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The Oyabun-Kobun Institution: an Introductory Analysis of a Ritual Kinship System in Japan by Iwao Ishino, 1954 Harvard University Dissertation

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THE OYABUN-KOBUN INSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF A RITUAL KINSHIP SYSTEM IN JAPAN

A Dissertation

Presented to

the Faculty of the Department of Social Relations

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Doctor of Philosophy

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by

Iwao Ishino

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PREFACE

From October 1949 to November 1951, the writer spent twenty months in Japan proper and five months in the Ryukyus, an island chain historically and culturally related to Japan for the last two centuries. His major interest in this visit to the Far East was to gather materials which would provide the basis for a dissertation in the field of social anthropology. However, no concrete research problem was planned before arrival in Japan.

It was evident that as a subject of anthropological investigation, Japan possessed certain complexities which do not usually face an anthropologist who studies a nonliterate or "tribal" society. In contrast to such societies, Japan is a complex nation with a high literacy rate, long history, large population, complex political structure, sophisticated religious beliefs, highly developed technology, intricate economic institutions, numerous subcultures, and other facets of "national cultures" which are typical for large-scale societies.

Though the study of a modern society has some definite advantages--the availability of census materials, good transportation facilities, abundant literature in most fields, and physical facilities for human comfort--there are also limitations on the kinds of study that a person with anthropological training could pursue.

Probably the most important of these limitations was that much of the culture of Japan is not simply a series of behavioral norms observable by means of standard field methods. The modern culture of

Japan cannot be understood as a homogenous entity, and Japanese culture today represents many levels and strata of organization and specialization. Moreover, no single Japanese or group of Japanese participates in or experiences the total culture of the modern society. Individuals and groups "carry" only very specific aspects of their culture. Finally, the large-scale institutional aspects of the society require a type of inquiry which goes beyond the personal observation of individuals.

With respect to the research problem at hand, then, it was clear that some strategic means of dividing this complex cultural "field" must be considered. On an ad hoc basis, the following three possibilities were visualized:

First, a community study was seen as a possible approach to the study of Japanese culture. This approach would provide the maximum utilization of standard field methods and would probably result in the demonstration of cultural integration at the community level. Yet, because each community is unique in some measure, some knowledge about other communities were also required.

Second, an examination of a specific subcultural group was seen as another approach. This group study could be one of a given social class, an ethnic group, a specialized occupational group, or even the so-called "intellectual" class. The examination of the sociocultural integration of any one of such groups would be within the means of standard anthropological methods of investigation and might provide some insights into facets of Japanese culture which would crosscut the community type of approach.

Third, a study of what might be called a "cultural institution" was seen as still another course of investigation: that is, the study of institutionalized aspects of Japanese society such as child-rearing and socialization patterns, family organization, kinship relationships, and the like. This approach was visualized as a kind of study which transcends both the "community" and the "subcultural group" approaches. It is this approach that has been followed in gathering materials for the subject matter of the present dissertation. The circumstances leading to the decision on this matter is described in Chapter I.

A brief acknowledgement may be made of the persons in Japan who have helped the writer organize his thinking and in providing him with empirical data about the ritual kinship institution. These include Keizo Yoneyama, Kunio Odaka, Hiroaki Iwai, Shizuo Matsushima, Koichi Bai, Eiichiro Ishida, Takeyoshi Kawashima, Masao Ikuta, Keigo Seki, Katsunori Sakurada, Susumu Isoda, Seiichi Kitano, and Takeyoshi Koyama.

In addition to these individuals, Professor Clyde Kluckhohn, Professor John W. Bennett, Mr. Herbert Passin, and Dr. Michio Nagai must be individually mentioned. Dr. Nagai, one-time research associate of the author at Ohio State University and presently at the University of Kyoto, has suggested bibliographic materials, made several translations of pertinent articles, and provided the writer with intellectual stimulation. Mr. Passin, a former deputy chief of the sociological research division in which the author was employed during his stay in Japan, wrote several office memoranda which first stimulated the interest in pursuing the subject described in this dissertation. To Professor Bennett, -- who,

as not only the chief of the division just alluded to, but as supervisor of the research project at Ohio State University where the author is presently employed--acknowledgement is gratefully made for favors and for help too numerous to mention. Professor Bennett has kindly read this manuscript, suggested a number of changes in the content of this study, and made numerous stylistic improvements. Indebtedness to Professor Kluckhohn is also great. It was he who encouraged and made possible the author's pursuing graduate studies at Harvard.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is concerned primarily with an introductory analysis of an old yet persistent pattern of "ritual" or fictitious kinship relations found in contemporary Japan. It proposes to examine the question of how this institutionalized pattern embodies a number of strategic principles used in establishing and maintaining an enduring system of social relationships. To the extent that this particular "ritual kinship" pattern has not yet been fully described in Western literature, it is necessary to illustrate the characteristics of the pattern with case histories. These cases, selected to show how the pattern operates in several representative economic and social contexts in Japan, are given in Chapters III through V. Each case will be analyzed in terms of certain strategic and tactical principles involved in such problems as how to protect vested interests; the facilitation of contacts between strangers; definition of channels of communication; the allocation of responsibilities and tasks, and other problems commonly occurring in situations where cooperative action is desired.

Before these case histories are considered, a few preliminaries are necessary. First of all, the basic concept, "ritual kinship," needs to be defined. Then there follows a brief explanation of why this particular subject matter was chosen, and a discussion of the history of the research underlying the dissertation. A general description of relevant Japanese forms of "ritual kinship," in the light of the objectives of the dissertation, concludes the chapter.

I THE CONCEPT OF RITUAL KINSHIP

The need for the concept. Partly by necessity and partly by predilection, an increasing number of social anthropologists within the last two or three decades have been turning their attention away from simple "stone age" peoples, toward peoples who have been influenced by contacts with the so-called higher cultures. Even more recently, the investigation of modern urban communities has become a legitimate anthropological enterprise. With this shift in focus, the need for a greater variety of conceptual tools and a wider selection of theoretical models has become apparent. So long as isolated, aboriginal societies were studied, the concept of kinship relations was probably adequate to describe the central aspects of their social organization. But with increasing attention being paid to more complex, yet non-industrialized societies--such as those represented by communities in Middle and South America and in the Near and Far East--anthropologists are finding that kinship relations are not as significant as they were once believed to be for describing the fabric of social relationships. The manifold relations among peasants, landowners, workers, tradesmen, and other social categories in these newly-studied communities are not simply a matter of kinship relations; they extend far beyond the sphere of consanguineal ties. These new types of relations found among different occupational and social groups often require the close cooperation and trust not only between unrelated persons in general, but also between strangers whose interests might be in conflict.

However, the significant fact for the present context is that cooperative action between non-kinsmen in these communities is often institutionalized in a form which clearly imitates kinship relations. Investigators report that frequently unrelated persons form enduring relationships symbolized not only by kin-like terms of address, but also by means of special rituals suggesting the establishment of "blood" relationships. This phenomenon of imitating true kinship has been found to be so common that recently it has been generally designated by anthropologists as "ritual kinship."

Paul's definition. In the past, such writers as Thurnwald (1932)[1] have attempted to conceptualize this phenomenon, but probably one of the least ambiguous and most comprehensive attempts to define the concept to date is that of Benjamin D. Paul (1942). He has defined ritual kinship as a relationship in which: "(1) unrelated individuals (2) enter into a ritual compact (3) to maintain an enduring relationship (4) of a kinlike order (5) other than marriage." Of course any one-sentence definition of a sociological concept is rarely adequate. Other criteria alluded to in this definition require further explanation.

Two basic types. One of the essential characteristics of the ritual kinship phenomenon is that it borrows much of the behavior

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1 In this study references to the literature are based on the method currently followed in the American Anthropologist. Each citation gives the author's last name, the year of publication, and, if necessary, the page number of the reference. For instance, reference to page 140 of Benjamin Paul's dissertation on ritual kinship, written in 1942, is designated as "(Paul 1942:140)." Complete reference is given only in the bibliography.

patterns and terminology of the type of relationships that comprise the nuclear or elementary family, such as sibling and parent-child relationships. And, interestingly enough, Paul claims that any ritual kinship institution can be classified in one of two basic types, according to these nuclear family relationships. That is, one type imitates the bonds between parent and child and the other type imitates the bonds between brothers or between sisters. The first is designated as "ritual parenthood" and is illustrated by the godparental institutions of Mexico, Guatemala, and other Catholic communities of the world; the second is called "ritual brotherhood" and is exemplified by the blood-brotherhood institutions commonly found in Africa.

The general nature of the obligations and the ritual behavior which permit the establishment of these two types are described by Paul (pp.140-41) in this manner:

> The kinlike nature of both kinds of ritual kinship is reflected in the content of the inceptive ceremonies, in the reciprocal rights and obligations they establish, and in the incorporation of each partly into the kinship system of the other. The motif of the inceptive ceremonies is of either filial or fraternal character. Ritual brothers may simulate consanguinity by literally exchanging blood; or they may symbolize gestures on the part of their respective parents or uncles. In cases of ritual parenthood the ceremonies of birth may be re-enacted; or the ritual may dramatize the complementary relationship of subordination and superordination obtaining between parent and child.

Types not included. Other fictitious or invented kinship institutions such as adoption, totemic clanship, and affinal relatives are expressly excluded from the sphere of ritual kinship because they are designated as aspects of kinship proper. Similarly, such informal designation of one's friends or acquaintances as "brother," "sister," "aunt," or "uncle," which in our society and elsewhere are often used

metaphorically as a matter of etiquette, as linguistic conventions, or as a means of showing regard or affection, are also excluded from ritual kinship. Such "metaphorical kinship," as Paul designates them, are excluded because they are not solemnized and publicized by formal ritual procedure. Neither are the obligations suggested by the use of these terms enforceable or institutionalized.

Ritual vs. true kinship. Paul also clarifies the distinctions between ritual and true kinship systems. The principal difference, he states, lies in the method of selection and recruitment of members. True kinsmen are established by the fact of birth, marriage, or formal adoption. Ritual kinship relationships, on the other hand, are not automatically prescribed by such institutional means; it is a relationship established between contracting parties as the result of selection and agreement.

However, in regard to this criterion of selectivity, marriage and adoption are both, in a sense, the result of selection. For instance, men may choose spouses and foster parents may adopt children of their choice. But Paul states that the distinction between the "natural" and the fictitious forms of kinship can be made if one considers what he calls the "genealogical record." In the cases of marriage and formal adoption, these relationships are entered into the genealogical record of the kinship group, whereas in ritual kinship, they are not. In other words, both marriage and adoption are clearly a part of the true kinship system because there is a legitimate expectation that both types will produce a common descendant who will be linked consanguineally to the true kinship group.

The definition used in the present study. To Professor Paul's excellent analysis and definition of the concept, the present study can make only one slight emendation. With regard to this, Paul states in this definition that "unrelated individuals" enter into the ritual kinship association, but fails to mention specifically that true kinsmen may also become ritual kinsmen at the same time. The fact seems to be that in many such systems, actual kinsmen may also enter into a ritual compact. In the village of Tusik in Guatemala, for example, Professor Redfield (1941:221) notes that the sponsored child's true grandparents are the "most desirable" ritual parents for selection. Or again, among the Yaqui in Arizona, Professor Spicer (1940) reports that ritual parents of a child may or may not be actually related to the latter. In one of the case histories given in the present study, a person's brother and a son were included in the ritual kinship group along with other unrelated persons. Thus, it would seem that the possibility of inclusion of true kinsmen should not be omitted from any definition of the concept of ritual kinship.

Having discussed at length Professor Paul's definition of the concept of ritual kinship, it is now possible to set forth the definition of the concept as will be followed in the present study: A ritual kinship system is defined as an institutionalized (i.e., culturally defined) relationship in which these attributes are present: (1) the participating individuals in this relationship refer to each other in either actual or modified kinship terms; (2) they assume obligations and derive benefits according to the kinlike roles which apply to them; (3) they reaffirm their relationship periodically under conditions or

in situations which are recognized by the group as appropriate; and (4) they have cultural symbols, other than kinlike terms of address, to designate the ritual kinship relationship (e.g., ceremonial drinking, gift-exchanges, secret language, jargon). As a part of this definition, it should be noted that membership in a ritual kinship group does not necessarily exclude consanguineal relatives. But to be recognized as a member, each person must have an appropriate ritual kinship title which designates his role and obligations with others so related.

II THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

It may be suggested from the foregoing discussion that a serious study of ritual kinship is relatively new. A statement of how the present writer became interested in this topic may help to orient the reader to the substantive parts of this study.

The writer spent twenty months in Japan from October 1949 to July 1951. He was employed during this entire period as a researcher in a SCAP[2] Headquarters unit established for the purpose of conducting sociological and public opinion surveys on behalf of other agencies of the Japan Occupation. Among the several specific projects to which he was assigned in this research organization, one became the original stimulus for the subject-matter pursued in the present study. This project, originally requested by SCAP's Labor Division, was the investigation of the sociological and cultural factors involved in the evaluation of a labor reform program to liquidate some tens of thousands

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[2]Abbreviation for "Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers." As it seems to be practice among contemporary writers of Japan, this abbreviation is used as a synonym for the Allied Occupation of Japan.

of groups organized along lines which it described as "feudalistic" and which it designated as the oyabun-kobun system. The total membership of these groups was estimated to lie between two and three million workers. As part of the investigation designed to evaluate the progress of the reform program, the writer was directed to undertake a pilot study of a group of Yokohama dock workers who, prior to the initiation of the program in 1947, were known to be organized along oyabun-kobun lines.

The results of the investigation indicated that the SCAP reform program to liquidate the oyabun-kobun connections of this dock-worker group was apparently successful. The new government-sponsored unemployment insurance program, the public employment exchange system of job referrals, the various public welfare measures, and the strict surveillance methods of enforcing the prohibitory measures to eliminate the oyabun-kobun system -- all of them directly and indirectly part of the reform program -- were found to be taking effect.[3] Yet, in the final analysis, the writer felt no confidence in the long range or permanent effects of these measures, and, it seemed to him, that there was a strong possibility that these traditional labor organizations would continue after the termination of the Occupation, especially when the pressure for reform was removed and general economic conditions worsened.

The decision to pursue the subject. Part of this uncertainty was brought about by the knowledge that casual investigations of other groups of workers, particularly those removed from Tokyo, and out-of-direct-reach of SCAP officialdom, were continuing their oyabun-kobun

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3 A report to this effect was submitted to the Labor Division, the SCAP agency requesting the survey.

relationships with various subterfuges. This opinion was also influenced by the considerable ancillary information received about the traditional institution in segments of Japanese life other than the casual labor market. Extended investigation of the literature and interviews held with Japanese sociologists and informed persons[4] suggested that this institution was not only strongly entrenched in folklore and tradition, but it also affected many spheres of contemporary social, economic, and political life. But more important for the present discussion was the opinion that many contemporary facets of this institution were not yet studied from a social anthropological viewpoint. Most of the published materials seemed to deal with the pre-industrial manifestations of the institution or, if contemporary, they were concerned with the "quaint" and isolated features of the institution such as the sake-drinking ceremony, secret rituals, and variations in the nomenclatures of the status system related to the oyabun-kobun complex.[5] This opinion, suggested by the writer's informants who were alluded to above, determined his decision to pursue this subject for the present dissertation.

A summary of the information learned while in Japan. The information supplied by these informants should be described here because it has influenced the author's subsequent thinking about this institution. The jist of the information he received concerning the structure of

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4 The names of these persons are listed in the preface where I have attempted to acknowledge their valuable help in this project.

5 These reasons for the lack of systematic studies seems to be largely due to the fact that many of groups based on oyabun-kobun principles were basically "secret" societies which were not usually accessible to scholars.

the oyabun-kobun system is as follows:[6]

This institution is one in which persons usually unrelated by close kin ties enter into a compact to assume obligations of a diffuse nature similar to those ascribed to members of one's immediate family. The relationship is formally established by means of ceremonies involving many of the expressive symbolisms of birth and marriage. Both the terms of address and the assignment of roles within the group are patterned on the Japanese family system: the leader becomes a "parent-figure" (oyabun) and his followers, symbolic children (kobun). These "children," in turn are symbolic brothers to each other and seniority among them is formally recognized by terms which imply elder brother--younger brother distinctions (e.g., anikibun--ototobun).

This symbolic family (miuchi) can, like the true family, be extended so that several "generations" of ritual kinsmen may be observed. Such cases occur among certain traditional professions and occupational groups having communally-held property or other vested interest that is recognized more by custom than by legal codes and acts of legislation. Thus a racketeer-like oyabun, having gained control in a given territory where many streetstall merchants operate their business, may subdivide his territory and transfer direct control over a part of his domain to one or more of his trusted and favored kobun. The kobun, upon "inheriting" this right, will recruit new ritual children and thereby become an oyabun in his own right. When this occurs, the several nuclear "families" (i.e., miuchi) thus established become affiliated into an "extended family," called ikka. At the same time, new relationships are automatically

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6 This summary was published previously in an article in the American Anthropologist. (See Ishino, 1953).

established, the symbolic grandfather-grandchild (o-oyabun-magobun) relationship between the original oyabun and the newly acquired symbolic children of the former kobun comes into being. Interestingly enough, in such cases the fiction of the extended family is maintained by the "descendants" who use the professional "family" names of the original oyabun. This constitutes the essential part of the information about the structure and dynamics of the oyabun-kobun system learned from Japanese informants and from an examination of the literature.

But equally important were some bread generalizations Japanese scholars had made about the history of the institution. There follows a recapitulation:[7] The oyabun-kobun pattern seems to have been developed at least by the late feudal period (circa 1700). Yet in variet forms it continues to exist in the modern society and was especially manifest during the recent Japan Occupation. In the feudal Tokugawa period, artisans, merchants, peddlers, and others of the commercial class organized their guilds along the lines of the oyabun-kobun system, while among the samurai and the upper classes, lord-vassal relationship continued through the Meiji Period (1868-1912) and it was particularly important in structuring clique formation among the political leaders of the time. The institution was observed in rural districts not only as a way of structuring landowner-tenant relations, but also as kind of godparent system in which symbolic fathers were ceremonial sponsors at name-giving, marriage, and other locally important crisis events.

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7 For this and the following paragraph, the primary works consulted were: Shirayanagi (1914; 1929; 1932), Yanagida (1937), Nagai (1953), Odaka (1950), and Okada (1952).

In the modern period, as nationalism took hold and as industrialization gained a foothold, new forms of social relationships were required. At the turn of the twentieth century, the oyabun-kobun system became one of the most significant means by which these new social relationships were formed. Modern political movements and party organizations were often patterned along these lines. Employment organizations for the recruiting of peasants for factory work, various types of business associations, and labor organizations--especially among miners, stevedores, construction workers, and casual laborers--were typically organized on oyabun-kobun patterns. Some of these groupings continued to be so organized during the recent Occupation period.

Under the pressure of the conqueror's programs--such as the establishment of national unemployment insurance, the creation of employment exchange systems, the encouragement of the labor unions, the prohibition of certain kinds of monopolistic trade practices, the redistribution of land holdings, and the general improvement of economic conditions--many of these oyabun-kobun relationships disappeared from the Japanese scene. The principal groups in which this institution continued to be important were the racketeers and hoodlums, neo-fascist political movements, labor suppliers in certain specific industries, and traditional professions such as sumo-wrestlers, kabuki actors, and artists' guilds.

The source of the writer's interests in oyabun-kobun phenomena should now be apparent. Here was an institution existing and flourishing in the present, with a fairly well-demarcated set of principles governing social relationships along "feudal" lines. It had a long history

covering at least two and a half centuries from the feudal period to the modern. It probably was something which was "independently invented" by the Japanese, and not something "borrowed," either from neighbors or from Western Europe. It had a variety of contemporary manifestations and it still persisted in spite of tremendous industrialization and westernization that had taken place in the last several decades.

III JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY

Not all of social science as it is known today is concerned with studies of human behavior under controlled laboratory conditions. Much of that which occupies the attention of behavioral scientists consists of the careful recording of human events and activities which take place in their natural setting relatively free from the manipulation of the observer. Much energy is spent in tedious fact-gathering activity not completely different from those of a botanist who spends months and even years in foreign countries looking for specimens of flora. Behavioral scientists of this genre have uncovered new information and new knowledge concerning the variations and uniformities in the solution of common human problems.

The need for ritual kinship studies. Traditionally, anthropologists have been considered by their behavior science colleagues as scholars of the "fact-gathering" type. They have been designated as students who were short on theory but long on facts. Nevertheless, probably no social scientist would deny that anthropologists have made notable contributions to our present day knowledge concerning the field of social organization and structure.

However, as scholars who claim to have a stake in a rounded and integrated "study of man," they have made notable omissions and oversights even within this well-defined area. One of the most striking of these gaps concerns what has already been defined as ritual kinship. In reading the current anthropological textbooks, one finds considerable attention paid to social groupings based upon kinship, locality, class, and other factors, but not a single page--so far as this writer knows--devoted to ritual kinship. What is perhaps worse is that some social anthropologists and ethnologists in the field have failed to record their observations concerning ritual kinship when, from other inferential evidence, it is clear that such an institution was present. Paul, (1942: 145-46), for example who made an extensive survey of the literature concerning this institution in meso-America states:

> The survey of Middle American sponsorship has disclosed a common tendency on the part of investigators to underestimate the social implications of ritual kinship. Thus La Farge and Beyers[8] dispose of the social organization of the Indians of western Guatemala without mentioning godparents, though referring to the presence of baptism. Termer[9] writes that the Indians show deference to their godparents but he offers no further information. Bevan[10] ignores the subject altogether in reporting on the Chinantec of Mexico. These deficiencies are thrown into relief by the exceptional cases of complete reporting, as Beals[11] indicates in his commentary on Spicer's competent account of ceremonial sponsorship at Pascua. Other scholars, concerned with different area, have likewise complained of the inadequate treatment accorded certain sectors of ritual kinship . . .

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8 (1926-27)

9 (1930:303-472)

10 (1938)

11 (1941:440)

Explanation for the oversight. This apparent social anthropological "blind spot" needs to be explained. Traditionally, anthropologists have classified social groups and structures smaller than the total society or tribe into two classes: those based upon kinship ties and those which are not. The first may be designated as "kin groups" and the latter as "associations," as Lowie (1920:257) has done. It is interesting to note how this taxonomy has differed, by and large, from that used by sociologists who seem to prefer such a dichotomy as "primary" and "secondary" groups.[12] These sociological concepts cut across and virtually ignore the kinship criteria so important to anthropological classifications. In view of this difference in orientation, a consideration of how anthropology has come to develop a classificatory system differing from that of the sociologist, may help to understand, in turn, the relative neglect of ritual kinship in ethnographic studies.

Perhaps the first to call attention to affiliations based upon kinship as an important key to the understanding of social organization is Lewis H. Morgan's Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity (1871). Since then such anthropologists as Rivers, Kroeber, Evans-Pritchard, Radcliffe-Brown, Spier, Lowie, Thurnwald, Levi-Strauss, Murdock and others too numerous to mention here have placed the study of kinship in a preeminent place in anthropological studies of social organization. The obvious predilection of anthropologists for kinship groupings, as opposed to non-kin associations, is a curious thing. It has led Linton

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12 Tonnies' gemeinschaft and gesellschaft relationships, Durkheim's "mechanical" and "organic" solidarities, and MacIver's "community" and "association" are examples of analytical distinctions which are roughly analogous.

(1937:209), for example, to speculate that this "may have been due in part to the European culture pattern of extreme interest in everything connected with mating and reproduction and to the greater variety of the social institutions which have been evolved from the family. The varying emphasis which various social systems placed upon marriage, the ways in which they limited it, and institutions like the joint family fired the investigator's imagination by their very contrast with anything to be met within his own society."

Whatever the reason, this strong focus on kinship formations may have blinded not a few field workers to the richness of other forms of human affiliation. An example may be found in Professor Murdock's Social Structure. This book devotes ten chapters to kinship while other forms of social groupings are summarized in one chapter (Chapter V, "Community").[13]

This is not to say, however, that social groups not based upon kinship ties are ignored in comparative studies of nonliterate societies. One of the first to direct attention to non-kin groupings on a cross-cultural basis was Heinrich Schurtz, who wrote Alterklassen und Mannerbunde in 1902.[14] He showed that the study of affiliations formed on the basis of common interests, sympathies, and tastes were just as relevant to the understanding of nonliterate social organization as groupings based upon consanguineal and affinal relationships. In the comparative study of these associations Schurtz is followed by Webster (1908), Wedgewood (1930), Lowie (1920), and others. Lowie (1920:257)

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13 Murdock (1949). The present writer was unable to find any references or discussion of ritual kinship institutions as such in the thirty-three pages of this Chapter V.

14 Quoted in Lowie (1920:296).

seems to be the first to designate these non-kin affiliations by the technical term, "associations."

Because the concept "association" is defined residually to enclose "social units not based on the kinship factors," it is easy to understand how it would include such diverse groupings as secret societies, blood-brotherhoods, tribal clubs, ceremonial friendships, military societies and like. Yet, it is strange that it seems to have remained as a residual category for anthropologists for the past thirty years, ever since Lowie first defined it as such. Lowie (1948), for example, in his recent book, Social Organization, still maintains the residual classification of non-kin groupings, despite the fact that he has dropped the term "association" in favor of another concept "sodality." Thus within the class of sodalities, Lowie (pp.294-316) includes not only such associations as age classes, occupational guilds, secret societies, and the modern Young Men's Christian Association, but also various ceremonial friendship groups and blood-brotherhood associations which are designated here as ritual kinship structures.

Herskovits (1948:303-307) is another example of an anthropologist who keeps the residual category. He maintains the category by making no analytical distinctions between institutionalized friendships, compadre relationships, feasting societies, cult groups, Knights of Templar Division of Masonic Order, and American labor unions.

Paul's proposal for the classification of ritual kinship. Though he does not specifically acknowledge any need for revision, Lowie himself indicates some awareness of the consequence of this lumping together of an assortment of different forms of social

organization into one residual category of "associations" or "sodalities." He writes (1948:294): "Since the concept of sodalities is merely a convenient lumber room for a great variety of associations, we cannot link it with a particular institution or with any one psychological motive."

