplines, such as history, political science, and economics.

Another indication of the state of research support is the National Science Foundation Individual Research Grants. In 1968, 124 awards were given to anthropologists; of these, only one was given for research in Japan, and this was in archeology (AAA *Newsletter,* December 1968, pp. 5-6).

The same dearth of awards to anthropologists specializing in Japan is found in the Postdoctoral and Special Research Fellowships of the National Institute of Mental Health. Of the 14 awards made in the academic year 1967-1968 to anthropologists, none was given to a Japan specialist. While I do not have comparable data for sociologists and psychologists specializing in Japan, I believe the findings will be the same. It appears that scholars in these fields either are not applying for grants for Japan or are unsuccessful in their attempts. My guess is that the former circumstance is more common.

Now what about doctoral candidates who constitute the future pool of Japan specialists? In 1968, SSRC-ACLS Foreign Area Fellowships for doctoral candidates numbered 45, of which 16 were for research in Japan. But of these 16, only one (in sociology) was for research in the fields of concern here. Awards of the National Institute of Mental Health (Postdoctoral Research Fellowships) in 1968 were more generous to anthropology. Of the 69 grantees in anthropology, four were for research in Japan, as compared with one in the previous year.

The average annual production of Ph.D.'s in the three disciplines for the 23 years of the postwar period is 2.7. As judged by the grants currently being awarded to doctoral candidates, this average will probably remain constant.

Some language institutes provide potential support for Japanese studies, such as the Summer Far Eastern Language Institute at Indiana University, which is sponsored by the "Committee on Institutional Cooperation" composed of eleven midwestern universities; the Inter-University Center for Japanese Language Studies in Tokyo, which is supported in part by the Carnegie and Ford foundations; and the NDEA Summer Language Institute for Specialist Training at various universities around the country. But these programs, while helpful, are adjuncts to the training of researchers.

In addition to the language training institutes, a number of Asian Studies programs have emerged in American universities. For understandable reasons these centers emphasize China, although Japan is also an essential area

of interest. The February, 1969 issue of the *Newsletter* of the Association for Asian Studies (pp. 30-36) briefly reviews the area programs at Carleton College, Columbia University, Connecticut College and Wesleyan University, East-West Center of the University of Hawaii, Ohio State University, Pennsylvania State University, and the University of Pittsburgh. In other issues of the same *Newsletter*, the California Institute of Asian Studies in San Francisco and the programs of Duke University-University of North Carolina and Stanford University have also been described. It is my view that such programs are primarily oriented toward undergraduate instruction, and even though a master's degree may be offered, the curricula are designed for training teachers rather than advanced scholars.

If the signs are discouraging for a substantial increase in the number of anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists specializing in Japanese studies, support from foundations for facilitating research in these three fields also seems niggardly. The three disciplines currently receive substantially less support from foundations than do other scholarly fields, say, Japanese studies in economics, political science, or history. For example, the Ford Foundation gave to Columbia University a grant of $400,000 for research on "Japanese economic history and development"; the American Academy of Arts and Sciences the sum of $100,000 for a three-year study of the impact of modern weapons and technology on international relations; a grant of $100,000 to the Japan Economic Research Center (Tokyo) both for training and for supporting international conferences; $100,000 to the Center for Modern Economics at Rikkyo University for research on Japan's postwar economic growth; and awarded Harvard University $800,000 "to help support research projects on contemporary Japan at the University's East Asia Research Center." I do not know what proportion of the Harvard grant went to what disciplines, but I suspect that anthropology, psychology, and sociology are under-represented. The Ford Foundation should not be singled out. The Carnegie Corporation, for example, has awarded substantial sums of money to the University of Michigan's research project on the Political Modernization of Japan. Again, the same emphasis was made in the selection of disciplines.

If this interpretation of the trends of foundation support is correct, it seems to me that it gives warning about the future of studies of Japan by anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists. That is, the kind of research we are doing has less public support and is deemed less socially relevant than the research of other disciplines. (See Pierce 1968 for an eloquent statement on what constitutes "good" research.) In the first part of this paper, I suggested that, as social scientists, we should frame our research problems in ways that contribute toward an understanding of public

policy. Perhaps a more conscious effort on our part, both in training future students and in designing our own research would be rewarded with greater public support for our endeavors.

Support from foundations is concentrated in a limited number of universities such as Harvard, Columbia, Michigan, and Stanford, leaving scholars and students in less favored universities with a severe handicap. Some Japan specialists in the latter universities are therefore directing their research efforts away from Japanese studies and into areas where the research support is more easily available. Some foundation and federal support is going to a number of universities where there is no obvious strength in Japanese studies; however, this is not done to foster research but primarily to enhance the instructional program of undergraduate education and the training of public school teachers.

This pattern of "adding strength to strength" in granting funds is found not only in Japan studies, but in most other area studies. This general attitude, which is perhaps also the policy, is stated by Robert F. Byrnes (1968 p. 15), who argues that world conditions have changed since 1958 and, accordingly, the universities should change with regard to area studies. Then he builds his argument for an elite status for certain universities:

> . . . To begin with, we should recognize that we have successfully created institutions for training an adequate number of specialists for most foreign areas. There are exceptions, such as Vietnam, Southeast Asia in general, India, and Eastern Europe; but by and large, American institutions have created an adequate number of excellent graduate programs for training teachers and scholars for each of the foreign areas. Our main problem is that we should now begin to review the training we provide, because we have placed too high emphasis upon scholarship as compared with teaching. We are, in short, producing a sufficient number of theologians; we now need to produce more parish priests who will go out into the colleges and universities to increase enormously the quality and quantity of undergraduate education on all the foreign areas.

Insofar as Japan studies are concerned, I personally do not agree with Byrnes' conclusions that schools which produce the "theologians" have "excellent graduate programs." If what I have said about research methodology and theoretical perspectives in the earlier sections of this paper is taken seriously, something basic needs to be changed in the training of anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists for research in Japan. This may sound like sour grapes, but I hope the assessment of the situation will speak for itself. The older, well-established institutions are less likely to be innovative and to discover new approaches and paradigms than younger, less well-established institutions (Schon 1967: 109-111).

Concluding Remarks

Most of the foregoing pages have presented evidence for two claims: (1) that some doubts are being expressed within the social sciences about the theoretical assumptions governing current research designs and method-

ology, and (2), that, while the pool of Japan specialists has grown at an even rate, the support for research has been meager and the present number of Asian studies centers is insufficient to provide tenured academic positions for this growing population of specialists. These two claims are amplified by questions posed at the beginning of this paper: Is the dwindling of resources for Japan studies in any way the consequence of the research methodology being followed? If so, can something be done by our academic community to improve these methods, and will these improved strategies be rewarded by greater public and foundation support?

Finding a new paradigm for organizing research is largely a prerogative of the academic community. On the other hand, the public or foundation support for research is controlled by outside groups and determined by such non-research considerations as national political conditions and changing international alliances (Deutsch 1968). Thus, in the short run the ability of the academic community to do anything about gaining public support seems to be nonexistent. This community can only hope that the vicissitudes of American politics and international relations may unexpectedly change in the favorable direction.

In the long run, however, there is some hope. For the bulk of Japan specialists who—to use the terms of Byrnes' (1968)—are like parish priests, the immediate clients are students. These students are the future decision-makers. The more effective the specialists are as teachers, the greater should be the public recognition and support for Japanese studies that may eventually accrue. To help college instruction, then, books designed for a variety of student audiences should be substantially increased. Norbeck's *Changing Japan* is an example of a highly satisfactory text for some undergraduate courses on Japan where an up-to-date, personalized, and ethnographically rich text is desired.

Another aid toward reaching these long-term goals is a greater understanding of social issues gained through comparative study. This may require some "retooling" in order to learn as much about American issues as is known about comparable Japanese issues. The increasing volume of public lectures and writings on social issues should enhance the relevance of Japan studies in the public view.

Still another suggestion concerns improved scholarly coordination of research efforts. Some way must be found to improve communication, preferably before publication, among scholars so that data obtained by one scholar can complement the findings of another. At present, cooperation of this kind seems fortuitious. Cooperative effort may be arranged on an institutional level. Often a more efficient allocation of talents, facilities, students, and funds is possible if several colleges join forces on a common project. As mentioned earlier, this procedure has enabled several small colleges to manage an expensive overseas studies program.

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PATTERNS OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS*

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Not all of social science as it is known today is concerned with studies of human behavior under controlled laboratory conditions. Much of what occupies the attention of some groups of behavioral scientists is the careful recording of human events and activities which take place in their natural setting free from the manipulation of the scientific observer.

FACT GATHERING

Much energy is spent in tedious fact-gathering activity not completely different from those of a botanist who spends months and even years in foreign countries looking for specimens of flora.

Group Relations

It is due to those scientists who, by the dint of their intellectual curiosity, bring back important facts about diverse peoples that we have today a fair knowledge about the range of variation in human behavior and how different societies solve certain universal human problems.

We have, for instance, a fairly complete knowledge of the different ways in which families are organized and how variations in family structures are related to the socio-economic organization of the society, to the psychology of its people, and to the cultural traditions these people follow. We have a considerable amount of information about the ways in which children are trained in different societies, how relatives are reckoned, and how religious beliefs are conceptualized. But such studies are not ends in themselves. They provide social scientists with comparative materials not otherwise available. They provide the "stuff" which a comprehensive knowledge of human behavior must take into account.

Interpersonal Relations

One specific area within the general framework of comparative studies of human behavior that has been relatively neglected, however, is the examination of the different modes of interpersonal relations. By this we mean the different processes by which face-to-face associations are established outside of the family or kinship context, and of the rules, premises, and symbols underlying such relationships.

If we are able to accumulate more knowledge about these matters, it seems reasonable that we can understand better than we do today how "grass roots" social movements are begun, how "behind-the-scenes deals" between politicians are made, how informal trade regulations and price agreements are informally maintained, how racketeering and other extra-legal organizations come into being, and how fanatic cults gain adherents. While the human relations involved in these matters are fairly well understood by the experts for the situation in the United States, we cannot assume that these American patterns apply to social movements, political deals, business combines, and the like which take place in other societies with a different cultural tradition. Much more information concerning "social relational" patterns needs to be systematically collected.

Study Made During Allied Occupation of Japan

It is with respect to these patterns of social relations, particularly those

* This is a brief report of one aspect of the social science project, "Research in Japanese Social Relations," at Ohio State University. The project is directed by Professor John W. Bennett of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology.

manifested in a certain non-Western society, that the project, "Research in Japanese Social Relations," has been devoting the past two years. The original materials used for this project were collected during the recent Allied Occupation of Japan and they constitute a good portion of the corpus of research of the Occupation's Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division.†

RITUAL KINSHIP, A SYSTEM OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP

As an illustration of the kind of problems pursued by this Project this paper will describe briefly a widespread and complex pattern of inter-personal relations found in Japan.

This pattern-complex, known most commonly as the *oyabun-kobun* system, is one in which unrelated persons enter into a compact and assume obligations, privileges, and rights of a familial nature. An employer, for instance, may enter into such a compact with some of his workers and maintain certain traditional, paternalistic, and "personalized" relations with these workers, but not with reference to other workers. Whether or not he manifests economically "rational" and self-interested orientation toward a given worker, then, depends in large part on the existence or absence of *oyabun-kobun* patterns in the relationship.

Not Unique to Japan

At the time field investigations were being carried out in Japan, it was believed that such a social relational system was unique to Japan.

Subsequent documentary investigation for comparative materials has revealed that such was not the case and that many societies throughout the world have similar patterns of relationship as, for example, in some European countries like Spain where industrialization has not been complete. Indeed, such a system of social relationships is so common that anthropologists have recently designated it by the technical term, "ritual kinship system."

How the System Works in Japan

Briefly, the ritual kinship system works like this in Japan:

Let us suppose that several unrelated people wish either to promote or to maintain against outsiders some vested interest which is not amply protected under the existing legal system. Thus, a group of street-stall merchants who want to protect their squatter's right on a section of the public sidewalk, a collection of casual laborers who want to keep the available sources of employment open to themselves, a gang of racketeers who want to prevent other gangs from encroaching upon their territory, a union of traditional artists who want to restrict and control their field of specialization, and a coalition of unaffiliated politicians interested in promoting certain political ends (e.g., a neo-fascist one) are all examples of individuals who lack legal and statutory protection of their interests in Japan. Typically, people in such circumstances, by mutual agreement and sometimes by intimidation, enter into a compact to assume obligations of a diffuse nature which are aimed to protect the interests of the group. The relationship is formally established by means of a ritual *sake* drinking ceremony involving some of the expressive symbolisms of kinship and marriage. The *sake,* or rice-wine, for example, is said to symbolize blood. Supernatural, rather than legal, sanctions are implied by taking the vow in the presence of a deity relevant to the group. Both the terms of address and the designation of roles within the group are patterned on the Japanese family system: the leader becomes a ritual parent (*oyabun*) and his followers, ritual children (*kobun*). These followers in turn are ranked in status designating "elder brother" and "younger brother" roles. A specific group of ritual parent and his followers, thus formed, constitutes a symbolic family group, and often assumes a "family" name. Some groups even have genealogies of ancestors traced through this ritual family line for five or six generations.

† This division has a staff of some 50 Japanese social scientists and five American social analysts. The large staff and the complete logistic support provided by the Occupation permitted the collection of data of a magnitude and depth difficult to duplicate under ordinary conditions of research support. The supervisor of the present project and the author were, respectively, Division Chief and research analyst of the Occupation's research division.

"Family" Coalitions

Not only is this nuclear group formed but several distinct "families" in may form combines or coalitions by one or both of these two methods:

One way is for the several leaders of these unitary families to enter into a brother compact (solemnized by *sake* drinking), thus uniting at the same time the membership, w facilities, and political influence controlled by their respective families. The other meth for the ritual parent (*oyabun*) of a given family to encourage his followers to recruit establish dependent "families" of their own. When this is done, the original ritual p becomes a "great parent" (*o-oyabun*) to the newest recruits and the recruits, in turn, be ritually related not only to their immediate leader but also to the original leader. Thu extending the relationships by means of these principles of brotherhood and of descent, a group may enclose a number of interlocking "family" units and organize the manp economic resources, and political power of even several hundred individuals.

The above version is admittedly an idealized picture of this pattern of s relationships, and particular details in each empirical case, of course, will according to the kinds of vested interests that are at stake and the specific na of the traditions of the particular group. This pattern—not completely un stood by the staff at the time the data were gathered in Japan—is a generaliza made from a close examination of dozens of cases during the past two years.

MESHING OF KINSHIP AND BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEMS

One more complication of this pattern of social relationship, however, n to be discussed. And that is, how this ritual kinship system of relations is, s speak, "meshed" in a more formalized and more "bureaucratic" syste relationships.

Formal and Informal Organizations

American sociologists typically describe large-scale systems (e.g., a fact of human relations in terms of "formal" and "informal" organizations.

The first refers to a consciously planned table of organization which purports to the manifest purposes of the social group. Being of such nature, formal organization symbolized by personnel charts to indicate lines of communication, the system of auth and the interrelated processes of decision-making, leadership, and control. The informal o ization, on the other hand, is seen by these sociologists as a more or less unpremeditated non-rational form of organization of people working within the framework of the fo organization. Specific aspects of such spontaneous organizations are known by such as "cliques," "friendship groups," and "natural groups."

In most Japanese social groupings examined by the Project staff, these mal" and "informal" aspects of organizations were clearly discernible—w supports the thesis that these aspects are quite universal. But over and a these aspects of organization there were many social groupings in Japan w had a third aspect, namely the ritual kinship structure.

In such formally organized associations as the Kanagawa Labor Supply Association w recruited and placed some 100,000 laborers in various government projects in 1945– and the Tokyo Street-stall Owners' Association which had in 1947 a membership of at 25,000 small-scale merchants, *oyabun-kobun* relationships were found to be operatin various levels of the organizational hierarchy. The officers at each level of the formal orga tion—the local "boss," the branch chief, the president of the association—had established only ritual parenthood (*oyabun-kobun*) relationships with their key subordinates, but ritual brotherhood (*kyodaibun*) relationships with leaders of comparable rank in the fo organization.

SIGNIFICANCE OF KINSHIP SYSTEM SURVIVAL

It is not possible here to go into the details of the significance of this aspe

ritual kinship—in the total organization, but those readers who are trained in the social sciences will see from what has been already stated how it might serve some very basic human needs, e.g., "personalizing" social relations in a potentially impersonal and bureaucratic organization. But since, in these large-scale organizations, ritual kinship compacts are entered into by select members of the group, "informal" organization—as the term is used by American sociologists—is found among those individuals not affiliated by ritual kin ties. These findings should prove to be of interest to students of comparative institutions.

Obviously not all large-scale organizations in modern Japan utilize ritual kinship relations as part of their organizational structure. Most large business enterprises, for example, which are strictly modelled after comparable Western systems, seem to lack this feature. Why, then, do some organizations have this feature and others do not? A preliminary and cursory answer was found in examining the Project's case materials. In every case we examined, ritual kinship structures were found in situations where the vested interest of the group concerned was not fully protected by the existing laws.

The obvious case is the racketeers whose interests are extralegal. But similar interpretations can be made for labor recruiting agencies, neo-fascist movements, religious cults, and other organizations utilizing ritual kinship patterns. This finding led to our generalization, which was stated earlier in this paper, viz., that *oyabun-kobun* are found where the people concerned are interested in protecting a "right," a "property," or a "privilege" which is extralegal.

Though the Project lacks detailed case materials, the author believes that these ritual kin patterns of social relations are also utilized by the major political parties in Japan to control and to organize their respective political machines, especially those in the rural areas. It is also suspected that some of the big industrial and financial combines (e.g., the former *zaibatsu*) have formerly utilized some of these patterns. The teaching profession, especially at the University level, might also be included in this generalization.

In summary, then, we have presented here a bare outline of a system of social relationship found in certain segments of contemporary Japanese society. As was stated at the beginning of this report, it is our belief that such fact-gathering activity as is illustrated by the present study is not only important in contributing to knowledge about the range of variation in human relations, but also to provide a comparative point of view for examining our own society, culture, and institutions.

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Japanese Team-Based Work Systems in North America:

EXPLAINING THE DIVERSITY

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In the mid-1980s, it was quality circles. More than half of the major U.S. corporations had at least some Quality Circle (QC) teams meeting on a regular basis.[1] The quality circles were seen as a vehicle for replicating Japanese competitive success. Yet, within a few years the majority of the Quality Circle efforts withered.[2] U.S. firms were criticized at the time for attempting to import this one element—quality circles—out of a complete Japanese system.

Today, it is teams. According to one estimate, more than half of major U.S. corporations are now exploring some form of team-based work system.[3] This time, systems rhetoric is being used, usually drawing on the language of Total Quality Management (TQM)[4] and lean manufacturing.[5] Too often, however, actual practice remains narrowly focused and ineffective.[6] In this context, work teams are embraced by managers as a vehicles for absenteeism coverage or supervisory headcount reductions, rather than as an integral tool aiding continuous improvement in work operations.

If organizations are to learn to use team-based work systems wisely, they must first understand the nature and function of team systems.[7] Since much of the current interest in teams is driven by Japanese work practices,[8] it is particularly important to understand the nature and function of teams in Japanese factories. Over the last decade, the establishment of Japanese-affiliated factories in North America has presented a particularly promising arena for study since

We are deeply appreciative of the feedback that we have received on various drafts of the article from individuals at our research sites and numerous colleagues, including: Michael Gagnon, William Hollister, Thomas Kochan, Dong Ok Lee, Robert McKersie, Michael Moore, Keisuke Nakamura, Harry Suzuki, Richard Walton, and Elaine Yakura. Also, note that this article is adapted from a chapter in a book manuscript under development by the same team of authors. The manuscript is tentatively titled *The Seeds of Change: Cross-Cultural Adoption of U.S. and Japanese Work Practices.*

there is both Japanese management influence and a domestic work force. This article reports on a detailed study of work practices in eight Japanese-affiliated factories[9] during which we identified three distinct forms of team-based work systems. In explaining the diversity of team systems found in these workplaces, key insights are derived about the general nature of team-based work systems.

Background

The findings presented here are drawn from a large-scale study of the cross-cultural diffusion of U.S. and Japanese work practices.[10] The study began as a doctoral seminar in field research methods co-taught by a U.S. professor and a Japanese professor, but has continued as an intensive research effort for more than two years following the conclusion of the seminar. We did not select the sample by type of team system, though we ended up with an interesting variety of team systems.

The Japanese subsidiaries and U.S./Japanese joint ventures we examined are: Auto Alliance International, AAI (Mazda/Ford—Flat Rock, MI); Coil Center (Tomen/Kasle—Howell, MI); Hitachi Magnetics (Edmore, MI); I/N TEK and I/N KOTE (Nippon/Inland—South Bend, IN);[11] Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc. (Battle Creek, MI); New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc., NUMMI (Toyota/General Motors—Fremont, CA); Ogihara (Howell, MI); and Yamaha Musical Products (Grand Rapids, MI).[12] In selecting sites, we sought to include a mix of unionized and nonunion locations, as well as variation in facility/workforce size and products. These and other attributes are listed in Table 1.

As Table 1 indicates, four of the sites involve joint ventures between U.S. and Japanese firms, while the other four are wholly owned subsidiaries of Japanese firms. Additionally, two of the sites began operations in the 1970s—a full decade prior to the other six, which all began in the mid-to-late 1980s or the early 1990s. The distinctions among the two forms of ownership and the two time periods for investment are key factors in explaining some of the observed variation in work practices, though neither was a key factor in our initial sample selection. The table also indicates that five of the sites are unionized, which represents an over-sampling of the number of unionized Japanese operations and reflects our interest in learning more about the changing roles of union leaders/managers in these settings.

In each of the eight factories included in the project, we conducted individual interviews with top management and union leaders, group interviews with production workers and (in some cases) team leaders, 1- to 4-hour periods of shop-floor and office observation, and analysis of various primary and secondary documents (e.g., newsletters, articles).[13] Altogether, we have conducted over 150 individual interviews, over 75 group interviews, and logged over 100 person-hours of focused shop-floor observation (separate from the many additional hours in which team members were conducting interviews, touring, and otherwise present at the research sites).[14] The guiding methodology for our

TABLE 1. Descriptive Characteristics of Research Sites

Research Sites	Location	Union Status	Ownership and Year Production Began	Number of Employees	Primary Products
AAI	Flat Rock, MI	UAW	Ford/Mazda* joint venture (1992)	3,500	Auto Assemt
Coil Center Corporation	Howell, MI	Non-union	Tomen/Kasle joint venture (1991)	50	Metal Blankir
Hitachi Magnetics Corporation	Edmore, MI	UAW	Hitachi Metals, Ltd. subsidiary (1973)	523	Permanent Magnets
I/N TEK and I/N KOTE	South Bend, IN	USWA	Inland/ Nippon Steel joint venture (1990)	290 (TEK)	Cold Rolled Steel
NUMMI	Fremont, CA	UAW	Toyota/GM joint venture (1984)	4,500	Auto Assemt and Stamping
Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A.	Battle Creek, MI	Non-union	Nippondenso, Ltd. subsidiary (1986)	1,204	Auto Parts
Ogihara	Howell, MI	Non-union	Ogihara subsidiary (1986)	370	Metal Stampir
Yamaha Musical Products	Grand Rapids, MI	UAW	Yamaha Subsidiary (1973)	250	Musical Instruments

*The Auto Alliance, International plant at Flat Rock, Michigan was originally wholly owned by Mazda Japan and productic began in 1983 as the Mazda Flat Rock plant. It became a joint venture with Ford in 1992.

research is what is termed "grounded theory," where "thick" case analysis is utilized to generate new perspectives and new frameworks.[15] Consistent with this methodology, the findings presented were not our original topic of study. Instead the ideas emerged from the field data collection experiences.[16]

Three Types Of Team-Based Work Systems

When we began our field research we did not make finely grained distinctions about types of work organization and forms of worker participation. Every one of the sites characterized itself as featuring team-based work systems

and we did not have in mind any specific distinction among types of teams. We had read the MIT auto study report entitled *The Machine that Changed the World*, which coined the term "lean production" as a fundamental shift from the dominant mass production paradigm. We expected to find examples of the lean production system among all the Japanese production facilities and we anticipated that union status would be a key factor in examining work organization and participation issues.

After a series of site visits, we observed far more variation in the forms of work organization than anything we had read in the literature. While the unionized sites certainly faced distinct challenges and opportunities as a result of their union status, the different types of work systems bridged both unionized and nonunion settings. In response, we have classified the plants in this study in three types of work systems, each of which features three distinct forms of work teams.

Our understanding of work systems was directly shaped by our first impressions as we visited the field sites. In some cases, we saw plants that we immediately recognized as being lean production facilities. Four of our plants fit this category. In other cases, we observed work systems that matched a very different model of teams, which featured the autonomous team structure that was pioneered in England and Sweden under the socio-technical systems (STS) approach. Two of our plants looked more like STS initiatives than like lean production operations. Further, two of our sites looked very much like traditional U.S. manufacturing plants at various stages of restructuring. These plants featured "off line" teams, including quality circles, employee involvement groups, task forces, and labor-management committees.

Table 2 provides a summary comparison of the three types of team systems, including historical information on the origins of each system across which we have classified our sites. In addition to the historical information on the origins of each type of system, the table reviews other key attributes—including the fact that each is designed to optimize different inputs, each points to different outputs, and there are different constraints on success under each model. We will be treating the three types of systems as ideal types.[17] At the same time, we will be noting important variations within each type of system. Following, we present a brief tour of all eight sites, organized according to the three systems. The tour is intended to paint a visceral image of the plants as we found them, explaining why we have classified them as we did and noting variation within each category.

Lean Production System

The four research sites we classified as lean production systems are each quite distinct. The sites are the Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc. plant in Battle Creek, Michigan; the Ogihara plant in Howell, Michigan; the Auto Alliance International (AAI—Mazda/Ford) plant in Flat Rock, Michigan; and

TABLE 2. A Comparison of Three Types of Team Systems

	Lean Production Teams	Socio-Technical Systems Teams	Off-Line Teams
Origins:	Japan (Toyota Pull System, 1960s)	Scandinavia (Volvo Kalmar, 1970s) and England (coal mines, 1940s)	U.S. (Harmon and GM/U QWL groups, 1970s) and Japan (Quality Circles, 19
System Optimizes:	Continuous improvement in work operations	Mix of social and technical sub-systems	Ad hoc problem solving
Expected Yield:	Systematic gains in quality and productivity	Increased worker commitment and targeted gains in quality and safety	Increased worker commitment and reactive response to quality probl
System Constrainers Would be:	High expectations of team autonomy; Low labor/ management support for continuous improvement	High levels of team interdependence; Limited resources for technical redesign	Separation from daily operations
Typically Found in:	Assembly operations (high interdependency among teams)	Continuous production operations (high autonomy among teams)	Broad range of workplace
Leadership:	Depends on strong team leader	Depends on self-managing group	Depends on group facilita
Membership:	Common work area	Common work area	May draw on multiple wo areas
Organization Structure:	Core building block	Core building block	Adjunct to the structure
Links to Other Teams:	Tightly linked to internal customers and suppliers	Tightly linked across shifts; loosely linked with other teams	Little or no links among teams

New United Motor Manufacturing, Incorporated (NUMMI—Toyota/General Motors) in Fremont, California.