It seems to the present writer that what Lowie has stated here leads inevitably to one conclusion, namely, that the residual category of "association" must be subclassified into a more rigorously-developed conceptual or descriptive framework. Of attempts made in this direction,[15] the one suggested by Paul (1942) seems to be the most suitable in the light of the present objectives, namely, that the class of phenomenon already designated here as ritual kinship be withdrawn from the residual category of associations and be placed on a comparable level to true kinship, on the one hand, and what would consequently remain of the "association" category on the other. So far as it is known to the present writer, Paul is the first to make this suggestion. Paul's thesis seems to augur well not only for the greater conceptual clarity and more systematic collection of data on ritual kinship structures, but also for the better understanding of social organization in general.

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15 To mention a few examples, (a) Chapple and Coon in Principles of Anthropology (1942) make a distinction between their concepts of "institutions" (a stable set of interaction patterns), "associations" institutions which arise around tangent relations), and "clique" (any group of individuals in interaction which is not an institution); (b) John Gillin's The Ways of Men (1948) subclassifies the non-kin groupings on the basis of "local and territorial ties" and of "age and sex differentiations;" (c) Ralph Linton in The Study of Man (1936) makes the descriptive differentiation between the "local group" or "band" and the "tribe and state."

The purpose of the present study. In recent years, many anthropologists seem to be following Paul's suggestion that ritual kinship be considered as a legitimate sociological phenomenon to warrant a focused study. Scholars like Mintz and Wolf (1950), Eric Wolf (1951), George Foster (1953), Edward Spicer (1941) can be named among others. These writers have dealt with the compadre and cofradia types of ritual kinship found in Middle and South America as well as in Europe. Paul's comparative study of ritual kinship institutions in some forty different societies has been mentioned several times previously. In line with this growing interest, then, the present study is an exploratory analysis of a ritual kinship system which has not yet been described.

This Japanese case of ritual kinship, the oyabun-kobun system, seems to be not only independently developed, but has a number of features which may be of interest to students of ritual kinship. Three of these features may be mentioned here. The first stems from the general observation that ritual kinship institutions seem to "disappear" with the advent of industrialization. This kind of empirical generalization is posited by Mintz and Wolf (1950) for the case of the compadre institution which was present in all of Europe, but which had been supplanted by other institutions following the industrial revolution. Compadre and other types of ritual kinship are found only in those countries, like Italy and Spain, where industrialization has been relatively retarded.[16] The Japanese case of ritual kinship is interesting in that while industrialization has gained considerably more foothold

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16 Mintz and Wolf (1950); see also Foster (1953).

in Japan than either in Italy and Spain, this institution is still present and, as shall be seen, under certain circumstances, quite virile.

The second noteworthy feature about this case is that, in contrast to the compadrazgo, the oyabun-kobun system is generally secular in outlook.[17] While it has a few ritual and sacred Shinto elements, it does not seem to be as strongly influenced by a religious theology as in the case of the compadrazgo. This is in part explainable by the general "laxness" of Japanese attitudes to an organized church in the sense that Westerners think of religion. The compadrazgo, of course, has been sponsored by the universalist Catholic Church and has been greatly influenced by it. The relatively secularized aspect of the oyabun-kobun institution may be related to the fact that it "survives" or rather persists into the modern, industrial period.

Finally, the third characteristic of the oyabun-kobun system and its contrast to the prototypic ritual kinship system in the New World is of a technical nature. Ritual kinship relations in Japan result in the formation of groups with definite boundaries and with collective interests. That is, oyabun establish ritual kin relationships with the intent of forming a small or primary group. These oyabun go so far as to designate their groups a "family" and even assign special "family" names to them. In the New World type, so far as this writer knows, ritual kinship relations seem to be kept on a person-to-person basis and "group consciousness," if present at all, seems to be weak.

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17 Redfield (1941:338), however, has noted that the compadrazgo is much more secularized in the town of Merida as compared with the institution in tribal Tusik.

Method of presentation. Professor George C. Homans (1950:19) wrote: "If we want to develop a theory of group behavior that will show every element of group related to every other element in a system, then the material we use must be connected as the theory. . .We must not, in the classical manner, use isolated facts to back up our theory, but related facts."

While the present study is not concerned with the theory of group behavior per se, but with the examination of a particular kind of ritual kinship system, Homan's advice can be applied to the problem at hand. Rather than give isolated facts about the oyabun-kobun system, a series of connected observations pertaining to a particular situation and problem faced by a concrete group is presented. In short, the analysis of case histories constitutes the substantive part of the study. Out of eight cases with sufficient information to justify inclusion in a study of this kind, three cases were selected for detailed consideration. Although it is obvious that the presentation of only three detailed cases results in some sacrifice in coverage, a gain may be made by a more concrete understanding of what this system of relationships means to the particular individuals concerned.

The selection of these case histories was made according to the following criteria:

1. The case should be limited to those which are found in contemporary society (i.e., within the last thirty years);

2. The cases should illustrate the operation of the institution among a group which has traditionally organized its relationships along these ritual kinship lines; and

3. The cases should illustrate how this oyabun-kobun system is used as a means for "solving" certain problems typical for the group under consideration.

The last point requires further comment. Each of the three cases were selected because they represent different socio-economic problems. Thus, the first case illustrates how the system provides a framework in which "informal" types of relationships are established in the context of a moderate-sized industrial organization. The second case exemplifies how ritual kinship can be used as a technique and an instrument for establishing a coalition between groups sharing the same type of vested interests. Finally, the third represents a case where, in lieu of legal contracts, ritual kinship mechanisms (i.e., norms, values, and ethics) are used to enforce discipline in fulfilling contractural obligations. These three cases will be presented in Chapters III-V. To provide a background for these specific cases a chapter --which immediately follows the present one -- makes some comparative notes between the true and the ritual kinship system in Japan and indicates in what sectors of Japanese society, ritual kinship institutions are likely to be found.

In the concluding chapter, an attempt is made to summarize some of these principles embodies in the oyabun-kobun system and to examine what relevance they might have for (1) a better understanding of the dynamics of modern Japanese society; and (2) developing certain lines of inquiry for future investigations of ritual kinship systems in Japan and elsewhere.

Limitations of the study. Before the case studies are considered, a final word must be given concerning the limitations of the study.

These are two:

The first is that no systematic attempt is made to present a historical development of the oyabun-kobun institution. Materials are available on this matter, but to pursue this interest would seem to detract too much from the problem of explaining how the institution operates in the complex modern Japanese society.

The second important limitation is that the study does not purport to be a comparative study of ritual kinship systems. Some comparative data are presented in the final chapter but these are given for the purpose of suggesting lines of future inquiries.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON RITUAL KINSHIP IN JAPAN

The case studies which constitute the bulk of this dissertation are designed to illustrate the role of ritual kinship in the daily life of ordinary Japanese citizens. But before examining the details, one must look at the wider society in which this institution of ritual kinship is found. The questions that guide this discussion are: (1) What, if any, is the relationship of ritual kinship to the widely acknowledged "traditional elements" in modern Japanese society? (2) In what socio-economic contexts or sectors of the society are ritual kinship relations found? (3) How does ritual kinship differ from the actual or true kinship system of Japan?

I TRADITIONALISM IN MODERN JAPAN

Aggressive traditionalism. Along with extensive industrialization and political reconstruction, modern Japan has been aggressively traditional in the matter of human relations. The basic tenets of this traditionalism were developed in the three centuries of isolation during the Tokugawa regime and were skillfully adapted to the conditions of pre-industrial society: small space, little wealth, and many people. The Japanese solved such problems by living in miniature dwellings with multiple-function rooms; by owning few things, but taking pride in what little was owned; by defining an elaborate code of ethics covering most human situations; and by subordinating the individual to

the family, the village, and the leader. They made the lack of opportunity for individual enterprise and self-expression a dignified way of life by emphasizing loyalty, filial piety, and devotion to extreme formality, symbolic behavior, and spartan virtues.

Fearing that the introduction of new ideas and institutions might upset the equiposed system of human relations and might bring their own downfall from power, the Meiji leaders and their successors seemed to have consciously attempted to control the modernization process.[1] Essentially, their idea was to introduce the material aspects of Western civilization, but not the ethics, morals, and codes of conduct associated with Western ways of life. "Machinery and technique we shall take from them (the West)," asserted Sanai Hashimoto, one of these early leaders, "but moral virtues we have among us" (Maruyama 1950:2).

However paradoxical and difficult such a course may have been, fastidiously maintained up to the present in spite of the existence of a degree of industrialization and a technology able to bear comparison with that of many Western nations. As George Sansom (1950:498) observed, "It is true that Western clothing, food, transport, and communications, as well as Western ideas, have enlarged and diversified

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1 It is interesting to note that at least some of these leaders were affiliated by ritual kin ties. An excerpt from the diary of the first American envoy to Japan suggests this: "I shall never learn that the 'three brothers of the Tai-kun' are merely titular brothers; they are of the family, but the removes by birth carry them beyond the list of parentage as known by us. They are Princes of Owari, Kii, and of Mito. These men are called 'first brothers' of the Tai-kun, and he also has three 'second brothers,' who are also merely titular relations." (Griffis 1895:301-302). I am indebted to Dr. John W. Bennett for calling my attention to this excerpt.

Japanese life, but they have not necessarily changed its essential character."

Familial analogies. One of the core elements in this aggressive traditionalism was the philosophy and practice of familism, which was systematically promoted by the state and taught in the schools. This philosophy, initially pursued by Japanese Confucian scholars and later turned into an official national ideology, was not restricted to the elite, but reached into the "grass roots" of the society. It was a system of moral codes, embodied in law, that the upper middle class probably observed less rigorously than did the peasants in the country and wage laborers in the city.

"It is obvious that the Japanese have traditionally placed a great deal of emphasis upon family," writes John C. Pelzel (1949:20). "It has been one of the major institutional referents to which they have turned to explain social relations and to underwrite ethics." Another anthropologist who lived for many years in Japan has observed: "In discussing the relation of Emperor and subject, patron and protege, employer and employee, or the organization of associations, corporations, and political parties, the Japanese cite the analogy of the family ad nauseam" (Haring 1949:853).

For Westerners, the frequent Japanese use of the family analogy in so many social contexts is a somewhat strange phenomenon. When it is also found that the family is used not only as an analogy, but also as a model by which to pattern actual social relationships, the Westerner is even more intrigued. Such features as the amazingly wide

use of kin terms and the holding of family ceremonies in non-familial circumstances, suggest that these pseudo-familial relationships are strongly institutionalized. This institutional complex has been designated in this study as the oyabun-kobun system. To understand one basic element in Japanese traditionalism, then, it is necessary to examine the institutionalization of oyabun-kobun customs and observe their functioning in differing social contexts.

II THE EXTENT OF RITUAL KINSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

Thus, in contrast to other modern industrial societies, Japan is quite clearly more traditional in her social organization and certainly more family-centered with respect to social ideology. Yet to maintain that these aspects dominate her society completely and without exception would be ludicrous. A society with a modern parliamentary form of government, an extensive body of career bureaucrats and civil servants, a public education system, and an industrial and trade system dependent upon international exchange, simply cannot organize all of its human relations and ethical codes on familial patterns *per se*. To what extent, then, are pseudo-familial relationships found in the contemporary society?

Since no extensive survey of the problem exists, the following statements must be based on general experience and materials which have been collected unsystematically. Nevertheless, it is felt with some confidence that the following four or five sectors of Japanese society are those most comprehensively and obviously organized on ritual kinship lines.

First, most "grass roots" rightist and neo-fascist groups seem to have been organized on ritual kinship principles, both in the pre-war and post-war periods. A distinguished student of Japanese nationalism and a professor at Tokyo University observes:

> The feudalistic elements in Japanese nationalism had their most characteristic and intensive expression in the various aspect of pre-war rightist movement . . .Practically all rightist organizations were organized on the basis of the so-called oyabun-kobun (boss - henchman) system (Maruyama 1950:6).

To appreciate the significance of familial or ritual kinship principles in rightist groups, one must understand the particular nature of Japanese nationalism. Professor Maruyama (1950:4-5) provides a brief review of the essential characteristics:

> . . . the leaders of the new government [i.e., the Meiji government], having been unable to depend on the spontaneous rise of national consciousness among the people, had to promote such consciousness hastily by state education. Instead of paving the way for the growth of conscious solidarity in civic life based on principles of liberty and equality through breaking up feudalistic loyalties these early Meiji leaders mobilized such traditional loyalties to be concentrated on the Emperor as supreme symbol of national unity. "Chukun Aikoku" (Loyalty to the Emperor and Patriotism) was thus advocated as the highest moral virtue of the Japanese people. A decisive feature of this ideology was that devotion to the Emperor should precede love of the country; the latter was a reflection of the former. This incidentally indicates the predominance of personalism in Japanese nationalism.
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> Furthermore, since the fiction that the Emperor's household was the head family of the entire nation and that the Emperor was the supreme head of all families - the concept of the family state - was emphasized, patriotism itself in a remarkable degree assumed direct extension or reflection of primitive attachment to the primary groups[2]

This "personalism" in Japanese nationalism and this "direct extension" of primary group attachments was greatly facilitated by

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2 Italics. Not in the original.

oyabun-kobun mechanisms. We need not list all the nationalist-rightist postwar groups with oyabun-kobun organizations, but a few names are useful to convey the flavor: Daito-juku (an offshoot of the Kokuryu-kai or Black Dragon Society), Nihon Kinrosha Domei (Japan League of Working People), Shin Nihon Kensetsu Doshikai (New Japan Construction Associates' League), Minken Doshikai (Civil Rights League), Nihon Kikuhata Doshikai (Japan Chrysanthemum Flag Association), and Shin-ei Taishu To (New Masses Party). To illustrate how some of these groups operated, the following quotation may be given:

> . . . This organization aimed at "crushing Communism, practicing and disseminating the ideas of true democracy and peace by uniting with affection and exercising self-control with justice." When the civil service employees attempted to carry out the general strike on February 1, 1947, members of this organization, wearing white hachimaki (cloth) around their heads and tasuki (shoulder bands), went up in a mass, in a motor truck, to the headquarters of the National Railway Workers' Union to cause them to cease the strike. Their "practice of democracy and peace" had its climax in the attacking and wounding with a sword of Katsumi Kikunami, then chairman of the leftist labor federation, the Congress of Industrial Unions.[3]

By 1949, this and 148 similar oyabun-kobun organizations were dissolved in accordance with SCAP directives by the Home Ministry and its successor, the Attorney General's Office.[4]

Next, closely related to the rightist organizations just discussed are the various kinds of organized criminal groups: gambling and racketeering "syndicates" like the gorotsuki, kashimoto, gurentai,

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3 (Maruyama, p. 21). A fuller explanation of this case is given in Costello (1948). The use of "democratic" slogans by these proto-nationalists does not mean, of course, that they have the same meaning for these groups as they do for Americans.

4 (Maruyama, p.9.) However, according to Japanese newspapers, there are indications that a number of these rightist groups have been revived since the termination of the occupation.

bakuto, and others which claim traditions antedating the industrial period, and typically organized on oyabun-kobun patterns. These groups not only tend to specialize in different forms of crime, but also claim a particular district or nawabari over which they exercise control. There are groups of pickpockets and petty burglars, of gamblers and bookmakers, of thugs and henchmen for hire, of organized blackmarketeers, and of racketeers who systematically collect "protection money" from the legitimate businesses. The metropolitan police board of Tokyo, like those of other cities, keeps regular files of these groups and their respective ritual kinship family ties, noting changes in personnel by arrests, etc.[5]

Third, the large category of casual laborers and temporary workers who depend upon their oyabun connections for jobs is another important sector of Japanese society using ritual kinship. Until Occupation reforms, casual workers of this type included those in fishing, stevedoring, practical nursing, carpentry, forestry, public works, domestic servants, and other occupations which were either seasonal or temporary. As an example, the following excerpt may be taken from Herbert Passin's account (1948:41-42) of fishing operations:

> In larger fisheries, where familial labor is inadequate, the center of operation is the boat or net owner. Around the owner, or oyakata (boss), a group of fishermen forms a work team. They are collectively known as kokata, kobun, . . . or ogo, names which indicate their subordinate position as "children" or followers of the "father" or boss. They form a stable group which the oyakata can call into action as needed. The oyakata is

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5 I was able to procure from the police a small sample (about fifty) of the names, addresses, and ritual kin ties of these oyabun.

> obliged to provide work, to offer assistance in times of need, and to have a direct personal interest in the problems of his followers. In return, the kokata are expected to show deference, loyalty, obedience, and respect. In stable communities, this relation goes on from generation to generation . . .

Fourth, a number of traditional crafts and professions which are organized as guilds constitute another important sector of Japanese society based on quasi-familial principles. These cover a wide range of occupations, like tomoko miners, sumo wrestlers, kabuki actors, teachers of ikebana or flower arrangement, various "schools" of poetry, painting, and writing, some sects of Buddhism, geisha entertainers, and a host of old crafts and trades as small-scale restauranteurs, barbers, collectors of "night-soil" (human fertilizer), peddlers, and streetstall merchants. These occupations all have traditional roots in the pre-industrial society, a monopoly or near-monopoly within a given district, and an institutionalized system of recruiting and training new members, i.e., an apprenticeship or discipleship system.

Fifth, landlord-tenant groups in many villages were, until the recent land reform program, organized on oyabun-kobun lines. Share-cropper types of tenants were most commonly organized in this way, in which case it has been called the nago or "name-child" system. These ritual kinship relations found among tenancy groups were perhaps the most important, not only in terms of numbers of people involved, but also with respect to the persistence of traditionalism in modern Japan. Writing in 1946 about the farm tenancy system in general Seiyei Wakukawa (1946:115-116) asserts:

> Analysis of the farm-tenancy system probably affords the most fundamental and comprehensive approach to agrarian Japan. Because of its universality and deep social implications, tenancy has offered the most knotty agrarian problem to confront every incoming Japanese cabinet for the past twenty-five years. As the chief source of rural unrest the land question has become increasingly acute with the years. Much of the continued dominance of feudal remnants that permeate every aspect of Japanese life finds an economic basis in the semifeudal tenancy system. Tenancy has epitomized everything reactionary and retrogressive in Japan since the Meiji revolution. Without a firm grasp of the broad implications of this aspect of Japan's complicated rural economy, any attempt to evaluate Japan's social and political systems is futile. It is impossible otherwise to comprehend the sphinxlike psychology of her people, so deeply submerged in medievalism though outwardly determined to exploit modern technology.

Of the foregoing sectors of Japanese society in which ritual kinship is a significant device for structuring human relations, only the last three are represented by case studies in this work. The inclusion of cases from the first two areas--politics and crime--would have extended the dissertation beyond standard limits. Those who wish to examine the pattern in these two areas may consult a number of references in English: In the sphere of politics Nobutake Ike (1950:202-03), the Lederers (1938:165-66), and William Costello (1948)--in addition to the above-mentioned Professor Maruyama--allude to this familial pattern of human relations. As for this pattern among criminals, Costello provides detailed descriptions and Edwin Reischauer (1950:216-17) presents some observations.

III RITUAL VERSUS TRUE KINSHIP IN JAPAN

Having considered the relationship of ritual kinship to the traditional ethos of Japan, and its presence in specific sectors of

contemporary society, one may now study its relationship to the true or "blood" kinship system. As noted in the introductory chapter, the structural aspects of a given ritual kinship institution are modelled after the real or true kinship structure of the society in which it is found.

At the same time, while both institutions may have many parallel features, it must be recognized that certain crucial characteristics differ very widely. In the definition of the concept of ritual kinship, given in the previous chapter, these critical differences were noted for pseudo-kinship institutions in general, but nothing has been said about the difference between Japanese ritual kinship and its own prototypic institution, the blood kinship system. The dissimilarities between the Japanese true and ritual kinship institutions, as well as their similarities, are briefly presented here as background for the case studies. A more comprehensive account must wait until further work has been completed on both of these institutions for Japan.

Terminological system.[6] A good starting point for comparison of the two types of kinship system may be found in terminology (See Table I). First, the terms for the conjugal or nuclear family are compared, and this is followed by a study of the terms which apply to relations outside of the elementary family.

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6 Terminologically, the Japanese terms of reference are almost identical to the system followed in the United States. The basic difference is in the relative age or birth-order designations of siblings. With this exception, virtually all Japanese terms can be translated directly into English without distortion.

With regards to the nuclear family, the true kinship system contains the following terms of reference: oya (parent), chichi (father), haha (mother), ko (child), ani (elder brother), ototo (younger brother), ane (elder sister), imoto (younger sister), sibling (kyodai). In the oyabun-kobun system, only the comparable terms for parent, child, elder brother, younger brother, and sibling seem to be generally recognized, and only occasionally the term for elder sister.

As a general rule, ritual kinship terms do not make sex distinctions, even though the true kinship nomenclature does. Instead of the term "father" (chichi), the word for "parent" (oya) is used. In fact, this writer observed no case where the term chichi was used to designate a male ritual parent. Similarly, the neuter noun is employed for both ritual sons and daughters; there are no sex distinguishing terms for either male or female ritual children.

Like most rules, however, there are exceptions and in this case there are two. In the first instance, distinctions in status between two ritual children are denoted by sex-distinguishing "elder brother" and "younger brother" terms. The other exception is noted in the case where the wife of an oyabun or of a kobun plays an important part in the group. In such circumstances, the wife is usually considered terminologically as an "elder sister." Occasionally, however, she may be called by the vocative form for "mother" (oka-san).

As for the terms for relationships extending beyond the elementary family, the oyabun-kobun system selects only a few from the many available in the true kinship system. The most important of these extra-

family terms are those for "uncle" (ojibun) and "grandchild" (magobun). The system does not regularly incorporate into its "lexicon" terms for these relatives: cousin, nephew, niece, aunt, and grandfather. With the exception of the last, these terms are not regularly used probably because they belong to the collateral lines of ritual kinship. As for the "lineal" relative, grandfather, the oyabun-kobun system uses an invented term, o-oyabun ("great father"). This improvisation was probably necessary because there is no term for "grandparent" in the true kin system, only terms for "grandfather" and "grandmother." The use of the term, o-oyabun, in place of sex-distinguishing terms, makes it consistent with the rule of neuter forms alluded to above.

Those who are familiar with ritual kinship systems of other societies know that fictitious kin terms are usually limited to those found in the elementary family. In the oyabun-kobun system there are special circumstances which probably explain why such terms as ojibun ("uncle") and magobun ("grandchild") which lie outside of the nuclear family are frequently used. One of these circumstances may be that the Japanese ritual kinship groups find it necessary to remember their "genealogies" in this system. Moreover, these relationships often involve "extended family" obligations so that ritual kin bonds are maintained between an oyabun and his kobun's ritual child. The function of these extended relationships can be understood when the case studies are examined.

Kin groups. Comparisons between social groupings based on ritual and true kin ties may also be made. Generally speaking, persons who

form oyabun-kobun relationships tend to constitute a social group which is imitative of the elementary family. These groups of ritual kinsmen symbolize their unity by using a common family name; this name is sometimes the same as the surname of the ritual father and sometimes it is purely a professional name. Moreover, as noted in Chapter I, at the time a recruit is first ceremonially inducted into the ritual family, many of these groups employ symbols which indicate birth.

In addition to imitating the elementary family, some groups, related by ritual kin ties, organize themselves along another type of true kin group, designated by Japanese sociologists as the dozoku ("same house").[7] This kin group is an affiliation of two or more households whose heads recognize a common known ancestor through the patrilineal line. The understanding of the principles of kinship involved in this type of group requires some explanation.

The household whose head succeeds to the main line of descent according to primogeniture principles is known as the honke (main house).[8] The younger brothers of this head may or may not be given the privilege of establishing a branch house (bunke or bekke).[9] In rural areas, this decision is usually based on whether the family property should be divided or kept intact. If the younger brother receives no land--and this is usually the case in a primogeniture

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7 The technical term is used here because the familiar names for the group vary from village to village; e.g., ikke, douchi, yauchi, douke, maki, ichimaki, ikkemaki, etc.

8 Variant terms for the honke are: oya, onya, o-ya, iya, honya, o-ie, etc.

9 Other terms for the bunke are: hiyawakare, miwakare, deiya, oyagakari, etc.

system--then he is excluded from the dozoku upon his marriage. On the other hand, if he is fortunate enough to receive some land, he will by the same token receive permission to establish a bunke house, and succeeding generations of families will be known as the bunke to the main house. Later one or more of these branch families might become prosperous and establish bunke houses in their time, thus starting a third line of houses. These sub-branch houses are known as mago-bekke or mago-bunke, literally, "grandchild" bunke. The foregoing clusters of honke, bunke, and mago-bunke, then, are known collectively as the dozoku.

There are several things to be noted about the composition of the dozoku:

1. In spite of the general rule of bilateral descent principle in Japan, a unilinear rule of descent is evident for each of the main, branch, and sub-branch houses. Each house is headed by a patrilineal descendant of the founder.

2. In each of these houses certain relatives are excluded, even though they belong to the patrilineal line of descent. Non-inheriting sons or brothers who are not given permission to establish a branch house are ruled out of membership in the dozoku.

3. At the same time, certain lineally-unrelated persons are brought into the group. These are the wives of persons who succeed to the headship of each of these houses of the dozoku.

These facts about the composition of the dozoku indicate another structural principle underlying this kin group. That is, membership in this affiliation is determined not only by the principle of patrilineal descent, but also by a residential factor. As stated, relatives or members who make a permanent move away from the original homestead are excluded from the dozoku; hence, the patrilineal kin principle is compromised by residence. Groups of this nature are called by Professor Murdock (1949:68) as "compromise kin groups" or more simply

as "clans." Thus, if Murdock's concept is used, the dozoku can be described as a group of patrilineally related clans.[10] The dozoku, then, is a group of one main clan and several branch and even sub-branch clans.[11]

This rather long explanation of the dozoku was necessary because ritual kinship in Japan imitates, as was stated, this type of grouping as well as the elementary family. The manner in which the system emulates the latter kin group is simple to explain, but the imitation of the former is not. A few remarks at this juncture may aid the reader in understanding the case studies.

Most groups of people related by ritual kin ties have some kind of vested interest at stake--among gangsters, their control area or bailiwick; among craftsmen and tradesmen, their business speciality; or among streetstall merchants, their sales territory. These rights or

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10 The dozoku is a type of kin group found in many agricultural communities in Japan (see, for example Okada 1952). The fact that it is so widespread, suggests a complication not generally recognized American anthropologists who have made reference to the Japanese kinship system. If one ignores for the moment, the residential factor in the dozoku and if one considers only the patrilineal descent principle, then it is possible to state that there are two basic principles of kinship relationships in Japan existing contemporaneously: One is the bilateral descent principle which is recognized by the Japanese Civil Code and which specifies relationships up to six degrees on both the paternal and maternal sides. The other descent principle is the patrilineal system just described for the dozoku.

All members of a given dozoku may not be relatives if the criterion of the Civil Code were used. For instance, in the third case study to follow, the head of the main clan was as far removed from the head of the branch clan as eighteen generations or degrees of kinship. This would place the two heads of households outside the bonds of consanguinity, if the bilateral descent principle were followed. These two persons were "relatives" only because the unilineal descent method was utilized.

11 Although not investigated thoroughly by this writer, the Chinese "common descent group" or tsu has many similarities to the dozoku. See Hsien Chin Hu (1948).

vested interests are passed on from one "generation" of ritual kinsmen to another "generation," just as it occurs in the dozoku, where the transmission of family land constitutes the "vested interest." Among the traditional oyabun-kobun groups, when one oyabun retires from the "business," he may pass his rights and interests intact to one of his ritual children, or may divide his interests among two or more of his kobun. If the latter happens, then, a honke-bunke ritual kin group has been established, one ritual son succeeding to the "main house" and the other to the "branch house." And like the dozoku system, a bunke house can eventually establish its own branch house. The second case study presented in Chapter IV illustrates this dozoku-type of ritual kinship organization. An understanding of how this "dozoku"principle in ritual kinship operates may explain an observation made by Professor Edwin Reischauer (1950:157) to the effect that Japanese schools of painting, poetry, literature, and the like have maintained a long hereditary line, even though nonrelatives were known to be regularly brought into the "school."

Value-orientations. Finally, another aspect of ritual kinship in Japan which follows the model established by the true kinship system lies in the area of value-orientations. The dominant value in this system concerned the oyabun's duties with respect to the kobun; namely, that the oyabun must emulate the norms of ideal of parental behavior. He is obliged to give the kind of protection, guidance, care, patronage, and leadership that is expected of parents. Conversely, the kobun is to act respectfully, loyally, and obediently toward his oyabun, as if the latter were his own father. This ethical code of "filial piety,"

at least in the ideal, is borrowed by the ritual kinship system in detail from the true system. The speeches made at ceremonies held among oyabun-kobun groups commonly admonish their listeners to practice these virtues, and to a considerable extent, as the case studies will indicate, these value-orientations are upheld in actual practice. The ritual fathers gave their followers many of the things provided by a true father, such as food, clothing, and shelter. In return, the ritual children undertook duties and responsibilities with respect to their "father" which would have otherwise been unnecessary.

Moreover, in line with this general tenor of hierarchy, the ritual children are expected to observe among themselves the distinctions in privilege and status of elder brother and younger brother. In the true family the eldest son, as the heir-apparent in the primogeniture system, has considerable authority over younger siblings and, in the ritual kin system, this ideal norm is observed. The senior kobun has privileges and authority over those who were later recruited into the ritual family. Thus, in their ideal form and to a considerable degree in practice, the relationships between ritual parent and between ritual sons are governed by a moral code of long tradition.

This completes a very cursory chapter on the background of the ritual kinship institution in Japan. The chapter attempted, first, to indicate the relationship of the ritual kinship institution to the traditional aspect of contemporary Japanese culture, generally acknowledged as the ideology of familism. Next, some indications were given as to the different groups in Japanese society which organize their

social relations along oyabun-kobun lines. Finally, some comparative notes were made on the similarities and differences between the Japanese ritual kinship and true kinship systems.

One final comment by way of assistance to the reader in his examination of the case studies to follow. These studies are not presented with a standard format; neither is there used a rigid conceptual scheme. The studies are meant to be a series of rather detailed ethnographic presentations, each centering upon one or two common human problems. It is believed that enough ancillary data are provided so that the reader who desires to do so can draw his own interpretations as to the role ritual kinship plays in the "solution" of the problems investigated in a given case. As stated previously, the concluding chapter will present the author's interpretations as to the structure and functions of the oyabun-kobun system.

CHAPTER III

RITUAL KINSHIP RELATIONS IN A CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

The first case study will illustrate how the oyabun-kobun system functioned in a construction enterprise identified here as the "Kogyo Company." The primary emphasis will be placed on how these ritual kinship patterns affected the methods by which laborers were recruited, assigned tasks, paid, and in general organized to provide a series of specified productive services. Nevertheless, as a "by-product" of this endeavor, the reader should be able to observe some of the inherently pragmatic characteristics of Japanese ritual kinship institutions, and a careful reading of the case should also provide some suggestions as to why ritual kinship mechanisms persist in modern Japan.

This study is presented, of course, not merely to document a single, isolated case, but to illustrate a more general problem. This problem considered here is so broad that a case study of a fishing company, a stevedoring outfit, or almost any other type of industrial enterprise regularly utilizing large numbers of casual laborers may have served equally well in place of the one selected. The general problem will be discussed before proceeding to the case of the Kogyo Construction Company.

I THE GENERAL PROBLEM

As in any complex industrial society, there are in Japan many productive and service enterprises whose labor force requirements vary

labor supplier, then, meant that he would receive preferential treatment over non-affiliated laborers. While the economic rationale for establishing these affiliations or coalitions is evident, why were they necessarily based upon ritual kin principles? Why could not these affiliations be made on an informal "gentlemen's agreement" basis? While this is one problem that will be taken up in the case study, it can be briefly suggested here that implicit in the oyabun-kobun relationship was a system of sanctions that was considerably more effective in forcing compliance with a given agreement than any informal gentlemen's agreement might be expected to entail.

Support from employers. This kind of recruiter-laborer coalition was looked upon with favor by most large employers of casual workers. There were several factors that might explain this attitude. One was that, most employers of this type,--in the absence of a really effective public employment exchange system[2]--saw an opportunity for exploiting these organized cells of recruiters and workers. For these employers, the organization of oyabun-kobun workers simplified the problem of recruiting temporary workers. Under this arrangement, an employer dealt, not with hundreds of individual workers, but with only a handful of labor suppliers. Another factor contributing to the employer's favorable attitude was that it complemented the widespread

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2 The explanation of why these employment exchanges were absent or ineffective until the Occupation period cannot be discussed here. See Cohen (1949) for an extended discussion of this problem. For an earlier description see Yoshisaka (1925:484-499).

practice of keeping the permanent staff of employees on a reduced wage scale. These employers avoided the costs of maintaining on its regular payroll a staff of salaried foremen to supervise the temporary workers, a cost which would have been necessary had it not been for the fact that many hired these labor recruiters not only to contact workers, but also to supervise them.

Not only did the employers seem to favor these ritual kin labor organizations, but in an amazing number of cases, their personnel manager or "hiring bosses" often linked themselves formally with these worker associations. They did this by entering into an oyabun-kobun relationship with the labor suppliers. Why? Again several motives can be suggested.

One stems from the reason indicated above, namely, that when these labor suppliers were engaged in a dual role of recruiter-foremen, the employer took certain risks. In engaging these temporary foremen, the employer unavoidably placed a great deal of responsibility and often valuable equipment in their hands. The threat of firing such temporary workers for irresponsible acts was not so serious a sanction as it was for his permanent staff members. The former was a temporary worker anyway and he could "always find another job." Thus, one possible motive for employers in establishing oyabun-kobun ties with these recruiter-foremen was to exploit this symbolic relationship for exerting greater control and enforcing greater personal loyalty.

Another possible motive for an employer to affiliate with labor suppliers on this symbolic basis lay in the belief that he could,

by utilizing these symbols, establish preferential rights to their services. This was particularly important in situations where several employers might be competing for the services of the same or limited number of expert labor suppliers. An employer who formed oyabun-kobun relationships with a given supplier, then, was in effect staking a claim on his services.

The purpose of the case study. The foregoing brief summary of how the oyabun-kobun mechanisms were commonly utilized in these industries which depended upon transient and temporary workers is, of course, oversimplified. There are many intangibles and variations to be taken into account in any concrete case. To illustrate in detail the role of the oyabun-kobun institution in these kinds of industrial enterprises, the first case history of the present study will describe the operations of a construction company, known here as the Kogyo Company. The particular features to which attention will be drawn are the following:

1. How the employer selected the labor suppliers.
2. Why these labor suppliers were used as foremen of the workers they recruited.
3. How these supplier-foremen recruited their subordinate workers.
4. How these foremen organized their work crews.

Each of these organizational problems were solved by utilizing, to a greater or lesser degree, oyabun-kobun mechanisms. In this case study, then, the purpose is to show how these ritual kin relationships affected the organization of the Kogyo Company.

The source materials. The material used in this presentation is based upon a field study conducted in October 1947 by Messrs. Koichi Bai, Yasuaki Masuda, Kohei Sakamoto, and Yuichi Hirota, all formerly of the Faculty of Law at Tokyo University. Mr. Bai, who was at a later date, a colleague of the present writer in the SCAP Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division, has kindly made his field notes and a preliminary draft of his report available to the author. More detailed comments concerning this data are given in Appendix A of this study, but one general observation is worthwhile here. These source materials do not contain personality data, so the following case study, by necessity, omits detailed descriptions of individuals and individual motives.

II THE INSTRUMENTAL ORGANIZATION OF THE KOGYO COMPANY

Like those just described, the Kogyo Company was an industrial enterprise in which the business varied seasonally. It could not afford to maintain a large permanent staff of construction workers in the lull periods between work projects, so that when it was commissioned to do a particular job, it had to recruit workers from the casual labor market specifically for that purpose. The following is an account of one of these busy periods:

The organization of the Takinozawa office. In early 1946, the Kogyo Company was one of three medium-sized construction companies which were awarded a contract to work on a large irrigation and drainage project in Fukushima, a mountainous prefecture in northern Japan.

This project shall be identified here as the "Takinozawa Project" after the place-name. The company's principal task was to excavate a series of tunnels as part of the overall construction project at Takinozawa. The actual tunnelling operations were begun in October 1946 and were expected to be completed by April 1948. To do this job, the company established a branch office on this site and assigned one "Ichiro Sakai" to act as its official representative and general superintendant of this unit.

With Sakai, a number of office workers and technical experts including several engineers, a supply officer, lumber expert, and mechanics and repairmen from the permanent staff of the company were assigned to this branch office. These people constituted the only salaried personnel of the unit at Takinozawa. The others, more than five hundred workers with varying skills in the construction trade, were those recruited from the casual labor market.

The formal or instrumental organization of the Takinozawa unit of the company seemed to be conventional for companies of this kind and size. At the top echelon, there were the aforementioned "white collar" employees who worked in or out of the front office with Sakai, and lived separately from the workers who did the actual tunnelling. The office workers did the usual paper work required in operations of this kind, while the technicians provided engineering and mechanical "know how" pertaining to the general construction work of the branch office.



Figure 1. The Kumi: The Instrumental Organization of the Hamba Group.

from the branch office. But more important was his function as the foreman's advisor and representative, in the latter's absence. The remaining four were the "straw bosses" (sewayaki) of the work teams that Sano had organized. Their chief responsibilities were largely limited to maintaining discipline and order among their respective teams. (It must be remembered that it was these teams that did the actual work in the tunnels.)

Each of these teams was composed of skilled and unskilled workers. The skilled workers (kofu) were those who did specialized work such as drilling the holes in the forward walls of the tunnel preparatory for the dynamiting operation; and the unskilled workers (nimpu) were those who handled the picks and shovels and carried away the after-blast from the tunnels. Usually, in addition to the leader, there were three kofu and five nimpu to each team. Depending upon such intangibles as illness, the composition of the team varied, and a team leader often borrowed workers from other teams. Since, in October 1947, Sano had contracted for work in only two tunnels, one team rotated with another in each of the tunnels. The laborers working on these teams were paid according to a very complicated wage system: piece-rate wages, special incentive payments, bonuses, and payments-in-kind. Furthermore, the wage system was complicated by deductions which Sano made for the worker's food.

Working conditions at Takinozawa. The work in the tunnel was strenuous, unhealthy, and hazardous. The men worked in dimly-lit, narrow passages. An electric bulb was strung about every five meters

along the tunnel, but these were inadequate and the men were forced to wear oil lamps, much like those used by miners. In the deep recesses of the tunnels, there was a real danger from cave-ins, even though the wooden scaffolding provided a modicum of protection. Water seepage was a source of irritation and the poor clothing and footgear was not sufficient to keep the workers dry and warm. Ventilation in the tunnels was also a problem.

These strenuous conditions of work were almost matched by the austerity of living conditions in the barracks and dormitories. Housing accomodations were necessary for laborers because it was expected that all of them would be recruited at some distance away from this place of work. Single men slept in a large, open, barracks-style room and ate in a common mess hall where the meals were prepared by Sano's wife and two of her helpers. They all agreed that the food was poor. The men with families were a little more fortunate. They were each provided with a small room in which their families ate, played, and slept. The furnishings were simple and not plentiful: a few kitchen utensils, blankets, and a minimum of furniture. One comforting feature of the entire housing arrangement was the cement Japanese-style tub large enough for several men to bathe at the same time. No rent was paid for the lodgings, but was deducted from the pay of each worker.

The Wage System. Along with working conditions, another important aspect of the internal organization of the Tokinozawa office of the Kogyo Company was the manner in which the temporary workers were

paid. Because wages were not paid directly to each worker personally, but in lump sum to the workers' recruiter-foreman, the latter had opportunities to manipulate these monies for his own ends.[4]

To understand the wage system of the Kogyo Company, then, it is necessary to consider the "flow" of wage payments from the company to the workers in two basic steps: one, from the company to the foremen, and, the other, from the foreman to the individual workers. Only the first of these steps, however, will be discussed in this section; the other will be described later.

The company remunerated its foreman and, indirectly, the workers in a variety of ways, but the two most important methods were the base pay (ryubi payments) and incentive payments (shinkosho). The first of these was based upon the total number of cubic meters (called ryubi by these people) of tunnel excavated by each kumi. A ryubi was computed by measuring the number of meters of progress made in the tunnel during the pay period and by multiplying this number by the 5.5 square meters which was the cross-section of the tunnel. Thus if a kumi progressed 100 meters into the tunnel during the month, then the total ryubi excavated by the group would be 550 cubic meters of ryubi (100 x 5.5). Once the number of ryubi earned by a kumi was established, the amount of money was computed according

4 This system prevailed for virtually all workers hired through labor suppliers. Because many suppliers were known to have pocketed as much as 30 percent of a worker's wages, SCAP Labor Division officials criticized this system as being unduly exploitive.

to the rates established for each kumi. For example, on one kumi (Sano's), the rate for September 1947 was 280 Yen per ryubi. The interesting feature of this seemingly "universalistic" and "rational" mode of payment is that Sano's rate was a little higher than that for the other five kumi-gashira. This differential rate was justified, according to Sano's assistant, because the tunnels assigned to Sano were composed of a greater percentage of rocks and therefore progress was slower. This may have been so, but from other facts obtained it seems that a part of this differential rate was due to other reasons which will be specified when the oyabun-kobun structure of the company is discussed.

One may now discuss the other important form of payments made to the kumi-gashira: the incentive payments. These were graduated payments based upon the rate of progress made by the particular kumi. For example, if in a ten day period, a crew excavated twenty-nine running meters, the foreman would receive an extra one thousand Yen. This rate of payment increased as the number of running meters of tunnel completed in the same period increased. Sano, for example, received a shinkosho payment of 16,000 Yen in September 1947.

There were other kinds of payments, too, such as the traditional bonus (which most Japanese employers give at New Years and mid-year O-bon season) and payments-in-kind. The latter were in the form of goods (e.g., work clothes, fuel for dormitory use, food items) which the company purchased wholesale and resold to the kumi chiefs at prices less than cost. These two types, of course, differed in

character from the former in that these were parcelled out on a more or less particularistic basis and no foreman could rightly demand such payments. More will be said later about this form of payment.

What did all this mean in terms of money? Precise figures were not available for payments made to the six foremen, but estimates for one foreman, Jiro Sano, indicates that he received for the month of September 1947 a net operating income of some 168,000 Yen, or, if converted to the then current U.S. military currency exchange rate, $3,500. This amount did not include the traditional bonus and the payments in kind because the information concerning these were not available. If we were to divide this 168,000 Yen by the total number of workers (80) in Sano's kumi, it would amount to 2,100 Yen per worker. Such an amount is somewhat less than the national average for male industrial workers in Japan of the same period.[5]

III THE ROLE OF RITUAL KINSHIP AT THE TOP LEVEL OF ORGANIZATION

So far in this description of the organization of the Kogyo Company at Takinozawa no specific mention of the oyabun-kobun relationships has been made. This aspect of the company's organization has been reserved for this and the following sections. These sections, therefore, will try to describe in some detail how the economic and social organization of the company was affected by the presence of these ritual kin structures. In essence, what was described in the

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5 The average monthly wage, in September 1947, for male industrial workers in Japan was 2,517 Yen. Programs and Statistics Division (1950), p. 82.

previous section was the end product of a series of customary strategies and administrative decisions made with reference to the general objectives of the company at the Takinozawa project. Now one may return to the case again and see how the existence of oyabun-kobun mechanisms has affected these strategies and decisions. Since some restriction of discussion is necessary, the company decisions and strategies selected for discussion in the present section will be limited primarily to these: (1) how foremen are selected, (2) how loyalty is instilled and how proper performance of duties on the part of the foremen are guaranteed and (3) how the foremen are remunerated. In the next section, decisions made and strategies followed by the kumi chiefs, or foremen, will be discussed. It is the intent of these two sections to show the role of ritual kinship in structuring the decisions and strategies used in solving these problems.

The selection of the six foremen or kumi-gashira. The occupational history of Jiro Sano, one of the six kumi chiefs, illustrates one of the several methods followed in the selection of men entrusted to become a foreman. Jiro Sano was born the eldest son of a poor farmer in northern Japan. Presumably because he had either no interest in farming or did not have the opportunity to follow his father's occupation, Sano began earning his livelihood as an apprentice in construction work when he was fifteen years old. When he was twenty-seven, and some twelve years after beginning as an apprentice, he was elevated from the status of a common laborer to that of an assistant to a labor supplier. As it was the custom in this trade

this position was formalized by a ritual kinship relationship. Accordingly, Sano became a kobun of this labor supplier who, in turn, was his oyabun, or ritual father. This oyabun happened to be the kobun of Ichiro Sakai, the present superintendent of the Kohyo Company. Sakai was at that time an official of the company in charge of the dam construction project. Hence, in the terms of the oyabun-kobun system, Sano was the ritual grandchild (magobun) of Sakai at that time. Nothing is known about Sano for the next few years but, by 1938, Sano had become an independent labor supplier and had consequently acquired and trained in the construction trade many kobun of his own. Between 1938 and 1940 he worked for Sakai at the "Towada Lake" project, as a labor supplier and kumi-gashira. From this time at least, Sano was considered a kobun of Ichiro Sakai, rather than a ritual grandchild. During the war years Sano worked on a project at the "Omi Army Base" where Ichiro Sakai again was the "hiring boss" of the construction company. The relationship must have been mutually satisfactory because, when the latter was given the present assignment, he brought Sano to the Tokinozawa project to become his principal kumi-gashira.

Here, then, was a case where the decision to select a foreman was understandably based on prior acquaintance. The long term association between Sakai and the foremen had proved enough of a "test" for the former to measure the latter's capabilities. But what about the other five foremen?

No information was available on two of these, but the remaining were hired by Superintendent Sakai as the result of Sano's personal

recommendation. The first of these, Suzuki, was the younger brother of one of Sano's colleagues who had established a ritual brotherhood (kyodaibun) relationship with him; and the other two were Suzuki's former kobun who had now been promoted to the status of oyabun and independent labor supplier. In other words, four out of the six were known to be hired through previous ritual kin ties. The fact that Sano acted as the "go-between" in the hiring of these men meant, in the acknowledged custom of this group, that he was assuming personal responsibility in the selection and would be under obligation to see to it that these individuals conduct themselves properly.

Guarantees for the proper performance of duty. The general practice of establishing of ritual kin relationships was already alluded to in the brief occupational history of Jiro Sano. The fact that a ritual kinship relationship was acknowledged and formally authenticated each time a new contractual relationship was established between Sano and Sakai, implied more than this fact alone. It is noteworthy that no evidence was found for a legal contract which specified the precise nature of the foremen's obligations. It would seem that some of the customary obligations implicit in the oyabun-kobun relationships were being used to solemnize and formalize a set of obligations covering a very wide range of contingencies, including the contractual relationship. Some of these obligations expected by the superintendent, when he makes a subordinate his kobun, are indicated in the following statement by Sakai:

> Once a person is made a kobun, he works hard, even without profit or immediate gain. Although he may be given permission to seek work elsewhere, he seldom does so. Even if he does, he comes back when ordered to do so . . .
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> When physically punished or scolded for being a numbskull (baka), he answers meekly, "yes, sir," and remains humble and obedient. Even as proud and influential a person as Sano is, he does what I request. Within reason, Sano does everything that I command.

Sano's loyalty to Sakai was, however, not without benefits. He was the most important of all Sakai's labor suppliers, and in the thirty years or more that he worked for Sakai, he rose steadily and could enjoy job security as the result of his oyabun-kobun ties. Sano himself was said to have in various localities, about forty former subordinates who have been at one time or another his kobun. These constituted a pool of skilled workers and friends whom he could "count upon" to a greater or lesser degree, if the need ever arose. Although by definition he was still a laborer, in his own eyes he had achieved status among his colleagues and had acquired certain technical skills as well as managerial ability of which he was evidently proud. Most certainly he had prestige in his community of construction workers, he exercised considerable control over his workers' technical roles as well as their private lives, and he enjoyed a living standard considerably better than many skilled factory workers. Sano's sentiments with regard to Sakai and the company were succintly expressed in this manner:

> The Kogyo Company is a family and the chief of the branch office /Sakai/ is the father. We, the workers, are the children and I am the eldest son among them.

The real sanction Sakai could exercise in the eventuality that Sano deliberately defaulted in his contractual obligations was not to place a monetary "fine" nor to request the intervention of the courts, but to exercise informal "blacklisting" and character "assassination." Such messages would spread among his colleagues in the trade and Sano would lose "face" and standing.

Yet, while the oyabun-kobun relationship between Sano and Sakai seemed to function as a means of symbolizing a relationship of mutual confidence and trust that had been established prior to their association on the present irrigation project, by no means did it invariably depend upon a direct and long-term association. In the Kogyo Company, Sano was the only kumi-gashira who was a kobun of Sakai prior to the present association. All the other five kumi-gashira were made kobun for the first time at this project. This suggests that this ritual kinship system also functioned as one important way in structuring interpersonal relationship between strangers. By assigning an individual to a status position within the ritual kin framework, the initial cues and role expectations of each of these statuses, standardized by tradition, could be utilized.

One further point about the oyabun-kobun relationships at the top echelon of the Company needs to be made. It was noteworthy that Sakai had established ritual kin relations only with those who were not permanent employees of the Company; that is, only with the six kumi-gashira. It was evident that Sakai saw no necessity for establishing such relationships with his office staff or with his technical

staff, all of whom were regular employees of the Company. These facts seemed to furnish additional evidence that Sakai's strategy in insuring the loyalty of these temporary employees was to establish ritual kin relationships and to bring into play whatever moral obligations this institution customarily fostered.

The remuneration of kumi chiefs. Strong and meaningful ritual kin relationships cannot, of course, be maintained indefinitely without some give-and-take of "favors" and benefits. The ritual ties that Sakai established were not a one-sided affair, with all benefits going to him. One of the important ways in which the relationship "paid off" for certain of his kobun occurred through the system of remuneration.

It was already noted that the manner in which the company paid the foremen and their crews had both "calculable" and "particularistic" types of payments. To some extent the former of these types, and to a much greater the latter, was used strategically to symbolize Sakai's paternal interest in his ritual children. The giving of work clothes, fuel, foodstuffs at less-than-cost and other forms of payments in kind were symbolic gestures of his status in ritual kin system. The amount of these "particularistic" payments to be given to a foremen in any particular case, of course, required shrewd balancing of many factors--including the particular needs of the given foreman, the amount of surplus that Sakai himself had at the moment, and the possibility that an excessive amount given to

one kumi chief may create ill-feeling and jealousy among the others. To some extent the latter factor was controlled by Sakai in that he tried to be as secretive as possible about the amount given. For instance, a kumi chief who was given some foodstuffs at a 20 percent discount could claim, when asked by other chiefs, that the discount was only five percent. Some indication was given that even in the "calculable" ryubi payments, one kumi chief was paid at a higher rate per ryubi than the others.

But secrecy was not the only way in which ill-feeling would be minimized in the differential amounts of "particularistic" rewards Sakai handed out to his kobun. Probably more important was the ranking system among the kobun themselves in which it was understood that the higher ranks were to receive preferential treatment over those of lower status.

A brief description of the method by which these six foremen ranked themselves may be given here. Purely on a formal basis, Sano had the highest status, because his association with Sakai was the longest. Seniority in this system was usually based upon length of association. But this high status could also be gleaned from observation of Sano's actions. That his seniority was recognized by the other five labor suppliers could be inferred from these events: (a) Sano presided over monthly meetings held by the six kumi-gashira or oyakata for both social and for business reasons; (b) he acted as the spokesman of the group in presenting to the Superintendent complaints or suggestions about their working conditions; (c) he offered technical

and managerial advice to other foremen; and (d) he was called "anibun" (elder brother status) by the others.