During our first visit to the Nippondenso plant in Battle Creek, Michigan, it was as if we were seeing the lean production system come to life—directly off the pages of the MIT auto project book. In that book, lean production is defined in terms of a combined system of work practices including: customer-driven priorities, just-in-time delivery between customers and suppliers, little internal inventory between work stations and reduced steps in work operations, high levels of worker participation via formal problem-solving organized around work teams, broad team responsibilities for monitoring quality and planning

work activities, product designs that eliminate waste and contribute to quality, and a commitment to continuous improvement (*kaizen*) in all aspects of operations.[18]

At Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A.'s Battle Creek plant, we saw machinery tightly packed together, with automated movement of parts from machine to machine such that raw materials flowed quickly through to the loading dock where trucks were dispatched every 12 minutes as part of a just-in-time delivery system. Workers were hustling from station to station; fork lift trucks were moving quickly to deliver raw materials and unload finished product. Despite the hustle, we observed that people also found time to make eye contact, smile, and even briefly converse with us as visitors. There was little inventory visible anywhere in the plant. In each work area, there were highly visible clusters of red, yellow, and green lights (the "*andon*" system) to indicate when the line was running (green light) and when workers wanted to consult about a possible quality or inventory problem (yellow light), and when a worker needed to shut down the line (a red light). Further, near each part of the production line, a "hot corner" meeting space was provided for each team, featuring a table, chairs, and a filing cabinet. Charts were displayed tracing key "measurables" on quality, safety, productivity, progress in building skills among team members, as well as awards and communications information. The entire work area was remarkably clean and every movable part, tool, or other item had a designated place painted on the floor or wherever it was stored.

Even though much that we saw at Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A., directly matched the written description of a lean production system, we also observed things about social systems that were not mentioned by the MIT auto study. For example, while there were teams and team meeting areas, the people had given these areas their own personal touches with plants, pictures, and cartoons. Also, the office environment was just as distinctive and integral to the system as the production environment—but one that we had not seen discussed in the literature. The entire group of approximately 200 support department staff and top executives all shared one big room about the size of a football field. The reason for the one main room was to facilitate communication and emphasize the fact that the group had one job: to work together to ensure effective production operations. Managers were seated on the outer perimeter of the office, facing their employee groups. We were surprised when a member of our research team who was working as a student intern pointed out that two of the firm's three vice presidents had their desks directly adjacent to hers. Between every few desks there were small meeting tables for conducting the discussions (termed "*nemawashi*" at Nippondenso, U.S.A.)[19] that are so critical to building consensus.

The Ogihara plant did not feature as tightly linked a set of manufacturing operations. It is a stamping plant with presses weighing hundreds of tons producing large body parts for automobiles. The pace of the press operation has a different rhythm than the assembly operations at Nippondenso Manufacturing,

U.S.A.. Ogihara workers are organized into teams that meet both on and off the production floor. There are posted charts on quality and other performance measures, but they are not necessarily generated by each team. Like Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A., the Ogihara plant was incredibly clean (especially given that this was a metal stamping plant)—there was no visible oil on the floor or metal scrap. One team member happened to be on crutches during a visit and there was no limit on her mobility. There were some open and some closed (executive) office areas. Still, the plant did operate on a just-in-time basis with its customers and utilized little internal inventory between operations. Thus, this was recognizable as a lean production plant, similar in many ways to Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A., but there was not the same degree of tight integration of various aspects of work operations.

When we visited the AAI plant in Flat Rock the first impression was of an outside rock garden with artfully placed boulders and a vast expanse of green lawn—a sense of serenity that was mirrored by a garden surrounded by glass in the center of the plant adjoining the cafeteria. The plant floor provided a sharp contrast. We found the same tightly linked manufacturing operations discussed in the MIT book and observed at Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A. There were the same *andon* lights in each area to indicate production line status, the same rapid pace of activity, and the same flow-through design with a steady stream of just-in-time deliveries arriving at the plant. Overhead, there was an elaborate network of conveyors that added another dimension of activity. While we observed team meeting areas, the employees were primarily using them as break areas—without as many of the personal touches (plants, posters). Equally, there were not as many indications of worker-managed functional activities (Statistical Process Control (SPC) charting, training skill attainment charts) as we saw at Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A. We knew the plant had a history including initial worker enthusiasm and then very difficult relations in the late 1980s, but we were still surprised by the level of tension between the union and management leadership. Our meeting schedule was tightly packed —conveying the impression of the same tight controls that characterized the work system. While the AAI plant was unquestionably a lean production plant, it had its own distinct climate and feel.

NUMMI began as a renovated, older facility. While its equipment is laid out to feature reduced internal inventory and to accept just-in-time deliveries, its location in California (as the only remaining West-Coast automobile assembly plant) calls for more inventory. As an older facility, the lay out is constrained to some degree by the original General Motors building design. Each cluster of 3-4 work teams shares a meeting area out on the production floor, filled with charts (on quality, team job allocations) and many personal touches—though there is variance in the degree to which charts are maintained and made visually attractive. Teams consist of just 4-6 people with their own "team leader" (who is a UAW member). "Group leaders" (who are not part of the UAW) are responsible for 3-5 teams and have many traditional supervisory responsibilities. The group

leaders and team leaders consult with team members about work load and job allocation, with the assignments laid out on large magnetic boards featuring hundreds of tiny magnets describing individual tasks and the seconds it takes to complete them. The result is an immediate visual representation of the balance of work in an area. While there is, therefore, a sense of control over the work process, this is constrained by the tight interdependencies of the production system.[20] Jobs are meant to be rotated every 2-3 hours, though this is sometimes limited as a result of workers being absent or away from the area at training sessions or new to the area or lacking sufficient training (such as will occur after a model change or technology change where people need to learn new skills). Even though it was an older facility (and hence darker and noisier than a newer facility might be), the plant was also very clean. Office space generally followed the open pattern seen in part at Ogihara and completely at Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A. One additional and unique aspect of the office seating was the labor relations office/union committee room. Management labor relations staff shared facing desks with their union committeeperson counterparts, while the head of labor relations and the union bargaining committee chair sit facing the entire group.

Thus, four of our sites were recognizable as lean production facilities, but each was different. Some, such as NUMMI, Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A. and AAI, were more "lean" in the flow of work from station to station internally. There was variation in the degree to which the rapid pace of the lean environment also had a "human dimension." In some cases, such as at NUMMI and Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A., it seemed as though people had "bought into" the new system. In other cases, such as at AAI, we sensed a measure of tension. Also, we observed a high degree of variation in levels of team control over work operations and decision making—much higher variation than was suggested by the original MIT description of lean production.

Socio-Technical Systems Production

Many of us were familiar with the socio-technical systems (STS) experience in Scandinavia and with its applications in nonunion greenfield plants in the United States.[21] This set of experiences was not foremost in our minds as we went to visit our sites. Yet we were surprised to find that two of our sites—I/N TEK and I/N KOTE, and the Coil Center—directly matched textbook descriptions of the sorts of autonomous teams typically found in STS systems. In the literature, the socio-technical system is described as an approach to work design that integrates the requirements of the social and technical systems.[22] Social systems are usually interpreted as primarily involving high levels of worker autonomy in decision making, no first-line supervisors, frequent job rotation, cross-training in skills, and close attention to ergonomics and work environment. Technical systems are not seen as deterministic, but rather as equipment and operations to be shaped through worker input. Theoretically, STS is a general framework that should allow for many types of integration among social and technical systems.

In practice, nearly all STS facilities have adopted autonomous work groups as a central feature and vary considerably in the degree to which the technology has been truly modified to match social system requirements.

The I/N TEK and I/N KOTE facilities are massive in scale. Production begins with raw coils of cold steel that are rolled to carefully controlled dimensions. The rolled steel may then be coated or annealed. The coating process includes cooling the steel via a continuous band of steel reaching up into a seven story tower. Computer guided vehicles move materials around in the plant and there is a fully automated storage facility. This is continuous process production (in contrast to an assembly operation) with high levels of automation. Despite the vast size, teams of 18 to 25 workers monitor and run the operations—including stopping the operations when required. The teams have high levels of autonomy in allocating tasks, direct input into the planning and scheduling of work, and central responsibility to ensure that quality standards are achieved. Originally, there was just one large production team and one maintenance team in the plant during a given turn (shift), though the production teams have since been sub-divided. Job rotation occurs within the sub-divided parts of a team. While this is certainly a team-system plant and the approach toward the technology matches the lean mindset (reduced waste and increased flexibility in work assignments), the social system closely parallels the autonomous work groups found in many STS facilities. The autonomy is facilitated by the continuous production systems, which allows for "free" meeting time when the full system is operating as it should. The degree of work group autonomy far exceeds that found in the lean production sites. As a result, we could not classify I/N TEK and I/N KOTE as a lean production system.

When we visited the Coil Center, our attention to the STS concept increased. This is a metal blanking plant that has carved out a specialty niche—producing steel blanks of the quality necessary for the production of "exposed" metal parts for car doors and hoods. The Coil Center is the smallest of the sites in the study, employing approximately 50 people in 1992. Although the company is a joint venture, the Japanese partner, Tomen, is a trading company making initial investments in the metal blanking business.[23] The work organization, which more strongly reflects the input of Kasle Steel and the U.S. managers, emphasizes work team autonomy. On each shift, a team of workers operates the blanking line and has full responsibility for job assignments, job rotation scheduling, team member selection, quality inspection, daily record keeping, inventory and scheduling of incoming raw materials, and training coordination. As well, the plant maintains fairly large buffers of raw material at the input end and at the output end. For example, the Coil Center builds one to two weeks of inventory of its products.[24] The high level of team autonomy and inventory buffers exactly match the typical STS work system—though it is important to note that the founding general manager, Bill Hollister, described the work system as a "common sense" customized system rather than as an attempt to follow either STS or lean production systems.

We have classified the two sites as socio-technical systems based on high levels of work team autonomy and relatively lower emphasis on inventory reduction within the process. These sites are very different in size and production systems—with one being a large steel mill utilizing a continuous production process and the other being a small blanking facility utilizing a single metal blanking line. The STS process is applicable in both cases because the "teams" have responsibility for an entire shift's production and operate with inventory buffers that together enable them to have high levels of autonomy. Both sites have been able to maximize internal flexibility within the team (in terms of job rotation, training, task allocation). Importantly, both sites have business strategies centered on specialized market niches which are complementary with the flexible, highly autonomous work systems.

Off-Line Teams

Although Japanese production facilities in North America are now the focus of extensive media coverage, there has been a Japanese presence in the United States for a much longer time. Two of our sites belong to the first wave of Japanese investment and illustrate a very different approach to work systems. Hitachi Magnetics represents an existing U.S. facility that was purchased in the early 1970s, with the work system left largely intact. Yamaha Musical Products started up a new production facility in the early 1970s, and they began production with a traditional assembly process. Both plants feature team activity that occurs "off line" on a periodic basis, rather than the reorganization of daily operations around either lean or STS "on line" teams.

In the case of Hitachi Magnetics, the facility was owned by General Electric at the time it was purchased by the Japanese parent firm, and the work force was already represented by the United Auto Workers Union (UAW). For almost a decade and a half, the management team and the work system remained unchanged, with the Japanese parent primarily providing capital inputs and marketing outlets. It was not until the late 1980s and the early 1990s that Hitachi began to experiment with less traditional work systems—at a time when the plant began to experience quality, cost, and production problems (in the face of increased international competition). A Japanese executive replaced the U.S. plant manager, a system of SPC charting was introduced, a plant-wide program emphasizing cleanliness and safety was initiated, union and management softball teams were set up, and, most recently, a form of "off-line" quality circles termed "*kaizen* groups" were established and provided with training in group problem-solving principles. Japanese managers were brought over by Hitachi Metals, Ltd. to help facilitate each of the new program initiatives. Concurrently, efforts were made to build more positive relations with a newly elected slate of union leaders through education and communication on the business operations. Today, the Hitachi Magnetics plant in Edmore, Michigan, closely resembles many traditional U.S. manufacturing facilities that are in the process of implementing total quality principles in response to competitive pressures.

Yamaha Musical Products is a final assembly operation where most of the skilled assembly and fine adjustment work on the musical instruments is done. The plant produces a wide range of brass, woodwind, and percussion instruments primarily via a sequential bench assembly process. In its early years, Yamaha Musical Products assembled electronic organs as well as band and orchestral instruments and operated on a nonunion basis. The employment relations climate deteriorated and the UAW led a successful organizing campaign in the late 1970s. A relatively stable "arm's-length" labor-management relationship developed over the next decade and it was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that labor and management began to explore innovations in work systems. A pivotal event in terms of increased employee involvement was Yamaha's decision to replace the plant with a new $10 million facility, which reflected high levels of employee input in establishing a layout more conducive to a logical product flow in the assembly process. Since then, a joint union-management steering committee and health and safety committee have been established, along with some "off-line" employee involvement groups. Managers have begun to be trained by executives from Yamaha Japan in their approach to *kaizen* (which is expected to then be extended to the work force). Yamaha is the high-quality producer in its markets, but the productivity rates do not match equivalent Japanese operations and are the focus of the change efforts.

Both the Hitachi and Yamaha facilities feature traditional forms of work organization, with parallel organizational change efforts in early implementation stages. Importantly, neither facility is an "on-line" team-based work system.[29] These two sites help to illustrate the existence of a first generation of Japanese investment that is not characterized by the new work systems that have received so much media attention. The challenges facing these long-established organizations parallel those facing many existing North American operations. One important difference, however, is that each has been able to draw on expertise in *kaizen* and other Japanese practices from their parent organization, but it is too soon to assess the impact of this avenue for technical assistance. Thus, for nearly two decades, neither organization was particularly "Japanese" in its operations, but the current change efforts represent a diffusion process that will be important to follow relative to similarly situated U.S. firms that do not have the same cross-cultural access. It will also be interesting to see how the Japanese parent organizations react to the unfolding change process in these established, traditional facilities. The question is whether the change will be fast enough to justify continued Japanese investment and support. Since one company, Hitachi Magnetics, is facing severe market pressures and the other, Yamaha, is just looking for incremental improvements in a financially successful operation, the contrasting responses from the Japanese parent companies will be particularly interesting to examine.

Explaining the Variation in Team Systems

Given the observed range of team-based work systems in the Japanese-owned and U.S./Japanese joint venture plants, how do we account for the variation? While no single factor can explain all of what we observed, there are three structural factors that together are helpful in untangling the story: the *timing of the Japanese investment* in the U.S.; the *ownership structure*; and the *technological constraints* on the work system. These factors are represented in Table 3, with our eight sites classified in the middle of the table according to each of the three structural factors.

TABLE 3. Research Sites Classified by Production Technology, Ownership Status, Waves of Japanese Investment, and Type of Team System

		Continuous Production Technology	Batch Production Technology	Assembly Technology
Joint Venture	**First Wave of Japanese Investment**			
	Second Wave of Japanese Investment	I/N TEK and I/N Kote (Inland/ Nippon) —**STS**	Coil Center Corporation (Tomen/Kasle) —**STS**	AAI (Mazda/ Ford)—**L** NUMMI (GM/Toyota)-**Lean**
Japanese Subsidiary	**First Wave of Japanese Investment**		Hitachi Magnetics Corporation—**Off Line**	Yamaha Musical Products—**Off Line**
	Second Wave of Japanese Investment		Ogihara Corporation—**Lean**	Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A.—**Lean**

Two Waves of Japanese Investment

Broadly speaking, there have been two waves of Japanese investment in North America. Although these waves of investment have not been addressed in great detail in the literature, they are clearly evident across our eight research sites. The distinctions emerged from the contrast between Yamaha Musical Products and Hitachi Magnetics, on the one hand, and the rest of the sites on the other. These two sites are the oldest in our sample and both feature relatively traditional forms of work organization. When these sites first came under Japanese ownership, there was no attempt to export the work system utilized in Japanese plants owned by the same companies. Instead, U.S. work practices have historically dominated in both sites.

Hitachi Metals bought the plant from General Electric, continued relations with the UAW, and maintained the traditional, arm's-length legalistic approach to collective bargaining. The focus of Hitachi Metal's investment initially seemed to be on buying GE's technology and adding capacity for the production of magnets—without giving much emphasis on matching Japanese and U.S. manufacturing methods. In the case of Yamaha Musical Products, the company established production with a focus on final assembly of instrument parts (retaining the work of shaping the metal and wood instrument bodies for Japanese operations). When employment relations with the workers deteriorated, the UAW organized the work force and a traditional approach to collective bargaining emerged. The focus of Yamaha Musical Products' investment seemed comparable to much of the U.S. investment abroad in the past half century—with a predominant focus on low value added final assembly work.

Today, a shift is occurring in both locations. Within the past year or two each has begun to give greater attention to what they called *kaizen* work teams. These teams are being utilized as "off line" teams for weekly problem-solving meetings—a modern form of quality circles that closely resembles improvement efforts at many unionized U.S. firms. Although the *kaizen* teams do not represent a complete reorganization of production around a team system, they do reflect a substantially increased level of involvement by the Japanese parent in work practices at their U.S. sites.

Based on the way work operated for many years and the recent shift to emphasize *kaizen* in these traditional sites, we find evidence to suggest that the first wave of Japanese investment in North America did not represent the influx of Japanese work practices that is now given so much attention in the business press. Instead, these facilities added manufacturing capacity primarily utilizing local employment relations practices—most of which are still in place. This finding directly challenges any unitary view of Japanese investment in North America—there is not any one system of management that permeates all of the transplant facilities.

There are many possible explanations for the existence of a group of Japanese-owned firms with many traditional North American employment relations practices. Where existing facilities were purchased, such as was the case with Hitachi Magnetics, many practices were firmly established under the former owner and thus hard to change. When new facilities were built, local consultants and U.S. managers brought with them an orientation toward best local practice. Also, in both of these sites the workforce was represented by the UAW, which introduced a wide range of standard expectations about work rules, wages, and benefits from the workforce. Underlying these explanations, however, is a deeper issue. A number of Japanese executives in all of our sites indicated that the Japanese firms were not as confident in the 1970s as they are now regarding the merits of their work systems (and there is still variation in Japan in the use of "lean" production methods). As a result, there was not a sufficient driving force to overcome the existing factors favoring replication of North

American practices. In facilities build after 1980—at least in the automotive, auto supply and steel sectors—there are some explicit and comprehensive efforts to import or develop new systems of work practices. Thus, the timing of the Japanese investment is a key structural factor that best accounts for the two traditional work systems that we found.[26]

An important question for future research concerns the generalizability of these findings. A recent working paper by Davis Jenkins tested this very hypothesis (drawing on our analysis of the two waves of investment) with Florida and Kenney's sample of 229 Japanese-affiliated auto supply plants in the United States.[27] Jenkins confirmed our preliminary findings of two distinct sets of work practices linked to the timing of the Japanese investment in North America. This is an excellent example of relating grounded research to subsequent hypothesis testing. More work is still to be done on this issue, however. For example, there is some evidence of more traditional work systems in electronics factories built in North America in the mid- and late-1980s.[28] It would be important to know how these factories compare to the factories producing similar products in Japan and whether there is a level of confidence in production technology in this sector that is comparable to the automotive, auto supply, and steel sectors. Ultimately, these findings have implications that reach far beyond the specific case of Japanese investment in North America.[29]

Multinational corporations from many countries face a core strategic decision: In investing around the world, is their goal just to add productive capacity (retaining local work practices) or to transplant "best in class" work practices in the new operations? The latter strategy holds the greatest promise for sustained competitive advantage, but it also involves undertaking the complex challenge of identifying the most promising mix of work practices in the home and host country. All of our second wave sites feature such combinations of work practices. However, some of the team systems centered on the lean model and some centered on the STS model, which raises the next key question—how to account for this mix of team-based work systems?

Two Forms of Ownership

The four firms featuring lean manufacturing work systems have all been established within the past ten years and they all reflect a much higher level of diffusion of Japanese work practices. The first two entries in the second wave—NUMMI and AAI—were joint ventures. Particularly in the case of NUMMI, the ownership structure reflected a desire on the part of both partners to learn from one another. GM sought to learn more about the Toyota (lean) manufacturing system, while Toyota sought to learn about the U.S. work force, legal system, and other local issues relevant to expanding manufacturing capacity in North America. These joint ventures provide further evidence to support the notion that the level of diffusion of Japanese work practices reflected the confidence of the Japanese parent in their work system and the willingness of the U.S. location to adopt that system. Here we find Japanese firms with intentions to

transplant elements of their work system and a desire for a local partner to facilitate the process.

The wholly owned subsidiaries in the second wave of Japanese investment followed at later dates, perhaps reflecting increased confidence by the parent firm in their ability to utilize elements of their work system on U.S. soil. Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A., for example, is a part of the Toyota keiretsu ownership system.[30] The NUMMI experience seems to have had a direct influence in increasing the confidence of Toyota in its ability to transplant its work system to the United States. The connection is quite clear in the case of Toyota's Georgetown, Kentucky, plant since some managers assigned to this facility had worked at NUMMI.

Within what we have termed the second wave of investment are two additional firms that do not utilize lean manufacturing principles. The Coil Center Corporation and I/N TEK & I/N KOTE were classified as socio-technical team systems. A close look at the cases of these joint ventures reveals that it was the U.S. side of each partnership that emphasized the STS-style autonomy. At the Coil Center, the team autonomy, along with the emphasis on extended job rotation and cross-training, was introduced primarily by the American who was the initial general manager of the business. At I/N TEK & I/N KOTE the union agreed to be part of a joint governance structure and played a key role in emphasizing team autonomy.

Thus, the two places where we found the STS system were joint ventures where the U.S. partners were the driving forces in establishing the employment relations systems. This provides some evidence to suggest that an STS approach —which is not typically found in Japan—will be more likely to be utilized in the context of a U.S. dominated joint venture. Still, even if joint venture status helps to account for the existence of the STS sites, it does not guarantee that an STS approach will be utilized. Joint venture status may be a necessary but not sufficient condition to explain the adoption of an STS approach (since there were also two joint ventures in our study that utilized lean production systems). The primary production technology in the operations is more useful in explaining the mix of STS and lean production teams.

Production Technology Constraints

The original conception of socio-technical systems emphasized an optimization of two overlapping sub-systems—the social and the technical.[31] In practice, socio-technical system interventions have tended to emphasize one primary social system (with modest variation) that centers on autonomous work teams as the primary vehicle to address what are assumed to be core human needs for influence and autonomy.[32] A key technological requirement for autonomous work teams is some form of buffer between teams (which could be inventory, highly discrete tasks, or operation on separate shifts). Observers have pointed out that the utilization of lean production/TQM principles such as just-in-time delivery and reduced inventory between operations removes buffers that are

critical to team autonomy.[33] Thus, when we found two U.S./Japanese joint ventures operating with STS teams, we took a close look at the production system constraints. In our analysis of production systems we found three broad modes of production: assembly, batch, and continuous.[34]

All three assembly operations in our study utilize lean production teams and one features the off-line teams. The traditional notion of off-line teams has roots in the U.S. auto industry, where QWL and EI teams were pioneered in the 1970s and utilized extensively in more recent years. Lean production is a concept that also derives from the auto assembly context and has been hailed as a more flexible and effective way to produce mass or extended runs of one or a few products.[35] Thus, it is no surprise that we would find both traditional off-line and newer lean production teams in the four assembly operations. In contrast, we would expect tensions to arise where STS-type teams were established in manufacturing settings operating on a lean production basis.[36]

Only one of our cases, I/N TEK and I/N KOTE, involves a continuous manufacturing process. Historically, continuous production settings have been the sites of the best documented STS cases[37] reflecting the relatively small number of staff associated with a particular production operation or required on a given shift. As a result, all of the workers on a shift or in a work operation can be established as an autonomous team. Thus, it was not surprising to find an STS team in such a setting. Importantly, the principles of lean production (such as just-in-time delivery, standardized work operations, and reduced in-process inventory) would not be as applicable in such settings.

The balance of the cases have been classified as batch production and here we find all three types of team systems. The presence of one of the firms with traditional off-line *kaizen* teams or quality circles is not a surprise since these types of team structures are broadly diffused across a wide range of work settings in North America[38]—we already know that the concept can be utilized in batch production as well as assembly operations. However, the presence of both a lean production case (Ogihara) and an STS case (Coil Center) is most interesting, especially when we consider that they are both metal stamping operations employing very similar technologies and even located within a few miles of one another. As we saw in the earlier discussion of ownership structures, the STS system at the Coil Center reflected the influence of the U.S. managers. The work system choice at Ogihara is more complex to trace, since the firm is primarily a die-making rather than stamping operation in Japan.

Thus, we see that the production technology helps to explain the central tendencies toward one or another type of team system—with assembly operations lending themselves to lean and off-line teams, and continuous production lending itself to STS teams.[39] We also see, however, that batch production technologies can be organized around all three types of team systems, revealing a high degree of flexibility in social structures. Our findings confirm the original notion of Social-Technical Systems even as they point to the limits on the autonomous structures that have become accepted STS practice.

Implications and Conclusions

Many U.S. employers seeking to establish team-based work systems are surprised by the diversity of meanings they find for the term "teams." Workplaces are filled with off-line teams, lean production teams, and socio-technical systems teams—as well as training teams, task force teams, sales teams, and softball teams. Although many consultants, and much of the literature, do not distinguish among alternative types of team systems, it should be clear that each has important advantages and limitations. The choice of a team system is more complex than many people believe. Type of product, technology, organizational structure and culture, and physical layout are only a few of the most important considerations in the matching of a team system to a company. A lean system optimizes flow-through manufacturing but reduces the amount of worker autonomy. A socio-technical system achieves worker autonomy by optimizing the balance between social and technical sub-systems, but may do so at the expense of efficiency or operating costs. The off-line team optimizes the application of problem-solving tools to specific issues, but does not address daily work operations. In other words, firms must not only pick the system that will maximize the strengths of the firm's production technology and employees, but they must also understand the trade-offs in the present and for the future.

Team systems can be utilized in a variety of production contexts. A tightly linked assembly operation such as we found at Nippondenso Manufacturing, U.S.A., will favor lean production teams and constrain STS teams, while a continuous production system such as we saw at I/N TEK and I/N KOTE will favor the STS teams. As such, the choice of a particular team system will be driven not only by what is desired, but also by what is feasible given technological constraints. Batch production apparently has the fewest technological constraints. Our study contains three firms characterized as batch production sites and yet they feature all three types of team-based work systems.

Within any single type of team-based system, a wide range of variation is possible. Both NUMMI and AAI feature lean production systems that subject workers to a tightly constrained set of work activities. Yet even in a system that constrains worker autonomy it is possible for workers to have a higher level of efficacy. For example, at NUMMI greater attention is given to team-building training and group process maintenance activities in comparison with AAI. Among the reasons for the variations within a category are the difference that particular management and union cultures can make (both of which have roots in key selection and hiring decisions) as well as the consequences of different historical patterns in the resolution of pivotal conflicts.

These findings may seem obvious, but they help to explain why countless manufacturing firms are headed for difficulties in the implementation of team systems. Many assembly operations are simultaneously attempting to encourage the formation of self-managing teams while reducing buffers (through reduced in-process inventory and just-in-time delivery).[40] The resulting tension between

team autonomy and team interdependence can be managed through strong team leadership—which does not fit the traditional view of teams as being self-directed or autonomous. Also critical are effective communications mechanisms, the setting of realistic expectations, and an overall understanding of how teams are parts of a larger system. Too often, however, technical specialists will benchmark material handling methods in Japanese factories, while human resource consultants will import notions of self-managing teams (with high levels of team autonomy in decision making). In this case, the teams are destined to be frustrated or even fail, as change initiatives and the advantages of reduced in-process inventory will never be realized. Tensions around these issues are evident in a number of U.S. facilities, such as the Saturn production facility,[41] that have attempted to simultaneously foster self-managing teams and lean production methods.[42] Conversely, organizations adopting the lean production system (with more tightly integrated teams) should anticipate additional operating costs associated with the high levels of support activity that teams require in this system from maintenance, materials handling, product and process engineering, and other functions.