Once Jiro Sano's position is made clear, the rest is relatively simple to determine. The other five labor suppliers were ranked in this order: Suzuki, Goto, Ikeda, Kondo, and Tanabe. The following were the facts which the investigators obtained to explain the reasons for the rankings made:

> 1. Suzuki, the second ranking oyakata, was the younger brother of one of Sano's many ototobun; hence by extension of ritual kinship relationship to Sano, Suzuki was subordinate in rank.
>
> 2. The third and fourth oyakata, Goto and Ikeda, were the former kobun or Suzuki; hence these two were still lower in rank than Suzuki, who ranks second.
>
> 3. Kondo and Tanabe, the fifth and sixth oyakata respectively, had no prior ritual kinship ties with either Sano or Superintendent Sakai; therefore, their status in the group was the lowest of all.

When interviewed on the problem of why differential payments were being made by him, Sakai began by stating that "the operating expense of the oyakata[6] naturally differ, and we [the Company officials] being human, must consider that fact." After some reflection, he added, "it is reasonable and just to make payments at a different rate according to the status of the oyakata because it is the key to keeping the loyalty of an oyakata."

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6 The term oyakata is a synonym for oyabun. In the present case it applies to the kumi chiefs. There is reason, as we shall see, for calling the kumi chiefs, "oyakata" or "oyabun," because they are ritual father to some of their subordinate workers. I have been using up to the present the term kumi-gashira (a term designating their technical role) to refer to these men, but it is suggested by Sakai's statement that he is thinking of these foremen in ritual kinship terms and not in terms of their instrumental or technical roles.

To return to "particularistic" payments as a way of symbolizing Sakai's oyabun-role and recognizing his obligations as such, it is necessary to add that money loans were also an important factor. As one kumi chief explained, "When red-ink figures appear on our books, we only have to inform the company and they will 'lend' us money without requiring a receipt. They will not say anything about the money, if we cannot pay them back." It was clear that this was a "loan" in theory only and that in practice the money was a gift or a benefice.

This complicated payment system practiced by Sakai with respect to his kobun-foremen, was justified by Sakai in the following manner:

> . . . Kobun are supposed to take the poorest. It is a mistake for them to expect to be given the best in a given situation. One cannot become a kobun if he thinks thus. When a non-kobun works ten hours, the kobun should work twelve.
>
> When seen in this light, it may seem that there is no advantage to the oyabun-kobun relationship. However, in exchange, when others are not looking, the oyabun looks after the welfare of his kobun /"mendo wo mite yaru"/

To summarize this description and analysis of the organization of upper echelons of the Kogyo Company at Takinozawa, the following observations can be made:

First, with regard to the problem of recruiting the six foremen, the means were not impersonal channels such as the "help wanted" columns of the newspapers, or the public employment agencies, but rather through personal "connections." The strategy followed by the superintendent was to make maximum use of the ritual kinship connections he had made in the past with qualified men.

Secondly, the problem of allocating responsibilities to these men was not simply a matter of setting up a single formal organization and letting the informal organization take its natural course. With respect to these "key" men, the superintendent deliberately followed a customary strategy of reinforcing the formal organization with an "expressive" organizational system based upon ritual kinship principles.

Thirdly, this expressive structure: (a) provides a means of substituting a system of traditional moral sanctions in the place of more rational-legal sanctions which might have been used to guarantee fulfillment of contractual obligations; (b) defined the relative status among these six foremen who, from the standpoint of their roles in the formal or instrumental organization, were equal; (c) reinforced the decision to have a flexible, but complex, system of wage payments deemed necessary in this kind of enterprise.

IV THE ROLE OF RITUAL KINSHIP IN THE KUMI ORGANIZATION

The lowest level of organization of the Kogyo Company's Takinozawa unit was the kumi. The kumi, as indicated before, was an organization of the construction crews that did the actual tunnelling work. The chief of the kumi faced problems of organization and supervision which were in many respects comparable to those faced by the superintendent. In this section, a few of these problems and their attempted solutions will be described in order to illustrate how the oyabun-kobun system was utilized. The problems selected are: (1) how to recruit the construction workers; (2) how to allocate tasks

and responsibilities within the kumi; (3) how to remunerate these workers; and (4) how to authenticate the oyabun-kobun statuses in the kumi. Though there were six kumi on this project, detailed information is available for one kumi, that of Jiro Sano's.

Recruiting workers by the supplier-foremen. One of the important considerations in the selection of Jiro Sano as a chief of a kumi was the fact that he was an experienced labor supplier. And as such he was expected to be able to recruit workers with the requisite skills through his various ritual kin ties. The required skills are probably obvious from the description of the kumi operations, but a few details may be added here before the recruiting procedure is described. It was significant that over half of the laborers Sano recruited had more than five years of experience in the construction trade. A few of them, like his assistant, Matsuno, and one of the team leaders, Mizuno, had more than seventeen years of experience. It was also noteworthy that most of these workers were rural people, that is, born on the farm. A minority were children of non-farmers, but they tended to be sons of miners, construction workers, and other trades where hard physical labor was characteristic. Only one was a child of a "white collar" family.

Until a month before the time of the field study Sano had some eighty workers. But since that time, thirty-one temporary workers from a neighboring community had returned to their normal task of farming. Thus, in October 1947, Sano's crew was reduced to forty-nine. By observing how these forty-nine remaining workers were recruited, it would be possible to see what channels Sano used in bringing together his labor force.

We may now describe how Sano recruited the forty-nine workers. The following list summarizes the salient information:

1.	Workers recruited by means of Sano's ritual kin ties	21
2.	Workers who were true relatives of Sano	3
3.	Workers who were friends of these relatives	3
4.	Workers who were introduced by those who were hired earlier	6
5.	Workers who came by self-introduction	12
6.	Workers on whom no information was available	4
	Total	49

It is significant that out of the forty-five for whom data were available, twenty-one persons were hired by means of Sano's ritual kinship connections. This means that Sano recruited slightly less than half of his workers by means of his oyabun-kobun ties.

One other striking pattern that emerges out of this recruiting practice is that the hiring of the workers in the Sano Gumi was done on a basically personal and particularistic basis. Though he had ample opportunity to hire strangers, only twelve out of seventy-six workers (including part-time farmers) came without some previous kinship, oyabun-kobun, or friendship ties with Sano. Each month about five unattached laborers (nagashi) came to Sano in seeking work. These were people who heard of the employment opportunity quite accidentally at the nearby railroad terminal and who had no kinship, ritual kinship, or friendship ties by which a relationship with the kumi members could be traced. Though Sano was in great need of men at the time of the study, and though these unattached strangers constituted a potential source of

labor, the fact that he had only twelve of these nagashi indicated that he viewed this type of laborer with suspicion. Indeed, the reasons for not hiring such workers were rationalized in this manner by Matsuno:

> Many of them are skilled workers and they work very hard, but because they come to work "lightly" [i.e., having no burden of obligation to any kumi member or to friends and relations of kumi members], they have a tendency to skip jobs whenever they feel like it. We have to take precautions against this.

"Taking precautions" meant, of course, that Matsuno and Sano rarely hired any of them. Thus, it was quite apparent that the kumi had deliberately avoided hiring anyone on an impersonal basis. Inasmuch as experienced workers among the friends and relatives of the kumi were limited, this meant that the oyabun-kobun ties of Sano became the most important source for recruiting workers.

The allocation of tasks and responsibilities. It has been repeatedly pointed out that in spite of the fact that much of the success of the Takinozawa operations depended on the effectiveness of the kumi organizations, the management of the company (i.e., the superintendent and his technical staff) attempted to put into practice a minimum of bureaucratic procedures to control, standardize, and direct the actual day-to-day operations of the kumi. A large part of the kumi policy, practice, and decisions were placed squarely on the recruiter-foreman's shoulder. The kumi chief's supervisory responsibilities ran the gamut from giving directions as to how to guide the pneumatic drills in the tunnels, to deciding the amount of food to be dispensed in the worker's mess hall, and disbursing the kumi's income among the different workers. Obviously, it was necessary for the kumi-gashira to delegate some of these responsibilities.

In the introductory section for this case study, it was noted that some delegation of responsibilities and division of labor were achieved by what was called an "administrative staff" or kambu. The tasks and responsibilities of Sano's assistant (chozuke) and his four team leaders (sewayaki) were briefly noted. But what was not noted was the fact that Sano had formed ritual kinship relations with these individuals. The parallel between this case and that of the company's superintendent forming ritual kin relationships with his subordinate kumi chiefs is clearly evident. In brief, then, in addition to the formal or instrumental organization linking the kumi level with the top level of the company, there was a parallel, ritual kinship or expressive structure established. (See Figure 2).



Figure 2. The Instrumental and Ritual Kinship Structures of the Kogyo Company's Branch Unit.

7 Two status terms are needed because, like true kinship terms, these terms differ according to whom is taken as the point of reference. The ojibun status is not enclosed in the chart because it was not known if kumi other than Sano's had this status.

An account of the circumstances leading to a given member's participation in the kumi is given below:

In seeking workers for his kumi, Sano recruited three relatives who were in need of employment: his eldest son (S. Sano), his younger brother (Y. Sano) and a brother-in-law (A. Maeno). Inasmuch as these individuals were his relatives, he felt that he could not rightfully assign them as his kobun, a role which included doing menial tasks for the oyabun. In his own words, he said: "I cannot let them (the relatives) do any ordinary work for if I did, it would violate my feelings of jingi (benevolence, integrity, or justice).[8] Thus, he assigned them the status of "ojibun" which meant that they were his ritual "younger brothers," instead of his ceremonial "children."[9] To these three relatives, there was another person who was designated as an ojibun. This person, H. Mizuno, was chosen because he had special skills as a scaffolding constructor. This person was "borrowed" for this project from another oyabun with whom Sano had ritual kinship relations. Why this person was appointed as an ojibun and not as kobun was fairly clear. He was considered a valuable associate. His age was close to that of Sano himself, and he had almost as many years of experience

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8 In general the moral code of jingi as defined by Ruth Benedict (The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, 1946, pp. 118-119) does not fit the present usage. She describes it as a virtue and a sense of honor found especially among gangsters and labor contractors, a moral code which exists "outside the law." All that Sano meant here was that he felt he had a certain higher obligation to his close relatives than he did to non-relatives.

9 This is the case to which reference was made in Chapter I concerning the inclusion of true relations into a ritual kinship group.

in the construction business as Sano. On the technical side, these four members were the leaders (sowayaki) of the four work teams in the kumi.

In addition to these four ojibun there was Matsuno, who was identified previously as the assistant foreman. Matsuno, thirty-six years old, claimed he started in this trade when he was fourteen. He was, like Sano, a son of a farmer. He lived in the second best quarters of the hamba (dormitory) with his wife and three children. Not much more than this was learned about his personal life, but it was known definitely that he became Sano's kobun, in 1939 and has been with Sano ever since. No doubt due to the satisfactory relationship, Sano appointed him his chief deputy. But at the same time, Matsuno's status in Sano's ritual family (called here a "miuchi") was technically that of kobun. Thus, in the kambu, he was ranked second-in-command, but in the miuchi group, he had one of lowest statuses. What this seemed to demonstrate was that ritual kinship status did not necessarily determine a person's instrumental or work status. Evidence for Matsuno's higher status in the kumi's administrative staff was shown by the fact that he was given a more responsible position, higher salary, and better housing than any of the ojibun (including those who were true relatives of Sano).

The six men described so far had important statuses in the two organizations of the kumi: the kambu and the miuchi. As indicated above, the assignment of statuses in the kambu was largely dominated by considerations of qualifications and the individual's fitness for the job. In the other, the selection was assigned on personal and particularistic grounds.

In addition to these six men who belonged both to the kambu and to Sano's ritual family, there were three other kobun (Wakano, Sugino, and Fukuno) whom Sano had on this project. Sano seemed to have brought them into his ritual family for two reasons. The first was that he was training new workers in this trade. Wakano, for example, was a repatriated soldier from the Pacific and when he returned, he found his house bombed out and no one to turn to for a job. Sano, probably feeling pity for him, gave him this job and encouraged him to take up this trade. Thus, to indicate Sano's personal interests in Wakano, Sano made him a kobun. The other reason for giving the three non-kambu workers kobun status was suggested by Sano himself. He said that if a worker was made a kobun, this would constitute one of the best ways of assuring the oyabun that the worker would remain on the job until the project was completed.[10] He also stated that he would have liked to have more kobun, but due to the extra expense involved in keeping up the requisite obligations resulting from this ritual kinship relation, he could not afford to support on this project more than the four he had.

It should be evident by now that Sano believed that basically impersonal, "bureaucratic" types of human relationships inherent in a formal organizational structure would not be sufficient to provide adequate social and supervisory control over his kumi. He supplemented this formal organization with a ritual kinship structure as

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10 Labor turnover was high here because of the difficult working conditions--a situation described previously.

a means of promoting a paternalistic form of supervision and a more personal system of human relationships. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the way he paid his workers.

The remuneration of kumi workers. It was noted previously that the wages that workers received did not come directly from the company but through the hands of the foreman. The company paid the foreman and the latter independently disbursed this fund. The former part of the "flow" of wages has already been described, so one need only to consider how the foreman paid his workers.

Like the payments of the company to the foreman, workers in the kumi were paid on a mixed system of both calculable and particularistic types of remuneration. For the lack of a better term, the kind of remuneration in which the workers were paid at a standard rate of output will be called here "wages," while the other, more unpredictable monies given on a personal basis (e.g., "pocket money," bonus) will be called "stipends." Thus, it can be said that all common laborers received a combination of wages and stipends, and kambu members, a combination of salaries (i.e., a fixed monthly wage) and stipends.[11]

First to be considered will be the "wages." These were calculated in two fundamental ways: base pay and incentive payments.

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11 All kambu officers--with the exception of Sano himself who pocketed whatever remained after paying his expenses and the workers--were paid on a monthly salary basis. Motsuno, his assistant, received a salary of 3,000 Yen and the remaining four sewayaki received 2,000 Yen each.

The latter, at least formally, was based on the previously-described incentive payments which the foremen received from the company. Each month Sano took this money and apportioned it out to each worker according to his (Sano's) estimate of the amount of work he completed during the month. The former, base pay, which constituted by far the largest amount of money, was calculated and disbursed in an interesting manner. From one standpoint, the foreman could have simply paid this type of wage according to a fixed hourly rate of pay. But instead, he used what was called a ninku system. This is equivalent to a piece-rate system on a team, not individual, basis. Hence, if a team blasted away 1.7 meters of the forward wall of the tunnel and removed the debris, all members of the team would receive one ninku credit;[12] if the team was more successful and advanced twice as far at a single blasting operation, all of its members would receive two ninku credits, etc. The rationale for using this method of calculation instead of an hourly system is not difficult to understand. The foremen themselves were paid according to the amount of tunnelling work actually completed, so they paid their workers according to a system which approximated their own remuneration.

Some slight pay differentials were established for the two classes of laborers. The skilled (kofu) earned 70 Yen per ninku credit, while the unskilled (nimpu) earned 60 Yen per ninku credit.[13] Some

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12 This figure, 1.7, seemed to represent the average penetration per blasting.

13 These rates were somewhat higher than they were prior to September largely because of the inflationary trend in the country as a whole.

examples picked at random of the number of ninku credits and amount of wages earned by three workers are given as follows:

	Number of ninku credits	Amount of wages in Yen
Osato, a kofu	44	2,640
Makino, a kofu	28	1,680
Matsumoto, a nimpu	20	1,400

Osato's wages were high because "he was ambitious" and worked on more blasting operations than most other workers in the kumi. Makino's wages were perhaps typical for the crew as whole. Matsumoto, because he was ill for about ten days in September, did not have the opportunity to earn more than the 20 ninku credits shown above.

Before the other type of payments, "stipends," is taken up, it would be helpful if some concrete family budgets were presented to indicate the workers' marginal economic existence and, at the same time, to show how dependent these workers were on stipends. Three cases are selected below for special consideration:

The first example is Makino, a skilled worker, who lived with his family at the Takinozawa dormitory. In September, 1947, he was ill for about twelve days and was able to work for only eighteen days. Since he did not have any savings, he asked for Sano's help in meeting his expenses. In addition to his earnings for the month, Sano paid him a "monthly incentive pay" of 500 Yen to meet his grocery bill and advanced him a sum of 1,100 Yen to pay his doctor bills incurred during the period of sickness. The following is a summary of his September expenses and income:

Gross Income:

Base Pay	¥ 1,680	
Incentive Payment	500	
Advance	1,100	
Total Income		¥ 3,280

Less Expenses:

Food	¥ 2,094	
Doctor Bill	1,100	
Total Expenses		¥ 3,194
Net Surplus for the Month		¥ 86

The 86 Yen that remained was all that he had left for the ensuing month.[14]

An example of a more fortunate individual is that of Osato. He lived with his wife at the Takinozawa dormitory, but his child was cared for by his elder brother's family in another prefecture. Osato claimed that he had earned 2,466 Yen as base pay and was given an additional "monthly incentive bonus" of 600 Yen. His family expenses, primarily food, came to 2,268 Yen. This left him a balance of 778 Yen. If it were not for the 600 Yen bonus that he received, he would have had only 178 Yen to spend for the month.

A final example is that of Maeno, a team leader and a brother-in-law of Sano's. He supported a household, including twelve relatives.

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14 To give an idea of what some items cost in this period, the following can be cited: a pair of working shoes (tabi) cost 360 Yen; rice on the blackmarket cost between 80 and 120 Yen per sho (a measure of volume equivalent to about three pints); and cigarettes were sold in limited quantities at 0.65 Yen each.

As a kambu member, he received a monthly salary of 2,000 Yen, but with such a large family, his grocery bill exceeded his salary, often as much as 1,000 Yen. This deficit was paid regularly by Sano.

The "stipend" type of payment may now be considered. First, a mere listing of the various types of these payments will be given and this will be followed by an analysis of the criteria Sano used for making these disbursements.

1. Gifts. These included such items as second-hand working clothes, new and old footwear (tabi), soap, towel, cigarettes, and other items of daily necessity, which were difficult to obtain in the open market in this period of Japan's postwar recovery. Sano purchased them through blackmarket channels and from the Kogyo Company which, in turn, obtained some of these goods from the government monopoly channels and from private business concerns.

2. Traditional bonus. These were payments made at New Year's and O-bon seasons. The largest amount of these semi-annual payments given to any laborer was 1,000 Yen, while the smallest amount came to about 500 Yen.

3. Pocket money (nigirisen). These were a "handful of pennies" which Sano personally handed out to each worker as he received his regular wages. These nigirisen were given usually in 100, 200, or 300 Yen lots.

4. Food allowances. Certain individuals of the kumi were given food allowances or perquisites. This varied from a perquisite equivalent to 1,000 Yen to one of a few hundred Yen.

Except for noting that there wasconsiderable variation in the amount of these stipends given to individual workers, it is difficult to say what specific "rules of thumb" the foremen followed in allocating them. The following are some interpretations as to what these rules might have been. First, it was quite evident that the amount of stipend given a worker depended upon the degree of economic need

of the recipient. This, of course, was sometimes exploited by clever workers who presented their needs more skillfully than others. But, in general, Sano and his assistants had built up a fairly good knowledge of the real financial circumstances of most of their workers, and therefore would not often be misled.

Secondly, some stipends seemed to be given as rewards to certain workers who were particularly faithful or diligent in their work. Osato was a case in point. In September, he completed 44 ninku, which was very high. As a consequence, he received several items of clothing, a high incentive payment, and a large amount of nigirisen.

Thirdly, Sano also seemed to give stipends to workers who had indicated dissatisfaction with their work or whose morale was otherwise low. Though threats and humiliating sanctions were often used on these individuals, Sano occasionally handled these morale problems by giving substantial amounts of stipend. The acceptance of these payments on the part of the worker would indicate that he was willing to conform and to assume the obligation to cooperate.

Finally, there was clear evidence that Sano paid attention to ritual kin ties in giving out stipends. All members of his ritual family received a larger proportion of stipends than comparable workers not belonging to this oyabun-kobun group. For example, Fukuno, a kobun, regularly received soap, towels, footwear, and other personal items, while non-kobun laborers only occasionally received such items. Fukuno also received larger amounts of nigirisen. Ritual kin members of the kambu also received stipends. In general, there was some

differentiation in the amount given to a ritual kin member according to the status he had in the ritual family group. Matsuno, for example, received by far the largest amount, an amount equivalent to his basic salary of 3,000 Yen.

If an interpretation regarding this wage system may be permitted, the following considerations are relevant: As was seen from the three cases in which a worker's income and his family expenses were shown, these workers were living in poor financial circumstances. In view of the fact that there was no national social security, effective public welfare measures, and unemployment insurance, these people had no one outside of their own relatives to help them in emergencies. Perhaps as a response to this kind of situation there is an "inherent logic" in having a flexible, stipend system of wage payments. Such a system in theory, at least, provides the kumi with an opportunity to create a fund which a foreman could use to distribute in response to special needs of the workers. In theory, this system seems to be designed so that a kumi chief--if he had Solomon-like powers of judgment--could legitimately withhold the wages from those who needed the money least and pass it on to those who needed it the most. This flexibility in wage payments would not be possible if all the kumi income were committed to the workers according to some rationally and objectively-calculated wage system, like the ryubi payments. But since Sano did not always exercise impartial judgment in disbursing these monies, inequities occurred.[15]

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15 To use technical terms, this wage system is basically what Max Weber referred to as a "budgetary administration," as opposed to "profit-making enterprise." Max Weber (1947), p. 199.

This concludes the description and analysis of how the ritual kinship institution was utilized by Sano and his co-workers in the organization of the kumi. Up to this point nothing has been said about the symbolisms and ceremonies with which these ritual kin relationships were normally established. Insofar as having a position in the ritual kinship structure does imply a certain degree of authority and status, one can expect to find a method to authenticate, dramatize, and dignify these positions.[16]

Authentication of ritual kinship bonds. There were many ways in which the oyabun-kobun bonds were authenticated and solemnized. In one sense, all the functions of ritual kinship relationships described in the previous discussions can be seen as aspects of the validation of these ties. But in addition, four others are noteworthy:

The first of these methods of authentication is found in the terminological system. In Table I is presented a listing of the acutal "terms of address"--rather than the technical "terms of reference" (used up to now).

The second method of status authentication was indicated by the "uniforms" worn by the workers. It is traditional in Japan for workers of this class to wear a happi coat or jacket, with bold, colorful designs and writings on them. Usually the name of the worker and the kumi or company to which he belongs is printed on the lapel, and on the back is found a design which represents the crest, "coat-of-arms," or trade mark of the kumi or company. In the present case,

16 Chester I. Barnard (1948), pp. 180-181.

TABLE I

SOME SELECTED TERMS OF ADDRESS

	If ego's status is . . .	. . . and alter's status is . . .	. . .then, ego calls alter:
1.	oyabun	kobun	"omae" (you) or by personal name
2.	oyabun	ojibun	"omae" (you) or by personal name
3.	ojibun	oyabun	"oyakata" (respectful parent)
4.	ojibun	kobun	"omae" or by kobun's last name
5.	kobun	oyabun	"oyakata"
6.	kobun	ojibun	"ojisan" or "ojiki" (uncle)
7.	senior kobun	junior kobun	"omae" (you) or by personal name
8.	junior kobun	senior kobun	"niisan" (elder brother)
9.	oyabun's wife	kobun's wife	"nee" or "ane" (elder sister)
10.	kobun's wife	oyabun's wife	"neesan" or "anesan" (elder sister plus the suffix "san" designating formal or respect relations
11.	oyabun	kobun's wife	"X-san toko no ane" (elder sister of Mr. X's place)
12.	kobun	oyabun's wife	"anesan" or "neesan" (older sister)
13.	oyabun	kobun's child	child's first name only; no "san" suffix added
14.	kobun	oyabun's child	child's first name plus "san" -- a sign of respect for the father

Gano purchased these happi coats for each of his ritual family members and had the ritual kin status of the worker and his ritual family name (i.e., "Gano Gumi") printed on them. To further distinguish these coats from other common laborers, he had them dyed brown, instead of the navy blue, the usual color.

The third way of authenticating this ritual bond was seen in the way the oyabun cared for his kobun and his other ritual relatives. Such paternal care as training the kobun, rewarding them with extra stipends, and loaning them money were described earlier. Two other aspects may be mentioned. One is that Gano assumed certain responsibilities to look after their recreational needs, and occasionally entertained them by means of a drinking party. Another responsibility was to take care of them when they became ill. While other workers had to care for themselves, Gano looked after his own kobun personally and paid their doctor bills. Though there was no opportunity at Takinozawa, at other times, he also acted as a "go-between" in arranging marriages for his kobun. It is apparent that the oyabun-kobun relationship was not merely an occupational relationship but a diffused paternalistic one.

The final authentification rite, and the most dramatic of all, was the initiation or investiture ceremony. This ceremony took place in the office of the oyabun and was held on a festive day honoring the local mountain diety. The ceremony was divided into two parts: the first was a rather simple oath-taking ritual which was witnessed by a "go-between" or sponsor. The oyabun, after a brief introduction,

announced to each candidate, "I will make you my kobun." To this the kobun candidates responded, "By your special generosity, I am pleased to become your kobun." The oyabun then placed two new name plates--small, thin wooden slats--on the wall of his office alongside other names of the miuchi. The name plates contained the status (e.g., kobun), legal name (e.g., Hideo Nakano), and the new ritual name (e.g., Hideo Sano) of the candidate. It will be noted that the surname of the candidate's new ritual name was the same as the oyabun's surname.

As he placed these name plates on the wall, the oyabun commented, "This is like getting a foster-child." This marked the end of the first part of the ceremony, and the candidates and the members of the miuchi, joined by the oyabun's wife went to the oyabun's quarters for the second half of the ceremony.

To describe the second half of the ceremony, a translation of Bai's field report may be given below:

> The oyabun and his wife sit at the head of the large table and the go-between (intermediary) at the side. After that, the others sit in line according to years of experience in the trade. There are two trays laid on the table in front of them. On one of them are two containers of sake or rice-wine, a small heap of salt, two fish with their bellies placed together on a plate and on the other tray is laid a hosho (folded Japanese paper for ceremonial use).
>
> The only person who speaks during this sakazuki goto (ceremonial drinking) is the go-between. The go-between says "I shall now be honored to act as a go-between." Saying thus he fills the two wine cups with wine, pours the sake in three motions, puts in a pinch of salt, picks up a piece of fish with his chopsticks, and drops it in the wine cup.
>
> The oyabun and his wife drinks three sips from their wine cups, and then the go-between carries the cups around the room for each guest to drink one sip, each in his turn. The oyabun's wine cup

is passed around the group from the left, and his wife's cup from the right, both cups eventually returning to the head of the table.

What is left of the sake is poured out onto the hosho with some pieces of fish. Then the entire contents and paper are kneaded together and thrown against the ceiling. The go-between returning to his seat says, "Omedeto Gozaimasu (congratulations), may I borrow your hands," and at his call everybody claps his hands. "Pon, pon, pon, . . ." /sound of clapping/. With another "Omedeto Gozaimasu" the ceremony is over.

This simple ceremony only takes an hour, although longer and complex ones are used at other occasions.

When everything is over the Oyaji opens his mouth for the first time and thanks the go-between for his troubles.

Now the ceremonial part is over, everybody feels "at home," laughs and sings as much as he likes.

A number of symbolic and sacred elements in this description deserve comment. The ceremony took place on a "happy day," that is, the holiday of the local mountain god. His picture was also hung on the wall. The deity's help in the protection of these newly established oyabun-kobun ties were believed to be important. The role of the go-between was significant both as a witness to the event and as visible representative of the larger community which sanctioned these ties in the miuchi relationship. The acquiring of the oyabun's family name by the kobun, as recorded on the name tags in the office, and the statement about acquiring a "foster-child" pointed to strong familial notions. The two fish (sea-bream) laid belly-to-belly were symbolic not merely of a contractual relationship, but a relationship that was emotionally felt at the "gut level" of human feelings. The mixture of salt, fish, and ritual wine was symbolic of blood. The three sips of wine were interesting in view of the fact that in the Japanese marriage ceremony, the

bride and groom exchange sake drinks in a similar fashion. Finally, the vows of loyalty taken to become a kobun were significant when one considers that the motive behind establishing this relationship was essentially an occupational one. It is notewrothy that in this oath nothing was explicitly stated about the purpose and duration of the relationship, the conditions under which the kobun were to serve, his technical functions or the rights and obligations of either parties to the relationship. Like the marriage ceremony, it was evident that the oath, at least ideally, was intended to cover a wide range of contingencies "for better or for worse."

The ceremonies like those just described mark the beginning of a set of mutual obligations established not only between the oyabun and his newly acquired kobun, but also between the kobun and the many previously established ritual kin relations of the oyabun. Examples of the obligations have already been presented in the cases where Sano had used ritual kin ties for recruiting his workers. While the obligations between distant ritual kin were hardly perceptible, the strongest were those between the oyabun and his most recent kobun. For this, the observations of Matsuno were most helpful. As he explained to the field investigators:

> Becoming a kobun is the same as becoming a member of a family. But in our everyday work life, it is often difficult to see the advantages of being a kobun. For instance, the kobun does not necessarily get a higher wage than the other, though he may get nigirisen (pocket money). Yet when he becomes of age /i.e., becomes an independent labor supplier/ or when he gets into some personal trouble, he can consult the "head of the family" and receive the much needed help.

> The way an oyabun nurses the kobun when he is sick is something which is considerably more than what the usual father does for his child. The good treatment Sano, for example, gives his kobun is testified by the many letters of gratitude that he received from the families of these kobun. Even if the oyabun himself is sick or in debt, he must see to it that his kobun are not in want.
>
> On the other hand, the kobun takes care of his oyabun more than he would his own parents. Whatever kind of a person the oyabun may be, good or bad, the kobun should be perfectly obedient and loyal to him. And, however, thoughtless the request may be, the kobun should obey.

On this last point, Matsuno, while shaking his head, regretted that the kobun's regard for these obligations in recent years have become "loose."

The role of the oyabun-kobun institution at the kumi level and at the top level of the Kogyo Company at Takinozawa may now be summarized:

First, there were really two formalized systems of organization. The one, which was called the "instrumental" was a consciously planned table of organization and was designed to serve the manifest objectives of the company. It contained a series of "offices" from the superintendent and his clerical and technical staffs down to the six work crew units each with their administrative staffs. The responsible roles in these units were designed to coordinate the manpower, equipment and the facilities of the total organization. The other formalized organization, designated as the "expressive," was based on ritual kinship principles. This was an organization which was "meshed" into the existing framework and formally brought into play certain personalized dimensions and symbolic elements which purported to take care of the "human side" of the total industrial organization. While both of these structures were in a sense "instrumental," each was "instrumental" in a different

sense. The "instrumental structure" was "instrumental" in the sense that it was derived more or less from an evaluation of the technical requirements of the company's tunnelling operations, while the "expressive structure" was "instrumental" in the sense that it was designed to coordinate the principal actors' sentiments and personal characteristics for the productive ends of the total organization. The resultant organization was a compromise of the two sub-types of formal organization.

Second, not every member of the total organization belonged in the network of this ritual kinship structure--only the individuals who could be classed as the "critical" personnel. To include everyone would tend to destroy the privileges and the particularistic aspects of the system. In Sano's work crew only eight members were so related. And at the top level, the superintendent and his six foremen-recruiters were included, but others of the technical and office staff were excluded. Each of these groupings was small enough to provide the opportunities for close, face-to-face associations.

Third, prior knowledge of the ritual kinship institution has affected the form of the company's strategies with regard to hiring personnel, allocating responsibilities, and remunerating the workers. In the problem of recruiting workers and foremen, the channels utilized were not an impersonal agency (such as a public employment office or the advertising media) but the established system of ritual kinship relationships. In the selection and assigning of important personnel, it did not

consider them only from the standpoint of technical qualifications, but also from the standpoint of prior personal and social relationships--in brief, ritual kinship "connections" were utilized. In the problems of motivating and maintaining discipline within the organization, the conventional methods based upon "rational" and bureaucratic practices were reinforced by "nonrational" (rituals, symbolic titles, etc.) practices inherent in the oyabun-kobun institution. Finally, the system of remuneration was not a straightforward, rationally calculated system of wages, but a method of payment which took into account the personal relationships, the particular needs of the recipient, and the prevailing sentiments of the group. Superficially, at least, it substituted an objectively self-interested norm of payment for a more flexible, "group-welfare" norm. The wage system was particularistic, nepotic, and paternalistic.

In conclusion, then, the case of ritual kinship mechanisms in the organizational structure of the Kogyo Company at Takinozawa was not a unique or exotic phenomenon. For it is evident that the organization of the company at various levels was based on the knowledge of oyabun-kobun relationships outside of its orbit. The company and its organization had to be supported by a system of values, understandings, and symbolisms of the oyabun-kobun institution in the larger society. It had to depend upon the existence of a complex and established system of recruiting and training casual laborers of the type described in the introduction to this case study.

CHAPTER IV

STREETSTALL MERCHANTS

In this second case study, attention will be turned from an employer-employee relations in a company which regularly hired large groups of casual laborers to another kind of socio-economic setting in which oyabun-kobun groupings were typically found, namely, among small-scale tradesmen, itinerant vendors, and streetstall merchants, known as the tekiya. The groups examined in this chapter were those which operated their businesses in the Tokyo Metropolitan District immediately following the end of the war.

But aside from describing a case of ritual kinship in a different setting, there is another purpose for selecting this case. The present case will focus on a different set of problems from that examined previously. It will be recalled that the underlying theme in the previous case was to show how ritual kinship relations supplemented the formal or instrumental organization of the Kogyo Company. It showed how oyabun-kobun ties made possible personalized relationships within the context of an organization manifestly organized along "rational," bureaucratic lines. In the present case, while this characteristic is also found, the role of ritual kinship in the following problems will be featured: (1) how ritual kinship relations are used to establish a claim and to protect the vested interests of the groups under consideration; (2) how these relationships are used to stabilize and to regulate potential competition within the groups; and (3) how these ritual kin ties are used to form coalitions with which to regulate competition coming from outside

of the group. To put this more simply, the present case will describe how these groups of streetstall merchants utilized ritual kin ties to protect their business interests and to set down rules for regulating competition.

Source materials. In contrast to the previous case, the present study is based upon a larger variety of source materials. The most important of these is a study by Professor Hiroaki Iwai (1950), formerly of Tokyo University and now at Sendai University. This study was published in the Shakaigaku Hyoron (Japanese Sociological Review). The present writer has had the privilege of interviewing Mr. Iwai regarding his report.

Another valuable and independent study was conducted by a group of former graduate students of the Economics Department of Tokyo University. This study which focuses on the economic relations in the tekiya society was published in the University's paper, Teikoku Daigaku Shimbun (see Hama et al 1946-7). The researchers are Makoto Hama, Takishi Otsuka, and Ko Takahashi.

Though not directly concerned with the problem of streetstall associations, a book written by a journalist (Costello 1948) portrays some of the activities of the principal leaders in this association. An interesting report on the most recent developments in the tekiya business is given in an article by Onisuke Kita (1953) in the Chuo Koron, a Japanese periodical roughly comparable to the Atlantic Monthly in level.[1] An unpublished analysis of systematic interviewing of fifty

1 I am grateful to Dr. Michio Nagai--formerly an associate of mine in the research project at Ohio State University--for having called my attention to this article.

oyabun, including thirty-one who specialized in the tekiya business, is also utilized in this case history. The interviews were conducted by the staff of Asahi (Tokyo) Newspaper's Public Opinion Unit in September and October 1947. These materials will be designated here as the "Asahi Report."

Finally, there is a series of about fifty reports of interviews, inter-office "check sheets," and reports of interviews written by SCAP officials from such agencies as the Civil Information and Education Section, Government Section, and the Public Safety Division. These unclassified SCAP reports and memoranda were collected by the present writer because they describe in detail various aspects of streetstall operations in the postwar period. While the chief interest of these documents is in the Tokyo group, they also give information for comparable associations in Kobe and Kyoto. In the present chapter, these documents are identified as SCAP Document 1, 2, 3, etc. Complete reference to each cited document is given in Appendix B. Also a selected list of other SCAP reports is given in this appendix.

I THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STREETSTALL BUSINESS

Before and during the postwar period, in more than seventy shopping districts and neighborhoods of Tokyo's metropolitan area, there were colorful groups of tradesmen who were known collectively as the tekiya people. Within this group, there were several recognized specialties, each with its particular characteristics. The most important of these can be described briefly:

First there were the ojime. These were the "pitchmen" who used various tricks to attract crowds--story-telling, displaying live snakes, performing magical tricks and the like. They operated in open lots (but not on public sidewalks) where the curious could gather. They rarely displayed their goods beforehand; only after a sizeable crowd was lured, would they bring out their goods. There was no clearly established line of goods, except that often various "quack" medicines, like powdered snake meat and the so-called "frog oil," were the monopoly of the group.

Then there was the korobi group. Like the former, the important characteristic of these people was not what they sold, but in the way they sold their wares. They usually operated in pairs, each taking a turn in delivering their rapid-fire, auctioneer sales patter. This pattern often resulted into shaming the on-lookers to buy the goods offered. They used a stick to emphasize their points and to denote a change in the auction price. If these methods did not work, they haggled over prices with their customers on a man-to-man basis. Both this group and the ojime often used "stooges" (called sakura) planted in the crowd to bid up the price and otherwise help make the sales. The customary paraphernalia of the korobi was primitive. Sometimes a wooden box, but never a prefabricated, collapsible booth. This group like the former did not restrict itself to a definite business location, but wandered from place-to-place. But, as will be noted later, their movement was not unrestricted. A number of regulations were placed on them as to where they could ply their ~~goods~~ trade.

Still another group was the komise. This was also a mobile group of peddlers, often composed of older women and teen-age girls. The komise people, by obtaining special permission from "local bosses" (the oyabun of the territory) set up their stands in subway stations, temple groups, and sidewalks opposite the neighborhood stores on appointed days of the month (e.g., the first and fifteenth of each month in Kyodo-machi of Setagaya Ward). These "appointed days," called ennichi or sairei, varied from neighborhood to neighborhood, and were staggered so that this group would be occupied a major part of the month. Goldfish, potted plants, candy, flowers, toys, textile, and firecrackers (in the summer months) were the typical merchandise sold by this group.

Finally there were the sanzun with which people of the Occupation Forces were most familiar. While the above groups were mobile, the sanzun hawked their goods at a fixed location; that is, they conducted their business each day from a designated sidewalk plot in a given district. In the postwar period, this type of business was by far the most numerous in the Tekiya system. The long lines of portable booths, each about six feet wide, and decked with a light bulb or two, turned what otherwise might have been a standard urban scene into an oriental bazaar. They dominated the sidewalk space in all the large shopping districts of Tokyo. The merchandise was of a varied sort, almost anything that could be fitted into the small booths was offered for sale, including eye glasses, binoculars, radio parts, magazines, shoes, bowls of soup, and paintings.

From even this brief description of the different tekiya traditions, it should be evident that: (1) this business was on a primitive

scale; (2) high technical training or special skills were not necessary, and (3) capital to begin in the business was nominal. There was no large stocks of merchandise to finance, no store building to purchase or pay rent, and no overhead to speak of. Yet, it was these very characteristics of the tekiya trade that threatened the entire business at the end of the war. Literally thousands of "amateur" peddlers, along with blackmarketeers, descended upon this business and initially disorganized the accustomed operations of the established tekiya tradesmen. Whereas there were only a few thousand street vendors during the war, within a year after the Surrender, there were some 30,000 streetstall merchants in The Tokyo Metropolitan Area. The newcomers to the trade were by and large a part of that large contingent of displaced people--war evacuees, repatriates, ex-soldiers, war widows--who sought a livelihood during this chaotic reconstruction period.

The purpose of the case study. In the face of this new competition, what did the established tekiya people do? What did these politically "voiceless" peddlers, who were outnumbered by the newcomers by something like six-to-one, react to the threat to their vested interest, an interest which had no legal basis?

This case study, then, will attempt to show how the tekiya people handled this situation. The strategies and tactics followed by these people, it may be stated here, were based upon oyabun-kobun principles. To tell this story, it is first necessary to appreciate the pre-existing or traditional form of organization found among the tekiya people and then to describe their reactions to the postwar situation. The

traditional organization of the tekiya, described in the next and following sections will treat the small group organizations of the tekiya and their intergroups relations in terms of their ritual kinship structure. The final section of the chapter will attempt to indicate how these oyabun-kobun mechanisms were strategically used to protect the vested interests of the established tekiya members.

II THE LOCAL GROUP ORGANIZATION: THE KUMI

Before the end of the war the four or five different "professional" groups of tekiya vendors were organized into more than 300 recognized local groups which were called kumi. A kumi was a group of street vendors who worked together in the same trade specialty and who operated in the same sales territory (niwaba). The number of individuals in each kumi varied from a small group of ten individuals to a large organization of one or two hundred, but the typical group was a small face-to-face group of about thirty persons.

The internal organization of each of these professional kumi were not unlike that of the Sano Gumi, examined in the previous case study. Like the construction crew, these Tekiya kumi had both an "instrumental" structure and an "expressive" structure, the latter based on ritual kinship principles. This system of allocating status positions within the kumi, of course, included methods for establishing and delegating authority, and defining the chain of command and communication linkage within the kumi.

When defined in terms of the instrumental structure, the typical kumi leader was known as the chomoto, and the several followers were ranked according to their business experience into such status positions

as the chowaki, sewanin, and wakamono. A kumi instrumental organization is diagrammed in Figure 4, below.



TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

Status:	Number of Individuals
chomoto	1
chowaki	1
sewanin	7
wakamono	21
	30

Figure 4. The status system and table of organization for a typical kumi in the Tekiya.

The expressive structure of the kumi, on the other hand, was based on oyabun-kobun principles. The formal status of the chomoto in the ritual kinship framework was the oyabun or oyakata. The rest of the personnel (i.e., chowaki, sewanin, and wakamono) were his kobun, when these were placed within the framework of the expressive structure, or ritual family. The kobun in turn were ranked according to elder brother and younger brother distinctions. The members of a group related by these ritual kinship principles were known as a ritual kinship family or miuchi. Thus, the local group when viewed in terms of the instrumental structure was known as a kumi and when viewed as an expressive structure, a miuchi.

All the "old-timers" in the Tekiya business were passing through or had already completed a period of apprenticeship. Of course the kind of training necessary in this business was not of a highly technical nature, but was one in which the special customs, codes, and secret jargon of the trade were more important. Moreover the apprenticeship system was also a method of "staking" a neophyte and extending credit to him, since traditionally impecunious and socially marginal individuals were selected. Before considering the apprenticeship system, it is necessary to describe this method of selection.

The selection of recruits. Generally speaking, the people selected were those with whom the chief and his kobun came into contact in a friendly and more or less accidental manner in such places as the local taverns, low-grade rooming houses, jails, and railroad stations. They were quite often people who came directly from the farms to seek a fortune in the city, but found such aspirations impossible of achievement. The chief befriended such people, gave them a few meals and free lodging, and watched them closely to see whether or not they might be acceptable for the group. The initial selection was rather impersonal, but once a person was accepted into the kumi, and endured a probational period, he was given tutelage on a personal basis.

One finds this kind of testimony monotonously repeated by the professionals who in their time were recruited in the above manner:

> When I left home, I had no money and no one to turn to. But the person who helped me eventually turned out to be my oyabun. Upon my first meeting with him, he gave me a place to stay without even asking my name or background and the next morning he gave me 150

> Yen which was big money in those days. I was left speechless and only tears flowed from my eyes (Iwai 1950:49).

It should be clear, then, that the kumi chief, in selecting men to become his future "retainers" chose men who would be likely to remain in a highly dependent relationship to him. To symbolize this dependent relationship more dramatically, an initiation ceremony was held for each new recruit. The following is a generalized description of such a ceremony:

> . . . Shinno kotei /patron diety of the tekiya/ is placed at the center of the room and a large placard with the words "four directions have no difference in rank (shiho-doretsu)" is shown on the wall. It symbolized world without status discrimination and it is aimed to prevent potential conflicts over the seating order. In front of the altar are placed (1) a small pile of salt (morijio), (2) sake or rice-wine offered to the god; and (3) two fish (sea bream) placed back to back . . . The ceremony begins with greetings offered by the master of ceremonies who may say to the new kobun, "We are now going to have a ceremony of the sakazuki. You had your own father but the business is the thing you have to live by for the rest of your life. You may think of the oyabun as the life-long parent. Go forward through fire and high water for the oyabun's sake."
>
> After this statement, the master of ceremonies takes the ceremonial paper (hosho) cuts it three times, and pours sake into the wine cup in three distinct motions. He places the wine before the god, then he drinks the sake in three sips, saying afterward that it is a very nice sake. Next he turns over the two fish which has been laying back-to-back so that they will face belly-to-belly and remarks that the kobun should be united as are these two fish. /i.e., the relationship should not be merely a verbal one, but one that is felt at the "gut" level, so to speak./ The kobun and the oyabun then exchange sake drinks and after the ceremony the cups are placed on the ridge at the top of the sliding door (kamoi).[2]

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2 (Iwai 1950:57). The reader will notice that there were a number of specific points in which this ceremony differed from that of the construction crew. Yet in spite of these variations, the two fish, the salt, the ceremonial paper, the drinking in three sips, the diety, etc. were present in both cases.

The training of recruits. The apprenticeship system may be considered now. Each neophyte who was accepted into the group was expected to serve a period of usually three years in apprenticeship. Three steps in this apprenticeship were recognized and these were correlated with the instrumental status positions of the kumi (see Figure 4). At the first stage, the apprentice was called a wakashu. The wakashu acted as a salesclerk for a streetstall belonging to a kumi member. In such a task, he usually earned 10 percent of the gross price of the merchandise he sold. In the course of such apprenticeship he was shown how to "dress up" his merchandise so that it would sell better. For instance, he might be taught how to attach special tags to the merchandise, which might claim that the goods were a "direct sale from the factory" and thus suggest that the customer was saving the middleman's commission. He would learn the jargon of the trade and the various sales "pitches" even down to the various intonations that were deemed necessary.

If the neophyte were successful in this first stage, he was promoted to the second stage. Here he would be referred to by others as a "sewanin." He would be assigned a street booth and would be permitted to buy his merchandise only from a wholesaler approved by the chomoto. But usually 10 percent of the wholesale price of the goods purchases went to his chomoto as tribute or commission. Since in most cases the capital for stocking his booth came from the chomoto, he was required to split his profits with his chomoto in addition to payment of the 10 percent fee.

Finally, in the last stage (chowaki status), the apprentice was given the right to become an independent vendor and no further commissions were required of him. If he were particularly favored among the group of apprentices, however, he would be given the right to bear the ritual family name of the chomoto. Such a designation meant that he was given a part or the whole of a sales territory controlled by the chomoto and a right to recruit apprentices for the management of the stalls or concessions within the territory. More details on this sales territory will be given next. later

This apprenticeship system has several implication for the kumi organization. In the first place, by the use of such a system, it was possible for the oyabun to control the course of the goods sold by the wholesalers, commission merchants, and others who supplied these tekiya vendors. The oyabun had a "corner" on this market. In the second place, this apprenticeship was a way of extending the chief's influence among the streetstall merchants. In general, the more ex-apprentices that he had, the greater was his social prestige. Finally, this system was a basic source of income for the oyabun.

The establishment of the sales territory. It should be reasonably evident by now how the instrumental structure of the kumi was established and what purposes it served. Another very important aspect of the kumi organization was the control and allocation of the sales territory. An understanding of this problem should provide a clue as to why the expressive (i.e., oyabun-kobun) structure was deemed necessary or at least desirable.

The sales territory over which an oyabun had established a claim was commonly known as the niwaba, and sometimes as a bawari. This territory--which sometimes was as large as several city blocks and sometimes as small as a section of a single city block--was the frequent object of bribery and violence, and even murder. Why was the niwaba so important?

The reason stemmed largely from the fact that all street vendors were potentially mobile. A vendor could move his place of business each day according to where he thought he could best sell his wares; that is, if there were no rules to regulate this mobility. But since the desirable business locations (such as the area in front of large department stores, movie theatres, train stations) were limited in number, the competition for these scarce locations would be particularly keen, and there would result a constant struggle to gain access to these premium spots. In recognition of this potentially chaotic condition, the established Tekiya people had arrived at a series of procedures--sometimes violated, however--by which to establish and to control these sales territories.

Thus, even though the claims were initially made in some cases by gangster tactics, at any given time, all territories where the Tekiya people conducted their business were established and controlled by a recognized oyabun. An individual vendor who wanted to change his place of business had to gain the permission of the oyabun who had a claim to the territory into which the move was contemplated. Inasmuch as this usually meant changing oyabun-kobun affiliations and other related complications, this was not done very often.

The validation of niwaba claims. Assuming that an oyabun had a legitimate or at least a recognized claim to his niwaba, there was an institutionalized way of transmitting this "property right" to succeeding "generations" of vendors. A hint of the way this process operated was already given when the apprenticeship system was described. A more detailed analysis will require a fuller understanding of the ritual kinship system.

An analysis of most influential oyabun in the business during the postwar period revealed that they each had a ritual kinship "genealogy" in which he could trace their affiliations back several "generations" through oyabun-kobun ties. This genealogy was important because it was a way of validating an oyabun's claim to a niwaba.

As an illustration, one may take the case of Kinosuke Ozu who was already mentioned as a one-time head of the Tokyo Rotensho Kumiai. Though his "instrumental" role was that of the head of a kumi, called Ozu Gumi, his "expressive" or ritual kinship status was designated as: "the second generation head of the Ogura branch house of the main house of Iijima." This meant that Ozu served as an apprentice to an oyabun by the name of Yonesaburo Ogura and received from him the right to all or a major part of the latter's niwaba. Ogura, in turn, was formerly an apprentice to an oyabun who was a lineal descendant of the house of Iijima (which was established in the late 1800's by Genjiro Iijima). Ogura, however, did not succeed to the headship of the house of Iijima, but upon achieving oyabun-ship, was given a small part of the Iijima niwaba and the right to establish a "branch house" which came to be known as the house of Ogura.

Returning to Ozu, he "inherited" his initial niwaba and his status in the Tekiya by these ritual kin ties. But he was a particularly ambitious oyabun and in the postwar period established claims to additional niwaba, some of which were illegally secured. The seizure of private property, after a long court battle, resulted in Ozu's second prison term, this time for an eight-year period beginning in June 1948.[3]

Just before Ozu's incarceration, the headship and the control of his niwaba was placed in the hands of an influential oyabun by the name of Matsujiro Nobara. In 1949, when Nobara was ready to retire, he assigned the niwaba to seven of his favored kobun. At a formal ceremony of "succession," Nobara made the following speech which was reported in the Rotensho Kumiai newspaper:

> I am getting old and I have to have men of a new era to cover my defects. I have chosen these men from among those who helped in the past and who are desirable in character to establish new families. You shall never do anything to betray the confidence

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3 During the trial one lawyer said in defense of Ozu; "The Ozu-gumi was the crystallization of years of traditionalism, and reached the peak of its power after Japan's defeat when the country was virtually without a government. There have been cases in Japanese history when men have risen to lead the people out of confusion; if their names have gone down to the annals of Japan's history--if heroes like Sakura Sogoro deserve to be enshrined in memory--then I believe Ozu and the work he had done should also take their place in Japanese chronicles!"

Said another defense attorney: "The development of Japanese culture during the past 3,000 years is recognized by everybody. In the course of history, systems which were suitable to that era were formed. Thus, in Japan at this time, it is most suitable that the oyabun-kobun system should have been developed . . . Even the emperor system, in my opinion, is similar to the oyabun-kobun system." (Costello 1948:140-141).

> your friends have placed in you (tomo dachi no shingi) and will not do anything by which our community could place blame upon you. Our society is likely to be misunderstood by the world and therefore I want you to respect the traditional spirit and ways of Shinno /i.e., the ways of the god of agriculture/ which will guide your daily conduct.[4]

In response to the above speech, one of the seven kobun replied:

> We who have long been engaged in this field of business feel extremely honored to have gained the recognition of our leader and to have been elevated to the rank of a head of a family. We are determined to do our very best for the business and even more, never to bring disgrace (na wo keyasu) on the name of our family. We, the inexperienced neophytes, humby request your blessings.