Another level of analysis also surfaces from our research. We found initial evidence for two distinct waves of Japanese investment in North America. The first wave or pre-1980 investment involved very little in the way of the intentional transplanting of work practices from the Japanese culture. In this first wave, most Japanese companies investing in the U.S. had little experience in overseas operations. They selected the most successful system available at that time. Just as many U.S. companies are finding it difficult to successfully move to team-based systems, the firms in the first wave of Japanese investment are also struggling. They illustrate the idea that work organization is more than just a series of separate techniques—it is an interweaving of factors such as technology, management techniques, and people's knowledge. Mastering this mix is critical, not just in the United States, but in the larger challenge of sustaining global competitive advantage.

The post-1980 investments, by contrast, represent unique cross-cultural experiments of great significance. Here the experiences bear directly on the transferability question. We find that the cross-cultural exchange can be powerfully influenced by the U.S. partners in a joint venture. Indeed, in some of our cases the exchange was dominated by the U.S. partner.[43] Further, even where the diffusion is dominated by the Japanese partner or where the U.S. location is a wholly owned Japanese subsidiary, issues of technology and other factors drive variation in practice. In other words, while it is important to know how company ownership is structured, it is much more important to know which principles are the foundation for the system.

These two waves of Japanese investment has significance for investment decision making in corporate boardrooms the world over. Increasingly, foreign investment is not just a matter of expanding manufacturing or sales capacity. Instead, competitive advantage is tied to the concurrent diffusion of effective

work practices. Indeed, we have found that the transfer of technology falls far short of its potential if not effectively integrated into the way people interact and are organized.

For managers who are contemplating joint ventures or foreign investments, the lessons from the second wave of Japanese investment are clear. The decision to invest or expand capacity requires an assessment of current work practices in home operations and in the host setting. Traditionally, work practices are not viewed as key source of competitive advantage, but our analysis suggests that the choice of work systems affects the success of an organization in the global economy.

In making choices about the transfer of work practices, managers become part of a global process of diffusion that involves both planned learning and spontaneous or unintended learning. The planned learning derives from the inherently experimental nature of exporting or importing work practices. For example, Toyota's joint venture with General Motors represented a planned experiment for Toyota to learn about a U.S. workforce and for GM to learn about Toyota's manufacturing system. The spontaneous or unintended learning is by its nature unpredictable, but equally inevitable. For example, Toyota did not anticipate and probably can not yet fully discern the impact that NUMMI is having on individuals, families and operations back in Japan.

Thus, global investment requires more than just capital to invest in promising products, technology, and markets. To achieve full value on their investments, firms must be able to construct work systems—including work teams—that best harness the ideas and energy of people in a given culture. In succeeding at this challenge, firms will inevitably learn lessons that fundamentally change who they are and how they operate.

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7. There is, of course, an extensive literature on workplace teams. See, for example, Dean Tjosvold, *Team Organization: An Enduring Competitive Advantage* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1991); Jon R. Katzenback and Douglas K. Smith, *The Wisdom of Teams: Creating the High-Performance Organization* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1993); Edward E. Lawler III, *High Involvement Management* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1986). Most of this literature has not focused on the cross-cultural transfer of team-based work systems and does not directly address the core issue here, which is the variation across Japanese facilities.
8. See, for example, James P. Womack et. al., *The Machine that Changed the World* (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990).
9. The two lead authors have conducted research (separately) in over a dozen additional Japanese joint ventures in North America as part of other projects. Additionally, nearly half of the co-authors have direct experience in the implementation or operation of team activities in U.S. workplaces. Finally, the full research team recently traveled to Japan to visit the parent companies and the sister factories of many of our research sites. The lessons learned in this study are informed and further confirmed by these additional experiences.
10. As noted earlier, a book tentatively titled *The Seeds of Change: The Cross-Cultural Diffusion of Work Practices* is currently being drafted to capture the full range of findings from this research.
11. Note that I/N TEK and I/N KOTE are two distinct factories, with the I/N TEK facility feeding steel to the I/N KOTE operation. They are distinct operations, they both draw on the same team system model, operate under the same collective bargaining language, and share a common higher management structure. Hence, we will refer to them jointly in this paper.
12. Eight sites were initially approached, but one asked that its involvement be postponed (AAI/Mazda-Ford) for business reasons and later joined the project. Another (National Steel) asked to postpone involvement and we have not returned to request access.
13. The level of access provided by the research sites was exceptional—far exceeding the usual levels of access to outside visitors in nearly all of the organizations. In some cases access was facilitated by past contacts with key individuals at the sites—either by the course instructors (in the course of prior research projects) or others at MSU for other reasons. For example, the secretary of one of the professors (Annette Bacon) used to work for the personnel director at one of the sites (Hitachi) years ago when that individual worked for General Motors. Also, in all cases, there was a strong interest on the part of the sites in supporting graduate education. Finally, the level of access increased over time, as project members established a measure of trust with site representatives and as U.S. and Japanese

officials in the sites became increasingly interested in what we were learning. As a result we have been able to develop extensive case descriptions of work practices and we have extended our learning into a number of unanticipated areas—including the present findings about alternative forms of team-based work systems.

14. From the outset the students were informed that we would be organizing ourselves as a research team with grades based on contributions to the team effort (rather than papers, exams, and other performance measures). In fact, the students were told that it was anticipated that they would each get a 4.0 grade for the course and that even this grade would understate the amount of work that everyone would be undertaking. Despite warnings of a challenging workload, the course attracted twelve students, four of whom were Ph.D. students (Barrett, Lin, and Belhedi in the field of labor and industrial relations, and Ramanand in the field of Resource Development Urban Studies), four of whom were alumni from the School of Labor and Industrial Relations with professional responsibilities relevant to the course subject matter (Coutchie, Inaba, Mothersell, and Wheaton), and four of whom were masters students with interests in cross-cultural issues and a research orientation (Lee, Bullard, Rabine, and Small). Eight nations were represented among the students—Canada, India, Japan, Laos, South Africa, Taiwan, Tunisia, and the United States. The course was co-taught by a U.S. and Japanese instructor (Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Nitta). It noteworthy that four of the masters students and masters alumni have recently been admitted to the MSU Ph.D. program and one of the Ph.D. students transferred into the program.
15. Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology*, 78 (May 1973): 1360-1380.
16. We hope the ideas presented here are useful for managers, union leaders, workers, and scholars seeking to better understand team-based work systems. We caution that our findings be seen as preliminary—subject to further confirmation with additional case study and survey research. Also, our presentation of the findings is somewhat informal. In our writing, we have sought to share the spirit of learning and discovery that is guiding us. Incidentally, our telling of the story reflects a unique writing process where much of this article was written as a large group with one person sitting at a keyboard and the rest observing the screen while we discussed each major point in sequence.
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18. J. Womack, D.T. Jones, and D. Roos, *The Machine that Changed the World* (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990).
19. The term "nemawashi" is often used to capture the process for achieving consensus during decision-making in Japan, but we use the term cautiously since we are aware that this process has many subtle meanings (negative and positive) that vary across companies in Japan and in the United States.
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21. R. Walton, "Establishing and Maintaining High Commitment Work Systems," in Kimberly and Miles, eds., *The Organizational Life Cycle* (San Francisco, CA:

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23. Note that Tomen bought out Kasle's shares after this article was complete, so Coil Center's classification as a joint venture is historically accurate, but no longer true.
24. Note that these levels of inventory were not necessarily considered as optimal by the sites. For example, the retired general manager for the Coil Center commented that the Coil Center "did not as a strategy chose to maintain one to two week inventories." He pointed out, instead, that the Coil Center lacked close enough ties with its customers/vendors to achieve lean production levels. Our research would suggest, however, that their team structure will be a constraint on seeking these close ties and on taking advantage of the opportunity if such close ties were forged.
25. In making the distinction between on-line and off-line team systems, we draw on the analysis of Saul Rubinstein in a personal conversation with Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1992). On-line teams function as teams all the time in the same way that an on-line computer terminal is always hooked up to a main-frame computer. Off-line teams may meet on a regular basis (weekly, bi-weekly, monthly), but the work is organized around individual jobs rather than a cluster of jobs under the auspices of a team.
26. In reaching this finding we are echoing Stinchcombe's 1965 analysis of the time of company formation helps explain variation in organizational structure.
27. Davis Jenkins, "Explaining the Transfer to the U.S. of Innovations in Shop Floor Work Systems by Japanese Transplant Manufacturers," working paper, Heinz School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon University, 1994.
28. Richard Florida and Martin Kenney, "Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organizations to the U.S.," *American Sociological Review*, 56 (June 1991): 381-398.
29. In fact, recent conversations with Greg Bamber from Australia's Queensland University of Technology point to a similar pattern with two waves of Japanese investment in Australia—the first of which featured plants that adopted local work practices and the second of which involved the adaptation of Japanese production methods.
30. Under this keiretsu system, there is not only common stock ownership and common ties to investment banks, there are also high levels of information sharing and joint engineering activities aimed at mutual prosperity.
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32. P. Lawrence, observations during Ph.D. seminar in Organizational Theory (1986).

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34. Note that Joanne Woodward [*Management and Technology* (London: HMSO, 1958): 4-21] linked together assembly and mass production, but we separate the two given the rise of lean production as an alternative mode of assembly production. Also, we distinguish assembly from batch based on typical lengths of production runs for a given product (with batch production involving many shorter runs), but the distinction does blur in the case of lean production where variations in product attributes are run in small lots to be responsive to customer requirements.
35. J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones, and D. Roos, *The Machine that Changed the World* (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990).
36. It is possible that some of the current tensions in the Saturn operations arise from the prominence given to group autonomy and input in the Saturn structure, which is overlaid on certain lean production concepts such as reduced in-process inventory and just-in-time delivery—an issue revisited in the conclusion to this article.
37. R. Walton, "Establishing and Maintaining High Commitment Work Systems," in Kimberly and Miles, eds., *The Organizational Life Cycle* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1980); T.D. Rankin, *New Forms of Work Organization: The Challenge for North American Unions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
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39. In reaching this finding we are echoing Woodward's findings linking organizational structure to production technology.
40. A.K. Naj, "Shifting Gears: Some Manufacturers Drop Efforts to Adopt Japanese Techniques," *Wall Street Journal*, May 7, 1993, p. A1.
41. Saul Rubinstein, Michael Bennett, and Thomas Kochan, "The Saturn Partnership: Co-Management and the Reinvention of the Local Union" in Bruce Kaufman and Morris Kleiner, eds., *Employee Representation: Alternatives and Future Directions* ,1993 IRRA Annual Research Volume (Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1993).
42. Our own field research and benchmarking activities in North America points to a number of General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and other plants facing the same dilemma.
43. It is interesting to note that none of our joint venture cases had a fully reciprocal exchange regarding work practices. One party or the other was in the lead in each case.

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Memories and Their Unintended Consequences

A. Introduction

It has been more than 50 years since President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 which authorized the incarceration of 120,000 Japanese Americans living on the West Coast at the beginning of World War II. This incarceration took place without due process and without formal charges of misbehavior. The public officials who supported this Executive Order attempted to justify it on the basis of "military necessity." However, as postwar studies have shown, military necessity was just an excuse. A study by a Congressional commission, for example, in 1982, concluded that the placing of the Japanese Americans in concentration camps was the result of "racial prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership." (Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 1982)

However wrong the Executive Order 9066 was in 1942 and however humanely the order was carried out in the ten wartime internment camps, the long term consequences of the order on both the interned people and American society at large was incalculable. In this paper I would like to discuss some of these long term consequences in the context of memories, generations, and culture--the themes that run throughout the present book. First, I would like to discuss why the survivors of internment camps repressed their memories of camp life for two decades and what was done later to resurrect their memories. Then I would like to discuss how these submerged memories affected their children as well as the Japanese American community in general. Finally, I would like to suggest how the children of the camp survivors, who came of age in the late 1960s and early 1970s, contributed toward the formation of a new ethnic entity known as Asian Americans and sometimes as Asian Pacific. The creation of the new entity was not only the product of a common shared need to fight racism among the various Americans of Japanese, Chinese, Korean and others of Asian descent, but it also led to community activism and organized electoral politics that was absent in the early years of post-World War II. But before I get into these issues, a background statement on the Japanese American community will be helpful.

B. The Prewar Japanese American community.

By the time Pearl Harbor was bombed in December 1941, people of Japanese descent on the West Coast reached a population size about 120,000 with two generations of family history. The first generation, called Issei, made up only one-third of the population and the second generation, called Nisei, constituted the remainder. Because of the prevailing attitudes toward people of Asian descent, the Issei were not eligible to become naturalized citizens, even though most of them had been residents for more than forty years.

Moreover the Issei, along with other foreign-born Asians, were prohibited by law from owning land and from marrying non-Asians. By 1924, this anti-Japanese climate on the West Coast was so pervasive that further immigration from Japan was prohibited.

This 1924 law and other discriminatory laws against Asians in general resulted in a rather steep cultural gap between the Issei and Nisei generations. On the one hand, the Issei, or first generation, not being able to become U.S. citizens, identified with Japan, their homeland. On the other hand, the Nisei, born and educated in the United States, identified with this the only country they knew. However, many Issei not certain what the future may hold for their families sent their Nisei children to Saturday schools to study Japanese language and culture. The Issei believed that if the anti-Japanese sentiments grew worse, they would have to return to Japan with their Nisei children. The language school training was seen as a form of insurance and preparation for that worse case scenario.

However, by the 1930s, sufficient numbers of Nisei have come of age to manage their own future and to exert influence on the community's future. Perhaps, in response to both their growing recognition of this leadership in their local community and at the same time in full awareness of their minority status in the general American society, the Nisei formed an organization in 1930, known as the Japanese American Citizen's League (JACL). By 1934 some twenty-one chapters located in Washington, Oregon and California were linked together into a national organization.

A recent study (Yoo 1993) of the Japanese language newspapers published on the West Coast in the 1930s reveals a number of interesting facts about this Japanese American community. First of all the 1930s was the period of the Great Depression and job opportunities were limited especially for minority groups. Accordingly, much of the community looked inward for its basic recreational, religious, and social life. Secondly, when the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1937, the community was split ideologically. Many Issei writers took a pro-Japan interpretation on the progress of the war, while the Nisei journalists took a more critical view of the Japanese action in China. And finally, the newspapers reported a few incidents where Chinese-Americans took out their frustrations on some Japanese-Americans over this Asian war.

[End note] This same war was the reason for my first appearance on the pages of the local newspaper, the San Diego Union. A Chinese-American friend, Jack Wong, and I were interviewed for our respective views on this Asian war, even though I was grossly uninformed about it. Perhaps what made this story newsworthy was that both Jack and I were in the high school R.O.T.C. unit.

Furthermore because political relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating, the national Japanese American

Citizen's League saw its primary mission as one of emphasizing Nisei loyalty to America. Thus for example one chapter near San Francisco, the San Mateo County Chapter, published in the September 17, 1941 issue of the Burlington Advance Star the following:

> We, Too, are Americans!
>
> Our aim is to let all Americans know that the American citizens of Japanese parentage stand loyally and shoulder to shoulder with Uncle Sam in this world crisis. All of us, who have been drafted or volunteered into the service of the United States have attained excellent records.

In any case, by the time World War II came along, the majority of the Japanese American community was composed of Nisei, as I noted above. Most Nisei were in their late teens and about one-fifth of them were married, mostly within the Japanese American community. Less than one percent had married outside of their racial or ethnic boundary. To put it another way, the Nisei was the generation that came of age in the late 1930s and early 1940s when the Japanese American community was closely knit and provincial in its outlook.

Though there were speculations a war between the United States and Japan might lead to the incarceration of certain enemy aliens (i.e., the Issei), the Nisei did not believe that they would be affected because they were citizens. This confidence in their citizenship status was shattered when the Nisei found themselves face-to-face with military orders for evacuation and internment following President Franklin Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066. Even though some Nisei appeared before a Congressional Committee which looked into feasibility of internment (known as the Tolan Committee) to protest these orders and three individuals went to prison to challenge the constitutionality of these orders, most Nisei went to the internment camps however reluctantly but without engaging in mass protest. Perhaps a message written by the San Mateo County JACL expresses the sentiment of the majority of the Nisei at that time. On May 7, 1942, two days before that community was uprooted from their residences, they published in the San Mateo Times the following:

> A Message of Thanks and Gratitude...to the citizens of San Mateo County--
>
> Shortly after December 7th, the Japanese residents of San Mateo County whole-heartedly expressed their willingness to aid in whatever war effort the United States called upon them to do. Their desire came as a natural result of living the American way of life...
>
> Today, as evacuation orders affect Japanese aliens and American citizen Japanese, the sorrow at the thought of leaving their homes is eased by the knowledge that by cooperation and sacrifice, they are aiding the United States war efforts.

> They look forward to participating in the Foods for Victory program at the various settlement areas. They hope that later they will materially add something to the flow of war supplies that is now bombarding the Axis aggressors. They are proud to continue sending their sons into the armed forces of the United States as a patriotic and privileged right...
>
> San Mateo County
> Japanese-American Citizens League

Much has been written about life in these concentration camps which held the Japanese Americans and much has been written about the historical circumstances that led to this unfortunate event. (See e.g., Uchida 1982, Spicer 1969). I shall not reiterate the details here because my purpose is to examine what happened afterwards, i.e., some of the consequences of camp life on the people who were interned and upon their children.

C. Memories of the "Silent Generation," the Nisei

It may seem natural for the Japanese American community today in 1994 to be dedicating monuments and going on rather expensive pilgrimages to the former camp sites where they were held as prisoners during World War II. But from the vantage point of the immediate postwar years, the Issei and Nisei had no interest in revisting the camps, much less raising funds to dedicate a monument. The reason for their disinterest in these gestures or symbols of remembrance was fairly obvious to the former internees. They did not cherish reliving the suspicion of disloyalty and the feelings of being victimized by the wartime hysteria. Revisiting their former camps and placing monuments would have meant a resurrection of unpleasant memories that they had repressed or had forgotten.

Many Sansei, the children of the Nisei, have commented on the failure of their Nisei parents to discuss and explain what conditions were like in the camps. One Sansei (Nagata 1993:vii) tells about an incident when she was six years old of finding a jar of colored shells under the kitchen sink. Not getting a satisfactory answer from her Issei grandmother, she asked her mother. Nagata describes her mother's response:

> "Oh, I made them in camp." "Was it fun?" I asked enthusiastically. "Not really," she replied. Her answer puzzled me. The shells were beautiful, and camp, as far as I knew, was a fun place where children roasted marshmallows and sang songs around the fire. Yet my mother's reaction did not seem happy. I was perplexed by this brief exchange, but I also sensed I should not ask more questions.

Then Nagata generalizes from this interchange:

> As time went by, "camp" remained a vague, cryptic reference to some time in the past, the past of my parents, their friends,

> my grandparents, and my relatives. We never directly discussed it. It was not until high school that I began to understand the signficance of the word, that camp referred to a World War II American concentration camp, not a summer camp.

Another Sansei has written (Hirasuna 1992:50) about her parent's failure to communicate with her about their internment experience at the Jerome camp in Arkansas:

> By the time I was born, exactly a year after the bombing of Hiroshima, the family just called it "Jerome" or "camp." Time was separated between pre-camp and post-camp. "We knew them from camp." "That was before Jerome [camp]." "We had to buy a new one after camp." No one told me what camp was and I never asked. I just accepted its existence. Yet somehow I knew that camp was not a good place, whatever it was.

Indeed it was not until the late 1960s, nearly three decades after they were first incarcerated, that the Nisei began to drop their inhibitions about sponsoring public events focusing on the internment experience. About the only noteworthy event was a weekend worshop the UCLA Extension Department organized in 1967 to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Executive Order 9066 (Nakanishi 1993:18)

This silence or the unwillingness of the part of the Nisei generation to dredge up their memories about their camp experience has produced some critical responses on the part of their children, the Sansei generation. Many Sansei did not understand why the Nisei have remained silent, but also why Nisei did not vigorously protest their incarceration. Take the following quotation from a recent newspaper article which announced the rationale for sponsoring a pilgrimage to Tule Lake, one of last camps to be closed at the end of the war:

> "...we hope this journey [pilgrimage to Tule Lake] will allow us to heal the intergenerational wounds of Executive Order 9066. This is the time for you to talk with your children, parents and interested people about a painful subject in a safe and supportive environment." (Rafu Shimpo, July 6, 1994, p. 1)

In addition to the unanticipated activity of visiting former camp sites, a second type of unexpected outcome was the harnessing of community activities to repeal Executive Order 9066 which President Roosvelet signed in February 1992. This Order had remained in force during the period when race riots took place in the 1960s. From 1968, the Order was made a part of Title II of the Internal Security Act. From the standpoint of the Nisei who were under suspicion of disloyalty in wartime and still suffering from post-traumatic syndrome, it is indeed surprising that they would take the initiative to engage in a movement to repeal the essence of

Executive Order 9066. Yet this activity was initiated by the Japanese American Citizen's League, which in 1968 was dominated by the Nisei generation. The movement was successful and on February 19, 1974, President Ford rescinded the order that President Roosevelt used to legitimize the U.S. concentration camps.

Still another unanticipated postwar activity by the "silent" Nisei was to resurrect the three court cases that challenged the military orders that excluded the Japanese Americans from the West Coast. Three Niseis--Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, Fred Korematsu--were put in prison because they deliberately challenged these wartime orders. Their test cases eventually were reviewed by the Supreme Court where it justified the exclusion orders on the basis of military necessity. (Nakanishi 1993)

At the end of the war, many Nisei believed that their wartime record for serving in the military had proven their loyalty and their place in American society. It was not necessary to review these Court cases because by so doing it would call the public's attention to them again. Besides, there was still a large part of the American public that did know about the internment of the Japanese Americans, or if they did know, some of them accepted the very fact of incarceration as evidence of the need to be interned (Nagata 1993:188). There were also Nisei scholars who argued that the Nisei assumed an attitude about these matters that had roots in Japanese culture, shikata ganai ("it can't be helped").

But other Nisei believed that these court cases should be re-opened to let the public know about the injustice of internment especially when researchers discovered, under the Freedom of Information Act government documents (Irons 1983) that indicated withholding of vital evidence and the issuing of false evidence to the Supreme Court. By raising funds in the Japanese American community and conducting the research necessary to overturn the Court's decision, it was believed that the community would revive its memories about camp life and talk about it more openly than before. It would also serve to remove the suspicion of disloyalty placed upon the community by the Court's decision. Thus in 1983 coram nobis petitions were filed to remove the convictions of Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu, the three who were jailed for disobeying the curfew or evacuation orders. It may be noted here that in 1988 two of the petition cases were successful, while the third person's case (Minoru Yasui) was considered moot because he died in 1986.

But the most significant unanticipated consequence of the internment experience was the organization and implementation of the so-called "Redress Movement." This movement hinged on the decision of the Japanese American community to seek a formal apology as well as financial redress from the federal government for the personal humiliation Japanese Americans suffered and for the properties and businesses they sacrificed as the result of being imprisoned in the camps.

[Endnote] It might be noted that in 1948, President Harry Truman signed the "Evacuation Claims Act" which paid less than ten cents on a dollar for property that the Japanese Americans lost in the internment process. But this Act was highly unsatifactory because many could not file a claim because they lacked the required documentary proofs. These documents were lost or destroyed in the internment process.

Needless to say, the broad aims of the redress movement involved not only gaining the approval of Congress in a time of budgetary deficits, but also because this ethnic community, compared to other minority groups, had a very small constituency. Furthermore by this time many Nisei had become somewhat complacent or too engaged with the exigencies of their personal lives: their own retirement, the care of their aged parents, and concern over their own health.

There were other factors to overcome if the movement were to succeed. Because the Japanese Americans were no longer living in the tightly knit ethnic communities of the prewar days cmmunication and coordination of the dispersed population was complicated. There were also emotional barriers to overcome. Many Nisei felt that launching a public campaign to seek an apology and monetary redress at a time when they were seeking to be assimilated into American society was unwise. Also at the time that the campaign did start, the general public was poorly informed about the internment and textbooks in the public schools generally failed to mention the internment program. (Nagata 1993: 187)

The movement to seek redress began in the 1970s, but it was not until ten years later that the first tangible progress in this strategy was achieved. This step came on July 31, 1980 when President Carter signed the law which created a Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC). The Commision had three large goals: to review the basis for and impact of Executive Order 9066; to review the military directives requiring relocation; and, to recommend appropriate remedies.

The Commission provided one of the best opportunities for the members of the Japanese American community to retrieve their memories collectively and to give public testimony about their camp experiences.

> The hearings "began on July 14, 1981 and continued for the next year and a half, holding a total of 20 days of public hearings in nine cities..." Commenting on the testimony of the former internees, Congressman Mineta described it as a "painful outpouring of memories" and a "great unlocking of passion." (Redress, p. 8)

The second major step in the redress movement was to lobby Congress for the passage of the redress bill, known now as the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. But before it passed there were two previous attempts which failed to get Congression approval, one in 1983 and the other in 1985. The usually restrained Japanese

American community did not hesitate this time and it came together in numerous efforts at lobbying the Capitol, including the formation of a group known as the "National Coalition for Redress and Reparations," a Los Angeles based group that spent five days in Washington, D.C.

C. Vicarious Memories and Sansei Generation

These unanticipated outcomes following the end of internment camps were described here largely in terms of the Nisei generation who were actually incarcerated. What should be spelled out now is the contributions the Sansei made to the success of these postwar developments, such as the redress movement and the repeal of Executive Order 9066. As stated before, the Nisei were the direct victims of the incarceration and thus had some ground for taking action in these postwar movements. However it was different for the Sansei. This generation was either too young to have a recall on this experience or born after their Nisei parents left the camps. Yet, I would like to argue that the Sansei played a unique role in restoring the submerged collective memories of their parents and in initiating the postwar activities just described. To support this thesis I would like to rely on the concept of "vicarious memory" which my colleague Jacob Climo suggested. He describes this concept as follows:

> Every group and individual has a rich store of memories that are not personal and self-generated. These memories come from others--from families, groups, cultures, and nation. [Such memories] are often not remembered personally but things that others have told us about and ... that somehow become important enough for members of the group to include in their collective memory. (Climo, personal note)

The notion of vicarious memory fits nicely with the history of the Sansei generation's involvement with the issues relating to Executive Order 9066 because most of them did not have personal experience in the camps. The vast majority was born after the camps were closed or after their parents had relocated. Furthermore, as previously indicated, their Nisei parents did not come out of their self-imposed silence about these matters until the late 1960s and early 1970s--about the same time that the Sansei were coming of age. Thus most of the ideas and images they have of the camps came from their efforts to construct their vicarious memories.

The development of the Sansei's vicarious memories was greatly aided by the establishment of the Japanese American Research Project (JARP), located at the University of California, Los Angeles. This project (Hosokawa 1982:312-13) was initiated in 1932 by a small group professorial types within the Japanese American Citizens League. The project's aims were to conduct an indepth sociological survey of the Issei and Nisei, to publish a scholarly history of Japanese Americans, and to assemble documents as well as

oral histories of this community. The project was initially financed by private contributions and later funded by the Carnegie Foundaton and the National Institute of Mental Health. A number of publications came out of this project and it was for the time being an important source of vicarious memories for the Sansei. Some of the basic publications from the project are listed below:

The Japanese American Community: A Three-Generation Study, coauthored by Gene N. Levine and Robert Colbert Rhodes.

The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: A Study of Japanese Americans by Edna Bonacich and John Modell.

The Bamboo People by Frank Chuman. [A study of the legal history of Japanese Americans]

Planted in Good Soil: Issei Contributions to U.S. Agriculture by Masakzu Iwata (unpublished ms)

East to America by Robert A. Wilson and William Hosokawa

Nisei: The Quiet Americans; The Story of a People by William Hosokawa.