Mutual aid. Another aspect of kumi organization was still relatively important in the postwar period. This was the so-called jingi code. Most contemporary Japanese are familiar with the word because they have seen it publicized in the movies, in the classical Kabuki drama, in popular literature and in newspaper articles describing the practice among various oyabun-kobun groups. But there is little popular understanding of the fact that there are two aspects of the institution: jingi as ritual and as a virtue. In the present context, only the latter aspect will be discussed; jingi as a ritual will be considered later. Professor Iwai (1950:57) has described "jingi" as virtue in this manner:

> In the broader meaning of the term, jingi has to do with certain ethical values of the Tekiya society and of other groups based upon oyabun-kobun principles. In this sense, jingi implies a moral principle underlying an obligation (giri) and mutual aid (sogofujo) system of relationships.

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4 Nippon Gaisho Taimusu (Japan Bazaar Times), n.d., quoted in H. Iwai (1950) p.57.

The late Professor Benedict (1946:118-19) noted that this concept was and adaptation of the Chinese concept, jen, or "benevolence." But in Japan, she states, jen has degenerated:

> . . . In fact jen became in Japan an outlaw virtue and was entirely demoted from the high estate it had in Chinese ethics. In Japan it is pronounced jin (it is written with same character the Chinese use) and "doing jin" or its variant "doing jingi" is very far indeed from being a virtue required even in the highest quarters. It has been so thoroughly banished from their ethical system that it means something done outside the law, . .
>
> . . . The honor among thieves of the raiding and slashing swashbucklers of the Tokugawa period. . . was "doing jingi;" when one of these outlaws asked shelter of another who was a stranger, that stranger, as an insurance against future vengence from the petitioner's gang, would grant it and thereby "do jingi." In modern usage "doing jingi" has fallen even lower. It occurs frequently in discussions of punishable acts; "common laborers," their newspaper say, "still do jingi and they must be punished. Police should see to it that jingi is stopped in the holes and corners where it flourishes in Japan." They mean of course the "honor among thieves" which flourishes in racketeering and gangsterdom. . . The degradation of the Chinese concept of jen could hardly go farther.[5]

Although Professor Benedict seemed to have neglected the ritual significance of jingi, her description of jingi as a virtue is on the whole quite appropriate. Among the tekiya people jingi was recognized as a generalized code, the pursuance of which promoted good personal relations between an oyabun and his followers. If the boss did not manifest jingi, the followers had a right to be disloyal. The oyabun who provided food, shelter, clothing and pocket money for his kobun was following the precepts of jingi; conversely the kobun who recognized his obligations (giri) to protect the good name of the oyabun and to obey his every command was following jingi.

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5 Ruth Benedict (1946) p. 118-119.

An indication of the extent to which jingi was being carried out in practice was shown by a poll conducted by the Asahi Newspaper in 1947. Among a battery of standardized questions in the survey, there was one set which asked each of the thirty-one oyabun whether or not he provided his kobun with following things: housing, board, pocket or spending money, clothing, medical expenses, and gifts for ceremonial occasions.[11]

DO YOU REGULARLY PROVIDE YOUR KOBUN WITH ANY OF THESE ITEMS?	Yes	No	No Answer
Housing	21	5	5
Board	19	7	5
Clothing	19	7	5
Spending money	27	0	4
Medical expenses	19	7	5
Gifts on ceremonial occasions	25	1	5

A question may be raised as to how these paternal acts were financed. The answer is simple: they came from the commissions, fees, and other forms of tribute that the oyabun collected from the streetstall operators and other vendors who hawked their wares in his niwaba. But,

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11 The Asahi Report (1947). Some background information on the thirty-one oyabun:

a. Years of experience in the business: 4 to 10 years or less; 9 with 11-20 years; 11 with 21-30 years; and 7 with 31-40 years.
b. Age: 17 between 36-50 years; and 14 being 51 years or older.
c. Education: 33 with primary school education only; 10 middle school; and 3 with higher education.

of course not all oyabun were equally successful in managing their business affairs--some brought into their kumi too many kobun or were too generous, and as a result had to relinquish control of their niwaba. Some of them were able to keep going by borrowing money from their fellow oyabun.

This completes the analysis of the role of ritual kinship in the traditional kumi organization, but a few summary points concerning the local group organization need to be made:

First of all, there were several structural similarities to the construction crew analyzed in the previous chapter. One of these similarities concerned the presence of both an "instrumental" structure based on a "rational" division of labor in the group and of an "expressive" structure based on ritual kinship principles. Another was that the oyabun-kobun relationships defined a "closed group" at a given time; one person was never at the same time a kobun to two different oyabun.[7]

Secondly, there was a number of fairly explicit strategic techniques employed by the oyabun to promote and to protect his vested interest; namely, the business of managing his kumi. His business and his income depended upon the control he exercised over his niwaba, which he may have "inherited" or taken from someone by force. To keep this control, he recruited a trained group of retainers. To maintain a loyal and subservient group of followers, he purposely selected men

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7 This is an important point which shall be taken up in the concluding chapter when comparisons with other ritual kinship structures are made.

who had no status in the society at large, trained them in the business and extended credit to them, and initiated them into his symbolic family. When their period of apprenticeship was completed, he gave them his blessing, helped them get started in a business of their own, and ritually linked them to his professional "house."

Finally, in the matter of control, division, and assignment of the crucial sales territory of each kumi, the rules were found to be not of a "rational" nature. That is, the determination of rights to receive and control the niwaba was not based on a price system (i.e., a system in which the highest bidder gains control) but on a much more diffuse set of values. Ritual kinship status and particular kinds of personal relationship, favoritism, and other nepotic considerations fostered by oyabun-kobun values, determined the transference of the niwaba from one person to another.

III INTER-KUMI COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Linking these nearly 400 groups or kumi into federations were, prior to 1946, many networks of communication lines. Sometimes these linkages were formalized into what was called a dogyo kumiai or guild and at other times left on a purely informal basis. Nevertheless, when the thousands of newcomers descended upon the Tekiya in the postwar years, these linkages solidified into a well-defined organization, as will be shown in the next section. An understanding of these earlier inter-kumi relationships is therefore necessary before one considers the postwar organization of the tekiya trade.

In these inter-kumi affiliations, one striking fact is that oyabun-kobun ties were the basic channels utilized for making these cross-kumi contacts. This is not to say that friendship and personal ties were not used; in fact, they were. But once it became necessary to further business interests through the help of a friend, the tekiya people inevitably formalized their business association by ceremonially exchanging drinks of sake and becoming ritually related.

The other means of establishing contact between kumi were considered part of the oyabun-kobun complex. These were the so-called jingi rituals and the chirashi notices. The description of these elements and the oyabun-kobun features will follow.

Affiliations based on common ancestry. One of the important ties established between different kumi groups were those based upon descent, not by blood but by ritual kin ties. As noted previously, each kumi in its expressive dimension was designated as a miuchi (i.e., a ritual family). In contrast to most ritual kin groups of construction crews (as in the previous case study), all established miuchi in the tekiya carefully preserved their family lineage. It seems that the reason for this was that in the tekiya, the keeping of genealogical records of ritual kin ties was important to the establishment and the validation of their sales territory, namely, the niwaba.

Be that as it may, each ritual kinship group had a "family" name and these names were identified with a "house" or lineage (ikka--literally, one house). Thus any traditional group having a common ritual kin ancestry was recognized as belonging to one of several



Figure 5. The house of Anegasaki and its ritual kin "branch houses." (The names enclosed in parenthesis are the true surnames of the oyabun of each "family.")

dozen ikka which has established niwaba claims in the Tokyo metropolitan area.

Before one considers a specific example of an ikka, it is necessary to understand three more technical terms, honke, bunke, and magobunke. In any group having a common ritual kin ancestry, there was a distinction made between the main line of descent and the branch line. The ritual family of the oyabun who first established a niwaba claim was called the honke. If this person, upon his retirement divided his niwaba claim among two or more of his ritual sons, then there would be honke and bunke houses or lines established. One ritual son would be designated as the successor to the main house (honke) and the other son or sons the head of the branch house (bunke). In time these branch houses could also establish additional branch houses, particularly if they accumulated additional niwaba territory in the meantime. In such an event, these branch houses would be bunke of the house from which they received their bunke-ship, but also be considered a mago-bunke ("grandchild" bunke in relation to the house that was established by the first or original oyabun.[8]

Now for the case example.[9] In Figure 5, there is presented a diagram of a ritual kinship genealogy of the house of Anegasaki and

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8 This system of "lineages" or houses is based on the true kinship system. An example of a true honke-bunke arrangement will be given in the next case study.

9 Data taken from Hiroaki Iwai (1950)

only two of its several branch houses. In this chart, three ikka (Anegasaki, Koshuya, and Fujioka) are presented. Koshuya was a bunke or branch house of Anegasaki, and Fujioka was a bunke of Koshuya. Yamamoto, Inamura, and Watanabe were the names of the oyabun who succeeded to these "houses" in the Occupation period; all other oyabun listed in the diagram have either retired or have died.

This chart, of course, overlooks the power struggles and the "jockeying-for-positions" that went on prior to 1946. A brief recapitulation of this will indicate some of the dynamic elements in the selection of successors in this type of social system. At the outset, however, it must be clearly understood that it was taboo for an oyabun to appoint his natural son as a successor to the "house." The rationale for this code may be presumed to be that once an oyabun has gained enough power and money to establish an ikka, he should be wealthy enough to educate his own son for a gainful occupation other than the Tekiya.

A brief summary of the selection of successors in the house of Anegasaki (see figure 5) follows:[10] The founder of Anegasaki ikka had several kobun, one of whom was a man by the name of Koshuya. While Anegasaki still maintained headship of his ikka, he gave a part of his niwaba to this Koshuya. Koshuya thus established a bunke and brought together a number of kobun including a promising one by the name of Kojima (see Figure 6). When Anegasaki I was ready to retire, he

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10 Data taken from Hiroaki Iwai (1950)

wanted a young man to take over the leadership of his ikka, so instead of picking one of his own kobun, he asked Koshuya to suggest an heir from among his kobun. Kojima was recommended and thus succeeded to the headship, and became Anegasaki II.

When Kojima was ready to retire, another successor had to be chosen. From among his own kobun there were two outstanding candidates, Tajima and Igarashi. The latter had a lot of personal appeal and great physical strength, but Tajima was considered to have better "business acumen." Accordingly Tajima was selected as Anegasaki III, and Igarashi grudgingly left the Tekiya society to join a gangster group. The other former kobun of Anegasaki II, who were before the change ritual brothers' of Tajima, now became kobun of this Tajima.

Among the group of kobun who remained with the ikka, there was one Yamamoto. He first served as kobun to Anegasaki II (Kojima) and then to Anegasaki III (Tajima). Yamamoto finally found his reward by becoming Anegasaki IV upon Tajima's retirement. With this change, three more kobun left the ikka. Two of Tajima's former kobun (A and B) left to be ritually adopted into a gambler's group and one (C) decided to go into the theatrical business.

Each of these changes in headship of the ritual family was duly solemnized by a sake-drinking ceremony not unlike that described for the Sano Gumi. In the postwar period, a few of the more notable ceremonies were written up in the Tekiya newspaper, as was noted in the instance of the succession to the house of Nobara. All of these very elaborate ceremonials and "geneaological" records illustrate



Figure 6. The changes in composition of Anegasaki ikka on the occasion of selection of new chiefs.

how the ritual kinship system embodied an important symbolic mechanism for implementing the feeling that the kumi members belonged to a long and honorable tradition. It was something with which these socially marginal personalities could identify.

Coalitions based on ritual kinship. It is not difficult to understand how kumi belonging to the house of Anegasaki and its branch houses might cooperate closely in business and in social affairs, but what about relations between groups that did not possess common ties? For these groups, it was the common practice to solemnize their affiliations by having their leaders establish a ritual brotherhood pact (kyodaibun). In this regard, Professor Iwai's statement (1950:53) is illuminating:

> When two oyabun enter into a kyodaibun compact, they seem, at first sight, to be in congenial spirits. But upon careful observation, their unity is like a military alliance of feudal lords during the Sengoku Period [1534-1615, i.e., the period of internecine warfare] or like the marriage which unites two clan households. To become a kyodaibun with a man of influence is a short-cut to success in this business: it is a means for establishing security and for expanding the influence of one's "family." Accordingly, there are tenfold and twentyfold kyodaibun relationships that are found today in the tekiya society. In times of conflict, they act as a stabilizing influence in this potentially quarrelsome society and despite the fact that they are formed with self-interested goals in mind, these affiliations constitute an important solidarity group with respect to outsiders.

The kyodaibun relationship was established by the kumi chiefs who, at the prescribed ceremony, exchanged vows of comradeship and solemnized their union by the ritual sake drinking. When two oyabun

thus established a ritual brotherhood compact, their respective kobun became "cousins" (itoko) to each other. At the same time, a set of ritual avuncular-nepotic relationships was established. But these two sets of relationships--the "cousin" and the "nepotic" sets--seemed to be much less important than the ritual brotherhood relationships. If one notes that there were few legal or bureaucratic sanctions that could be applied to force the oyabun members to abide by the decisions and agreements of the group (e.g., those concerning price agreements and trade practices), the sanctions and obligations implied in this kyodaibun relationship were means by which strong moral sanctions were brought into play. An oyabun's honor was involved if he defaulted on an agreement made with a kyodaibun. In brief, then, these ritual kinship mechanisms served to symbolize and solidify the coalitions established among kumi chiefs.

Communication linkage. Aside from the more formalized methods of forming affiliations between two or more kumi, there were several techniques for exchanging information and working cooperatively on a less formal basis. In this kind of association, where human relations were based upon personalized standards of behavior and particularistic modes of evaluating others, it was necessary to have some method whereby contact with strangers could be facilitated. Among several techniques two specific methods were most important: one, the custom of "doing jingi", and the other, the chirashi.

"Jingi", as already noted, refers to an ethical code as well as to a specific ritual. As a ritual, jingi was a traditional form of

greeting followed by many oyabun-kobun groups and especially by the tekiya people. It was always utilized when two strangers had to establish a relationship without the benefit of an intermediary. These strangers would exchange an elaborate and long sequence of utterances, the result of which would indicate each party's ritual kin affiliation and his purpose in wishing to talk with the other person. Thus, a kobun of a korobi oyabun may wish to sell in another oyabun's sales territory for a limited period and, would recite jingi in order to gain the latter's permission. The following is a description by Iwai (1950:57-58) of a jingi ritual as practiced among the Tekiya people:

> Each of the participants removes a part of his clothing, such as the outer garment (haori), a sandal (geta). . . The posture they assume is a squatting position with the right knee on the floor or ground. The left elbow is placed on the left knee while the right hand forms a fist. If the participant has an oyabun, he leaves the thumb outside of the fist. If he is an independent or has no oyabun, then the thumb is enclosed in the fist. /The conversation between them might run as follows:/
>
> A: Please take a seat.
>
> B: No, after you, please.
>
> A: I am but a raw youth (wakazo). Please, you take the seat first. /They make such mutual concessions three times./
>
> B: As you have said it repeatedly, I will take a seat before you, but I think it is not the proper order.
>
> A: Thank you for your taking a seat (and hearing my introduction). Please excuse me if I made mistakes in the words I am going to state now. I was born in Joshu. Joshu is a vast area so I will be more specific. I came from so-and-so of Joshu. At that time, I left home and took up temporary residence at so-and-so in Tokyo. I came to belong to oyabun so-and-so of so-and-so family. I hesitate to give my name because I am inexperienced. However, to give my name: my last name is . . . . . and first name is . . . . . I am just a

beginner at this business who needs the help of you honorable oyabun, anisan and friends. Please remember me (my face) and I ask of your generous help in every way.

B: It is very polite of you. Excuse me but I ought to have greeted you before. By nature I am slow of speech and if I make mistakes in the order of my salutation please excuse me. . . .
[Then the purpose of the visit and the related business is discussed.]

Chirashi: The other way in which communication between kumi was facilitated was the use of the chirashi. Manifestly, thechirashi was an invitation to attend a wedding, a funeral, or some other crisis event affecting a given Tekiya member. But the fact that this so-called invitation extended far beyond the close relationships of the principal person, and the fact that it listed the guests according to a very rigid protocol, indicates that it functioned as a means of notifying or reminding the kumiai society at large of the present membership of the given kumi, its range of affiliations, and changes in status of individuals within this cluster of kumi.

By considering a single chirashi in detail, one may appreciate some of the functions which this instrument served. The chirashi invitation which was issued in December 1946 by Yoshio Inamura, an oyabun of the branch house (Koshuya III) of the house of the Anegasaki may serve as an illustration. The manifest prupose in sending out this invitation was an announcement of a funeral service to be held for the wife of one of Inamura's kobun.

Attached to this formal announcement of the funeral was a list of 143 names to whom invitations were sent. This list included

the following classes of people:

a.	Yoshio Inamura, the oyabun, who was acting as the sponsor since the deceased was the wife of one of his kobun.	1
b.	True family members of the deceased.	5
c.	Inamura's former oyabun, ojibun and others who have retired from their position as headship to the various branches of the Anegasaki house.	21
d.	Inamura's ritual brothers (These included those who served apprenticeship under the same oyabun as he did, and those with whom he formed ritual brotherhood relations after he became an oyabun.)	50
e.	Representative of "friends" of Inamura's ritual family (These included the names of all the leading figures in the Tokyo Rotensho Kumiai, including the one-time president, Kinosuke Ozu.)	45
f.	Funeral arrangement committee (These were selected from the deceased's husband's anikibun and ototobun.)	6
g.	The remainder of Inamura's ritual kin family	5
	Total	143

Several things concerning this list are noteworthy. First of all, in spite of its being manifestly an announcement of a funeral and to receive koden[11], only five true family members of the deceased were listed, the rest of the 143 names being of those who were directly or indirectly connected with the Tekiya business and its complex ritual kinship extensions. Secondly, though there were no direct ritual kin ties with these people, some forty-five of the most influential "bosses" of the tekiya were listed (See part "e" of the above list). Thirdly, not only were the names of the invited listed,

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11 A koden is a customary contribution which a person who attends a funeral usually makes to the deceased's family--an obituary gift.

but also their ritual kin statuses (main house, branch house, and generation). These facts suggest that the chirashi listing functioned as a means to report to the kumiai society at large what the present ritual kin affiliations were and what changes had recently occurred (e.g., due to promotion, withdrawals, and succession). Moreover, the functions of the chirashi in calling together various people in the Tekiya business for a face-to-face meeting on other reasons than business must not be overlooked. The fact that most of the chirashi were issued for announcing deaths, funerals, and succession ceremonies,[18] indicates that the "human side" of the Guild's instrumental organization was being duly recognized.

In summary, this section described some of the traditional ways in which these local groups of tekiya merchants traditionally formed inter-kumi affiliations and established cross-kumi communications. Inter-kumi affiliations were based on the principle of common ritual kin descent and on the conscious formation of brotherhood pacts between two or more oyabun. Communications between strangers within the tekiya system was facilitated by iingi rituals and the practice of distributing chirashi notices. These features of the inter-group relations are important, to keep in mind because, in the next and concluding section of this chapter, they explain in large part the

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18 This is based on the analysis of chirashi received by one relatively minor oyabun. Iwai (1950) pp. 54-55. It does not give the dates on which these were issued but from other data, it may be inferred that they were received between December 1946 and the middle of 1948.

strategy used to handle the competition brought by the thousands of the city's unemployed, war victims, demobilized soldiers, and repatriates.

IV THE POSTWAR ORGANIZATION OF THE STREETSTALL BUSINESS

It is now possible to return to the problem stated at the beginning of this case study. There it was stated that the purpose of the case was to illustrate how oyabun-kobun principles were used by traditional groups to protect their vested extra-legal interests. The postwar organization of the tekiya society provides an excellent example for demonstrating this.

The Problem. The wartime bombings decimated about one-half of Tokyo's heavily populated 656 square miles and caused the displacement of some three million persons. Despite these heavy damages and the lack of housing, some 400,000 repatriates—ex-soldiers and civilians—from various parts of the former empire and nearly two million evacuees who had gone to the countryside returned to the metropolitan district within months after the Surrender. For the thousands of jobless people with limited skills and capital resources in this period, one solution to their quest for employment was seen in the trade that was traditionally the monopoly of the established tekiya people. The "professional" tekiya vendors, however, had no legal right to prevent these destitute people from entering this business, and, accordingly, by the middle of 1946, the police surveys indicated that some 30,000 people were earning their livelihood seemingly in direct competition with the "professionals".

What did the established tekiya people do about this sudden rise of competition? How did they attempt to control and protect their monopoly or vested interest in the trade?

The course of events. When the amateurs first began invading the sales territories claimed by the established tekiya kumi, trouble resulted. In the first few months, the local police received reports of hundreds of cases where the newcomers were threatened, beaten, and physically thrown out from sales spots on the sidewalk, empty lot, and other places where traditionally the kumi operated. Not only were there bitter feelings between the newcomers and the professionals, but also within the tekiya society itself. The wartime bombings left open new areas where business could be conducted, and the oyabun competed with each other to gain possession of them. Dispute between kumi flared out into the open many times and at least six major gang fights took place in the various districts.

Faced with this situation, both the police and the influential tekiya men agreed that something had to be done about this situation. Soon afterward, in the various wards and neighborhoods of Tokyo, the oyabun of the established kumi were observed in the process of forming alliances with each other, and the more influential of these were joining forces with the "bosses" from other wards and districts. At the same time, unorganized amateurs were given a choice of occupying a spot in the niwaba for a price (tribute paid to the kumi) or leaving. To encourage the stability in the streetstall business, the Metropolitan Police Board Ordinance ruled that no one would be issued a license

unless he was an accepted member of an established kumi. Hence legally, a street vendor could not sell without joining a kumi.

This process of incorporating amateurs into the professional group and the joining of forces by different kumi and district bosses continued until a federation of Tekiya operators was completed at the end of 1946.

The outcome. The resulting structure, officially called the Tokyo Rotensho Dogyo Kumiai (Tokyo Streetstall Guild), had a membership of 40,000 persons in 1947. The Guild, while not an ideally efficient or benevolent organization, did accomplish certain ends with some degree of effectiveness. It brought order into an otherwise cut-throat competitive situation; it established a certain degree of regularity and predictability in the daily conduct of business affairs; it minimized gang fights for control over sales territory; and it enabled the limited police force to exercise indirect control over the tekiya business. But most important, from the standpoint of the oyabun, was that it enabled them not only to get official recognition of their niwaba, but also to profit from the membership dues, taxes, street cleaning fees, and other forms of tribute which were systematically collected from the amateurs.

The more than 300 old established kumi became the "cells" in the new guild organization, and the responsible agency for collecting tribute as well as for enforcing price agreements, trade practices, and cooperative purchasing arrangements made by the higher echelon of the Guild. At the next level of guild organization,

the oyabun of the local groups formed a district federation and entered into a ritual brotherhood compact, if they had not been kyodaibun previously.

There were 73 of these district federations in the metropolitan district. Each federation had jurisdiction usually over one recognized shopping area. The organization of each federation had a continuity in command because the policy-makers were, at the same time, kumi chiefs, the most influential of these becoming the boss and representative of the federation. A part of the various assessments collected from individual streetstall operators was retained by these district offices, and in the larger districts this money was used to rent an office, pay its small office staff, and to cover other administrative costs.

With respect to the internal organization, these chapters functioned as an important mechanism by which different kumi chiefs could exchange views and agree on common policies relative to the business problems were discussed, agreements upon price fixing were made, information concerning opportunities to purchase special wholesale or cut-rate items was exchanged and strategies for controlling outside competition were planned. The chapters also cooperatively purchased goods which were required by the street venders, for instance, lumber and awnings for the street-stalls.

In its external relations, the chapter served as a means of coordinating public relations in its district. This meant that the officials of the chapter entertained various locally influential people with whom they wished to keep on good terms, including the

underworld leaders and the local politicians. This entertainment practice is one of the most familiar and established Japanese customs.

From the standpoint of the police interest, these chapters were important in settling open disputes by individual Tekiya men in the use of sidewalk space, keeping clean the areas occupied by the streetstallers, and maintaining police regulations such as those pertaining to sanitation.

As for the organization of the Central Headquarters, this was composed of a less solidaristic group than that of the branch association. It, too, was composed of the most influential persons coming from the lower echelons (i.e., from the district federations) and so it was primarily a council of leaders who agreed to cooperate together on certain issues of common interest. It was not a corporation. Nevertheless the specific accomplishments of this council were noteworthy. They established an office in Shiba ward and placed there a small staff of about thirty clerks and other minor officials.[13] They had established a system by which the Guild collected at least two million Yen between February 1946 and May 1947 in the way of membership fees, "taxes," and other contributions from the rotensho operators.[14]

This money was used to finance several activities which the central headquarters initiated and coordinated. This office participated with the chapters on welfare measures (such as the purchase of drugs and medicines for distribution to the kumi members), published

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13 SCAP Document No. 1. See Appendix B for complete reference.

14 Ibid. At the prevailing military currency exchange rate of 15-to-1, this would mean a sum of about 130,000 dollars.

a newspaper for the Tekiya society, provided entertainment for certain community leaders (as part of the "public relations" activities of the guild), and coordinated and paid for the expenses of several Tekiya "incidents".[15]

By far the headquarters' most important function was what might be described as lobbying activity for this kind of activity, SCAP reports intimated that the kumiai leaders had established certain high-level political connections with members of the Liberal Party, and reports were circulated that some leaders contributed to the campaign funds of that Party (SCAP Document No. 2). Such political interests and "connections" were also suggested by the fact that three kumiai leaders ran for the Japanese parliament, four for the Tokyo Municipal Assembly and five for ward assemblies (Iwai 1950). Most of these candidates ran on the Liberal Party ticket. It was interesting to note that when the Asahi Newspaper Public Opinion Staff interviewed fifty kumiai leaders from various districts in Tokyo, thirty-eight stated they voted for the Liberal Party.[16] Presumably, their subordinates also voted accordingly.

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15 One of these "incidents" took place in Shimbashi. A group of Korean streetstallers were alleged to have been selling "contraband articles" (blackmarket items). To stage a demonstration against this, the central headquarters rounded up by taxis men from various parts of the city.

16 The remaining twelve were distributed in this manner: eight voted for other political parties (Socialist, Liberal-democrat), two gave no response, and two said they did not vote.