The book in the above list was the most controversial--not so much for its contents, but for its title. One segment of community, mainly the Sansei population, objected to the "Quiet American" designation because it tends to create a negative stereotype of Japanese Americans. Others, largely the Nisei, felt it was an appropriate designation, and it generally matched the interpretation of facts presented in the book. In any case the controversy over the book illustrates very well the generation gap between Nisei and Sansei. It was the Nisei view that, if they kept their faith in American democracy, eventually justice and rationality would prevail. Patience and preserverance, many Nisei felt, were the requisites to their full assimilation into American society. In fact this point of view seemed to have been validated by non-Nisei writers who looked upon the Nisei as a "model minority." [Source?]

The Sansei, on the other hand, argued that people do not achieve justice without a struggle and without confrontation of issues. Born and raised in a different political climate from that of their Nisei parents, they saw the image of the Quiet American and the Model Minority detrimental to their own future.

Armed with the vicarious memories of World War II and imbued with the political rhetoric of the late 1960s, the Sansei generation played key roles in all the postwar unanticipated activities of the Japanese American community--such as the pilgrimages to the camp sites, the repeal of the Executive Order 9066 and the complicated movement to secure an apology and monetary redress from the U.S. government. For example it was a team of Sansei lawyers that petitioned the courts successfully to vacate in 1988 the

Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu cases that went before the Supreme Court in the 1940s.

This generation persisted in learning about the camps even though their parents were reluctant to talk about it at first. This generation provided the stimulus for resurrecting their parent's memories and they provided the skills and training to organize the postwar activities. Sansei journalists and scholars did much to increase substantially the literature on the internment and its consequences. They interviewed their parents, they took advantage of the Freedom of Information Act to delve into government documents, and they researched the newspapers that catered to the Japanese American community of the period. Sansei in the educational field prepared teachers' guide and histories of the internment camps so that this knowledge may be placed in the classroom.

One of the fascinating studies along this line is known as the "The Sansei Research Project" conducted in 1987 [Nagata 1993], just a year before the Redress campaign was successfully completed. This national sample included a 20-page questionnaire received from 740 Sansei (out of 1,250 mailed to potential respondents) and over 40 indepth interviews. More than half who completed the questionnaires also wrote additional comments expressing their personal and emotional reactions to the topics raised in the survey instruments. The author of the book, a Sansei, subtitled her book, "Exploring the Cross-generational Impact of the Japanese American Internment." I believe it is a most comprehensive analysis of the vicarious memories of the Sansei on the Nisei camp life.

The Survey investigated these topical areas: (Nagata 1993:65)

1. The nature of communication that has occurred between the Sansei and their parents about the internment experience.
2. The level of interest held by Sansei about the internment.
3. The level of knowledge Sansei have about the internment as a historical event.
4. Sansei opinions about the movement to seek monetary redress from the government for former internees.

There were two other topical areas, but were not included here because they were not directly related to vicarious memory.

Here are a few findings I have selected (Nagata 1993:209):

1. The researchers hypothesized that the age of parent at the time of their incarceration and their length of internment would influence Sansei responses. But the data did not support their hypothesis.

2. Sansei fathers were seen to be less communicative about internment experience than their mothers.

3. [In the sample, there were some Sansei who had neither parents and other Sansei respondents who had at least one parent in camp.] The Sansei who had a parent interned said they attribute to themselves a number of negative consequences including "feelings of low self-esteem, the pressure to assimilate, an accelerated loss of Japanese culture and language, and experiencing the unexpressed pain of their parents."

4. On the positive side of internment, many Sansei "admired their Nisei parents for their ability to succeed in life despite the injustices" and they "recognize that they now share in the responsibility to educate others about the internment and must themselves be vigilant not only of their own rights...but also of the rights of all minority groups."

This last statement alludes to attitudes and activities that engaged the Sansei generation in their adult years. As noted before, the Sansei was the generation that grew up in the late 60s and early 70s. Many of them attended colleges at a time when students in general were swept up in whirlwind of civil rights issues and antiwar sentiments. Here are some facts gleaned from a Newsweek report in order to remind of this period of history:

In 1965, Martin Luther King, Jr. lead a protest march of 4,000 from Selma to Montgomery Alabama.
In the same year, the National Guards were called to halt Black riots in the Watts section of Los Angeles.

In 1966, Students for Democratic Society promoted "Make Love, Not War" slogans.
In the same year, urban race riots raged in 16 U.S. cities.

In 1967, Black Panthers and NOW (National Organization for Women) were founded.
In the same year, "hippies" lead an anti-Establishment movement and moved into communes.

In 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in Memphis.
In the same year, Robert Kenneday was assassinated in Los Angeles.

In 1969, 400,000 attended the Woodstock Festival.
In the same year the Gay Rights movement began with protest marches and demonstrations.

In 1970, some 448 colleges were either closed or on strike as part of the anti-war movement.
In the same year, Kent State student protesters were fired upon by the National Guard.

In 1973, Native Americans expressed their grievances by seizing property at Wounded Knee.

While the above events received much national press attention, there was very little space devoted to the rise of Asian American movement during the same period of social upheaval. Sansei, as well as other Asian American students were engaged in student strikes and sit-ins at various campuses around the country. But the student strike at San Francisco State College (now a "University") was only one example, but it was one that the Sansei community believes was significant enough to devote an entire issue of Amerasia Journal (15:1, 1989) for recalling its significance.

Having now reached middle age in the 1990s, the Sansei are thinking about passing on their legacy to their children, the Yonsei, or fourth generation, some of whom are now reaching adulthood. The Sansei editor for this special issue of the Journal, Glen Omatsu, had this to say:

> It may be difficult for a new generation--raised on the Asian American codewords of the 1980s stressing "advocacy," "access," "legitimacy," and "assertiveness"--to understand the urgency of the demand by Malcolm X for freedom "by any means necessary," Mao's challenge to "serve the people," the slogans of "power to the people" and "self-determination," the principles of "mass line" organizing and "united front" work, or the conviction that the people--not the elites--are the makers of history. But they were the ideas that galvanized thousands of Asian Americans and reshaped our communities. And it is these concepts which must be grasped in order to understand the scope and intensity of our movement and what it created.

He continues to state the rationale for this special issue:

> This issue of Amerasia is devoted to a reexamination of these themes. Our focus is not on recounting the past events themselves but on retrieving the legacies for our current situation. Our goals is to identify--especially for a new generation of Asian Americans--the lessons of an earlier generation.

It is noteworthy that Omatsu writes of the "new generation" as being Asian Americans, not as yonsei or fourth generation Japanese Americans. In the next and final section of this paper, I discuss the significance of this new "codeword" and new generation.

E. Asian Americans, A New Subculture

During the campus turmoil of the sixties and seventies, the Sansei generation perhaps sensitive to their small population size (compared to the African American and Hispanic populations) began to form coalitions with other organizations, particularly those of Asian descent: Chinese-Americans, Filipino-Americans, Korean-Americans, etc. In due time, a social movement was formed and duly recognized as the Asian American Movement (see Wei 1993).

One example of a coalition group with a Sansei membership was the Berkeley AAPA (Asian American Political Alliance), the first of many that sprung up around the country. William Wei (1993: 21) has this story to tell about this Berkeley AAPA meeting:

> ... it was at the second meeting that Larry Jack Wong [Chinese American] first brought up the internment of the Japanese Americans, saying, "Hey, you're Japanese. Why don't you people protest about the concentration camps? Woo noted that a long discussion ensued and, ever the gadfly, he said, "Hell, the way things are going now, they might do that to us. So you're not doing this just for the Japanese, but for all other people...

William Wei continues this story:

> Wong and Woo had touched upon a taboo topic, one that older Japanese Americans had sought to forget. After that tragedy was revealed to sansei (third-generation Japanese Americans) participating in the Asian American Movement, the internment during World War II became the issue among Japanese American activists and, for many of them, the sole reason for being involved politically. (Wei 1993: 21)

The previously mentioned statement by Omura implies that a new community, known as Asian Americans, is now a viable and self-sustaining social entity. That is, the student activities of the period constructed a new subculture out of previously unconnected organizations.

Wei discusses this Asian American movement and its accomplishments under a number of specific points. The movement (Wei 1993:

> 1) produced a new identity by transcending specific Asian ethnic identities and focusing on a pan-Asian consciousness. It has even lobbied the Census Bureau to have its classification system modified. (Le Espritu, 1992)
> 2) created a generation of activists who were willing to act for the collective benefit of their Asian American community.
> 3) attempted to change the cariacature of Asians by producing new histories, literature, film, and art works that was more in tune with mainstream America. [Museums were also built.]
> 4) became associated with Asian American women's movement, a movement that faced the gender inequalities.
> 5) gave birth to a host of new institutions in higher education, for example the new academic field known as Asian American Studies. [Asian American Studies spawned a new journal, Amerasia, as well a national Association of Asian Studies that held its 11th annual meeting this year.]
> 6) sponsored community agencies in Asian enclaves of the country: welfare assistance, counseling services, recreational facilities, job placements, etc. [The movement often assumed the role of intermediaries between the community and the larger society, thereby making the traditional leader less

relevant.]
7) validated, without intending to do so, ethnic pluralism and multiculturalism that is becoming a new vision of American society.

In summary, then, this paper attempted to relate the post World War II consequences of Executive Order 9066, consequences which were largely unintended and unanticipated. The paper started out with the Nisei generation's memories of their internment camp experiences and why for two decades the Nisei were reluctant to discuss these memories with their children or to engage in collective action to "display" these memories. Next, the paper focused on eagerness of the Sansei generation to learn more about the camps and as a result created a memory bank which was identified as "vicarious memories." With these learned memories, the Sansei supported a wide range of collective activities that were unanticipated at the time the camps were closed, such as pilrimages to former camp sites, Congressional hearings on the reasons for internment, and a large-scale movement to seek redress and apology. The final section described how the Sansei generation armed with these vicarious memories of citizens being interned were engaged in a social movement that culminated in a new ethnic identity known as Asian Americans and thereby added a new wrinkle to the growing multiculturalism of mainstream America. From the perspective of the aging Nisei generation, this Asian American identity was an unintended consequence of the camps.

THE LABYRINTH OF MEMORY

Ethnographic Journeys

Edited by
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sharply with my memory of silence and secrecy. The loss I felt was the sharing I had experienced as a child; sharing an unspoken, secret experience with adults had bonded me in silence to the generation of Holocaust survivors. The public speaking out about the Holocaust put an abrupt end to the secret nature of that bond, and I lost an important attachment of my childhood, something familiar and important to me. I felt betrayal in the sense that I was part of the conspiracy but not part of the decision to end it. Ending the silence at the same time forced me to reconsider the Holocaust in a new way. I could no longer regard it as an unspoken secret carrying intense but unfocused emotions that I could hide behind in childhood innocence. Making it public required me as an adult to consider it for the first time rationally and consciously as a real event; I had to confront it intellectually as an adult, not only emotionally as a child.

And for one of the few times in my life, I found myself crying out loud when I thought about the Holocaust. I was crying because I began to understand the nature of genocide and I was crying because as a child I had not cried but simply had accepted my reality without question. And I cried because I suddenly became acutely aware of the immense pain my Holocaust teachers had repressed and concealed from me, and because I understood for the first time that the conspiracy of silence was constructed to conceal their pain, so they could control it and it would not control them.

I believe my feelings of abandonment also represent a sense of accepting the responsibility to remember the Holocaust, a responsibility passed from one generation to the next: from those who had experienced it directly to those, like me, who had experienced it vicariously. For the generation of survivors, Holocaust fears and memories had encompassed their lives in the postwar years. Most felt little desire to talk about it; they wanted instead to repress it and get on with their lives. But their mannerisms, body language, attitudes, perceptions, and melancholia betrayed them and set the tone for transmitting their feelings to anyone near them, especially to children like me who were sensitive to them as people.

But for my generation, however real and vital to life, Holocaust memories and identities will always be vicarious. Understanding the Holocaust and its universal human messages about genocide and in particular Jewish terms, about the gaps in Jewish life caused by the destruction of European Jewry, requires talking and telling: putting overwhelming experiences into words and language so we can carry the message and the memory with us now and into the future.

Memories and Their Unintended Consequences

Iwao Ishino

It has been more than fifty years since President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which authorized the incarceration of 120,000 Japanese Americans living on the West Coast at the beginning of World War II. This incarceration took place without due process of law and without formal charges of misbehavior. The federal officials who supported this Executive Order attempted to justify it on the basis of "military necessity." However, as postwar studies have shown, military necessity was just an excuse. A study by a congressional commission in 1982, for example, concluded that the placing of the Japanese Americans in concentration camps was the result of "racial prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership" (Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 1982).

However wrong the Executive Order 9066 was in 1942 and however humanely the order was carried out in the ten wartime internment camps, the long-term consequences of the order on both the interned people and American society at large were incalculable. In this chapter I will discuss some of these long-term consequences in the context of memories, generations, and culture—the themes that run throughout the present book. First, I will discuss why the survivors of internment camps repressed their memories of camp life for two decades and what was done later to resurrect their memories. Then I will address how these submerged memories affected their children as well as the Japanese American community in general. Finally, I suggest how the children of the camp survivors, who came of age in the late 1960s and early 1970s, contributed toward the

formation of a new ethnic entity known as Asian Americans and sometimes as Asian Pacific Americans. The creation of the new entity was not only the product of a common, shared need to fight racism among the various Americans of Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and others of Asian descent, but it also led to community activism and organized electoral politics that were absent in the early years of post–World War II. But before I get into these issues, a background statement on the Japanese American community will be helpful.

THE PREWAR JAPANESE AMERICAN COMMUNITY

The Japanese immigration to the U.S. mainland began soon after the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. From a population size of only 2,039 in 1890, the mainland Japanese community (excluding those in Hawaii) grew to 72,257 by 1910 when it surpassed the Chinese population in size. For the next twenty years, while the Chinese population remained virtually constant, the Japanese nearly doubled, to 138,834 (Takaki 1989:180). This population increase came, not from more immigrants arriving on these shores, but from the second-generation children of immigrants. It is interesting to note that the Japanese American community coined special terms to recognize the differential memories and legacies that existed between the generations—*Issei* for the immigrant group and *Nisei* for the children who were born in this country.

Because of the prevailing attitudes toward people of Asian descent, the Issei were not eligible to become naturalized citizens, even though many had been residents for more than thirty years. (It was not until 1952, seven years after the end of World War II, that the Issei became eligible for naturalization under the Walter-McCarran Immigration and Naturalization Act.) Moreover, the Issei, along with other foreign-born Asians in California and other Western states, were prohibited by law from owning land and from marrying non-Asians. By 1924, this anti-Japanese climate on the West Coast was so pervasive that further immigration from Japan was prohibited. This 1924 law and other discriminatory laws resulted in a rather steep cultural gap between the Issei and Nisei generations. The Issei, or first generation, not being able to become U.S. citizens, identified with Japan, their homeland, while the Nisei, born and educated in the United States, identified with this the only country they knew. However, many Issei, not certain what the future might hold for their families, sent their Nisei children to Saturday schools to study Japanese language and culture. The Issei believed that if the anti-Japanese sentiments worsened, they would have to return to Japan with their Nisei children. The language school training was seen as a form of insurance and preparation for that worst case scenario. In fact, some Issei sent their children to Japan for a Japanese education. These were called *Kibei*. According to Hosokawa (1969:296), there were some eight thousand Kibei in the United States on December 7, 1941, who had spent three years or more in Japan.

However, by the 1930s, sufficient numbers of Nisei had come of age to manage their own future and to exert influence on the community's future. By the time of Pearl Harbor, the Nisei constituted two-thirds of the Japanese American community. Perhaps in response to their growing recognition of this leadership in their local community and at the same time in full awareness of their minority status in the general American society, the Nisei formed an organization in 1930, known as the Japanese American Citizen's League (JACL). By 1934 some twenty-one chapters located in Washington, Oregon, and California were linked together into a national organization (Hosokawa 1982). The JACL published a weekly newspaper, *Pacific Citizen*, which served as the main voice by which the organization reached its membership and the larger society. (More will be said about this organization when the postwar situation is described.)

Serving the Japanese American communities on the West Coast were a number of newspapers like the *Rafu Shimpo* and the *Kashu Mainichi*. A recent study (Yoo 1993) of the Japanese language newspapers published on the West Coast in the 1930s reveals a number of interesting facts about this Japanese American community. First of all, the 1930s was the period of the Great Depression and job opportunities were limited, especially for minority groups. Accordingly, much of the community looked inward for its basic recreational, religious, and social life. Secondly, when the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1937, the community was split ideologically. Many Issei writers took a pro-Japan interpretation on the progress of the war, while the Nisei journalists took a more critical view of the Japanese action in China. And finally, the newspapers reported a few incidents where Chinese Americans took out their frustrations on some Japanese Americans over this Asian war.

This same war was the reason for my first appearance on the pages of the local newspaper, the *San Diego Union*. A Chinese American friend, Jack Wong, and I were interviewed for our respective views on this Asian war, even though I was grossly uninformed about it. Perhaps what made this story newsworthy was that both Jack and I were in the high school R.O.T.C. unit.

In any case, by the time World War II came along, the majority of the

Japanese American community was composed of Nisei, as I noted above. Most Nisei were in their late teens and about one-fifth of them were married, mostly within the Japanese American community. Less than 1 percent had married outside of their racial or ethnic boundary. To put it another way, the Nisei was the generation that came of age in the late 1930s and early 1940s when the Japanese American community was closely knit and provincial in its outlook.

Though there were speculations that a war between the United States and Japan might lead to the incarceration of certain enemy aliens (i.e., the Issei), the Nisei did not believe that they would be affected because they were citizens. Their confidence in the rights of citizenship was shattered when the Nisei found themselves face-to-face with military orders for evacuation and internment following President Franklin Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066. Even though several Nisei used the courts to challenge the constitutionality of these military orders, most Nisei entered the internment camps without engaging in any form of mass protest. However, after the incarceration took place, a deep and long-lasting controversy emerged where one group of Nisei argued that the JACL had betrayed American principles of justice by urging its own constituents "to accept evacuation to U.S. Army-operated concentration camps" (Hosokawa 1982:190). The dissidents also argued that the JACL had too great an influence in persuading the military and government authorities that the Japanese Americans would obey these evacuations peacefully because they were loyal citizens eager to serve the war effort.

Much has been written about life in these concentration camps and much has been written about the historical circumstances that led to this unfortunate event (see, e.g., Uchida 1982, Spicer 1969). Here is a short description of the camps, or "Relocation Centers," which summarizes well my own thoughts about them:

> It can be said safely that there were no happy Relocation Centers. All had their problems. At best, camp life was abnormal—subject to uncertainty, fear, frustration, anger, emotional pressures, great physical discomfort, resentment, and beset by an abundance of rumors that fed on boredom and bitterness. (Wilson and Hosokawa 1980:220)

Other than this short quotation, I shall not attempt to describe the experiences in the camps, because my purpose here is to examine what happened afterwards, that is, how the memories of camp life formed the basis for a series of events and collective actions that were unexpected at the time the uprooted people were leaving the camps.

MEMORIES OF THE "SILENT GENERATION," THE NISEI

It may seem natural for the Japanese American community today to be dedicating monuments and going on rather expensive pilgrimages to the former camp sites where they were held as prisoners during World War II. But from the vantage point of the immediate postwar years, the Issei and Nisei had no interest in revisiting the camps, much less in raising funds to dedicate monuments at these camp sites. The reason for their disinterest in these symbols of remembrance was fairly obvious to the former internees. They did not cherish reliving the suspicion of disloyalty and the feelings of being victimized by the wartime hysteria. Revisiting their former camps and placing monuments would have meant a resurrection of unpleasant memories that they had repressed or had forgotten.

Many *Sansei*, the children of the Nisei, have commented on the failure of their Nisei parents to discuss and explain what conditions were like in the camps. One Sansei (Nagata 1993:vii) tells about an incident of finding a jar of colored shells under the kitchen sink when she was six years old. Not getting a satisfactory answer from her Issei grandmother, she asked her mother. Nagata describes her mother's response:

> "Oh, I made them in camp." "Was it fun?" I asked enthusiastically. "Not really," she replied. Her answer puzzled me. The shells were beautiful, and camp, as far as I knew, was a fun place where children roasted marshmallows and sang songs around the fire. Yet my mother's reaction did not seem happy. I was perplexed by this brief exchange, but I also sensed I should not ask more questions.

Then Nagata generalizes from this interchange:

> As time went by, "camp" remained a vague, cryptic reference to some time in the past, the past of my parents, their friends, my grandparents, and my relatives. We never directly discussed it. It was not until high school that I began to understand the significance of the word, that *camp* referred to a World War II American concentration camp, not a summer camp.

Another Sansei has written (Hirasuma 1992:50) about her parents' failure to communicate with her about their internment experience at the Jerome camp in Arkansas:

> By the time I was born, exactly a year after the bombing of Hiroshima, the family just called it "Jerome" or "camp." Time was separated between pre-camp and

post-camp. "We knew them from camp." "That was before Jerome [camp]." "We had to buy a new one after camp." No one told me what camp was and I never asked. I just accepted its existence. Yet somehow I knew that camp was not a good place, whatever it was.

Indeed it was not until the late 1960s, nearly three decades after they were first incarcerated, that the Nisei began to drop their inhibitions about discussing the internment experience. About the only noteworthy event was a weekend workshop the UCLA Extension Department organized in 1967 to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Executive Order 9066 (Nakanishi 1993:18).

This silence or the unwillingness on the part of the Nisei generation to dredge up their memories about their camp experience has produced some critical responses on the part of their children, the Sansei generation. Many Sansei did not understand why their parents have remained silent. There was a language barrier between themselves and their Issei grandparents' generation, but there was no such barrier in the Nisei household. They spoke English.

In this context, consider an announcement inviting the public to participate in pilgrimage to the former Tule Lake camp, the last camp to be closed. The sponsors of this program explained:

> We hope this journey [pilgrimage to Tule Lake] will allow us to heal the intergenerational wounds of Executive Order 9066. This is the time for you to talk with your children, parents and interested people about a painful subject in a safe and supportive environment." (*Rafu Shimpo*, July 6, 1994, 1)

This explanation is given for a pilgrimage taking place not five or ten years after the camps were closed, but in August 1994, some fifty years after the end of World War II.

Another type of unanticipated activity at the closing of the camps was the set of political activities dealing with Executive Order 9066 (E.O. 9066). This order that set in motion a series of events leading to the incarceration camps became obsolete when World War II ended. However, there was no formal statement of termination for E.O. 9066 and there were many civil rights activists who were concerned that the order had some life left in it. For example, the basic idea of incarcerating citizens under emergency conditions in E.O. 9066 was incorporated in the "Emergency Detention Act," Title II of the Internal Securities Act of 1950. During the urban race riots in sixteen American cities in 1966, some concerned

citizens feared that this detention act would be activated and the "trouble-makers" placed in a camp such as the one at Tule Lake in northern California. Officially recognizing this threat only in 1968, the national JACL began a systematic campaign to repeal this Title II law (Nagata 1993:189). The campaign was spurred on by the Sansei activists—a part of the 1960s generation—who were critical of the JACL's World War II role of representing the Nisei to the federal government as a cooperative and "Quiet American" who could be led by the nose. This detention provision in the act of 1950 was repealed in 1971.

Soon after the successful campaign to repeal the Title II detention program was finished, JACL entered another campaign to obtain an apology for the errors committed by E.O. 9066. Taking advantage of a year of national celebration (that is, the Bicentennial Year of 1976), JACL requested from the president a formal statement regarding the termination of E.O. 9066. By some delicate lobbying efforts, this campaign was also successfully completed. On February 19, 1976, President Gerald Ford issued this proclamation (quoted in Hosokawa 1982:340–42):

> February 19th is the anniversary of a sad day in American history. It was on that date in 1942, in the midst of the response to the hostilities that began on December 7, 1941, that Executive Order No. 9066 was issued . . . resulting in the uprooting of loyal Americans. . . .
>
> We now know what we should have known then—not only was that evacuation wrong, but Japanese Americans were and are loyal Americans. On the battlefield and at home, Japanese Americans . . . have been and continue to be written in our history for the sacrifices and contributions they have made to the wellbeing and security of this, our common Nation.
>
> The Executive Order that was issued on February 19, 1942, was for the sole purpose of prosecuting the war with the Axis Powers, and ceased to be effective with the end of those hostilities. Because there was no formal statement of its termination, however, there is concern among many Japanese Americans that there may yet be some life in that obsolete document. I think it appropriate, in this our Bicentennial Year, to remove all doubt on that matter, and to make our commitment in the future.

Still another unanticipated postwar activity by the "silent" Nisei was the resurrection of three court cases that challenged the military orders that excluded the Japanese Americans from the West Coast. In 1942 three Niseis—Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu—were put in prison because they challenged these wartime orders. In the midst of World War II (in 1943) their test cases were reviewed by the Supreme

Court. The Court had decided that the exclusion order was a lawful exercise of the army's power and that due process of law was not violated (Nakanishi 1993; see also Wilson and Hosokawa 1980:252).

At the end of the war, many Nisei believed that their wartime record for serving in the military had proven their loyalty and their place in American society. It was not necessary to review these court cases because by so doing it would call the public's attention to them again. Besides, there was still a large part of the American public that did not know about the internment of the Japanese Americans, or if they did know, some of them accepted the very fact of incarceration as evidence of the need to be interned (Nagata 1993:188).

But other Nisei believed that these court cases should be reopened to inform the public about the injustice of internment and about "a story of democracy gone awry." This desire to reopen the court cases was reinforced by the fact that researchers discovered under the Freedom of Information Act government documents that indicated that Justice Department officials withheld vital evidence and issued false statements to the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned three cases (Irons 1989). By raising funds in the Japanese American community and conducting the research necessary to overturn the Court's decision, it was believed that the community would revive its memories about camp life and talk about it more openly than before. It would also serve to remove the suspicion of disloyalty placed upon the community by the Court's decision. Thus in 1983 *coram nobis* petitions were filed to remove the convictions of Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu, the three who were jailed for disobeying the curfew or evacuation orders. It may be noted here that in 1988 two of the petition cases were successful, while the third person's case (Minoru Yasui) was considered moot because he died in 1986 (Irons 1988; Nagata 1993:193).

But the most significant unanticipated consequence of the internment experience was the organization and implementation of the "Redress Movement." This movement hinged on the decision of the Japanese American community to seek a formal apology as well as financial redress from the federal government for the personal humiliation Japanese Americans suffered and for the property and businesses they sacrificed as the result of being imprisoned in the camps.

In the context of reparations, it might be noted that in 1948, President Harry Truman signed an "Evacuation Claims Act," which paid less than ten cents on a dollar for property that the Japanese Americans lost in the internment process. But this act was highly unsatisfactory because, lacking documentary proof, many could not file a claim. These documents were

lost or destroyed in the wartime process of being uprooted from their homes. Regarding this act, Wilson and Hosokawa (1980:260) had this to say:

> The Department of Justice, which administered the claims program, misunderstood the intent of Congress, which was to offer the evacuees some sort of compensation for their losses. The bureaucrats took the position that their responsibility was to challenge every claim.

Needless to say, achieving the broad aims of the redress movement would be especially difficult not only because it involved gaining the approval of Congress in a time of budget deficits, but also because this ethnic community, compared to other minority groups, had a very small constituency that carried little political clout in Congress. There were other factors to overcome if the movement was to succeed. Because the Japanese Americans were no longer living in the tightly knit ethnic communities of the prewar days, communication and coordination of the dispersed population was very difficult. There were also emotional barriers to overcome. Many Nisei felt that launching a public campaign to seek an apology and monetary redress at a time when they were seeking to be assimilated into American society was unwise. Also at the time that the campaign started, the general public was poorly informed about the internment, and textbooks in the public schools generally failed to mention the internment program (Nagata 1993:187).

Nevertheless, the movement did begin in the early 1970s as the result of some forward-thinking Nisei leaders. But it was not until ten years later that the first tangible progress in this strategy was achieved. This step came on July 31, 1980, when President Carter signed the law that created a Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC). The commission had three large goals: to review the basis for an impact of Executive Order 9066; to review the military directives requiring relocation; and to recommend appropriate remedies.

The commission provided one of the best opportunities for the members of the Japanese American community to retrieve their memories collectively and to give public testimony about their camp experiences. There were twenty days of public hearings that took place in nine cities. Congressman Mineta from California described the testimony given by the former internees as a "painful outpouring of memories" and a "great unlocking of passion" (Naito and Scott 1990:8).

The second major step in the redress movement was the enactment of the redress bill, known officially as the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. Before it was finally passed there had been two previous attempts that failed to

obtain the requisite votes, one in 1983 and the other in 1985. The Japanese American community mustered its resources and its energies to lobby the legislative bodies in Washington, D.C. On one occasion, a Los Angeles–based group known as the National Coalition for Redress and Reparation brought to the Capitol a large volunteer group which spent five days lobbying.

Before leaving this discussion about the unexpected events in the postwar period, I want to note that the Nisei who served in the armed services of both the European and Pacific theaters during World War II contributed much to an improved public opinion about Japanese Americans. Before the war, some 3,500 Nisei were serving in the U.S. army, but when Executive Order 9066 went into effect the enlistment of Nisei was stopped and they were reclassified as "4-C," the designation used for "enemy aliens." The message was clear: Nisei were under suspicion that they were disloyal. Then, in the fall of 1942, the Japanese American Citizens League requested the War Department to open up the Selective Service responsibility to Japanese Americans. By January 1943, the War Department responded by agreeing to form an all-Nisei combat team, which eventually became known as the 442nd Battalion (Wilson and Hosokawa 1980). After the formation of this combat team and its heroic service in Europe, the Selective Service was opened to Nisei and eventually 33,300 Nisei served during World War II and in the Korean War. Included in this group were nearly four thousand Nisei and Kibei who served in the Pacific theater (Harrington 1979; Oda 1981). Two of these veterans became U.S. Senators—Daniel Inouye and Spark Matsunaga—and played key roles in the passing of critical congressional bills discussed above. A third veteran of the 442nd was Mike Masaoka who, more than any other Nisei, helped to shape JACL policies that influenced the sweeping legal and monetary gains that were unexpected when the camps were closed (Hosokawa 1982; Masaoka and Hosokawa 1987).

VICARIOUS MEMORIES AND THE SANSEI GENERATION

These unanticipated outcomes following the end of the internment camps were described here largely in terms of the Nisei generation. What comes next are the contributions the Sansei generation made to the success of the postwar programs. As stated before, the Nisei were the direct victims of the incarceration and thus had first-hand knowledge for taking action in these postwar movements.

However, it was different for the Sansei. This generation was either too young to recall this experience or born after their Nisei parents left the camps. Yet, I believe that the Sansei played a unique role in restoring the submerged collective memories of their parents and in initiating the postwar activities just described. To support this thesis I rely on the concept of "vicarious memory," which my colleague Jacob Climo has suggested. He describes this concept as follows:

> Every group and individual has a rich store of memories that are not personal and self-generated. These memories come from others—from families, groups, cultures, and nation. [Such memories] are often not remembered personally but things that others have told us about and . . . that somehow become important enough for members of the group to include in their collective memory. (Climo, personal note, June 1994)

To Climo's definition, I would like to add another feature of vicarious memories. In my view these "memories" cannot be claimed by just anyone wishing to do so. Rather, only those people who have particular ties to the people who had the original experiences and memories of those experiences can be said to have vicarious memories. Thus the Sansei children of those who were in the camps can claim vicarious memories of the camps because their personal lives have been affected by the camp experiences of their parents. Or, to put it another way, the Sansei are legatees of their parents' memories. The word "legatee" is used here to suggest that vicarious memories are those that can be bequeathed.

The notion of vicarious memory fits nicely with the history of the Sansei generation's involvement with the issues relating to Executive Order 9066, because most of them did not have personal experience in the camps. The vast majority were born after the camps were closed or after their parents had relocated. Furthermore, as previously indicated, their Nisei parents did not come out of their self-imposed silence about these matters until the late 1960s and early 1970s—about the same time that the Sansei were coming of age. Thus most of the ideas and images they have of the camps came from their efforts to construct their vicarious memories.

The development of the Sansei's vicarious memories was greatly aided by the establishment of the Japanese American Research Project (JARP), located at the University of California, Los Angeles. This project was initiated in 1982 by a small group of scholarly types within the Japanese American Citizens League (Hosokawa 1982:312–13). The project's aims were to conduct an in-depth sociological survey of the Issei and Nisei, to

publish a scholarly history of Japanese Americans, and to assemble documents as well as oral histories of this community. The project was initially financed by private contributions and later by the Carnegie Foundation and the National Institute of Mental Health. A number of publications came out of this project and it was an important source of vicarious memories for the Sansei. Some of the basic publications from the project are listed below:

- *The Japanese American Community: A Three-Generation Study*, by Gene N. Levine and Robert Colbert Rhodes.
- *The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: A Study of Japanese Americans*, by Edna Bonacich and John Modell.
- *The Bamboo People*, by Frank Chuman (a study of the legal history of Japanese Americans).
- *Planted in Good Soil: Issei Contributions to U.S. Agriculture*, by Masakzu Iwata (unpublished manuscript).
- *East to America*, by Robert A. Wilson and William Hosokawa.
- *Nisei: The Quiet Americans; The Story of a People*, by William Hosokawa.

The last book in the above list was the most controversial—not so much for its contents, but for its title. One segment of the community, mainly the Sansei population, objected to the "Quiet American" designation because it tends to create a negative stereotype of Japanese Americans. Others, largely the Nisei, felt it was an appropriate designation, and it generally matched the interpretation of facts presented in the book. In any case, the controversy over the book illustrates very well the generation gap between Nisei and Sansei. It was the Nisei view that, if they kept their faith in American democracy, eventually justice and rationality would prevail. Patience and perseverance, many Nisei felt, were the requisites to their full assimilation into American society. In fact, this point of view seemed to have been supported by non-Nisei writers who looked upon the Nisei as a "model minority" (Takaki 1989:474–84).

The Sansei, on the other hand, argued that people do not achieve justice without a struggle and without confrontation of issues. Born and raised in a different political climate from that of their Nisei parents, they saw the image of the Quiet American and the Model Minority as detrimental to their own self-image and to their future.

Armed with the vicarious memories of World War II and imbued with the political rhetoric of the late 1960s, the Sansei generation played key

roles in all the postwar unanticipated activities of the Japanese American community—such as the pilgrimages to the camp sites, the repeal of Executive Order 9066, and the complicated movement to secure an apology and monetary redress from the U.S. government. For example, it was a team of Sansei lawyers that petitioned the courts successfully to vacate in 1988 the *Hirabayashi*, *Yasui*, and *Korematsu* cases that went before the Supreme Court in the 1940s.

The Sansei generation persisted in learning about the camps even though their parents were reluctant to talk about it. The Sansei provided the stimulus for resurrecting their parents' memories and they provided the skills and training to organize the postwar activities. Sansei journalists and scholars did much to increase substantially the literature on the internment and its consequences. They initiated the *Amerasia Journal*, now in its twentieth year of publication, and the *Asian America*, a journal of culture and the arts, published since 1991. They interviewed their parents, they took advantage of the Freedom of Information Act to delve into government documents, and they researched the newspapers that catered to the Japanese American community of the period. Sansei in the educational field prepared a teachers' guide and histories of the internment camps so that this information may be placed in the classrooms.

One of the more detailed analyses of the Sansei's vicarious memories is known as "The Sansei Research Project," conducted in 1987 [Nagata 1993], just a year before the redress campaign was successfully completed. This national sample included a twenty-page questionnaire received from 740 Sansei (out of 1,250 mailed to potential respondents) and over forty in-depth interviews. More than half who completed the questionnaires also wrote additional comments expressing their personal and emotional reactions to the topics raised in the survey instruments. The author of the book, a Sansei, subtitled her book "Exploring the Cross-Generational Impact of the Japanese American Internment." I believe it is a most comprehensive analysis of the vicarious memories of the Sansei on the Nisei camp life.

The survey investigated these topical areas (Nagata 1993:65):

1. The nature of communication that has occurred between the Sansei and their parents about the internment experience
2. The level of interest held by Sansei about the internment
3. The level of knowledge Sansei have about the internment as a historical event
4. Sansei opinions about the movement to seek monetary redress from the government for former internees

Here are a few findings I have selected (Nagata 1993:209):

1. The researchers hypothesized that the age of parents at the time of their incarceration and their length of internment would influence Sansei responses. But the data did not support their hypothesis.
2. Sansei fathers were seen to be less communicative about internment experience than their mothers.
3. [In the sample, there were some Sansei who had neither parent and other Sansei respondents who had at least one parent in camp.] The Sansei who had a parent interned said they attribute to themselves a number of negative consequences including "feelings of low self-esteem, the pressure to assimilate, an accelerated loss of Japanese culture and language, and experiencing the unexpressed pain of their parents."
4. On the positive side of internment, many Sansei "admired their Nisei parents for their ability to succeed in life despite the injustices" and they "recognize that they now share in the responsibility to educate others about the internment and must themselves be vigilant not only of their own rights . . . but also of the rights of all minority groups."

This last statement alludes to attitudes and activities that engaged the Sansei generation in their adult years. As noted before, the Sansei were the generation that grew up in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many of them attended college at a time when students in general were swept up in a whirlwind of civil rights issues and antiwar sentiments.

While the urban riots, campus strikes, and antiwar movements in the 1960s received much national press attention, there was very little space devoted to the rise of the Asian American movement during the same period of social upheaval. Sansei, as well as other Asian American students, were engaged in student strikes and sit-ins at various campuses around the country. But the student strike at San Francisco State College (now a "University") was so significant to the Sansei community that an entire issue of *Amerasia Journal* (15:1, 1989) was devoted to it.

Having now reached middle age in the 1990s, the Sansei are thinking about passing on their legacy to their children, the *Yonsei*, or fourth generation, some of whom are now reaching adulthood. The Sansei editor for this special issue of the *Amerasia Journal*, Glen Omatsu, had this to say:

> It may be difficult for a new generation—raised on the Asian American codewords of the 1980s stressing "advocacy," "access," "legitimacy," and "assertiveness"—to understand the urgency of the demand by Malcolm X for freedom "by any means necessary," Mao's challenge to "serve the people," the slogans of "power to the people" and "self-determination," the principles of "mass line" organizing and "united front" work, or the conviction that the people—not the elites—are the makers of history. But they were the ideas that galvanized thousands of Asian Americans and reshaped our communities. And it is these concepts which must be grasped in order to understand the scope and intensity of our movement and what it created.

He continued to state the rationale for this special issue:

> This issue of *Amerasia* is devoted to a reexamination of these themes. Our focus is not on recounting the past events themselves but on retrieving the legacies for our current situation. Our goal is to identify—especially for a new generation of Asian Americans—the lessons of an earlier generation.

It is noteworthy that Omatsu writes of the "new generation" as being Asian Americans, not as *Yonsei* or fourth-generation Japanese Americans. In the next and final section of this chapter, I discuss the significance of this new "codeword" and new generation.

ASIAN AMERICANS, A NEW SUBCULTURE

During the campus turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s, the Sansei generation, perhaps sensitive to their small population size (compared to the African American and Hispanic populations), began to form coalitions with other organizations, particularly those of Asian descent: Chinese Americans, Filipino Americans, Korean Americans, and so on. In due time, a social movement was formed and duly recognized as the Asian American Movement (see Wei 1993).

One example of a coalition group with Sansei membership was the Berkeley AAPA (Asian American Political Alliance), the first of many that sprang up around the country. William Wei (1993:21) has this story to tell about this Berkeley AAPA meeting:

> It was at the second meeting that Larry Jack Wong [Chinese American] first brought up the internment of the Japanese Americans, saying, "Hey, you're Japanese. Why don't you people protest about the concentration camps?" Woo noted that a long discussion ensued and, ever the gadfly, he said, "Hell, the way things are going now, they might do that to us. So you're not doing this just for the Japanese, but for all other people."

William Wei continues this story:

Wong and Woo had touched upon a taboo topic, one that older Japanese Americans had sought to forget. After that tragedy was revealed to *sansei* (third-generation Japanese Americans) participating in the Asian American Movement, the internment during World War II became the issue among Japanese American activists and, for many of them, the sole reason for being involved politically. (Wei 1993:21)

The previously mentioned statement by Omura implies that a new community, known as Asian Americans, is now a viable and self-sustaining social entity. That is, the student activities of the period constructed a new subculture out of previously unconnected organizations.

Wei (1993:271–74) discusses this Asian American movement and its accomplishments under a number of specific points. The movement:

1. Produced a new identity by transcending specific Asian ethnic identities and focusing on a pan-Asian consciousness
2. Created a generation of activists who were willing to act for the collective benefit of their Asian American community
3. Attempted to change the caricature of Asians by producing new histories, literature, film, and art works that were more in tune with mainstream America
4. Became associated with the Asian American women's movement, a movement that faced the gender inequalities
4. Gave birth to a host of new institutions in higher education, for example the new academic field known as Asian American Studies
6. Sponsored community agencies in Asian enclaves of the country: welfare assistance, counseling services, recreational facilities, job placements, etc.
7. Validated, without intending to do so, ethnic pluralism and multiculturalism that is becoming a new vision of American society

In summary, then, this chapter has attempted to relate the post–World War II consequences of Executive Order 9066, consequences that were largely unintended and unanticipated. The chapter started out with the Nisei generation's memories of their internment camp experiences and why for two decades the Nisei were reluctant to discuss these memories with their children or to engage in collective action to "display" these memories. Next, the chapter focused on the eagerness of the Sansei generation to learn more about the camps and as a result created a memory bank that was identified as "vicarious memories." With these learned memories, the Sansei supported a wide range of collective activities that were unanticipated at the time the camps were closed, such as pilgrimages to former camp sites, congressional hearings on the reasons for internment,

and a large-scale movement to seek redress and apology. The final section described how the Sansei generation, armed with these vicarious memories of interned citizens, were engaged in a social movement that culminated in a new ethnic identity known as Asian Americans and thereby added a new dimension to the growing multiculturalism of mainstream America. From the perspective of the aging Nisei generation, this Asian American identity was an unintended consequence of the camps.

MASTER

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THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF COMPLEX SOCIETIES: THE CASE OF JAPAN

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JAPANESE STUDIES

This paper reviews some of the highlights of the anthropological studies of Japan, a society which I believe would qualify as a "complex society." Such a review illuminates the strengths, as well as the weakness, of the anthropological approach to contemporary civilizations. More important for the present conference, it examines the weaknesses and offers a remedy.

The Case of Japan

By and large American anthropologists became interested in Japanese studies at the beginning of World War II. At that time there was just one major monograph on a Japanese community by a non-Japanese anthropologist or sociologist. This was John Embree's Suye Mura, an isolated mountain village in the southern island of Kyushu. Embree who carried out his study in 1937 concluded that though Suye Mura "cannot be claimed to represent all rural Japan any more than any other single village, it is at least representative in many respects... (1937: xv). Similarly in contrasting this village with a primitive community, he had this to say: "A peasant community possesses many of the characteristic of a preliterate society, e.g., an intimate local group, strong kinship ties, and periodic gatherings in honor of some defined aspect of the environment. On the other hand it presents many important differences from the simpler societies... /which/ make it impossible to regard Suye Mura as comparable to a purely self-contained preliterate society" (1937: xvi). The image of the preliterate society persists in the study of the literate.

The next major contribution to Japanese studies came from Ruth Benedict who wrote The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946). In her first chapter she provides some insights which guided her analysis: "...There are many social arrangements and habits of life in Japan which have close parallels even in the primitive tribes of the Pacific Islands. Some of these parallels are in Malaysia, some in New Guinea, some in Polynesia. It is interesting, of course, to speculate on whether these show some ancient migrations or contacts, but this problem of possible historical relationship was not the reason why knowledge of these cultural similarities was valuable to me. It was rather that I knew in these simpler cultures how these institutions worked and could get clues to Japanese life from the likeness or the differences I found... Anthropologists had shown over and over in their studies of primitive people how valuable such cultural comparisons can be" (1946: 8-9).

She continues to explain her approach to the study of Japanese society: "As a cultural anthropologist also I started from the premise that the most isolated bits of behavior have some systematic relation to each other. I took seriously the way hundreds of details fall into over-all patterns. A human society must make for itself some design for living ... Some degree of consistency is necessary or the whole scheme falls to pieces" (1946: 11-12).

I shall return to this configurational premise later, for it strikes at the heart of the discussion on the holistic approach that, according to many, lies at the core of cultural anthropology.

In the postwar period there followed dozens of field investigations carried out by anthropologists, sociologists and other social scientists. No doubt attracted by the favorable public health conditions and generally excellent facilities for travel, residence and research support, this group of foreign scholars pursued a wide range of research projects. The field situation as

as Beardsley ably described it (1959:1-2) was also attractive:

> 1. Nature and culture combine to make Japan almost unique as a locus for comparative studies. Sharp cultural contrasts of many sorts exists side by side, resulting from marked variation of topography or ecology, intensive specialization of occupation, extensively developed social stratification, rapid cultural change, and other factors. These variations repeat themselves from region to region, for, in each area, city is set against country, mountain against lowland or seashore, old against new, in close juxtaposition...
>
> 2. Japan's spectacular leap from the past to the posture of a modern, industrialized nation, at a rate which has not yet begun to slacken, opens a wealth of processes to investigation. The study of these processes in Japan provide a model for nations with similar economic and social issues in prospect throughout the non-Western world...

The Japanese studies conducted by Western anthropologists and sociologists can be conveniently grouped into several categories: village studies, institutional analyses, national character researches, and urban life studies.

Village Studies. By far the most numerous were the village or community studies. While most tended to be problem-oriented -- e.g., culture change, family structure, land reform -- each contained a strong ethnographic interest. Beardsley (1954: 37-53) surveys this output through 1953, but the substantial productivity summarized here has multiplied since then. Over the entire period some of the best known monographs are by Robert J. Smith (1953), John B. Cornell (1953), Edward Norbeck (1954), John D. Donoghue (1958), Erwin H. Johnson (1961), Harumi Befu (1962), Felix Moos (1963), J.F. Plummer (1963). The most sustained and detailed analysis of a single community by any social scientist is a book written by Beardsley, Hall and Ward (1959). This work will be examined in more detail later.

One major interest in doing community studies is to obtain data and observations on the nature of the total culture of the society. The community study is a feasible handle for getting at this rather diffuse thing called "culture." Yet long-time students of the community study methodology like

Arensberg and Kimball (1965: 42) claim that such is not the purpose of doing community studies: "Community study is not the study of whole culture, or of communities; that is, in the natural contexts made up of natural and full human cooperative living, of living intergenerational and intersexual relationships, of ongoing cultural and interfamilial communication and transmission." In looking over the various community studies in Japan, I am forced to agree that Arensberg and Kimball are essentially correct. Out of these Japanese village studies no consistent picture of Japanese culture emerges.

Psychological Anthropology. Culture and personality studies, now being designated as psychological anthropology, have been popular in Japan. Both American anthropologists as well as their Japanese counterparts have pursued such interests as child-rearing practices, family relations, the diagnosis and care of the mentally ill, delinquency behavior, and national character. As is true elsewhere, in Japan the basic data for interpretations have relied on questionnaires, projective tests, opinion surveys and the like. William Caudill, George de Vos, Edward Norbeck, Hiroshi Wagatsuma, Takeo Doi, Hiroko Sue, and Takao Sofue are examples of researchers in this field. Y. Scott Matsumoto (1960) has attempted to delineate some salient features of Japanese national culture through the analysis of opinion survey data.

Again, while in many respects psychological anthropology in Japan might have been aimed at a holistic, integrative conceptualization of Japanese culture, such a product has not yet emerged. In a very recent article a Japanese scholar (Tatsuro Yamamoto 1964: 96-97) has examined these culture and personality data and synthesized findings under 17 topics:

> 1. Delicacy, fondness, beautification of life, harmony with nature, sensitiveness to seasonal change, love of small-scaled completion and simplicity, tampaku (unemotional, frankness, indifference), love of purity, cleanliness, attachment to the past.

2. Politeness, courteousness, respectfulness, delicacy and sensitiveness to interpersonal feeling, fulfillment of promises, sycophancy, well-intentioned lie, dislike of flat confrontation.

3. Nonextremism, moderation, harmony, gentleness, tolerance, compromise, mediation-system.

4. Diligence, sincerity, patience, self-control, self-sacrifice, perseverance, sanguine temperament, blowing hot--blowing cold.

5. Love of peace, but bravery in war, martial spirit, and if the opponent is found to be stronger in a fair and square fight, frankness in surrendering at discretion.

6. Imitativeness, lack of creativeness and originality, ability to assimilate, receptiveness, adaptability, utilitarianism, pragmatism, progressiveness, sensitiveness to the external world. Reliance upon external standards and help, quick response to the outer impact, inferiority complex in facing foreign civilization.

7. Order, discipline, and self-sacrifice in the family, utmost importance of filial piety, nonestablishment of individual's place in the family, tradition of benevolent housefather, higher position of mother than wife, indulgence to infants, high estimation of family name and family honor, adoption of son for the continuation of household, inkyo (abdication of the headship of a family), ancestor worship, veneration of kami (god) together with the worship of ancestors, family suicide (including children).

8. Prominence of national interest, the nation as a disguised family, the religion of Tenno worship, mythological sanction of the position of the ruler, sympathetic relations between the imperial family and the people.

9. Thinking much of prestige, dignity, and honor, fear of being mocked, maintenance of dignity, attitude of protection from disdain, aggressive when insulted or blamed, virtuously vengeful when insulted.

10. Paternalistic benevolence in social contacts, boss-and-follower relations fictiously identified with father and son, submission and nonresistance to authirity, devoted service to lord annihilating private concersn--sometimes connected with the ascetic practice of Zen Buddhism, self-immolation on the death of the lord.

11. Having proper place in the graded social system, importance of honorifics and self-abasing expressions in the language, weakness of class consciousness, underdevelopment of public morality, indifference of politics, shame at being involved in political affairs.

12. Placing more importance upon limited human relations than universal ethics or religious belief, less importance on individuality than particular human groups, social tie of on (favor flowing down) and giri (sense of obligation created by on), conflict between humanity and giri obligation, endurance of the feeling of gratitude.

13. Immediate perception, intuitive and realistic thinking, actualism, empiricism, worldliness, love of practicality, nonmediativeness, nonmetaphysicality, dislike of abstract thinking, not giving recognition without concrete evidence, stressing koto (things, happenings) more than ri (reason, fundamental principle), vulgar meterialism, acceptance of existing reality, stressing the particular more than the universal.

14. Nontheoretical irrational thinking, underdevelopment of scientific spirit, ambiguous consciousness of subject and predicate in the expressive form of judgment, lack of imagination and criticism, classification by simplified categories, biased attachment to theory detached from actuality, general conclusion based upon one fact.

15. Dislike of religious commandments, more reliance upon humanity and sympathy than law, weak consciousness of super-existence over human groups, observance of social norms irrespective of one's thoughts in mind, changing principle of behavior according to time and place, inconsistency, opportunism.

16. Little care about life beyond the grave, no god of preeminence distinct from human being, double belief in Shintoism and Buddhism with no contradiction, no cruel treatment of infidels, belief in the divine favor in this world, subordination of religion to ancestors, parents, lord and nation, suicide normal and not a sin, shinju (lovers' suicide).

17. Belief in the uncertainty of life, fatalism, quick resignation, little consciousness of guilt, lack of profound hatred of sin, nonchalant optimism, oharai (expulsion of sin and impurity by means of Shinto ritual).

The compiler of the above list acknowledges the "somewhat arbitrary mixtures of heterogeneous writings ... and observations of diverse authors." In my view such a listing does not bring out the neat configuration which Ruth Benedict posited in her study of Japanese culture (see Benedict 1946: 11-12, quoted above).

Institutional Analysis. Going to another category of anthropological studies, I believe an increasing interest is shown in the various "institutional" areas "the Japanese" society. Ronald Dore (1965) has examined the roots of Japanese educational system in the pre-modern Tokugawa period, John Singleton (1965) has examined a secondary school and its relation to the community in northern Japan. Herbert Passin does one on education. Robert N. Bellah (1957), a sociologist, has assayed Tokugawa religion and its value system. Felix Moos (1963 b) has combined religion and politics in a survey of the Soka Gokkai, a religious group devoted to political action as a part of its nativistic orientation. David Platt (1965) has examined Utopian communities and their related religious values. David Plath (1964) has also produced an excellent study of the complex recreational life of the Japanese and its implications in the rising affluent society.

Family and kinship analysis continues alongside of community studies and an analysis of this institutional feature is accomplished with the standard ethnographic reports on communities. Bennett and Ishino (1963) have a book on the role of parakinship institutions in the Japanese economy.

Urban Studies. So far as Western anthropology or sociology is concerned, the significant contributions are these three: Ronald Dore's, City Life in Japan, (1958), Robert Smith's Pre-industrial Urbanism in Japan, (1960), Ezra Vogel's, Japan's New Middle Class, (1964), which focuses on the significant strata of urban life. However none of these attempts to show the total gestalt of the city.

Dore's work, for example, aims to "give an idea of what it is like to be a Japanese living in Shitayama-cho, a neighborhood of some three hundred households not far from the center of Tokyo" (1958: 3). Moreover, the view of urban life that the reader gets from this book does not fill the gaps that are left in his understanding of the urban growth of the Japanese society as a whole and the role Japan is playing in the modern scientific and political world. I realize that there is only so much that one could put in a single book, but the shortcomings noted here are matters of intent and intellectual curiosity.

Conclusion about the Japanese Studies

One cannot help but conclude that, despite the headstart both Embree's Suye Mura and Ruth Benedict's The Chrysanthemum and the Sword gave anthropology over other disciplines in the study of modern Japanese society, the lead has not been maintained over the last twenty years. Various academic disciplines with their more rigorous conceptual models have portrayed both historically and contemporaneously the political, economic, and demographic aspects of Japanese society. The following list suggests the mature, scholarly development of the literature on Japanese society.

Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masum, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (1962).
Robert A. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan (1953).
Nobutake Ike, The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan (1950).
George Akita, The Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868-1900 (1965).
Kazuo Kawai, Japan's American Interlude (1960).
Irene Taeuber, The Population of Japan (1959).
William Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan; Growth and Structural Change 1868-1938 (1954).
Henry Rosovsky, Capital Formation in Japan (1961).
Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880 (1955).

John Mathi

The development of a substantial literature on the politics, economics and demography of Japan very definitely aids the maturation of anthropological studies. It enables anthropologists to obtain insights into those aspects of the modern "culture" which were not previously available. The most comprehensive ethnography of a Japanese village available in any language (Bearsdley, Hall and Ward 1959) illustrates this point. This magnificient compendium of facts and interpretations of the Niike people benefited from the efforts of a multidisciplinary team which included specialists in history, political science, geography, psychology and economics. It is safe to say that without such a team a thorough ethnography of this type would not have been possible.

At the same time, it becomes evident that as additional disciplines become involved in the study of the same complex society, the role and significance of anthropological findings may diminish concurrently. Another recently published book, an ethnographic monograph on the entire society of Japan, exemplifies the declining role of "anthropologically collected" facts. In this book, Twelves Doors to Japan (Hall and Beardsley 1965), only two of the twelve chapters can be clearly identified as being part of the anthropological province--one with the title of "Cultural Anthropology" and the other "Personality Psychology."

When it comes to integrating the various known facts about Japan and delineating the grand design, as Benedict urged, the historians have approached it better than any living anthropologist. The high quality of the following books illustrates the integrating skills of the historian:

George B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan (1951)

Thomas C. Smith, The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan (1959)

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present (1964)

Hugh Borton, Japan's Modern Century (1955)

E. O. Reischauer and Fairbank, J. K., East Asia: The Great Tradition (1958)

Perhaps their control over historical documents and their broad humanistic concerns give them a better vantage point for uncovering the structure of the social and cultural patterns than do the anthropologists' field work experiences and the book learning of comparative cultures.