A test case of political connections occurred in 1949, when SCAP officials put pressure upon the municipal officials to dissolve the Guild and their streetstall business. Insofar as SCAP was concerned this was a part of its efforts to liquidate the "control associations" of which this Guild was an example. The members of the Guild brought pressure upon municipal government leaders to forestall action on this directive and they were generally successful until the end of 1951, when an orderly procedure was instituted to rehabilitate the streetstall keepers at some expense to the municipal government.[17]

In spite of these accomplishments the means used to achieve these ends were not particularly desirable either from the standpoint of SCAP or the Japanese government. In theory at least there were a number of favorable factors which might have resulted in a more democratic type of organization like a cooperative or an ordinary trade association. One of the most important of these factors was that the large majority of the people engaged in this business were those who were not identified with the traditional "boss" system. Here, then, was an opportunity for skillful organizers to establish an association of streetstall operators on a more "rational" and less particularistic basis. Yet, in the final analysis, these temporary workers succumbed to a system of control and organization that could by no means be regarded as a "cooperative" or a "trade association" in the western sense of these words. The ordinary streetstall operators had no voice nor voting privileges in the management of the Guild affairs, and the power and authority of the assigned

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17 The story of the subsequent rehabilitation is told in O. Kita (1953).

leaders were not restricted by a set of by-laws. The codes and regulations of the Guild were not primarily established by consent or legislative procedure, but by custom and often decree by the "bosses."

It is now possible to summarize this case study of streetstall merchants. The case began with the problem these vendors faced in the early months of the postwar reconstruction period when thousands of unemployed persons descended upon them as competitors. The newcomers threatened not only to destroy their business monopoly, but also to disorganize their apprenticeship system, mutual aid practices, and even their "way of life."

But before the details of this crisis situation and its eventual solution were described, the case study examined the traditional organization and standard business methods of the tekiya society. It was noted that the backbone of the established order was the local group or kumi. Each of these groups had both an instrumental organization well-attuned to pre-war business conditions and an expressive system based upon oyabun-kobun principles. The former organization stipulated methods by which neophytes were recruited, trained, and "staked" in the business and by which price agreements and cooperative purchases were arranged. The latter system provided symbols for expressing the unity and solidarity of the local group, standard procedures for authenticating and transmitting its principal vested interest (sales territory) and customs for promoting mutual aid and general sociability.

The discussion then turned to the consideration of traditional means by which inter-kumi communications and contacts were facilitated.

One basis for establishing formal linkages between groups was the recognition of a common ritual kin ancestry. Descriptions of "main" and "branch house" affiliations illustrated this principle of association. It was also noted that when these local groups could not legitimately claim a common ancestry, associations between two or more kumi could be formalized by means of "brotherhood" compact. In addition to these practices, the case also illustrated how information and assistance could be exchanged less formally. The jingi ritual and the chirashi method of disseminating news--both of which are associated with ritual kinship in Japan--were cited as examples.

Following this background information on the characteristics of the established streetstall business, the case study returned to the original problem: how these people attempted to cope with the large number of "opportunistic" vendors who threatened to enter the tekiya system through "unorthodox" channels.

The facts revealed that these traditional streetstall operators solved their collective problem sagaciously. Local groups combined with each other by means of ritual kinship mechanism previously described and controlled the vital sales territory in each of the important shopping districts of Tokyo. These districts associations then became affiliated through their top leaders into a Tokyo--wide streetstall keepers' association.

The encouragement of the Metropolitan Police Board in taking such steps was, of course, an asset. But the professional tekiya people, themselves, conducted and efficacious public relations program for

protecting their vested interest, organized complex system for collecting revenue and taxes, and enforced a general policy for regulating both business practices and competition. While the tekiya organizers accomplished much in the face of many difficulties, they could not have been so successful had there not been a culturally-approved technique for forming such coalitions. This technique, the study suggested, is inherent in the Japanese ritual kinship system.

CHAPTER V

FARM TENANCY SYSTEM

The third and final case study concerns ritual kinship in a farm tenancy system practiced in Iwate Prefecture and studied by a Japanese sociologist in the 1930's. As noted in Chapter II, the farm tenancy problem has been drastically altered in Japan by the land reform program instituted in the postwar period. At least up until this program, ritual kinship has often been associated with landlord-tenant relations in Japan. The name for this type of tenancy relationship varied from region to region but in Iwate Prefecture where the present case was studied, it was called the nago (literally, "name-child") system.

The socio-economic setting of this case differs from that of the two previous cases. In the first case, the construction workers, though living together with their family in close physical contact in dormitories, looked upon their association as more or less restricted in time and limited to the duration of the construction project. In the second case, the tekiya people viewed their association as more or less permanent, but their ritual kinship relationships were chiefly centered around their business associations, and their true family members were ~~more or less~~ isolated and kept apart from these associations. For example, it was noted that the true sons of oyabun were not permitted to follow in their father's footsteps; they were expected to pursue another kind of career. The socio-economic setting of the present case differs from either of these earlier ones. Here, the landlord-tenant relationships are defined ordinarily as a long-term and more or

less permanent economic arrangement for at least the remaining life of either parties. Moreover, inasmuch as these people lived and worked together in a natural community, their true kinsmen were inevitably brought into their economic relationships. These "external" conditions--the permanancy of their economic relationships and the close ties between economic and familial relationships--characterize the ritual kinship system in the nago type of farm tenancy.

Source materials. There are many excellent studies of Japanese rural villages available, but few have described the sociological aspects as carefully or with as much detail as those reported by Professor Kizaemon Ariga (1939). Of his several studies, the present case is based upon a valuable monograph which Ariga published in 1939. Though this monograph was designed primarily as a sociological study of a large cluster of household units known as the dozoku, and a system of tenancy (nago seido) practiced by this household group, there are sufficient data to warrant their use here as a case study of ritual kinship. The monograph is based on field studies conducted during the period 1935-1936 by Ariga and Takao Tsuchiya, an economic historian.

The original suggestion to use Ariga's materials as a case study for the present dissertation came from Dr. Michio Nagai, formerly a research associate at Ohio State University and now at Kyoto University. Dr. Nagai (1953) was at that time writing a research report on the dozoku and used Ariga's materials as an illustrative case. Since the present writer had spent many hours discussing his report in the formative stages

with him, this experience played an important part in the analysis of the case study presented here, even though Nagai's problem and the present writer's were quite different.

Incidental information about the tenancy relations were obtained from the files of the Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division in which the writer was employed in Japan. More details on these materials and other concerning this case study are presented in Appendix C.

II THE NAGO SYSTEM OF FARM TENANCY IN IWATE PREFECTURE

One of the most traditional types of farm tenancy in Japan is known as the nago system. This type of landlord-tenant relationship, commonly found in isolated mountain villages and in those communities dominated by comparatively large landowning houses, was a system in part based on the oyabun-kobun plan. The landlord was variously called ji-oya ("land-parent"), oya-saku ("cultivator-parent"), or simply as oya-kata ("parent-role"). His tenants were known as ko-saku ("small-cultivator"), ko-kata ("child-role"), nago ("name-child") etc.

While generally all landlords in Japan had the customary right to impose restrictions on the kind of crops to be planted and to prevent the subletting of tenant tracts, the relations of landlord to tenant in the nago system extended far beyond mere economic exchange relationships. For instance, a nago-type landlord was usually asked to act as a go-between (nakodo) in arranging marriages of his tenant's sons, especially if the latter were the eldest son. Furthermore, when a child was born to this

couple, the landlord would be asked to name the child and act as a sponsor at a special ceremony held for that purpose. On festive days, the landlord entertained and feasted his tenants, even hiring professional dancers for the occasion. In return, the tenants paid their "rent" in terms of crop payments--usually one-half--and in labor services. But more than this, there were obligations to participate in religious ceremonies, to bring token gifts, and to help the landlord in preparations in the event of births, marriages, and deaths in the landlord's family. And, if the landlord were politically active either in the village or prefectural levels, his tenants supported him with the appropriate votes.

The nago system, then, was a type of diffused authority system where the landlord was not only a landowner as such, but functioned as a banker to loan money to his tenants in times of need, as a political spokesman in the village government, as a social leader in the community and as a parental figure in a large extended pseudo-kinship system.

It is these over-lapping and diffuse relationships which make the presentation of the present case study more complex than in the previous cases. It will be recalled that for the other two cases, the instrumental and expressive aspects of the socio-economic relationships were distinguished. Here, it is more difficult to draw the line between what is instrumental and what is expressive. For instance, in the present case the landlord usually furnished meals when he called upon his tenants to provide labor services. Is this providing of meals to be considered an aspect of the instrumental relationship or the expressive? When the labor services were provided for ritually significant duties at rice-planting time, the landlord provided a special type of rice and sake--

wine honoring the occasion. Is this an instrumental or expressive aspect of landlord-tenant relations? These examples obviously involve both aspects, but to avoid repetition, they have been more or less arbitrarily included under the discussion of instrumental relationships.

Notwithstanding these difficulties in classifying empirical data that can be only analytically distinguished, an attempt to make meaningful distinction will be made in the chapter. In the section to follow, the instrumental aspects of the landlord-tenant exchange relationships, and the role of ritual kinship in organizing those relationships, will be examined. In the succeeding and final section, the expressive aspects of the nago tenancy relationship will be considered. These problems can be examined more effectively if information about the village and the landlord under consideration is first provided, and the remainder of the present section is devoted to background information.

The village setting. The village in which Ariga and Tsuchiya did their field study was located in Iwate Prefecture on the rugged western slopes of Kitakami, the dominant mountain range of northern Japan. This village, called Arasawa, was more or less typical for mountain communities of the north: Sparsely populated, relatively self-sufficient, handicapped by a short growing season and much snow, blanketed with large stands of deciduous and coniferous trees, impoverished by a dearth of farm land, and dependent upon animal husbandry and sericulture as supplementary income sources.

For their subsistence, the 5,498 villagers were engaged in a limited number of occupations. Most of them were farmers. Of the 898 households, 618 or 68 percent were farm households, while the remainder

were largely those who operated the village shops, ran small home industries, or were dependent upon wage work. By far the village's largest source of income was from the forest and its by-products: lumber, firewood, charcoal, and compost. Next in importance were the agricultural products, of which the most important was rice. Soy beans, wheat, barley, and a variety of vegetables also produced income for the farmers. The total cash value of these agricultural products were slightly less than one-half of that of the forestry products. Animal husbandry, including cattle, horses, hogs, and poultry, resulted in a total value of about one-third of that for cultivated farm products. Small-scale industries produced a cash income of about one-half of the cash-value of animal husbandry. These industries include among a few others, lacquer, wood processing, and stone quarrying.

Ishigami hamlet. Like most rural communities in Japan, the village of Arasawa was divided geographically into smaller administrative units known as the buraku ("hamlets"). There were thirty-nine of these hamlets in Arasawa in 1935. In comparison to those located in less mountainous regions to the south, these hamlets were very small in population. The hamlets here averaged perhaps two to three hundred persons in all. As a result Arasawa's hamlets had greater than usual social cohesion.

Ariga in his field study did not investigate all the hamlets in this village, but focused his investigations in one called Ishigami. This hamlet contained thirty-seven households with a total population of 263 persons. Sociologically this hamlet was divided into several kinds of groupings, but its principal social and economic life seemed

to revolve around one large household of fourteen kinsmen and thirteen servants. It was headed by the largest landowner in the hamlet and a direct descendant of one of the founders of the hamlet. The landowner's name was Zensuke Saito.

The Saito Dozoku. One Japanese sociologist, in attempting to explain why the nago type of tenancy developed in one village and not in another, has used the argument of "historical accident." Thus, in villages where the original settler accumulated and virtually monopolized all agricultural land in the village (e.g., by receiving a fief from the ruling Shogunate), the nago type of tenancy is most often found; whereas, in villages where settlement was first made by many family groups, no one of which dominated the available farm land, the nago type of relationships is not likely to be found. However empirically sound or unsound this generalization may be for other parts of Japan, it is clear that in the present case Zensuke owed his present status as a nago landlord to the former type of "historical accident."

Early in the seventeenth century, when all of Japan was organized in a feudal system under the Tokugawa Shogunate, one of Zensuke's ancestors, Soemon Kaga, first came to Ishigami. Ishigami, then a part of the Nambu fief, grew and prospered, and with it, the family line which Soemon established. The land to which Soemon laid claim was passed on to succeeding generations according to the primogeniture system and therefore was kept from fractionalization. Though the family name had changed in the meantime (in the fourth generation), Zensuke Saito fourteen generations later assumed control of the estate and succeeded to headship of the "house"

of Saito. Although by that time Japan was no longer a feudal society, this long tradition and proud heritage weighed heavily in Zensuke's attitudes toward his land and his behavior toward the tenants who tilled the land.

Under a primogeniture system, the younger sons upon their marriage do not ordinarily inherit any land, but leave the parental home and seek fortunes elsewhere. From time to time, however, it is possible for a given landowning family to accumulate additional land (for example by reclamation or by purchase) and to pass this new land on to one or more of the younger sons who then would have the privilege of establishing what is called a bunke (sometimes bekke), terms meaning "branch house." This is what happened in the fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and eleventh generation families in the house of Saito. These branch houses maintain their line of descent and property down through the succeeding generations much as does the main house.

Thus in the case of the branch houses of the Saito group, eventually nine lines had been established (since in several instances, two or more branch lines were formed in one generation). By the time of Zensuke's generation, however, two branch lines had become extinct, leaving seven still surviving. Inasmuch as all of these houses had the surname, special names (yago) were used to differentiate between the branch houses: Himashi, Sakaya, Nakayashiki, Kagachu, Tahei, Kagazen, and Atarashie. These seven branch houses, called bekke in Ishigami, were affiliated to the main Saito house (honke) by virtue of a recognized common ancestor.

If any of these branch houses were to establish a branch house themselves, this would create another set of honke-bunke relationships, and if these sub-branches of the first branch houses were recognized by the main or original house, there would exist honke and mago-bunke ("grandchild branch house") arrangements between the main house and the sub-branch houses. This happened in Ishigami. In their relatively long history, some of these branch houses grew prosperous, and these in turn established their own branch houses. In 1935, there were five of these mago-bekke. Thus, in all, there were one main house, seven branch houses, and five sub-branch houses recognizing a common ancestor, Soemon Kaga.[3] This group of households was called the Saito Maki, or as Japanese sociologists prefer, Saito Dozoku, the designation to be used here. This group of households, each reckoning descent in its own line, but at the same time all recognizing a common ancestor, may be viewed as the true kinship model or prototype for the ritual kinship system of "houses" and "branch houses" described in the tekiya system, and called ikka.

The nago group. But this sociological picture of Zensuke's affiliations requires further analysis. In addition to the various houses," he was the central figure of another group of eighteen households called the nago households. Within this group, Zensuke had a

3 Since the lineage extends back for a number of generations, the heads of these households are only distantly related. For example, the head of the Sakaya branch house was eighteen degrees of kinship removed from Zensuke. The Japanese civil code, as was noted in Chapter II, recognizes six degrees of kinship as belonging to the circle of relatives.

dual role, that of a landlord and of a ritual father. The ritual kinship aspect was clearly symbolized by the terms which all heads of nago households called him and his family members. According to Ariga the nago tenants called:[4]

Zensuke	o-ya san or danna san ("great house" or "master")
Zensuke's wife	oka san (term for true mother)
Zensuke's sons	ani san (term for true elder brother)
Zensuke's daughter	ane san (term for true elder sister)
Zensuke's father	ii san (term for true grandfather)
Zensuke's mother	ba san (term for true grandmother)

Conversely, when Zensuke spoke to his nago tenants, regardless of the latter's age, he followed the pattern used by the typical Japanese father, that is, by their first names or by subordinating personal pronouns as kisama, omae, and uga.

Zensuke's household. Ariga does not describe Zensuke's personal appearance, his mannerisms, temperament, or hobbies. However, Ariga has provided pertinent information on the family details. For instance, he carefully notes Zensuke's family composition and the respective ages of its various members. This information is summarized in Figure 5. As can be seen from the diagram, Zensuke's family was not only large, but

4 These terms are not regarded as "polite" usage. The fact that a tenant of 40 or 50 years of age would call Zensuke's nine-year-old son "elder brother," in itself suggests that this was not a true metaphorical usage of kinship terms. In metaphorical usage, the speakers would approximate the true kinship situation insofar as age is concerned: a fully grown man simply would not call a young child by sibling terms. These "ritual kin" terms suggest a particular power-authority system; not simple metaphorical kinship.



Figures 5 The extended family of Zensuke Saito. (Numbers below the sumbols represent ages)

Source: Ariga (1939), pp. 40-42. An 18 year-old married daughter is not included in the above diagram.

was an extended family containing four generations of relatives. It was a family of about twice the size of the average tenant's.

In addition to family members, Zensuke's household also included a special type of servant designated as meshi-tsukai (literally, food handlers). Although they were not wage laborers, all of them received their living quarters, clothing allowance, and board from him. In 1935, there were five men and eight women, all relatives of Zensuke's tenants. They ranged in age from a one-year-old child born to a couple in this group to a woman of fifty-seven years. These thirteen servants were, themselves, living in the landlord's household as either complete or partial family units. The reason for their presence in the household need not be discussed here, but it may be said that they constituted an important link in the landlord-tenant relations to be described later.

Zensuke's property. A complete account of Zensuke's property is lacking in the original source materials, but a crude estimate is possible. First of all there were the residence and associated buildings. To house the fourteen kinsmen and the thirteen ritual kinsmen, not to mention the various home industries, required a sizeable plant. The main residence, built in 1823, was a large rectangular structure about 50 by 120 feet with a guest room, several bedrooms, a huge kitchen, many work rooms (for sericulture), and ~~a handful of~~ servants' quarters. Other structures in the large yard included the bath house, an out-house, three barns, a stable large enough for 30 horses, a saw-mill, and a large storehouse (kura).

In addition to these buildings, Zensuke also held title to the old homestead of Zensuke's family. This structure was used in 1935 as

a general meeting place for the dozoku and the patron diety of the group was kept there.

By far Zensuke's most valuable property was land and the products of the land. Zensuke owned some 295 acres of forest land with broad-leaf deciduous trees and mixed stands of conifers and hardwoods. These represented his important capital savings and the major source of his cash income, because from this source, compost, charcoal, firewood, lumber, herbs, mushrooms, and other by-products were regularly harvested. He also owned about eight acres of valuable residential land scattered in strategic places throughout the hamlet. This property, as will be seen presently, played an important role in his relations with tenants.

More important than forest, however, was agricultural land. These were divided, as is typical in Japan, into paddy and upland fields, the former being used for wet-rice production and the latter for many kinds of vegetables and cereals. Zensuke owned some 80 acres of paddy fields and more than 175 acres of upland fields. In a country where a farm household usually can live on three acres, these holdings were considerable. He tenanted all but 1.3 cho of paddy and 2.0 cho of upland fields.[5]

II THE INSTRUMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE NAGO SYSTEM

The foregoing paragraphs, while lacking a discussion of the personal motives and predilections of the individuals concerned, provide the general framework in which Zensuke's instrumental exchange relationships with his tenants may be examined. This will be analyzed in two

5 One cho is equivalent to about 2.45 acres.

parts. One part will be concerned with the method of allocating these tenant lands and the other with the allocation of labor services which constituted a basic part of the tenant's rental.

The allocation of tenancy rights. In large measure, the system of allocating tenancy rights was as much a matter of custom as it was a matter of Zensuke's decision and independent action. When Zensuke succeeded to his position as the head of the Saito Dozoku, he assumed obligations which his forefathers had passed on to him. This was particularly true in the case of the nago tenants of the Saito Dozoku. With respect to the other class, sakugo tenants, Zensuke had greater freedom of choice in allocating tenancy rights. What, then, was the difference between these two types?

Ariga states that the crucial difference between these types was that in the nago type, a house site was provided along with the farm land, while in the other only the farm land was provided, on a rental basis.

However, it is more important for present purposes to note that in the former type, ritual kinship relationships were involved, while in the latter they were not. Thus a house site was provided in the nago type because this could be taken as an expression of the fact that the landlord was a "father" who must provide for his "sons." Zensuke, by providing land on which the nago tenant could build his home was in effect stating that he was acting as the tenant's sponsor in the village and would look after the latter's general welfare. In the case of the sakugo, no such responsibility was noted. The relationship was largely

contractual and limited to these instrumental exchanges of land on the one hand and labor and share-crops on the other. The landlord assumed no sponsorship obligations. This did not, however, prevent the sakugo from being sponsored by another landlord who would then provide the necessary housesite.

The hereditary type: bekke-kaku nago. Within the class of nago there were three sub-types which Zensuke had to consider in allocating tenancy rights to his farm land. The first of these was the bekke-kaku nago ("like branch house" nago) or the "hereditary type." In the common type of nago tenancy, a candidate labors a number of years (usually about ten) in the house of the landlord as a servant, and upon successful completion of such service, he receives tenant land as a reward.

This hereditary, or ascriptive type of tenancy is initially established by a process like that just described, but, for reasons to be explained below, it becomes a permanent tenancy right. In Zensuke's time, there were three such households, headed by Suetaro Saito, Nitaro Saito, and Kamakichi Saito (note that these surnames are the same as that of Zensuke's). These constituted a special type of nago because a particular set of circumstances influenced the selection of the founder of the tenant household and subsequently led to a close, personal relationship between the landlord and the original tenant.

These special circumstances can be illustrated by two cases, the first is that of Suetaro Saito. Suetaro was a second son of Mrs. Iwamatsu Baba, but Mr. Baba, a nago tenant, was not his recognized father. Thus, instead of being raised in the Baba household, Suetaro was ritually adopted

into the household of the landlord who was, at that time, Zensuke's father. The circumstances leading to this decision are not described in the Ariga monograph, but the fact that Suetaro was taken into the landlord's household suggests that Suetaro's natural father might have been one of the Saito clan members. This also would explain why Suetaro was given the surname of "Saito" rather than that of "Baba" which was his mother's married name. At any rate, when he married and left the main house, Suetaro was given a bekke-kaku or hereditary type of tenancy.

The other illustration of how bekke-kaku nago relationships were established may be taken from the history of the present generation of the Nitaro Saito household. Nitaro's grandfather established this hereditary nago household. The grandfather was an unwanted child in a poverty-stricken tenant family and, in accordance with infanticide customs of the time, he was about to be drowned by his parents. The wife of the then head of the Saito main house heard about this and, taking pity on the child, rescued him. She gave him the name, Kataro Saito, and raised him as a foster child. In spite of her loving care (she nursed him with her own milk) and the closeness of daily contact, Kataro was never legally adopted, but remained a ritual son. However, when he reached maturity and was about to be emancipated, Kataro was not treated as an ordinary tenant, but was given a hereditary tenancy, and an elegant house. It was to this tenancy and house that Nitaro succeeded two generations later.

In both of these bekke-kaku nago cases, there were grounds for adoption, but the landowner did not undertake to carry out this procedure. Instead, he assigned each man the status of tenant, and the land remained

in Saito hands. If the head had legally adopted them, he would have had to treat them as natural sons, and perhaps even give them ownership of the land, just as in the case of the heads of true kin branch houses of the Saito Dozoku.[6]

The achievement type: bunke nago. The other two classes of ritual kin tenants can be described more briefly. The first of these was the bunke nago (literally, "branch house nago"). This differed from the first type in that in each generation, the tenant had to achieve or earn the tenancy, whereas, in the first case, once the tenancy was established it became ascriptive and the tenancy was transmitted according to ordinary primogeniture patterns.

A bunke nago earned the right to rent land by laboring for a number of years in the landlord's household as a servant. Thus, if a contemporary bunke nago wanted his son to assume his tenancy rights, it would be necessary for the son to serve time as an "apprentice" in the landlord's household. This explains why there were a number of male servants living in Zensuke's household.[7]

Zensuke in 1935 had nine bunke nago households. These nine households rented a total of 17.8 cho of paddy and 41.0 cho of upland, making

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6 The amount of land tenanted for these three households was:
(a) Suetaro Saito: 2.5 cho of paddy and 2.5 cho of upland.
(b) Komakichi Saito: 2.5 cho of paddy and 4.0 cho of upland.
(c) Nitaro Saito: 3.0 cho of paddy and 7.5 cho of upland.

7 The presence of female servants is a different problem, and will be discussed in the next section.

an average tenancy of nearly 3.0 cho of paddy and 4.5 cho of upland each. Of these nine households, three were in a relatively favorable economic situation in that they owned some land themselves. These lands were generally acquired by gaining special permission from the landlord to reclaim new land. By such methods at least three of these bunke nago tenants have been able to provide their eldest sons with the land of their own, and thus establish independent farm households.

The "lese majeste" type: yashiki nago. The third type of nago tenancy was designated as the yashiki (literally, "residence" nago). The necessity for this type of nago may be understood if one realized that under the primogeniture system, the second and younger sons of a farm household, particularly a poor tenant household, usually either had to leave the village to find gainful employment or had to marry into a landowning family which had no sons. While the opportunity for a son of a tenant farmer marrying into a landowning family was remote, the chances for finding employment elsewhere were almost as rare for many of these "peasants," were devoid of special skills, and lacking interest in living away from the farm. This was particularly true of younger sons of the bunke nago. The number of bunke nago sons who could be hired by the landlord as a servant was limited so their chances for becoming bunke-nago were accordingly limited. However if such sons were determined to remain in the village and raise a family, they could make one of two choices: either to rent farm land from a landowner in a neighboring hamlet,[8] or to engage in some type of home industry. In either case, they would need a small plot of land on which to build a

8 In this case he would become a sakugo tenant of that landlord.

house. To obtain such land, they usually asked their father's landlord. If the landlord approved it, then the son became his yashiki nago. Thus, the third type of nago consisted of those who did not serve a period of apprenticeship in the landlord's house, but who were given a plot of land through the "connections" they had with the local landlord.