A more important factor might be gleaned from the 20-year experience of anthropologists dealing with the frustrating problem of trying to delineate holistically the Japanese culture pattern. That is, our attempt to find a national cultural comparable to the "whole culture" of primitive societies is resulting in a dismal failure because no such entity really exists. Perhaps the lack of a national culture is a defining characteristic of a "complex society."

Earlier, Richard N. Adams (1958: 357) came to a similar conclusion about the validity--or lack of it--of the national culture concept when he surveyed the cultures of middle America. He writes: "cultures and psychological characteristics attributed to nations may in fact not be national at all, but peculiar to one or a few components of the total population, or be characteristics of a supranational culture." (See also S.N. Eisenstadt 1960: 208 on a comparable point).

Eric Wolf (1964) put this non-transferability of the culture concept from simple to complex societies more delicately: "We are confronting a concept of culture vastly different in shape and meaning from the concept that occupied the anthropologist at an earlier time. . . We have moved on to emphasize interrelationships, and to visualize chains of systems within systems, rather than isolated phenomena with impermeable boundaries."

In another book, the same author dramatizes the point. It is

quoted here in some length because it makes still another point which I wish to make later: (1965: 42)

> A simple network market may exist where one peasant sells pigs, another woolen sweaters, a third hobnails for walking boots, a fourth lime and the pig-seller finally buys lime, the seller of woolen sweaters purchases hobnails. But as we have said, the relations are ever subject to the entry of third parties and are therefore capable of ever-increasing complication. More and more middlemen and converters, processing this or that product, may intervene between the primary producers. Nor need the circulation of product and money be confined to the original habitat of the primary producers. Coffee raised in Columbia may furnish the raw material for the office break in Ann Arbor, Michigan; butter and cheese produced on Danish farms may make the English breakfast; machetes made in Connecticut may be sold in stores in Papantla on the Mexican Gulf coast; German aspirin may cure a headache in . Indonesia. Potentially, therefore, these chains of exchange not only involve ever larger numbers of middlemen, but they also add to the "horizontal" movement of goods and services among members of a peasant population increasingly complex "vertical" ties in which goods pass from the countryside to towns, from towns to inland cities, from cities to seaports, from seaports into overseas markets.

Eric Wolf continues this analysis:

> Put in another way, exchanges of locally produced goods in a local market may form but a small range of exchanges in a regional market, regional exchanges but a small sample of a national network of exchange, national networks of exchange but a small part of international markets. The peasant may thus find himself not merely dealing with a large number of middlemen and processors, but also becoming involved

> in a market system with many levels of ever widening scope. Moreover, the peasant involved in such far-flung systems may discover that prices are no longer regulated by custom and by local exigencies, determined by the many-stranded relations of his local world, but by ever stronger forces of demand and supply which he may not entirely understand and which he certainly does not control.

Let us carry this analysis one step farther (Wolf 1965: 44-45):

> As the peasant sector become more firmly committed to marketing through network markets and grows increasingly dependent upon prices set in those markets, it will also be affected by even quite small changes in pricing. This may have astonishing implications for the entire economy of a country. For example, it has been estimated that in the modern world a change of only five per cent in average export prices for primary products, including agricultural products from the so-called underdeveloped countries, would be roughly equivalent to the to the annual inflow into these countries of private and public capital and of government grants-in-aid lumped together. In recent decades price fluctuations have frequently been much larger than five per cent, thus causing serious economic dislocations among the peasantry, as well as in the larger society so affected.

Putting together the ideas quoted from the preceding Adam's statement and from that of Wolf, we get at least two major implications for anthropological study. One is the growing need to consider the cross-national cultural and economic linkages in order to understand the nexus of the many lines of communication which converge on any given society. Here the analysis of these supranational processes was anticipated by Alfred Kroeber (1952: 379-95) in his Oikumene studies and extended by Gordon Hewes (1961). Useems and Donoghue (1963) have written a related paper on this subject.

The other implication has to do with the new awareness of the need to develop more "universalistic conceptual models" to handle the "macroscopic" linkages between the community and the nation-state. But before we enter into this discussion, we should understand the distinction between the "inside view" and the "outside view" in ethnographic endeavors (Hockett 1964: 125):

> In ethnograpy . . . we find two equally objective views that can be taken towards the life of any human community.
>
> One is the outside view, whose frame of reference is that of physics. An ethnographer speaks from this view when he locates a tribe by latitude and longitude, or estimates its population, or describes its habitat. . . .
>
> The other is the inside view. This does not arise in physics because stars and electrons are not observers. The members of a community are, and they perceive and react to things in certain ways. An ethnographer speaks from this view when he locates a tribe in a valley at the center of the world, surrounded successively by mountains, a river, and a sea of fire . . . The inside view is subjective for the members of the community, but for the investigator it is just as objective as the outside view.
>
> Both of these views are necessary for ethnography. Conjointly they are sufficient . . .

At the risk of oversimplification we might say that standard ethnographies and village studies present the inside view with some degree of sophistication. But with respect to the outside view, we train our students poorly and we obtain results which are highly variable. The fact that the peasant's world is affected by world markets, whether the villager recognizes it or not, behooves the investigator to analyze the outside view as well. The cold facts concerning the impersonal forces that surround the village and are part of the community must be delineated with skill equal to the talents used in describing the villager's image of reality.

It is from a concern with the outside view that the behavioral sciences generally have been attempting to derive "nonculture bound" concepts and measurable indices. If anthropology were to acquire a greater repertory of conceptual models based upon a more explicit understanding of the outside view, it would be a distintive achievement and perhaps counter much of the criticism which comes from the sister disciplines. Some concrete suggestions along these lines will be made in the context of urban studies, the topic for the concluding section of this paper.

The Strategic Role of Urban Studies for Anthropology

Given the assumption that the notion of "whole culture" as an integrating concept is obsolete for the study of complex societies, what direction can anthropology take?

Certainly peasant communities should be continued as an object of study. But data should be collected on the interpersonal and inter-organizational linkages among the various sectors of the nation state, in addition to the internal relations of the community. The "flow" of messages back and forth among the "vertical" and "horizontal" components of the total society needs to be traced particularly with respect to their effects upon decisions and the allocations of social power, goods and services. Karl W. Deutsch (The Nerves of Government, 1963) provides a good start for developing some conceptual models for taking the outside view of the community. Some of these ideas are being pursued at Michigan State where a graduate student (Daniel Whitney 1963) is processing his field data collected in Okinawa. It is hoped that, by synchronizing the humanistically-oriented inside view with the behavioral science approach of the outside view, we will be able to develop a more holistic analysis of the small community in a complex society.

A second suggestion about anthropological studies in modern nations has to do with a greater investment of effort in the analysis of urban life. Much of the standard methods used in the rural communities to obtain the inside view are readily transferable to the urban setting, as Ronald Dore (1958) has so ably done for the Tokyo neighborhood. We need, however, to superimpose on this analysis the outside view of the city. At Michigan State's Institute for Community Development several

of us are engaged in "transforming" nonanthropological concepts into our conceptual framework in order to sharpen the outside view of the city. The previously mentioned Deutsch volume (1963) is a fruitful source. Another provocative work is by Richard Meier (A Communications Theory of Urban Growth, 1962). With certain adaptations of this kind, we have grouped the "flows" in and out of the urban setting in terms of materials, energy, people and information (MEPI flows).

Related to these hopefully quantifiable indices of city operations and growth is the concept of "social accounts." In Naha, the capital of Okinawa, where I sojourned for the past two years, the value of the daily imports of materials was $524,475, while the value of goods exported on an average day was $12,827. Such an unfavorable balance is related to the city's dependence upon the United States armed forces which is stationed there. Similarly some other illustrations of the daily MEPI flows include:

Material:	Water consumption	91,856 kiloliters
Energy:	Electric power consumed	18,899 KWH
People:	Passengers from abroad	289
	Passengers going abroad	292
	Intra-city bus passengers	80,070
	Entering residents	72
	Residents leaving	54
	Births	16
	Deaths	3
Information:		
	Number of telephone calls	97,252
	Number of pieces of mail	16,591

Such are the crude daily averages for this city of 261,535 persons. The systematic collection and analysis of these and other accounts--and their fluctuations--are now technically known as social accounts. Gross (1965: 14-17) has written a popular article explaining the principle and purpose of social accounts for a total society. Conceivably these ideas can be adapted to the city. A system of social accounts could also provide the

means for comparing urban societies and urban central places.

In addition to these social accounts and the flow conception of social transactions, we have found it necessary to develop a conceptual model which meshes the various components together into a "grand design." We tenatively call this design, "systems theory." A very concise statement of this theory, as applied to organizations, has been written by ~~Shadwick J. Haberstroh~~ Haberstroh in March (1965: ~~1171-1211~~). As a footnote, we might contrast this systems approach to the cognitive approach of Ruth Benedict and her search for the design of culture. Essentially, I believe, Benedict structured her search of the grand scheme in terms of the inside view; ours, in contrast, is organized in terms of the outside view.

In conclusion a few points might be made. Based on the Japanese experience, it seems that it is presently premature for anthropology to undertake a holistic synthesis of a modern society as complex as Japan is. In its place, I would like to suggest that a concerted attack on the study of urban centers be made, both from the inside and outside views. For the inside view, the traditional methods used in community studies can be transferred to city studies; for the outside view the methods and concepts of selected behavioral science disciplines are available. Studies of urban life may be the strategic intermediate step before anthropologists can push to the summit, the totality of the complex society.

Some beginnings in the analysis of cities are already evident. Braidwood and Willey's Courses Toward Urban Life (1962) and the Oriental Institute's City Invincible (1960) form the background for the case of pre-industrial cities. And the often quoted paper by Redfield and Singer (The Cultural Role of Cities, 1956) provide moral support for greater anthropological interest in the urban phenomenon. From our demographer friends, we learn

today some 70 per cent of the human population lives in rural areas. By the year 2000, however, they estimate that the balance will be reversed with 70 per cent living in the cities. Let us prepare for this transition by developing an urban anthropology.

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2/5/94

Dear Juan:

We are making progress again. Here is a tentative Table of Contents with your title (tentative). I hope you're still working on this project?

Jack

February 7, 1994

Lynn Flint, Editor
Anthropology and Education
Greenwood Publishing Group INc.
88 Post Rd. West
Westport CT 06881-5007

Dear Ms. Flint:

I am enclosing the table of contents and the authors of the articles for our work Memory, Generation, And Culture. In reply to your enquiry please make out the contract with Marea Teski as first and Jacob Climo second editors. You can send us each a copy to sign or we'll pass along a single copy, whatever you prefer. We should, however, share any royalties, payments, earnings etc. equally. I hope this clarifies what you needed to know. If you have any other questions please let me know.

In addition to these materials we are still negotiating to include two or possibly three other papers. We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Jacob J. Climo, Ph.D.
Professor

MEMORY, GENERATION, AND CULTURE

Edited by Marea Teski and Jacob Climo

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7/27/94

Iwao,

Most of my comments are just typos and minor revisions.

- Note the last quote on P. 7.

Otherwise I think it's excellent.
I used through Nagata's quotes because the similarities were so close to the work I'm familiar with from Children of Holocaust survivors.

It's a very moving paper with a sharp analytical point linking movements to collective memories.

Jacob

7/13/94

Iwao- Please correct this draft bio and give me any other pieces of information you may feel relevant to this work.

Iwao Ishino is Emeritus Professor of anthropology at Michigan State University where he served on the faculty for thirty-five years with specialization in Asian-American ethnicity and Japan Studies. Born in San Diego, California in 1921 he was incarcerated as a Japanese-American teenager during the early years of World War II. In 1944-45 he became a social science analyst in the Office of War Information and soon after a graduate student at Harvard University. Ishino conducted field research in Washington D.C. and in Japan on issues of post-war Japanese adaptations including resettlement, social relationships, ritual kinship, and socio-economic adjustments of the peasantry. He took his Ph.D. degree in 1954 from Harvard University. In 1973-4? Ishino served as director of NSF? During the last decade he has focused attention on issues of social and technological changes in Japan, especially the organization and dynamics of the Japanese automobile industry in the United States and in Japan.

the auto section??

8/8/94

Dear -

Can you get me your paper this week so we can submit the package to the publisher?

Thanks. I am really glad we waited.

Best,

Jack

4:00 p.m.

July 28, 1994 (~~10:45 am~~) File: 9066out.lin

Memories and Their Unintended Consequences

It has been more than 50 years since President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 which authorized the incarceration of 120,000 Japanese Americans living on the West Coast at the beginning of World War II. This incarceration took place without due process and without formal charges of misbehavior. The public officials who supported this Executive Order attempted to justify it on the basis of "military necessity." However, as postwar studies have shown, military necessity was just an excuse. A study by a Congressional commission, for example, in 1982, concluded that the placing of the Japanese Americans in concentration camps was the result of "racial prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership." (Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 1982)

However wrong the Executive Order 9066 was in 1942 and however humanely the order was carried out in the ten wartime internment camps, the long term consequences of the order on both the interned people and American society at large was incalculable. In this paper I would like to discuss some of these long term consequences in the context of memories, generations, and culture--the themes that run throughout the present book. First, I would like to discuss why the survivors of internment camps repressed their memories of camp life for two decades and what was done later to resurrect their memories. Then I would like to discuss how these submerged memories affected their children as well as the Japanese

American community in general. Finally, I would like to suggest how the children of the camp survivors, who came of age in the late 1960s and early 1970s, contributed toward the formation of a new ethnic entity known as Asian Americans and sometimes as Asian Pacific American. The creation of the new entity was not only the product of a common ~~shared~~ need to fight racism among the various Americans of Japanese, Chinese, Korean and others of Asian descent, but it also led to community activism and organized electoral politics that was absent in the early years of post-World War II. But before I get into these issues, a background statement on the Japanese American community will be helpful.

The Prewar Japanese American community.

By the time Pearl Harbor was bombed in December 1941, people of Japanese descent on the West Coast reached a population size about 120,000 with two generations of family history. At that time the first generation, called Issei, made up only one-third of the population and the second generation, called Nisei, constituted the remainder. Because of the prevailing attitudes toward people of Asian descent, the Issei were not eligible to become naturalized citizens, even though most of them had been residents for more than forty years. Moreover the Issei, along with other foreign-born Asians, were prohibited by law from owning land and from marrying non-Asians. By 1924, this anti-Japanese climate on the West Coast was so pervasive that further immigration from Japan was prohibited. This 1924 law and other discriminatory laws against Asians in general resulted in a rather steep cultural gap between the Issei

and Nisei generations. On the one hand, the Issei, ~~or first generation,~~ not being able to become U.S. citizens, identified with Japan, their homeland. On the other hand, the Nisei, born and educated in the United States, identified with this the only country they knew. However, many Issei not certain what the future may hold for their families sent their Nisei children to "Saturday Schools" to study Japanese language and culture. The Issei believed that if the anti-Japanese sentiments grew worse, they would have to return to Japan with their Nisei children. The language school training was seen as a form of insurance and preparation for that worse case scenario.

However, by the 1930s, sufficient numbers of Nisei have come of age to manage their own future and to exert influence on the community's future. Perhaps, in response to both their growing recognition of this leadership in their local community and at the same time in full awareness of their minority status in the general American society, the Nisei formed an organization in 1930, known as the Japanese American Citizen's League (JACL). By 1934 some twenty-one chapters located in Washington, Oregon and California were linked together into a national organization.

A recent study (Yoo 1993) of the Japanese language newspapers published on the West Coast in the 1930s reveals a number of interesting facts about this Japanese American community. First of all the 1930s was the period of the Great Depression and job opportunities were limited especially for minority groups. Accordingly, much of the community looked inward for its basic recreational, religious, and social life. Secondly, when the Sino-

Japanese war broke out in 1937, the community was split ideologically. Many Issei writers took a pro-Japan interpretation on the progress of the war, while the Nisei journalists took a more critical view of the Japanese action in China. And finally, the newspapers reported a few incidents where Chinese-Americans took out their frustrations on some Japanese-Americans over this Asian war.

This same war was the reason for my first appearance on the pages of the local newspaper, the San Diego Union. A Chinese-American friend, Jack Wong, and I were interviewed for our respective views on this Asian war, even though I was grossly uninformed about it. Perhaps what made this story newsworthy was that both Jack and I were in the high school R.O.T.C. unit.

Furthermore Because political relations between the United in the late 1930s States and Japan were deteriorating, the national Japanese American Citizen's League saw its primary mission as one of emphasizing Nisei loyalty to America. ~~Thus~~ For example one chapter near San Francisco, the San Mateo County Chapter, published in the September 17, 1941 issue of the Burlington Advance Star the following:

> We, Too, are Americans!
>
> Our aim is to let all Americans know that the American citizens of Japanese parentage stand loyally and shoulder to shoulder with Uncle Sam in this world crisis. All of us, who have been drafted or volunteered into the service of the United States have attained excellent records.

In any case, by the time World War II came along, the majority

of the Japanese American community was composed of Nisei, as I noted above. Most Nisei were in their late teens and about one-fifth of them were married, mostly within the Japanese American community. Less than one percent had married outside of their racial or ethnic boundary. To put it another way, the Nisei was the generation that came of age in the late 1930s and early 1940s when the Japanese American community was closely knit and provincial in its outlook.

Though there were speculations a war between the United States and Japan might lead to the incarceration of certain enemy aliens (i.e., the Issei), the Nisei did not believe that they would be affected because they were citizens. However, the confidence in their citizenship was shattered when the Nisei found themselves face-to-face with military orders for evacuation and internment following President Franklin Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066. Even though several Nisei used the courts to challenge the constitutionality of these military orders, most Nisei entered the internment camps without engaging in mass protest.

Perhaps a message written by the San Mateo County JACL expresses the sentiment of the majority of the Nisei at that time. On May 7, 1942, two days before that community was uprooted from their residences, they published in the San Mateo Times the following:

> A Message of Thanks and Gratitude...to the citizens of San Mateo County--
>
> Shortly after December 7th, the Japanese residents of San Mateo County whole-heartedly expressed their willingness to

aid in whatever war effort the United States called upon them to do. Their desire came as a natural result of living the American way of life...

Today, as evacuation orders affect Japanese aliens and American citizen Japanese, the sorrow at the thought of leaving their homes is eased by the knowledge that by cooperation and sacrifice, they are aiding the United States war efforts.

They look forward to participating in the Foods for Victory program at the various settlement areas. They hope that later they will materially add something to the flow of war supplies that is now bombarding the Axis aggressors. They are proud to continue sending their sons into the armed forces of the United States as a patriotic and privileged right...

San Mateo County

Japanese-American Citizens League

Commenting on why Nisei did not show greater resistance to the evacuation orders, William Hosokawa (1994) a noted Nisei journalist commented: (see Pacific Citizen, July 1994)

Much has been written about life in these concentration camps which held the Japanese Americans and much has been written about the historical circumstances that led to this unfortunate event. (See e.g., Uchida 1982, Spicer 1969). I shall not reiterate the details here because my purpose is to examine what happened

afterwards, i.e., how the memories of camp life produced a series of unanticipated consequences on both the Nisei and Sansei generations.

Memories of the "Silent Generation," the Nisei

It may seem natural for the Japanese American community today in 1994 to be dedicating monuments and going on rather expensive pilgrimages to the former camp sites where they were held as prisoners during World War II. But from the vantage point of the immediate postwar years, the Issei and Nisei had no interest in revisting the camps, much less raising funds to dedicate a monument. The reason for their disinterest in these gestures or symbols of remembrance was fairly obvious to the former internees. They did not cherish reliving the suspicion of disloyalty and the feelings of being victimized by the wartime hysteria. Revisiting their former camps and placing monuments would have meant a resurrection of unpleasant memories that they had repressed or had forgotten.

Many Sansei, the children of the Nisei, have commented on the failure of their Nisei parents to discuss and explain what conditions were like in the camps. One Sansei (Nagata 1993:vii) tells about an incident when she was six years old of finding a jar of colored shells under the kitchen sink. Not getting a satisfactory answer from her Issei grandmother, she asked her Nisei mother. Nagata describes her mother's response:

> "Oh, I made them in camp." "Was it fun?" I asked enthusiastically. "Not really," she replied. Her answer

> puzzled me. The shells were beautiful, and camp, as far as I knew, was a fun place where children roasted marshmallows and sang songs around the fire. Yet my mother's reaction did not seem happy. I was perplexed by this brief exchange, but I also sensed I should not ask more questions.

Then Nagata generalizes from this interchange:

> As time went by, "camp" remained a vague, cryptic reference to some time in the past, the past of my parents, their friends, my grandparents, and my relatives. We never directly discussed it. It was not until high school that I began to understand the signficance of the word, that camp referred to a World War II American concentration camp, not a summer camp.

Another Sansei has written (Hirasuna 1992:50) about her parent's failure to communicate with her about their internment experience at the Jerome camp in Arkansas:

> By the time I was born, exactly a year after the bombing of Hiroshima, the family just called it "Jerome" or "camp." Time was separated between pre-camp and post-camp. "We knew them from camp." "That was before Jerome [camp]." "We had to buy a new one after camp." No one told me what camp was and I never asked. I just accepted its existence. Yet somehow I knew that camp was not a good place, whatever it was.

Indeed it was not until the late 1960s, nearly three decades after they were first incarcerated, that the Nisei began to drop

their inhibitions about ~~sponsoring public events focusing on the~~ internment experience. About the only noteworthy event was a weekend workshop the UCLA Extension Department organized in 1967 to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Executive Order 9066 (Nakanishi 1993:18)

This silence or the unwillingness of the part of the Nisei generation to dredge up their memories about their camp experience has produced some critical responses on the part of their children, the Sansei generation. Many Sansei did not understand why the Nisei have remained silent, but also why Nisei did not vigorously protest their incarceration. Consider ~~Take~~ the following ~~quotation from a recent newspaper article which announced the~~ rationale for sponsoring a pilgrimage in August 1994 to Tule Lake, one of last camps to be closed at the end of the war:

> "...we hope this journey [pilgrimage to Tule Lake] will allow us to heal the intergenerational wounds of Executive Order 9066. This is the time for you to talk with your children, parents and interested people about a painful subject in a safe and supportive environment." (Rafu Shimpo, July 6, 1994, p. 1)

In addition to the unanticipated activity of visiting former camp sites, a second type of unexpected outcome was the harnessing of community activities to repeal Executive Order 9066 which President Roosvelet signed on February 19, 1992. The members of the Japanese American Citizens League played a significant role in calling the public's attention to this Order. On February 19, 1976,

As a matter of fact this Order was no longer ceased to be effective at the end of WW II However the living role of the

President Gerald R. Ford signed a proclamation entitled "An American Promise" in front of five Asian American members of ~~the House and Senate~~ U.S. Congress and twenty-five Japanese American guests. The Proclamation said in part: (quoted in Hosokawa 1982: 340-41)

> February 19th is the anniversary of a sad day in American history. It was on that date in 1942, in the midst of the response to the hostilities that began on December 7, 1941, that Executive Order No. 9066 was issued...resulting in the uprotting of loyal Americans...
>
> We now know what we should have known then--not only was that evacuation wrong, but Japanese Americans were and are loyal Americans. On the battalefield and at home, Japanese Americans...have been and continue to be written in our history for the sacrifices and contributions they have to the wellbeing and security of this, our common Nation.
>
> The Executive Order that was isssued on February 19, 1942, was for the sole purpose of prosecuting the war with the Axis Power, and ceased to be effective with the end of those hostilities. Because there was no formal statement of its termination, however, there is concern among many Japanese Americans that there may yet be some life in that obsolete document. I think it appropriate, in this our Bicentennial Year, to remove all doubt on that matter, and to make our commitment in the future...

While Executive Order 9066 was made obsolete at the end of World War II, nevertheless there were some concerns especially

among antiwar demonstrators and political actvists examining the 1966 race riots in the sixteen U.S. cities that a wholesale removal of a group might take place. There was on the statute books an act that allowed for the establishment of "emergency detention camps" i.e., the Emergency Detention Act, Title II of the Internal Securities Act. The national JACL's campaign to repeal this law was begun in 1968 and it was successfully completed in 1971 with the substantial assistance of Senator Inouye and Representative Matsunaga. (Nagata 1993: 189)

From the standpoint of the Nisei who were under suspicion of disloyalty in wartime and still suffering from post-traumatic syndrome, it is indeed surprising that they would take the initiative to engage in a movement to repeal the essence of Executive Order 9066. Yet this activity was initiated by the Japanese American Citizen's League, which in 1968 was still largely a Nisei organization.

Still another unanticipated postwar activity by the "silent" Nisei was to resurrect the three court cases that challenged the military orders that excluded the Japanese Americans from the West Coast. Three Niseis--Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, Fred Korematsu--were put in prison because they deliberately challenged these wartime orders. Their test cases eventually were reviewed by the Supreme Court where it justified the exclusion orders on the basis of military necessity. (Nakanishi 1993)

At the end of the war, many Nisei believed that their wartime record for serving in the military had proven their loyalty and their place in American society. It was not necessary to review

these Court cases because by so doing it would call the public's attention to them again. Besides, there was still a large part of the American public that did know about the internment of the Japanese Americans, or if they did know, some of them accepted the very fact of incarceration as evidence of the need to be interned (Nagata 1993:188). There were also Nisei scholars who argued that the Nisei assumed an attitude about these matters that had roots in Japanese culture, shikata ganai ("it can't be helped").

But other Nisei believed that these court cases should be re-opened to let the public know about the injustice of internment especially when researchers discovered, under the Freedom of Information Act government documents (Irons 1983) that indicated withholding of vital evidence and the issuing of false evidence to the Supreme Court. By raising funds in the Japanese American community and conducting the research necessary to overturn the Court's decision, it was believed that the community would revive its memories about camp life and talk about it more openly than before. It would also serve to remove the suspicion of disloyalty placed upon the community by the Court's decision. Thus in 1983 coram nobis petitions were filed to remove the convictions of Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu, the three who were jailed for disobeying the curfew or evacuation orders. It may be noted here that in 1988 two of the petition cases were successful, while the third person's case (Minoru Yasui) was considered moot because he died in 1986.

But the most significant unanticipated consequence of the

internment experience was the organization and implementation of the so-called "Redress Movement." This movement hinged on the decision of the Japanese American community to seek a formal apology as well as financial redress from the federal government for the personal humiliation Japanese Americans suffered and for the properties and businesses they sacrificed as the result of being imprisoned in the camps.

> It might be noted that in 1948, President Harry Truman signed the "Evacuation Claims Act" which paid less than ten cents on a dollar for property that the Japanese Americans lost in the internment process. But this Act was highly unsatifactory because many could not file a claim because they lacked the required documentary proofs. These documents were lost or destroyed in the internment process.

Needless to say, the broad aims of the redress movement involved not only gaining the approval of Congress in a time of budgetary deficits, but also because this ethnic community, compared to other minority groups, had a very small constituency. Furthermore by this time many Nisei had become somewhat complacent or too engaged with the exigencies of their personal lives: their own retirement, the care of their aged parents, and concern over their own health.

There were other factors to overcome if the movement were to succeed. Because the Japanese Americans were no longer living in the tightly knit ethnic communities of the prewar days cmmunication

and coordination of the dispersed population was complicated. There were also emotional barriers to overcome. Many Nisei felt that launching a public campaign to seek an apology and monetary redress at a time when they were seeking to be assimilated into American society was unwise. Also at the time that the campaign did start, the general public was poorly informed about the internment and textbooks in the public schools generally failed to mention the internment program. (Nagata 1993: 187)

The movement to seek redress began in the 1970s, but it was not until ten years later that the first tangible progress in this strategy was achieved. This step came on July 31, 1980 when President Carter signed the law which created a Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC). The Commision had three large goals: to review the basis for and impact of Executive Order 9066; to review the military directives requiring relocation; and, to recommend appropriate remedies.

The Commission provided one of the best opportunities for the members of the Japanese American community to retrieve their memories collectively and to give public testimony about their camp experiences. There were twenty days of public hearings that took place in nine cities. Congressman Mineta from California described the testimony given by the former internees as a "painful outpouring of memories" and a "great unlocking of passion." (Naito & Scott 1990:8)

The second major step in the redress movement was to lobby Congress for the passage of the redress bill, known now as the

Civil Liberties Act of 1988. But before it passed there were two previous attempts which failed to get Congressional approval, one in 1983 and the other in 1985. The usually restrained Japanese American community did not hesitate this time and it came together in numerous efforts at lobbying the Capitol, including the formation of a group known as the "National Coalition for Redress and Reparations," a Los Angeles based group that spent five days in Washington, D.C.

Vicarious Memories and Sansei Generation

These unanticipated outcomes following the end of internment camps were described here largely in terms of the Nisei generation who were actually incarcerated. What should be spelled out now is the contributions the Sansei made to the success of these postwar developments, such as the redress movement and the repeal of Executive Order 9066. As stated before, the Nisei were the direct victims of the incarceration and thus had some ground for taking action in these postwar movements. However it was different for the Sansei. This generation was either too young to recall this experience or born after their Nisei parents left the camps. Yet, I would like to argue that the Sansei played a unique role in restoring the submerged collective memories of their parents and in initiating the postwar activities just described. To support this thesis I would like to rely on the concept of "vicarious memory" which my colleague Jacob Climo suggested. He describes this concept as follows:

> Every group and individual has a rich store of memories that are not personal and self-generated. These memories come from others--from families, groups, cultures, and nation. [Such memories] are often not remembered personally but things that others have told us about and ... that somehow become important enough for members of the group to include in their collective memory. (Climo, personal note)

[Makes a note here that vicarious memories are not merely memories reconstructed by anyone. Rather the people who do the reconstruction must have some personal, kinship, or experiental ties with the source of the memories. For example the children of those who were in the camps are eligible for laying claim to these vicarious memories because their personal lives have been affected by the camp experience of their parents.]

The notion of vicarious memory fits nicely with the history of the Sansei generation's involvement with the issues relating to Executive Order 9066 because most of them did not have personal experience in the camps. The vast majority was born after the camps were closed or after their parents had relocated. Furthermore, as previously indicated, their Nisei parents did not come out of their self-imposed silence about these matters until the late 1960s and early 1970s--about the same time that the Sansei were coming of age. Thus most of the ideas and images they have of the camps came from their efforts to construct their vicarious memories.

The development of the Sansei's vicarious memories was greatly aided by the establishment of the Japanese American Research

Project (JARP), located at the University of California, Los Angeles. This project (Hosokawa 1982:312-13) was initiated in 1932 by a small group professorial types within the Japanese American Citizens League. The project's aims were to conduct an indepth sociological survey of the Issei and Nisei, to publish a scholarly history of Japanese Americans, and to assemble documents as well as oral histories of this community. The project was initially financed by private contributions and later funded by the Carnegie Foundaton and the National Institute of Mental Health. A number of publications came out of this project and it was for the time being an important source of vicarious memories for the Sansei. Some of the basic publications from the project are listed below:

The Japanese American Community: A Three-Generation Study, coauthored by Gene N. Levine and Robert Colbert Rhodes.

The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: A Study of Japanese Americans by Edna Bonacich and John Modell.

The Bamboo People by Frank Chuman. [A study of the legal history of Japanese Americans]

Planted in Good Soil: Issei Contributions to U.S. Agriculture by Masakzu Iwata (unpublished ms)

East to America by Robert A. Wilson and William Hosokawa

Nisei: The Quiet Americans; The Story of a People by William Hosokawa.

The last book in the above list was the most controversial--not so much for its contents, but for its title. One segment of

community, mainly the Sansei population, objected to the "Quiet American" designation because it tends to create a negative stereotype of Japanese Americans. Others, largely the Nisei, felt it was an appropriate designation, and it generally matched the interpretation of facts presented in the book. In any case the controversy over the book illustrates very well the generation gap between Nisei and Sansei. It was the Nisei view that, if they kept their faith in American democracy, eventually justice and rationality would prevail. Patience and preserverance, many Nisei felt, were the requisites to their full assimilation into American society. In fact this point of view seemed to have been validated by non-Nisei writers who looked upon the Nisei as a "model minority." (Takaki 1989:474-84)

The Sansei, on the other hand, argued that people do not achieve justice without a struggle and without confrontation of issues. Born and raised in a different political climate from that of their Nisei parents, they saw the image of the Quiet American and the Model Minority detrimental to their own future.

Armed with the vicarious memories of World War II and imbued with the political rhetoric of the late 1960s, the Sansei generation played key roles in all the postwar unanticipated activities of the Japanese American community--such as the pilgrimages to the camp sites, the repeal of the Executive Order 9066 and the complicated movement to secure an apology and monetary redress from the U.S. government. For example it was a team of Sansei lawyers that petitioned the courts successfully to vacate in 1988 the Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu cases that went before

the Supreme Court in the 1940s.

This generation persisted in learning about the camps even though their parents were reluctant to talk about it at first. This generation provided the stimulus for resurrecting their parent's memories and they provided the skills and training to organize the postwar activities. Sansei journalists and scholars did much to increase substantially the literature on the internment and its consequences. They interviewed their parents, they took advantage of the Freedom of Information Act to delve into government documents, and they researched the newspapers that catered to the Japanese American community of the period. Sansei in the educational field prepared teachers' guide and histories of the internment camps so that this knowledge may be placed in the classroom.

One of the fascinating studies along this line is known as the "The Sansei Research Project" conducted in 1987 [Nagata 1993], just a year before the Redress campaign was successfully completed. This national sample included a 20-page questionnaire received from 740 Sansei (out of 1,250 mailed to potential respondents) and over 40 indepth interviews. More than half who completed the questionnaires also wrote additional comments expressing their personal and emotional reactions to the topics raised in the survey instruments. The author of the book, a Sansei, subtitled her book, "Exploring the Cross-generational Impact of the Japanese American Internment." I believe it is a most comprehensive analysis of the vicarious memories of the Sansei on the Nisei camp life.

The Survey investigated these topical areas: (Nagata 1993:65)

1. The nature of communication that has occurred between the Sansei and their parents about the internment experience.
2. The level of interest held by Sansei about the internment.
3. The level of knowledge Sansei have about the internment as a historical event.
4. Sansei opinions about the movement to seek monetary redress from the government for former internees.

Here are a few findings I have selected (Nagata 1993:209):

1. The researchers hypothesized that the age of parent at the time of their incarceration and their length of internment would influence Sansei responses. But the data did not support their hypothesis.
2. Sansei fathers were seen to be less communicative about internment experience than their mothers.

3. [In the sample, there were some Sansei who had neither parents and other Sansei respondents who had at least one parent in camp.] The Sansei who had a parent interned said they attribute to themselves a number of negative consequences including "feelings of low self-esteem, the pressure to assimilate, an accelerated loss of Japanese culture and language, and experiencing the unexpressed pain of their parents."
4. On the positive side of internment, many Sansei "admired their Nisei parents for their ability to succeed in life despite the

injustices" and they "recognize that they now share in the responsibility to educate others about the internment and must themselves be vigilant not only of their own rights...but also of the rights of all minority groups."

This last statement alludes to attitudes and activities that engaged the Sansei generation in their adult years. As noted before, the Sansei was the generation that grew up in the late 60s and early 70s. Many of them attended colleges at a time when students in general were swept up in whirlwind of civil rights issues and antiwar sentiments. Here are some facts gleaned from a Newsweek report in order to remind of this period of history:

In 1965, Martin Luther King, Jr. lead a protest march of 4,000 from Selma to Montgomery Alabama.

In the same year, the National Guards were called to halt Black riots in the Watts section of Los Angeles.

In 1966, Students for Democratic Society promoted "Make Love, Not War" slogans.

In the same year, urban race riots raged in 16 U.S. cities.

In 1967, Black Panthers and NOW (National Organization for Women) were founded.

In the same year, "hippies" lead an anti-Establishment movement and moved into communes.

In 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in Memphis.

In the same year, Robert Kenneday was assassinated in Los Angeles.

In 1969, 400,000 attended the Woodstock Festival.
In the same year the Gay Rights movement began with protest marches and demonstrations.

In 1970, some 448 colleges were either closed or on strike as part of the anti-war movement.
In the same year, Kent State student protesters were fired upon by the National Guard.

In 1973, Native Americans expressed their grievances by seizing property at Wounded Knee.

While the above events received much national press attention, there was very little space devoted to the rise of Asian American movement during the same period of social upheaval. Sansei, as well as other Asian American students were engaged in student strikes and sit-ins at various campuses around the country. But the student strike at San Francisco State College (now a "University") was only one example, but it was one that the Sansei community believes was significant enough to devote an entire issue of Amerasia Journal (15:1, 1989) for recalling its significance.

Having now reached middle age in the 1990s, the Sansei are thinking about passing on their legacy to their children, the Yonsei, or fourth generation, some of whom are now reaching

adulthood. The Sansei editor for this special issue of the Journal, Glen Omatsu, had this to say:

> It may be difficult for a new generation--raised on the Asian American codewords of the 1980s stressing "advocacy," "access," "legitimacy," and "assertiveness"--to understand the urgency of the demand by Malcolm X for freedom "by any means necessary," Mao's challenge to "serve the people," the slogans of "power to the people" and "self-determination," the principles of "mass line" organizing and "united front" work, or the conviction that the people--not the elites--are the makers of history. But they were the ideas that galvanized thousands of Asian Americans and reshaped our communities. And it is these concepts which must be grasped in order to understand the scope and intensity of our movement and what it created.

He continues to state the rationale for this special issue:

> This issue of Amerasia is devoted to a reexamination of these themes. Our focus is not on recounting the past events themselves but on retrieving the legacies for our current situation. Our goals is to identify--especially for a new generation of Asian Americans--the lessons of an earlier generation.

It is noteworthy that Omatsu writes of the "new generation" as being Asian Americans, not as yonsei or fourth generation Japanese

Americans. In the next and final section of this paper, I discuss the significance of this new "codeword" and new generation.

Asian Americans, A New Subculture

During the campus turmoil of the sixties and seventies, the Sansei generation perhaps sensitive to their small population size (compared to the African American and Hispanic populations) began to form coalitions with other organizations, particularly those of Asian descent: Chinese-Americans, Filipino-Americans, Korean-Americans, etc. In due time, a social movement was formed and duly recognized as the Asian American Movement (see Wei 1993).

One example of a coalition group with a Sansei membership was the Berkeley AAPA (Asian American Political Alliance), the first of many that sprung up around the country. William Wei (1993: 21) has this story to tell about this Berkeley AAPA meeting:

> ... it was at the second meeting that Larry Jack Wong [Chinese American] first brought up the internment of the Japanese Americans, saying, "Hey, you're Japanese. Why don't you people protest about the concentration camps? Woo noted that a long discussion ensued and, ever the gadfly, he said, "Hell, the way things are going now, they might do that to us. So you're not doing this just for the Japanese, but for all other people...

William Wei continues this story:

> Wong and Woo had touched upon a taboo topic, one that older Japanese Americans had sought to forget. After that tragedy

> was revealed to sansei (third-generation Japanese Americans) participating in the Asian American Movement, the internment during World War II became the issue among Japanese American activists and, for many of them, the sole reason for being involved politically. (Wei 1993: 21)

The previously mentioned statement by Omura implies that a new community, known as Asian Americans, is now a viable and self-sustaining social entity. That is, the student activities of the period constructed a new subculture out of previously unconnected organizations.

Wei discusses this Asian American movement and its accomplishments under a number of specific points. The movement (Wei 1993:

> 1) produced a new identity by transcending specific Asian ethnic identities and focusing on a pan-Asian consciousness. It has even lobbied the Census Bureau to have its classification system modified. (Le Espritu, 1992)
> 2) created a generation of activists who were willing to act for the collective benefit of their Asian American community.
> 3) attempted to change the cariacature of Asians by producing new histories, literature, film, and art works that was more in tune with mainstream America. [Museums were also built.]
> 4) became associated with Asian American women's movement, a movement that faced the gender inequalities.

5) gave birth to a host of new institutions in higher education, for example the new academic field known as Asian American Studies. [Asian American Studies spawned a new journal, Amerasia, as well a national Association of Asian Studies that held its 11th annual meeting this year.]

6) sponsored community agencies in Asian enclaves of the country: welfare assistance, counseling services, recreational facilities, job placements, etc. [The movement often assumed the role of intermediaries between the community and the larger society, thereby making the traditional leader less relevant.]

7) validated, without intending to do so, ethnic pluralism and multiculturalism that is becoming a new vision of American society.

In summary, then, this paper attempted to relate the post World War II consequences of Executive Order 9066, consequences which were largely unintended and unanticipated. The paper started out with the Nisei generation's memories of their internment camp experiences and why for two decades the Nisei were reluctant to discuss these memories with their children or to engage in collective action to "display" these memories. Next, the paper focused on eagerness of the Sansei generation to learn more about the camps and as a result created a memory bank which was identified as "vicarious memories." With these learned memories, the Sansei supported a wide range of collective activities that were unanticipated at the time the camps were closed, such as

pilgrimages to former camp sites, Congressional hearings on the reasons for internment, and a large-scale movement to seek redress and apology. The final section described how the Sansei generation armed with these vicarious memories of interned citizens were engaged in a social movement that culminated in a new ethnic identity known as Asian Americans and thereby added a new dimension to the growing multiculturalism of mainstream America. From the perspective of the aging Nisei generation, this Asian American identity was an unintended consequence of the camps.

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RELATING COMMUNITY STUDIES TO NATIONAL STUDIES IN JAPAN

As is generally recognized, the methodology of community studies developed as a by-product of ethnological interests in tribal or nonliterate cultures. When applied to such homeogeneous societies, the community study was at once ethnographic in its collection of facts, historical in its explanation of cause and effect, and comparative in its selection of problems. But when we use this tool in research on more complex national cultures, a community study obviously cannot be as thorough or as comprehensive in all aspects as those for tribal cultures. As a result, there seems to be a growing recognition that a modern community study is not research on a community. Rather it is seen as a method for observing and exploring ~~some~~ specific facets of human life--for example, child training, family organization, religious activity--that happens to interest the researcher. With these introductory remarks about the scope and aims of community studies generally, let me survey what has been accomplished in Japan.

A. Survey of Community Studies in Japan.

If we define the concept of community study broadly, then, at least 126 examples for Japan can be counted in the literature; and if we include in this list the yet unpublished investigations, the figure should run well over 200. Of these 200, the vast majority have been investigated by Japanese ethnologists and sociologists. The remainder, about 40, have been examined by American social scientists. Since these two groups have differed somewhat in their interests and orientations, their contributions will be discussed separately. Let me begin with the Japanese researches.

Studies by Japanese. Despite a number of social surveys made at the local levels by various government agencies since the 1870's, it was not until the mid-1930's that community studies ~~really~~ began in Japan as a recognized academic endeavor. As a rule, the studies of the 1930's were primarily limited to rural life, particularly those mountain and fishing villages not greatly

affected by the direct influence of industrialization. Studies of urban communities were largely limited to three or four investigations of city wards. During the war these general trends continued, except that research activities were greatly diminished. However I find in the postwar years a growing body of community studies which indicates a healthy distrust of sweeping generalizations and an attempt to cover their former blind spots. The Japanese are trying to keep abreast of recent developments in social theory and are using many of the current fads in sampling, scale-construction, attitude testing, and projective techniques to supplement the informant-interviewing and participant observation methods.

Yet, it is noteworthy that the time spent "in the field" by most Japanese researchers is seldom longer than six months. These time limitations are in part a function of an assumed familiarity with their own culture and in part a function of limited funds--often derived from meagre government or university grants, not from private foundations. But perhaps more significant for the present purposes is the fact that not more than five can be classified as ethnographic; the rest deals with special problems such as family relations, tenancy problems, social stratification, and the like. Moreover most Japanese have confined their investigations to hamlets or buraku that typically contain less than 500 residents. Studies of a whole city, town, or even a village have been made rarely. Now for the researches by Americans.

Studies by Americans. With the exception of a handful of scholars working under private auspices, American community investigations in Japan have been dominated by two organizations which produced studies only in the postwar period: one is the University of Michigan's Center for Japanese Studies, and the other is the Occupation's Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division.

Each year since 1950, the Michigan Center has sent to its field station in Okayama city a ~~few scholars~~ two members of the University's staff and several graduate students from different

Richard Beardsley's, Robert Hall, & Robert Ward + others

disciplines to work in this Inland Sea region. To date, the Michigan Center has published or has in press four standard village ethnographies: Norbeck's Takashima, an island fishing village; Cornell's Matsunagi, a mountain hamlet; Robert Smith's Kurusu, a lowland farm community; and the joint staff's Niike, another lowland village of somewhat larger size. The common theoretical problem of these investigations is the ~~Westernization~~ industrialization process and consequently the influence of ~~western~~ new artifacts and customs are noted with care in these works.

The Occupation's Research Division, on the other hand, conducted studies in a larger number of communities covering a wider territory. Over a period of four years, some 33 communities were surveyed ~~on specific problems~~ by a staff of five American social scientists and 12 Japanese ethnologists working in groups of three or four. These surveys, which required less than two week's residence in any one community, deal with problems related to the land reform program, fishery rights system, and family relations.

Other American studies, not included in the above group projects are noteworthy, for example, John Embree's well-known study of Suye Mura, an isolated, economically marginal, mountain village in Western Kyushu. I understand that Roger Yoshino has recently completed, but not yet published, a follow-up study of this village. Andrew Grad's research of Fukaya is interesting because it is a town of considerably larger population--40,000--than is true for the others considered so far. One other large community study is that of Ishigami ~~City~~ which John Pelzel studied in 1949. Both of these researchers have used Japanese student assistants and quantitative survey techniques to reach the relatively large population.

The foregoing survey of studies by both foreign and indigenous researchers suggest wide variations in the problems investigated, in the amounts of time spent in the field, and in the definitions of a "community." However, both American and Japanese investigators have dealt with the basic problems of studying, at the directly observable local group level, the "goodness of fit" between an opinion and behavior, and between an ideal pattern and actual pattern. Because of this unity of problem orientation, their investigations

are included here as "community studies."

B. Relating Community Studies to National Studies.

Before we specifically take up the problem of how the foregoing studies contribute to the understanding of Japanese culture, it may be well to pause here briefly to consider what kinds of knowledge, or rather what types of information, are desired for a comprehensive study of any national society. If agreement can be reached on this, it can serve as a baseline from which to evaluate the contributions of community studies.

The following paradigm, which leans heavily on Julian Steward's area research monograph, considers four basic "dimensions" as essential to a national study. These are:

(1) Common Cultural Denominators. This "dimension" refers to a number of culture traits which the vast majority of the individuals in the society holds and cherishes either explicitly or implicitly: Hence the phrase "common denominator." It includes such traits-complexes as linguistic behavior, gestures, patterns of interpersonal relations, folkways and folklore, values and ideologies, and basic personality structure.

(2) Local units. The total population of any nation is residentially distributed into such local units as neighborhoods, hamlets, villages, towns, and cities, metropolitan areas, and other forms of settlements. A national study, then, should include some basic information about how these local groups are internally organized and also how they are related to each other to form larger patterns of organization such as the "region."

(3) Subcultural groups. This dimension seeks information concerning occupational, class, caste, ethnic, and other social categories which are not confined to given local and regional units, but which form more or less common group symbols, value-orientations, and styles of life. These subcultural groups usually "cross-cut," so to speak, local residential units and may be visualized as a series of "horizontal" strata in the national society.

(4) Formal Institutions. These refer to such relatively stable elements as organized churches, legal processes, banking systems, mass communication channels, parliamentary systems, and other institutions which are not entirely localized in any community or subcultural groups of individuals. They have a structure which persists over time and are more or less independent of individuals associated with them.

Taking each of these dimensions, in turn, let us examine what kinds of information community studies in Japan have provided. The first dimension is concerned with:

(1) Common cultural denominators. How have community studies provided information about such common cultural denominators as ~~linguistic patterns and gestural habits~~, values and ideologies, ~~patterns of interpersonal relations~~, behavioral norms and expectations, and basic personality structure of the Japanese? Here the contribution of the community studies is substantial. It may be noted, however, that Ruth Benedict's famous book, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, written without the benefit of personal field experience in Japan, set a high goal for which any ethnographer might strive to attain. As a first approximation, Benedict's synthesis was remarkable, but I think these postwar community studies do much to correct the overly precise and exceedingly formalized set of value-orientations and moral precepts that she set forth. Moreover, her rules of proper conduct do not seem to apply uniformly throughout the social structure. These field studies show that proper behavior will vary not only according to time and circumstance, but also to the social roles of the individuals involved. In brief, then, these community studies indicate the extent to which the actual behavior departs from the ideal.

As for the discussion of other common denominators of culture, systematic and strictly comparable personality data have not yet been collected, although some, like the Michigan group, have assembled a number of biographies and have done substantial research into child-training methods. Even these scanty materials, however, are enought to expose the gross misrepresentations

made by LaBarre, Gorer, Meadow, and others. Their thesis, that the Japanese adult behavior of secretiveness, cleanliness, pedantry, and the like are the direct consequence of severe toilet training and subsequent restrictive conditions of Japanese life, is emphatically denied by many who have examined the available evidence from community studies. Other aspects of this "common denominator" category will be discussed later in another context.

Despite some obvious shortcomings noted above, community researches have contributed heavily to our knowledge about the common denominators of Japanese society. Without these local group studies, we can be as far wrong on many points as LaBarre, Gorer, and Meadows were about Japanese national character.

The second dimension of our "national study" paradigm is:

(2) Local units. It will be recalled that here we are concerned with information which tells us both how local, territorial groups are internally organized and how they are related to each other and to larger units of the society. What kinds of information do the community studies provide us with respect to this dimension?

Unquestionably, community studies are indispensable for delineating the internal structure of given communities. As the review of community studies suggested, vast quantities of information pertaining to family and kinship relations, social class and stratification patterns, neighborhood associations, power relations within the village, and religious affiliations can be gleaned from them. Papers by Richard Beardsley, John Cornell, & John Donoghue, being given at the Bloomington meetings, illustrate this very point very well.

Embree's study of Suye Mura and the Raper Survey on the land reform reveal a great deal about the formation and membership of informal exchange-labor groups as well as more formalized economic groups within the village structure. Ariga's well known study of landlord-tenant relations in an Akita village is outstanding for its description of a complex mixture of feudal paternalism and shrewd self-interested pursuits. John Benett's unpublished study of a forestry community in Tochigi indicates how a coalition of religious, social, and economic interests determine the power structure of this community.

Pelzel's unpublished study of Ishigami City suggests how the medium-sized indistries affect the social and cultural activites of a relatively small town.

These examples, are, perhaps, sufficient to indicate the range of interests that revolve around the problem of defining the social structure of a community. Taken as a whole, they reveal a wide diversity in the social organization of these rural communities, ~~which~~ This fact, in turn, suggests that Japan is yet a transitional society.

As for inter-community relations ~~Similarly~~, somewhat less information is available. ~~on inter-community relations provided by these studies in the relations of a given community to its neighbors.~~ However, studies showing rural-urban migrations, inter-village marriage patterns, shifting occupational patterns, particularly those in the farm villages, are sufficient to indicate some basic trends in this repsect. Another neglected area is the ecological adjustment of the ~~urban~~ ~~Centers and it urban areas, unfortunately, have not been studied to any extent~~ rural areas to their changing trade or business centers. Despite these shortcomings Nevertheless no one would deny that this "local unit" dimension, if taken as a whole, is most dependent upon community studies for its basic information.

The third dimension of our paradigm is called:

(3) Subcultural units. What do these community studies tell us about the various subcultural units within the society? They present a rather skewed picture, in my judgment, of the ways in which social class lines are drawn in Japan, and of the ways in which political, economic, and religious groupings function. The very nature of the rural bias in the sampling of the communities means that these discussions of subcultural units are descriptive of farm communities and not of the large towns and cities. While fishing operations, landlord-tenant relations, forestry practices, and other rural occupational groups are well illustrated in detail, the life styles of white collar workers, managerial classes, and small-scale businessmen cannot be gleaned from these community studies.

In addition, contemporary Japan has many other varieties of subcultural entities, including one or two "outcaste" groups persisting from feudal times.

A number of the "batsu" groups like the zaibatsu, the prewar financial oligarchies, and the gakubatsu, elite groups of intellectuals, form rather interesting subcultures that strengthen their bonds by sharing common interests and by arranging properly the marriages of eligible scions. Also along with the usual occupational subcultures familiar to Westerners (at least in their outward manifestations), there are such groups as the kabuki theatrical players whose society is based on both actual and fictitious kinship principles. These varieties of traditionally-oriented and the more modern subcultural groups constitute an important category that community studies have not yet covered systematically.

Let us proceed to the final dimension of our paradigm:

(4) Formal Institutions. This dimension of a national study, it will be recalled, concerns the organization and functions of institutions like the church, the government, the schools, the newspapers, and the like.

With respect to formally organized church institutions, the actual operation on the community level is perhaps best documented in village studies. Details as to the amount of money contributions to the religious body, the extent of involvement in terms of beliefs, and nature of various kinds of pilgrimages--these and many other aspects of how the church as an institution functions at the local levels are amply documented in their highly varied aspects. Slightly less, but rapidly accumulating knowledge about the governmental and political processes at the grass roots levels is now evident. One rather interesting study by Paul S. Dull concerns a political boss system as it is manifest in rural villages in the Inland Sea Region. Paul Dull, Joseph L. Sutton, and Kurt Steiner have some valuable studies of the political party and governmental machinery at the community level. As for studies on the effects of a national government program on the local citizenry, the previously mentioned SCAP Research Division's various studies, such as the fishery rights survey, the Raper land reform survey, the forestry research, and the labor boss study, illustrate some interesting variations. For some reason,

investigations of children at school do not appear very often in community studies, though conceivably this might fall within their purview. Similarly research on the effects of mass communication media upon the local community have been by-passed. Sometimes in a community study the extent of readership or circulation figures on newspapers are given, but rarely does an indication of their "deeper" role in molding community opinion or personal attitudes appear. It seems, in summary, that the contribution of community studies to this dimension of our paradigm is potentially great but is still a long way from realization.

Let me try now to recapitulate what appear to be some of the major contributions and shortcomings of community investigations to the national study of Japan. These village and town studies are, as one might expect, most significant with reference to those aspects of the national culture designated above as "local unit" and "common cultural denominators." Yet the information pertaining to these dimensions indicate some serious shortcomings, such as the lack of information on the patterned relations between neighboring communities, and in the area concerning the effects of mass communications media on the local group. On the other hand, the most glaring deficiencies are found in the "subcultural groups" and "formal institutions" dimensions of our paradigm. These and other deficiencies, I believe, can be mitigated if future community studies consider the reverse of the problem we have been discussing up to now, namely how studies on the national level relate to community studies. This is briefly treated below.

Relating National Studies to Community Studies

National studies which analyze the various formal institutions of Japan are presently available in Western literature and these can serve to sharpen the kinds of problems undertaken in community studies. Jerome Cohen's Japan's Economy in War and Peace, Miriam S. Farley's Aspects of Japan's Labor Problems, Wolf Ladejinsky's numerous articles on agricultural problems and policies;

Robert K. Reischuaur's Japan: Government and Politics; and D.C. Holtom's books on Shinto religion; are just a few examples of institutional studies on the national level. Here, then, is an opportunity for students of community investigations to see what effects these formal institutions have at the local, "grass roots" level of the nation.

So far we have not mentioned any studies of Japanese language. As a national study, the only Whorf type of linguistic analysis of Japanese that I know of is a Harvard thesis by John Fisher. One conclusion he makes is that since the Japanese sentence structure is periodic--that is the verb coming at the end--this fact makes it possible for a Japanese speaker to watch the reactions of his listener as he is speaking. If listener's face expresses violent opposition to what the speaker is saying, then, the latter can change the complete meaning of his sentence before he finishes it by merely shifting the verb from a positive form to a negative form or vice versa. In English, because the verb comes earlier in the sentence, the speaker is already committed and cannot change the meaning of his statement so readily. Community studies in Japan have not been concerned with the relation of language to patterns of interpersonal behavior.

Along somewhat similar lines, John Hall's recent article in the Scientific Monthly about the "anthropology of manners" suggest another area of common cultural deonominators that Japanese community studies have not examined systematically. For instance, John Hall suggests that the standard distance between two people conversing with each other is shorter in Latin American countries than it is for those in the United States; and that the ignorance of these implicit rules have led to innumerable faux pas committed by Americans working in South America. While explicit patterns have been described, these implicit customs, or "manners," as Hall terms them, have been neglected in community studies in Japan.

Similarly, other types of research, if taken into account by community studies, may enhance their contributions to knowledge. For instance, a number of empirical studies using attitude survey and other quantitative methods has gained prominence in Japan. Three randomly selected examples may be given. One is a social stratification study directed by Kunio Odaka and conducted on a sample of residents in six large cities. Another is a series of content analysis work of popular magazines, movies, novels, and songs by the "Science of Thought" society. A third example is the Unesco-sponsored study of the attitudes of youth by Jean Stoetzel, a French social psychologist. It would seem that these studies offer many suggestions for specific problems, empirical generalizations, and hypotheses to be checked at the local levels.
To be more specific, Jean Stoetzel's attitude survey suggests that traditional norms--as defined by Ruth Benedict--no longer hold for the postwar youth. A community study which relies not on verbal response as opinion polls do, but on participant observation, should shed some demonstrable light on this problem.

Summary. In summary, then, my feelings about all this can be stated quite simply. While it does not provide as comprehensive a picture of the total society as analogous studies have done in a tribal culture, the modern community study is still a basic and indispensable tool. The reason for this is not that a community study is a study of a village, town, or city, but, as Arensberg has argued, it is a device for "coming to grips with social and psychological facts in the raw." The village, town, or city, then, does not define the purpose of a community study, it merely is the setting for such a study.

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PREPARATION AND METHODS FOR COLUMBUS STUDY

During the preparation for and carrying out of the Columbus study, a substantial part of the time was devoted to perfecting the research design and in preparing and pretesting the instruments for data collection. Findings from the Columbus study have served to increase the confidence in the technique adopted as a means of measuring the attitude behind shopping behavior. However, because of the complexity of the forces involved, and the small coverage of the initial study, there is also an awareness that the findings may not have validity for all cities.

To test methods and findings further, the study has been repeated in two more cities: Houston (Texas) and Seattle (Washington). Data gathered in these cities are now being analyzed, and if the results obtained there show a high degree of consistency with the Columbus study, confidence in their generality will be increased.

PATTERNS OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS*

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Not all of social science as it is known today is concerned with studies of human behavior under controlled laboratory conditions. Much of what occupies the attention of some groups of behavioral scientists is the careful recording of human events and activities which take place in their natural setting free from the manipulation of the scientific observer.

FACT GATHERING

Much energy is spent in tedious fact-gathering activity not completely different from those of a botanist who spends months and even years in foreign countries looking for specimens of flora.

Group Relations

It is due to those scientists who, by the dint of their intellectual curiosity, bring back important facts about diverse peoples that we have today a fair knowledge about the range of variation in human behavior and how different societies solve certain universal human problems.

We have, for instance, a fairly complete knowledge of the different ways in which families are organized and how variations in family structures are related to the socio-economic organization of the society, to the psychology of its people, and to the cultural traditions these people follow. We have a considerable amount of information about the ways in which children are trained in different societies, how relatives are reckoned, and how religious beliefs are conceptualized. But such studies are not ends in themselves. They provide social scientists with comparative materials not otherwise available. They provide the "stuff" which a comprehensive knowledge of human behavior must take into account.

Interpersonal Relations

One specific area within the general framework of comparative studies of human behavior that has been relatively neglected, however, is the examination of

* This is a brief report of one aspect of the social science project, "Research in Japanese Social Relations," at Ohio State University. The project is directed by Professor John W. Bennett of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology.

the different modes of interpersonal relations. By this we mean the different processes by which face-to-face associations are established outside of the family or kinship context, and of the rules, premises, and symbols underlying such relationships.

If we are able to accumulate more knowledge about these matters, it seems reasonable that we can understand better than we do today how "grass roots" social movements are begun, how "behind-the-scenes deals" between politicians are made, how informal trade regulations and price agreements are informally maintained, how racketeering and other extra-legal organizations come into being, and how fanatic cults gain adherents. While the human relations involved in these matters are fairly well understood by the experts for the situation in the United States, we cannot assume that these American patterns apply to social movements, political deals, business combines, and the like which take place in other societies with a different cultural tradition. Much more information concerning "social relational" patterns needs to be systematically collected.

Study Made During Allied Occupation of Japan

It is with respect to these patterns of social relations, particularly those manifested in a certain non-Western society, that the project, "Research in Japanese Social Relations," has been devoting the past two years. The original materials used for this project were collected during the recent Allied Occupation of Japan and they constitute a good portion of the corpus of research of the Occupation's Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division.†

RITUAL KINSHIP, A SYSTEM OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP

As an illustration of the kind of problems pursued by this Project this paper will describe briefly a widespread and complex pattern of inter-personal relations found in Japan.

This pattern-complex, known most commonly as the *oyabun-kobun* system, is one in which unrelated persons enter into a compact and assume obligations, privileges, and rights of a familial nature. An employer, for instance, may enter into such a compact with some of his workers and maintain certain traditional, paternalistic, and "personalized" relations with these workers, but not with reference to other workers. Whether or not he manifests economically "rational" and self-interested orientation toward a given worker, then, depends in large part on the existence or absence of *oyabun-kobun* patterns in the relationship.

Not Unique to Japan

At the time field investigations were being carried out in Japan, it was believed that such a social relational system was unique to Japan.

Subsequent documentary investigation for comparative materials has revealed that such was not the case and that many societies throughout the world have similar patterns of relationship as, for example, in some European countries like Spain where industrialization has not been complete. Indeed, such a system of social relationships is so common that anthropologists have recently designated it by the technical term, "ritual kinship system."

How the System Works in Japan

Briefly, the ritual kinship system works like this in Japan:

Let us suppose that several unrelated people wish either to promote or to maintain against outsiders some vested interest which is not amply protected under the existing legal system. Thus, a group of street-stall merchants who want to protect their squatter's right on a section of the public sidewalk, a collection of casual laborers who want to keep the available sources of employment open to themselves, a gang of racketeers who want to prevent

† This division has a staff of some 50 Japanese social scientists and five American social analysts. The large staff and the complete logistic support provided by the Occupation permitted the collection of data of a magnitude and depth difficult to duplicate under ordinary conditions of research support. The supervisor of the present project and the author were, respectively, Division Chief and research analyst of the Occupation's research division.

other gangs from encroaching upon their territory, a union of traditional artists who want to restrict and control their field of specialization, and a coalition of unaffiliated politicians interested in promoting certain political ends (e.g., a neo-fascist one) are all examples of individuals who lack legal and statutory protection of their interests in Japan. Typically, people in such circumstances, by mutual agreement and sometimes by intimidation, enter into a compact to assume obligations of a diffuse nature which are aimed to protect the interests of the group. The relationship is formally established by means of a ritual *sake* drinking ceremony involving some of the expressive symbolisms of kinship and marriage. The *sake*, or rice-wine, for example, is said to symbolize blood. Supernatural, rather than legal, sanctions are implied by taking the vow in the presence of a deity relevant to the group. Both the terms of address and the designation of roles within the group are patterned on the Japanese family system: the leader becomes a ritual parent (*oyabun*) and his followers, ritual children (*kobun*). These followers in turn are ranked in status designating "elder brother" and "younger brother" roles. A specific group of ritual parent and his followers, thus formed, constitutes a symbolic family group, and often assumes a "family" name. Some groups even have genealogies of ancestors traced through this ritual family line for five or six generations.

"Family" Coalitions

Not only is this nuclear group formed but several distinct "families" in turn may form combines or coalitions by one or both of these two methods:

One way is for the several leaders of these unitary families to enter into a brotherhood compact (solemnized by *sake* drinking), thus uniting at the same time the membership, wealth, facilities, and political influence controlled by their respective families. The other method is for the ritual parent (*oyabun*) of a given family to encourage his followers to recruit and establish dependent "families" of their own. When this is done, the original ritual parent becomes a "great parent" (*o-oyabun*) to the newest recruits and the recruits, in turn, become ritually related not only to their immediate leader but also to the original leader. Thus, by extending the relationships by means of these principles of brotherhood and of descent, a given group may enclose a number of interlocking "family" units and organize the manpower, economic resources, and political power of even several hundred individuals.

The above version is admittedly an idealized picture of this pattern of social relationships, and particular details in each empirical case, of course, will vary according to the kinds of vested interests that are at stake and the specific nature of the traditions of the particular group. This pattern—not completely understood by the staff at the time the data were gathered in Japan—is a generalization made from a close examination of dozens of cases during the past two years.

MESHING OF KINSHIP AND BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEMS

One more complication of this pattern of social relationship, however, needs to be discussed. And that is, how this ritual kinship system of relations is, so to speak, "meshed" in a more formalized and more "bureaucratic" system of relationships.

Formal and Informal Organizations

American sociologists typically describe large-scale systems (e.g., a factory) of human relations in terms of "formal" and "informal" organizations.

The first refers to a consciously planned table of organization which purports to serve the manifest purposes of the social group. Being of such nature, formal organizations are symbolized by personnel charts to indicate lines of communication, the system of authority, and the interrelated processes of decision-making, leadership, and control. The informal organization, on the other hand, is seen by these sociologists as a more or less unpremeditated and non-rational form of organization of people working within the framework of the formal organization. Specific aspects of such spontaneous organizations are known by such terms as "cliques," "friendship groups," and "natural groups."

In most Japanese social groupings examined by the Project staff, these "formal" and "informal" aspects of organizations were clearly discernible—which

supports the thesis that these aspects are quite universal. But over and above these aspects of organization there were many social groupings in Japan which had a third aspect, namely the ritual kinship structure.

In such formally organized associations as the Kanagawa Labor Supply Association which recruited and placed some 100,000 laborers in various government projects in 1945–1946, and the Tokyo Street-stall Owners' Association which had in 1947 a membership of at least 25,000 small-scale merchants, *oyabun-kobun* relationships were found to be operating at various levels of the organizational hierarchy. The officers at each level of the formal organization—the local "boss," the branch chief, the president of the association—had established not only ritual parenthood (*oyabun-kobun*) relationships with their key subordinates, but also ritual brotherhood (*kyodaibun*) relationships with leaders of comparable rank in the formal organization.

SIGNIFICANCE OF KINSHIP SYSTEM SURVIVAL

It is not possible here to go into the details of the significance of this aspect—ritual kinship—in the total organization, but those readers who are trained in the social sciences will see from what has been already stated how it might serve some very basic human needs, e.g., "personalizing" social relations in a potentially impersonal and bureaucratic organization. But since, in these large-scale organizations, ritual kinship compacts are entered into by select members of the group, "informal" organization—as the term is used by American sociologists—is found among those individuals not affiliated by ritual kin ties. These findings should prove to be of interest to students of comparative institutions.

Obviously not all large-scale organizations in modern Japan utilize ritual kinship relations as part of their organizational structure. Most large business enterprises, for example, which are strictly modelled after comparable Western systems, seem to lack this feature. Why, then, do some organizations have this feature and others do not? A preliminary and cursory answer was found in examining the Project's case materials. In every case we examined, ritual kinship structures were found in situations where the vested interest of the group concerned was not fully protected by the existing laws.

The obvious case is the racketeers whose interests are extralegal. But similar interpretations can be made for labor recruiting agencies, neo-fascist movements, religious cults, and other organizations utilizing ritual kinship patterns. This finding led to our generalization, which was stated earlier in this paper, viz., that *oyabun-kobun* are found where the people concerned are interested in protecting a "right," a "property," or a "privilege" which is extralegal.

Though the Project lacks detailed case materials, the author believes that these ritual kin patterns of social relations are also utilized by the major political parties in Japan to control and to organize their respective political machines, especially those in the rural areas. It is also suspected that some of the big industrial and financial combines (e.g., the former *zaibatsu*) have formerly utilized some of these patterns. The teaching profession, especially at the University level, might also be included in this generalization.

In summary, then, we have presented here a bare outline of a system of social relationship found in certain segments of contemporary Japanese society. As was stated at the beginning of this report, it is our belief that such fact-gathering activity as is illustrated by the present study is not only important in contributing to knowledge about the range of variation in human relations, but also to provide a comparative point of view for examining our own society, culture, and institutions.

TIME FOR A CHANGE

Just ten years ago, the Station NEWS policy of devoting the major space in each issue to activities of the Station was temporarily set aside because many Station projects were classified, i.e., Government sponsored and not for publication. The Station publications office circumvented this restriction by publicizing in turn each department of the Engineering College, and each department of physical science which closely supports or supplements the engineering curricula, and devoting each entire issue to the research, curriculum, and activity reports (from faculty and alumni contributors) which that department was free to publish. Now, each of the University's engineering and physical science departments has had at least one NEWS issue devoted to its program and work, and the present NEWS make-up has gone full circle. Therefore, arrangements have been made by the new Dean of the Engineering College (G. B. Carson) and the Advisory Council of the Station to publish the NEWS quarterly (February, April, July, and November), and to present in each issue four or more articles representative of the four main fields of engineering: chemical, mechanical, electrical (including physics), and construction. Henceforth, beginning with the April 1954 number, these four fields will be covered annually and respectively by at least four papers on their research and development. One page will be reserved in each issue for comments from the Technical Editor on pertinent engineering events and personalities and on forthcoming manuscripts for publication in the NEWS or in the Station's Bulletin-Circular series. Other innovations include a change in page size, type face, and Cover feature. Reader comments on these changes, and suggestions for further changes, are solicited.

LABOR BOSS SYSTEM IN KANAGAWA, JAPAN, 1946



LABOR BOSS SYSTEM IN
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

Draft

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ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR JAPANESE RURAL SOCIETY

by
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Draft of paper presented at annual meeting of the Japan Ethnological Society, May 15, 1965, held at International Christian University, Tokyo, Japan.

April 30, 1965

Rural Society in Modern Japan Symposium

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR JAPANESE RURAL SOCIETY

Probably no subject matter of cultural science activity in Japan has received as much attention as has the rural village. This subject matter is associated with the earliest attempts of Japanese scholarship in ethnology, sociology folklore, linguistics and still continues today as the object as well as the location of empirical field research. (UNESCO, 1958; Kuroda 1964).

Yet, perhaps because there are too many reports, analyses and experts we do not have comprehensive and integrated view of village life and organization. I believe an anxiety of this sort has led the planners of this symposium to choose today's subject: rural society in modern Japan. Is there any method or conceptual approach that might help us visualize the underlying structure and process of modern Japanese rural villages? Is there any consistent pattern to be derived from studies which indicate that the dozoku system is declining, that ko-gumi type villages are to be found in southwest Japan, that the primogeniture system is weakening, that traditional customs and festivals survive in some villages but not in others, that miai kekkon is still strong but rennai-kekkon is increasing, that due to the rising numbers dekaseginin the pattern of family division of labor is changing?

Today, I would like to introduce the idea of "alternative futures" as perhaps one technique for "making sense" of this enormous information and data we now have about the changing nature of Japanese villages. This idea is really quite simple. It proposes that we hypothesize a limited number of alternative ways in which the present Japanese village system might develop, given the present known conditions. These alternative ways are technically called "alternative futures."

To provide an example of a set of "alternative futures" we take the work of a political scientist, Herman Kahn, (1964) who worked out three alternative futures for international relations for the 1970s. He carefully summarized the important indicators of world power, and analyzed trends in the build-up and decline of power. The result was three world futures, one of which was a world where the basic condition was characterized by high stability and peace resulting directly from arms control agreements between all major world powers. The second alternative future was a world in which there were structured strains. Here was visualized the decline of Soviet Russia's dominance over world communism, the European Common Market pursuing exclusionist trade policies with respect to the rest of the world, and Communist China, France, Germany developing independent nuclear deterrents. The third alternative future was one where the old strong alliances developed in the 1950s no longer prevail and where many smaller nations develop and use atomic power extensively because an inexpensive process has been found. Here the European countries fail to develop into a viable political community and the smaller nations gain in power relative to the big powers of the 1950s.

Such conscious statement of alternative futures for international relations, the author claims, helps us (1) to clarify kinds of moral

choices the nations of the world have before them, (2) to anticipate certain likely occurence in a more systematic fashion, and (3) to reduce uncertainty about the nature of indicators of change--in this case, political change--now presently available. In essence, then, Herman Kahn's alternative futures does not make predictions for us. (The mere listing of alternatives is no prediction). Instead they help us interpret the meaning of currently available trends, statistics, and facts and they help us "see" the consequences such factors may have for the future state of affairs.

Borrowing the technique, then, I have attempted to put down three alternative futures as I saw them for rural Japan. These alternatives are called, alpha, beta and gamma. They are described as follows:

Alpha:

Assumes that the Japanese village social organization and culture has achieved some kind of equilibrium and further development or change is wall nigh impossible to achieve--unless some drastic revolution takes place in the Japanese society as a whole. Such a revolution would imply such startling changes as the overthrow of the emperor institution and the abolishment of the parliamentary system.

Beta:

Assumes the conditions where the number of farm families will decline sharply and where part-time farming will increase. It also assumes that the average size of land-holding will increase and that with this increase will come greater input of agricultural machinery and other labor-saving devices. Simultaneously the size of the farm labor population will decrease as this labor force moves to urban areas or, if it remains in the rural areas, it will take up nonfarm occupations.

Thus the education of farm youths will be increasingly directed toward nonfarm occupations. The government will play an important role in both subsidizing education, making farm credit more accessible, and help to protect the price of farm products through certain controls.

Gamma:

Assumes that agricultural pursuits will rest largely in the hands of a managerial class that would operate the farm system as efficiently and cost-consciously as do industrialists in other productive enterprises. The labor costs will be closely calculated according to the best cost accounting principles; market conditions will be carefully followed to insure the greatest returns on the crops raised; modern scientific chemical and biological technology will be utilized; research will be carried out to cover all phases of the farming operations. These farm enterprises may also be corporately integrated with other manufacturing companies such that the farm products can be efficiently marketed as raw materials for the manufacturers.

These farm enterprises may be operated under two different types, as joint stock companies and as state-operated collectivized farms. Where joint stock company type of industrial farms prevail, this system will be identified as Gamma 1. Such company farms may be associated with food processing concerns or with companies that rely on agricultural products, as cotton, oil, soybeans, tallow, hides and skins. Where collectivized farming system prevails, this pattern may be designated here as Gamma 2 type.

To restate the three alternatives, we have the Alpha future in which we imagine an equilibrium stage. In the Beta future, we see an

increase in the average size of farm holdings and a marked decrease in farm families. In the Gamma future farming is taken out of the hands of individual family units and put into the control of a managerial class.

If we have in mind these three alternative futures for Japanese rural society, then, we can return to our original proposition. At the beginning of this paper I tried to suggest that the vast amount of studies on the Japanese villages make it difficult for us to assess or to interpret what is going on here. Of the hundreds of indicators of social and cultural change that researchers have brought to our attention, which of these indicators are significant? Which indicators of change are superficial and ephemeral? Furthermore we all know competent scholars who have come to different conclusions about one or another aspect of modern village life and who have become involved in intellectual argument about who is right and who is wrong. Most of these arguments arise because the standpoint or frame of reference for making the evaluation is not clearly understood. (Many such arguments are just as silly as arguing whether a given cup of coffee is half-full or half-empty). In short, then, to understand any analysis or evaluation one has to identify the standpoint from which it is made.

This clarification of standpoint, or frame of reference, is the main purpose for introducing the alpha, beta and gamma alternative futures. Each alternative future I believe is an explicit standpoint from which to look at indicators of cultural change. Let us assume for the moment at least that we all agree that this is so. How, then, can we use the alternative futures to help us understand the present status of village life and conditions?

Let us begin with this bit of information which appeared on March 10,1965 in the Japan Times newspaper. It reported that Japanese farm wives complain of overwork. The reason for this complaint, it turns out, is that farmers are leaving for cities in search of better paying jobs, leaving the farm in the care of their wives. Additional facts are given: in 1963, the population movement away from the farms was 930,000 or 5.1 per cent of the rural population. Furthermore it noted that fewer graduates of junior high schools are seeking work on the farms (last year the total was only 6,800. Ten years ago this population was four times larger).

Such bits of information suggest that trends if continued would necessarily lead toward a Beta Alternative Future, and possibly toward Gamma, but not toward Alpha.

Along similar lines, we come across information like the following: This from early Meiji to the present day, there has been a consistent decline in the proportion of the number employed in agriculture. (Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1960). In 1878-82, some 64 per cent of the total labor force was employed in agriculture. By 1938-42 it was reduced to 44 per cent. Presently it is slightly less than one-third of the total labor force. Furthermore the present agricultural labor force depend upon non-farm sources for nearly 40 per cent of their income. This strongly suggests support for a Beta alternative future.

Yasumas Kuroda, reports that out-migrants from rural areas is reaching such proportions that government sponsored research is being undertaken by sociologists in four regions of Japan. This research comes under the rubric of "New Life Movement Association." This is another odd piece of information that can be classified under Beta Alternative Future.

There are other kinds of informations available in the literature which suggests that Alpha alternative future is likely to be maintained. The reports of Takashi Koyama, Seiichi Kitano and others who have worked on the family system, marriage patterns, and primogeniture system indicate in a general way that the present pattern of adjustment to the modern world is proceeding smoothly and that these institutional patterns are still viable. Reports by Fukutake, Gamo, Izumi and others indicate that there are widely divergent patterns of kinship structure, ceremonial activities and religious orientations throughout Japan. Yet each of these divergent polymorphic patterns in itself seem to be relatively stable over time. Hence, their data indicates a tendency toward Alpha alternative future.

Contributing toward an Alpha alternative future are the present institutional supports for agriculture, especially those supports which are provided by the national government. Farmer cooperatives, research experiment stations and agricultural extension services are designed to maintain the status quo. The specialized and multipurpose cooperatives enable Japanese farmers to effectively pool their resources and their efforts. The large staff of more than 6,000 scientists and technicians developing better seeds and better chemicals is another example of how the farmer can maintain himself under the situation of land shortage.

Not all bits of information, however, suggests a stronger belief in either Alpha or Beta alternatives. Gamma type of alternative is already on the horizon. This excerpt from the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture contains this remark:

"[Japanese] government planners expect the gross national product to double during the next decade. During this period, population is expected to increase only about 10 per cent, thus making it possible for per capita incomes to almost double as well. This rise in income will be

reflected in the food consumption pattern -- the consumption of high protein foods will increase, while the consumption of starchy foods will decline.

"Income in the agricultural sector are expected to rise but not as rapidly as in the non-agricultural sector. As the level of living rises, emphasis will shift from increased yields per acre to higher productivity per farm worker. This will require fewer people on the land and a consolidation of many, uneconomically small, farm units. Land reform legislation limiting the size of farms will likely be revised. The ultimate goal of the Japanese land reform program will have been reached -- per capita production of farmers will have increased sufficiently beyond farm consumption to permit the enlargement of farming units and the acceleration of mechanization. The accelerated application of agricultural technology will also continue to raise yields and per capita productivity."

To summarize, then, I have suggested that we are approaching the point of "information-overload" with respect to the study of rural society in modern Japan. The dynamic forces that push and pull the Japanese farmer and his cultural institutions in several directions at one is extremely difficult to comprehend unless we devise some method for simplifying our image and our concept. The thousands of learned papers written on one or another aspect of Japanese rural life do not easily form a comprehensive and integrated picture. Yet something of this kind is necessary, if we scholars are to come to agreement as to what is happening in the countryside. I have suggested the notion of "alternative futures" as a possible method for viewing the dynamic changes now in process in rural Japan.

File under: Ishino

May 29, 1976

Re: UNESCO meeting on "The Role of Socail Studies in Education for Peace and Respect for Human Rights."

Thismorning, being Saturday, I got up at a lesirely hour. About 10:30 I've decided to get over to Kellogg Center to see what materials I could pick up at the UNESCO conference.

When I got there I poked my head into the room and Stan Wronski saw me and waved me in. So I walked in. I was fascinated by the proceedings and was there until 1:35.

There are several deep impressions I received.

1) The capabilities of Dr. Kim, the Director-General's representative.

2) The difficulties of bringing together the viewpoints of the delegates.

3) The apparent cross-cutting loyalties and prior commitments inspite of their sharing a common professional interest as educators and teachers.

Some of the substantive issues.

It became apparent that there was a division of thinking about the purpose of the conference. People like Jim Becker, through the Rapporteur, was pushing for "international education." People like Mr. Tata (Madagascar), Mr. de la Cruz (Philippines), Mrs. Sohrab (Iran) were arguing that the conference was on the topic of "Education for Peace and Respect for Human Rights."

I assumed that the difference in perspective was the result of whether one belonged to a rich or a poor country.

There was also some division along the lines of disciplinary interest. There was Mr. Grahis (Egypt) who are argued for geogrphy and environmental studies over history, while Sylvester (UK) argued for the latter. They belonged to the discipline for which they were arguing.

Another division was between Mr. Sylvester and Mrs. Malkova, on the issue of"objectivity." Social studies should be presented with as much differing points of view in order to make possible a better (more objective) assessment of reality, argued the white paper. Mrs. Malkova appeared to indicate that in her country this might not be possible and not realistic. Mr. Sylvester then, perhaps as a comparomise suggested that the phrase, :objective as possible: be put in. Then Mr. Tata, with the French turn of mind came in to say that "objectivity" was a state and there was not such a thing as 'degrees of objectivity.' Hence a ridiculous position to spell out in this document.

Final impressions: There was little sense of building upon an accumulated store of knowledge. Rather the group was ~~in a legislature~~ to legislate certain guidelines. Somehow the knowledge level was irrelevant

to the situation here.

I saw no heard anything about a new idea that would promote peace, a new concept that may lead to a more enlightened educational program, a new strategy that would produce a more effective curriculum to produce respect for human rights.

The discussion was largely nit-picking operations. Dr. Kim kept reminding the people what an important mission this group was on, but there was nothing on the table that appeared to spark the group on to new heights, new insights. The only spark of creativity appeared in the realm of avoding conflict, of keeping the civility in thediscussions, of utilizing humor to keep the group on track.

Finally, there was the apparent poor coordination of efforts. The chairman made a passing remark that the fact that donuts appeared 20 minutes after the coffee arrived; the disruptive way in which the coffee was served--all this reflected the disturbing manner in which this conference was being run.

12:15 a.m.
May 30

Distribution: limited

Paris, 6 May 1976

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

INTERNATIONAL MEETING ON THE ROLE OF SOCIAL STUDIES IN EDUCATION FOR PEACE AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

REUNION INTERNATIONALE SUR LA CONTRIBUTION DES ETUDES SOCIALES A L'EDUCATION POUR LA PAIX ET LE RESPECT DES DROITS DE L'HOMME

Kellogg Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, USA
23 - 29 May 1976

Provisional List of Participants

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