There were in 1935 six such households with a total of 41 persons. Now, in theory, these nago had no claim to tenancy farm land because they did not serve a period of apprenticeship in the landlord's house. But, as a matter of fact, three tenants of the six actually operated a very small paddy field (1.5 cho each) which belonged to yashiki nago, the Saito landlord. Moreover, two additional households rented a token amount of upland (0.5 and 1.0 cho, respectively). But all these were lands which their father or elder brother had earned the right to tenant, and which had been assigned to them by these relatives. The one remaining yashiki nago who had not rented any land from Zensuke actually supported his family by tenanting small parcels of land from three different branch houses of the Saito Dozoku: Nakayashiki, Atarashie, and Tahei. Thus, with respect to the main house, he was a yashiki nago, but with respect to these branch houses, he was the sakugo of each.

Rates of rental payment. Thus far, the different classes of tenants and the allocation of tenancy rights to them were described. A word or two of explanation about the payment of rent needs to be made before a description of how the labor services of these tenants were utilized.

In general, rental rates were determined by oral agreements, which in turn were partially governed by the local customs of Ishigami.

The mode of payment was not money, but crops and labor services. When the tenancy agreement was made, each parcel of land involved in the transaction was defined according to the type of rental required. Land which required as rent a certain proportion of each harvest was called wakesaku; and land which required labor services, yakuji. In Table III, there is shown the amount of wakesaku and yakuji lands rented by each of Zensuke's tenants. Since rice was the most important crop for rental payments and since rice was grown in the paddy fields, the statistics for wakesaku and yakuji lands are presented accordingly to paddy and upland classifications.

Zensuke required one-half of the crop as rental for all sharecrop land. For the reader who is interested in computing Zensuke's income from this source, it may be stated that the average rice yield per cho of land was about 6.1 koku or roughly 31.2 American bushels. This was very low, for the average yield for Japan as a whole was 20.2 koku in 1943.[9]

This "artificial" division of tenant land is a curious thing which Ariga does not seem to explain. That is, why did not all of the land rented by a tenant require payment in crop? If fifty percent of the crop yields for the entire land was too much, then, why could not the percentage of the required crop yields be reduced? It seems to the author that there were at least two good reasons for this. One is that it is easier to compute the rent and the other is that it was a method for reducing the amount of rent, in given circumstances according to the particular needs of the tenant, without actually reducing the rate of rent. That is, if a given tenant had a larger household than others

9 Asahi Nenkan (1951), p. 383.

TABLE III

AMOUNT OF WAKESAKU AND YAKUZA LAND
RENTED FROM ZENSUKE SAITO BY EACH TENANT CLASS

	PADDY		UPLAND	
	Yakuza	Wakesaku	Yakuza	Wakesaku
Bekke-kaku Nago				
Saito, Suetaro.....	1.0	1.5	2.5	1.0
Saito, Komakichi.....	1.0	1.5	3.0	1.0
Saito, Nitaro.....	1.0	2.0	5.5	2.0
Bunke Nago				
Saito, Fukumatsu.....	0.6	2.0	4.0	1.5
Saito, Matsutaro.....	1.5	1.8	2.7	2.0
Hashimoto, Tetsugoro....	0.5	1.7	3.0	1.5
Hashimoto, Sataro.....	0.7	1.5	3.0	2.5
Hashimoto, Magozo.....	0.6	0.6	5.0	.....
Hashimoto, Torazo.....	0.6	2.0	2.5	2.0
Baba, Iwamatsu.....	0.5	0.6	2.5	1.0
Baba, Takematsu.....	0.5	1.0	2.5	1.5
Yamamoto, Kanematsu.....	1.5	.....	4.0	.....
Yoshiki Nago				
Yamamoto, Harumatsu.....	.....	1.5	1.5	1.2
Ishida, Umanosuke.....	0.5	1.0	2.0	1.0
Hashimoto, Nagoroku.....	.....	.....	0.5	.....
Hattori, Seiji.....	.....	.....	1.0	.....
Ishida, Harumatsu.....	.....	1.5	1.0	.....
Ishida, Ishizo.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sakugo				
Ishida, Shishi.....	.....	0.5	1.0	.....
Ishida, Nagota.....	.....	.....	1.5	.....
Asuka, Nagotaro.....	.....	0.6	3.0	2.0
	10.3	24.3	51.7	20.2

Source: Ariga (1939), p. 72. Data given in chō units:
One chō equals 2.45 acres.

and could not pay the usual rent, he might be given permission to reduce the amount of sharecrop land, but not the rate of rent on whatever sharecrop land he operated. In this way, the "face" of individuals concerned might be saved.

The allocation of tenants' labor services. Having examined the method by which Zensuke's farm lands were allocated to his tenants, one may now consider how he utilized the labor services provided by his tenants. As noted in Section I, Zensuke had inherited from his father a going concern in several home industries (sericulture, horse and cattle-brreding, lacquer works, and saw-mill operations), a large tract of forest--which, incidentally, was probably sufficient in itself to provide him and his family a fairly secure existence--and a considerable amount of farm land. These various economic enterprises required more labor than he and his family could provide. The manner in which labor for his tenanted land was furnished was already discussed, but the problem of carrying on some of his forestry operations and all of his home industries were not. These labor requirements may be briefly listed:

1. Extra laborers for his small personal farm.
2. Helpers to assist the craftsmen in the wood and lacquer industries.
3. About forty man-days of hard labor for timber-cutting and collecting firewood.
4. Women laborers for sericulture activities.
5. Occasional work for general clean-up and maintainance of the physical plant.
6. A limited amount of labor connected with horse and cattle-breeding activities.

The interesting fact is that in all these operations, only two wage laborers were hired. The rest were provided by his tenants.[10]

One obvious reason for these "side-line" activities was climatic. In this region where the growing season was short, the farmers would be non-productive, if it were not for such side-line occupations. In the present case, Zensuke profited by this seasonal character of farming and utilized the "free-time" of his tenants to advantage. However, not all of his labor requirements came in the off-season period.

For instance, the care of his personal farm was not. For this work, he required about 15 man-days a year from his "achievement type" of nago tenants and about seven man-days a year from both his yashiki nago and sakugo tenants. The preferred class of nago, bekke-kaku nago, did not supply any labor for this work. Since there were nine households of bunke nago, six households of yashiki nago, and three households of sakugo, the total amount of man-days of labor that Zensuke received to work his small farm would be roughly 198, or practically the entire growing season in this part of Japan.

The labor force used in the wood and lacquer industries and the timber-cutting and firewood collections was less systematically calculated and common "rules of thumb were followed. Those tenants who lived nearer to Zensuke's house tended to be called upon more frequently than those living on the other side of the hamlet. At the same time, these were likely to be the ones more familiar with Zensuke and to receive special favors from him. The tenants who had a large family of able workers were also the most likely to be called upon for these activities.

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10 There were in 1936, 58 men and 50 women between the ages of 10 and 60, among Zensuke's tenant households.

As for the sericulture industry, the women servants in Zensuke's household were utilized. The income from this activity, of course, was used to defray part of their living expenses.

For the semi-annual cleaning of the landlord's large house, these women and people from the tenants' families were called. Men from the tenants' households were also required for the care of the landlord's yard and barns. Zensuke felt freer to call on workers for home industry and household chores than for farm work, but even so, he took into account the number of workers available in each tenant house when issuing requests for laborers.

When Zensuke ordered workers to appear, it was customary for him to provide four meals a day to each laborer, and at rice-transplanting and firewood-cutting time, he supplied rice-wine and special delicacies.

The handling of the cattle and horse breeding activities require more explanation. In general, it parallel the land tenancy system. To his favored nago tenants, Zensuke "loaned" a head or two of horse or cattle. The obligations of the borrower were to feed and care for the animal and to breed it whenever practical. Aside from occasional directives from Zensuke to bring along a horse when the tenant was to supply labor service, the only other obligation was to sell the product of a successful attempt at breeding. When the animal was about two years old, the tenant would take it to the annual horse or cattle fair and sell it, splitting the price with the landlord. According to Ariga, the tenants considered borrowing an animal a special favor because it not only provided manure for fertilizer, but was a source of cash in the event it was sold. The interesting part of this exchange relationship

is, however, that, if the animal died while in the tenant's care, there was no damages to be paid.

In summary, there was much evidence for the interdependent nature of Zensuke's seemingly separate economic activities. His fundamental economic relationship with his tenants, both nago and sakugo, constituted the basic source of labor supply for his economic activities. His tenants tilled his lands, collected firewood from his forests, supplied extra labor for the various home industries, and bred his animals. Yet, at the same time, he had certain customary obligations with respect to his tenants, especially his nago "children." He could not, at his discretion, turn away those tenants who "belonged to the village" and who had legitimately gained the right to use the land.

III EXPRESSIVE ASPECTS OF THE NAGO SYSTEM

Ariga presents no simple measure of the standard of living of these tenants, but the general impression one can glean from the data is unmistakable. The tenants were virtually destitute. Accumulated savings were unthinkable and their living was on a hand-to-mouth basis. Crop failures, even minor ones, constituted a disaster to the household. The economic disparity between Zensuke and his tenants was so great that comparison would be ludicrous. What form of social control, then, did Zensuke and his predecessors follow to maintain a stable landlord-tenant relationships in the face of economic disparity and deprivation?

This question is difficult, but to a considerable degree the "expressive" aspects of the landlord-tenant relations--ceremonial observances, mutual aid practices, common value-orientations--have played a part in allaying hostility and in softening the blow, so to speak, of economic hardship. In this concluding section, an attempt will be made to indicate how ritual kinship mechanisms have been used to organize these expressive aspects of the landlord-tenant relationship. These mechansism were very much in evidence at crisis events--births, marriages, and funerals--and in local festivals, situations in which the compadrazgo customs are utilized in the Catholic communities of Latin America.

Births. The well-known Japanese folklorist, Kunio Yanagida, and his students have accumulated an immense list of names used for substitute parents in various districts and regions of Japan, past and present. Within this vast collection, the names for substitute parents who participate in naming and other ceremonies related to birth are conspicuous. Yet, these collections almost never indicate what is the pre-existing relationship of this "parent" to the true parents of the child. In Ariga's report, however, it clearly specifies that the person selected to act in naming ceremonies of nago children and even to select the child's name is almost always the landlord. The name-giver is called nazuke-oya. Ariga gives a pragmatic reason for this, namely that tenants deliberately seek the landlord as a nazuke-oya for self-interested ends. For example the nago may hope to receive help in defraying expenses of the naming ceremony or they may wish to commit the landlord to take a personal interest in the child's future welfare, much as the compadres

of high social standing are sought after in some Latin American communities. Gift exchanges also take place between the landlord and the tenant in the event of a birth in either party's household. Interestingly enough, eggs were among the standard items exchanged.

Marriage of Zensuke's servants. Marriage provides another excellent example of the expressive aspects of Zensuke's exchange relationship with his ritually-related tenants. The particular content of these expressive acts, however, varied according to whether the person to be married was a landlord's household servant or an offspring of a tenant living with his parents.

For marriage of his household servant, Zensuke assumed the burden of costs of the marriage of servants. He even took the obligation to find prospective spouses for his servants who were, as noted before, his ritual children. The marriage ceremony, if the servant were a man, would be held in the same room used for the marriage of his own offspring. The interesting part of this entire affair was that Zensuke assumed the full responsibilities of a true parent to both bride and groom. The true parents of the prospective groom were not consulted about the arrangements; they merely attended the marriage ceremony as interested third parties.

If the person to be married were a female servant, Zensuke would be responsible for her trousseau and assume the general role of a parent in all the arrangements, as well as that of a nakodo, the traditional "go-between" for all Japanese arranged marriages.

Since the expenses related to marriage arrangements for his household servants were considerable, it may be asked why the landlord assumed such obligations. To answer this question it is necessary to ask why they were selected as servants in the first place. In the case of the five men, this was understandable because as explained before, they were candidates for one of the houses of the "achievement" or bunke nago type of tenancy. But in the case of the eight women no economic rationale can be given.

This problem aroused Ariga's interest and he stated that from an economic standpoint, these servants were "surplus" and did not really contribute to the household budget. The care of silk worms and the related sericultural activities was the chief occupation of these women. Ariga concluded that this work was not great enough to justify employment of eight female servants. He therefore felt that the reason Zensuke accepted these women was that their parents were too poor to take care of them, and as a ritual father, Zensuke was obligated to look after the welfare of his "children." The marriage expenses that Zensuke assumed were an extension of this basic obligation.

The marriages within the nago group. The nago offspring married other nago children more frequently than non-nago young people. Sometimes the marital bonds extended beyond the nago of Ishigami, but most frequently the marriages were between children of nago within the community. There was evidently no explicit obligation on the part of a nago to obtain the landlord's permission for marriage. But his permission was sought quite often, Ariga explains, so as to obtain Zensuke's

blessing, gifts, and loans. Since most nago tenants were very poor, the cost of a marriage ceremony would be a heavy burden to any nago household budget. By asking the landlord's permission, they received the following: first, Zensuke's wife was usually sent down to supervise the general arrangements for the ceremony. Secondly, if helpers were needed, Zensuke sent a group of nago members. Such workers received credit for this work as part of their "labor service" to Zensuke. Thirdly, he loaned the nago dishes, cooking utensils, rice, tatami (floor covering), and even a complete wedding dress and outfit for the bridal couple--all of which were kept on hand by Zensuke for such purposes.

Symbolic gifts exchanged at marriage. The foregoing "expressive" elements were not the only ones involved in marriage. Highly formalized gift exchanges also took place.[11] Basically, there were two types in this village, oiwai sen (festive money) and hanamuke (present or gift usually given on "going away" occasions, but here it had a special usage). When a member of the landlord's household was married, the nago tenants brought 2, 5, or 10 sen (depending upon the type of nago) gifts as oiwai sen and a hanamuke gift. The latter was usually a towel, yard or so of textile, or even a small bag of homegrown products such as eggs, persimmon, or chestnuts.

On the other hand, when a member of a nago household was married, the landlord sent an oiwai sen of about the same amount as the one received from his ritual child; but the hanamuke gift was one Yen (i.e., 100 sen). Why was this dual gift exchange system used?

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11 Readers of Marcel Mauss' monograph, Essai sur le don may find this case of gift exchange interesting.

These gifts were not meant for a Potlach-type of competitive gift-giving game; they were meant to express "good human relationships." As the result, the oiwai zen represented, Ariga reports, feeling of equality and reciprocity between the two exchangers. The hanamuke, on the other hand, when given by the landlord, was more of a gift in which the parental role of the "provider" was expressed. It was a "practical" gift which the receiver could use and even needed, in view of his economic circumstances.

"Expressive" exchanges at funerals. Marriage was not the only crisis event in which these expressive elements pâyed a role in the landlord-tenant exchange relationships. The death of a person brought forth a number of symbolic expressions and related obligations. These may be differentiated according to whether the death occurred in the ritual father's family or in the family of the ritual son.

In the case where death occurred in the ritual father's family, the nago tenants, like the landlord's branch house members, were obliged to attend the wake services each night for seven days. The village priest and his assistant, a novice, officiated at the services which included more than one hundred persons. A light supper was given to everyone, and in order to defray part of the expenses, nago as well as other households were expected to contribute at least once during the period.

Sakugo households also attended, but they were not required to participate in this second aspect of the funeral ceremonies. After burial, the nago and the true kin (bekke) households were required to visit the grave twice each day--morning and night--for seven successive

days. Finally, on the 21st, 49th, and 100th days after death, the nago and the true kin households met together at the landlord's house for brief services held for the deceased.

When death occurred in the house of a nago, the ceremonies were less elaborate and fewer persons attended. Instead of a priest and his assistant, only the novice came, the landlord paying for his services. The landlord attended in person if the deceased were the tenant, but if he were one of the latter's children, usually the landlord's wife was sent. The expenses of the funeral were often advanced by Densuke as an expression of his role as a ritual parent.

In these funeral obligations, as in marriage, the role of the landlord with reference to a death in the nago's family was, formally, the same as that assumed when a death occured in one of the branch houses of the Saito Dozoku. Similarly, the funeral "contributions" made were formally the same in both cases. But the amount differed. In the case of a branch house funeral, the landlord's contribution was made in a form of a koden (an obituary gift) of .10 to .20 Yen and a tetsudai (literally, an "assistance") of one sack (ippyo) of rice. The nago household, on the other hand, received a koden of .01 or .02 Yen and either one-half of a sack of rice or a ration of sake wine of equivalent value. The koden gift, like the oiwai sen marriage gift, was a token gift to be reciprocated in roughly equivalent amounts. The tetsudai, however, was like the hanamuke marriage present, that is, one which varied according to the status of the giver.

Festivals: Hachiman-to. These "expressive" exchanges between the landlord and his tenant were not confined to crisis events. They were also institutionalized in the ceremonial calendar of the community. The most important of the regular festivals was the Hachiman-to, the celebration of the patron deity. On the 15th of each month, every household head in the community gathered at the original homesite of the Saito Dozoku where the diety, Hachiman, was kept. After a ritual of offering food to the god, the group of household heads drank amazake (a sweetened rice-wine) and ate simple food, like beans. The manifest purpose of the meeting was to pay homage to the local god, but at the same time, the exchange of news and gossip was apparent. It was a convenient way of reaffirming face-to-face relationships among the villagers.

In addition to these regular monthly meetings, there were two special meetings, one in January and one in August. On these occasions, the village priest was called to conduct a formal, full-scale service. At these times also, a new household head was appointed as caretaker of the shrine and meeting-place. Formerly, all the expenses related to the upkeep of the shrine and the refreshments at these monthly meetings were borne by the head of the Saito Dozoku, but since the turn of the century, they were paid by contributions from each household in the community.

Other festivals. The traditional girl's day (March 3) and boy's day (May 5) festivities were celebrated, but since the tenants were too poor to have their own dolls, the landlord's house displayed its large collection, and the branch house members and the nago household members

attended en masse. There were also festive occasions when professional dancers were brought to the landlord's house. Of these, the "rice-transplanting dance" festival (Taue-odori) and the shinto ritual dance (Zato-kagura) were the most important. On these occasions the tenants as well as the members of the landlord's branch houses met at the latter's home.

The most evident symbol of the solidarity of the landlord and his nago tenants appeared on New Year's day. The tenants visited the landlord's house and worshipped at the altar of the honke's house god, a Shinto diety. The only other group attending this intimate "family" service consisted of members of the true-kinship branch and sub-branch houses of the Saito Dozoku. The fact that the unrelated nago tenants worshipped the dozoku's patron diety indicated the extent to which their ritual kin ties were recognized as symbolic evidence of their membership in the group-poverty or no poverty.

In the mere listing of these expressive aspects of the landlord-tenant relationship, it is easy to overlook the time and energy consuming, not to speak of the expensive, nature of Zensuke's role. All of these exchange relationships were focused on him. As a landlord, he had to deal with twenty-one tenants, each with their special problems and ambitions. But as a ritual father, there were nearly 100 persons who constituted the families of his ritual children. If one adds his ceremonial and kinship obligations with respect to his twelve dozoku households, the number of persons involved runs into several hundred. Yet occasionally he maintained his role with virtually no administrative staff. His wife/ aided him in fulfilling some of his ritual kinship obligations and

his eldest son acted as a kind of farm foremen to collect rent and to issue work orders to the tenants. But other than these helpers, this duty was largely his own. As much as he might have liked to shirk his ritual obligations, both from the financial and self-interest standpoint the evidence seems to be that he carried them out faithfully. Apparently, these expressive aspects were important to him and to his tenants.

To summarize this final case study, then, the ritual kinship relations between Zensuke and his tenants were more involved and integrated than either of the two previous cases. True relatives were incorporated into the sphere of ritual kin ties to a much greater degree. Births, marriages, funerals, and holidays were particularly significant in demonstrating the expressive ties of the landlord to his tenants. Greater economic dependency was placed in the hands of the "ritual father;" yet, there were strong traditional "checks" against the landlord in usurping his authority as in the allocation of tenancy rights. And, finally, the participants viewed these ties as a more enduring set of farm tenancy relationships which would extend beyond the present generation.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATIONS

This dissertation has explored one institutionalized aspect of contemporary Japanese society, an aspect which is currently designated by social anthropologists as ritual kinship. This Japanese form was called oyabun-kobun system. While a description of this Japanese institution must necessarily entail at least a partial analysis of the social structure of the society in which it is "located," this was not the primary purpose of the study. Rather, the principal objective was to introduce to social anthropologists and other students the form and operation of a case of ritual kinship not yet widely known. This meant that an analysis of the points at which the pseudo-kin system and the total social system of Japan are articulated must perforce be sacrificed in favor of a more intensive analysis of the former system itself. Nevertheless, it is hoped that readers who are more interested in the subject-matter of Japan than in ritual kinship may have found in this study an explanation of interesting aspects of the society that were not previously understood. Perhaps such readers can now comprehend better than before the cultural tools a labor boss of the oyabun-type uses to keep a group of arrogant workers under his control, the mechanics of the so-called "extended family" organization, and the diffuse social, political, and religious ties between a landlord and his nago tenants. In line with the stated objective of the dissertation, then, this concluding chapter reviews some of the formal but operational aspects of the Japanese case of ritual

kinship and recommends for future ritual kinship studies certain lines of inquiry and general points of reference which have grown out of this study. But before these technical details are presented, the study as a whole is briefly recapitulated.

I SUMMARY

Put simply, this study attempted to add one more case to the available literature on ritual kinship. Its substance was divided into three parts: the first laid the theoretical or conceptual grounds for the study; the second described the structural or formal aspects of the Japanese case of ritual kinship and the cultural factors which support it; and the third illustrated by means of case studies the operation of the system in three typical situations. A brief description of each of these parts follows:

(1) Evidence for the widespread extent of ritual kinship institutions, both in time and space, was cited, and a proposition, first advanced by Professor Benjamin D. Paul, agreed to: namely, that ritual kinship be treated separately from kinship proper, on the one hand, and "associations" or sodalities, on the other. Systems of ritual kinship, it was argued, have characteristics basically different from either of these traditional anthropological categories for describing social structure. With respect to kinship structure, ritual kinship differs in that there are no biological or consanguineal underpinnings; it is entirely independent of blood ties. However, with respect to the residual category of associations, ritual kinship lacks the complex embellishments

familiar in these "non-kinship" groupings--a lack created by the very restrictive principles of organization borrowed from the true kinship system.

(2) Following this definition of the concept of ritual kinship, background information on the oyabun-kobun institution was presented. Three main points were stressed: The first concerned the relationship of this institution to other cultural features of contemporary Japanese society. Despite a high degree of industrialization, it was noted that the Japanese still cling to a moral and ideological outlook developed in the feudal period and deliberately fostered by the state and schools in the period of modernization. The keynote of this traditionalism was found in the widely held ethical code of familism. Within the kinship structure of the society, the cherishing of such values can be understood, but the maintenance of familial ideology among unrelated persons seemed more difficult of comprehension. The study suggested that it is in this latter area that oyabun-kobun principles find their function. Pseudo-kin ties could be invented; ritual families could be constructed; and even clan-like descent lines could be reckoned by proper utilization of oyabun-kobun principles.

The second point concerned the extent to which ritual kinship customs are practiced in modern Japan. Five conspicuous sectors of the society were regarded as being significantly organized on these principles. These were: extreme rightist groups; gangster and racketeering syndicates; traditional craft guilds; day-workers and casual laborers; and landlord-tenant groups. Of these, the last three were seen as the most numerous and qualitatively the most important.

Finally, comparative technical details on the structure of the oyabun-kobun system and the true kinship system were offered. This analysis was prefaced by a statement suggesting that a serious anthropological study of either system is yet to be published.

(3) The third aspect of the dissertation demonstrated by the case method how the oyabun-kobun system works in concrete situations. One case study of a construction company examined the formation of these ritual kin compacts between an employer and his recruiter foremen, on the one hand, and between these foremen and their temporary workers, on the other. The second case treated this system in the context of a guild-like streetstall merchants' association. How ritual kinship mechanisms facilitate the formation of business coalitions and the protection of vested interests was the human problem featured here. The final case portrayed how the oyabun-kobun system works among a landlord-tenant group in northern Japan. Here, the case was used to illustrate the role ritual kin mechanisms play not only in the economics of tenancy practices but also in the structuring of social and religious life of these farmers. Thus, each of the three cases was designed to particularize one or two functions or facets of the oyabun-kobun institution.

In sum, the, the three substantive sections of the dissertation provided a conceptual groundwork for the study, a set of structural principles for the Japanese system of ritual kinship and the system's cultural "support," and a description of the functions of the system by means of case studies. Consequently, this dissertation did not claim to analyze the historical development of the institution. Neither did it aim

to make systematic comparisons with analogous institutions of other societies. This it left to future studies.

One word of caution is, however, necessary in this summary. A study such as this, which attempts to focus on a single aspect or institution within a society, runs the risk of having its findings misinterpreted. Since attention is drawn upon one aspect, this very focus may be understood by the casual reader as the keystone of the social structure of Japan. Professor Kluckhohn (1944:69), writing in his Navaho Witchcraft, emphatically cautions his readers not to interpret witchcraft as "the key" to the "workings of Navaho society." He advises that his study of one aspect of the culture is a "point of departure" and "a convenient heuristic device for the task in hand." Along the same lines, it may be dogmatically stated here that the present study does not claim that the oyabun-kobun system is the one magic clue to understanding the dynamics of Japanese social relations generally. It only claims that the system has relevance for understanding the behavioral expectations of groups designated in Chapter II.

II INTERPRETATIONS

The three cases in the substantive part of this study presented much data about concrete groups, but drew only limited generalizations about the nature and significance of the oyabun-kobun system as a whole. In this section of the concluding chapter, the author attempts to record his broad interpretations, tentative though they may be, about the system. The crux of these interpretations center around these two questions: First, what is the significance of these ritual kin ties to those who are

so affiliated? And, secondly, what common group or social problem are "solved" by the formation of these groupings?

The meaning of oyabun-kobun relationships. The comments to follow concern the affective and cognitive meanings the oyabun-kobun pattern of human relationships has for the people involved in the three cases. At the outset, one fundamental assumption must be clarified. Though the author, at times, may have failed to recognize this when presenting the cases, he holds to the view that customs or regularities of behavior do not persist merely because of "inertia." "Custom is not just 'natural'," Professor Homans (1950:282) advises, "it is a miracle, and its persistence demands more than inertia alone." The point of view taken here is that persistent customs are, in some measure, more "rewarding" than they are "punishing" to the individuals concerned. While neither the precise values of "rewards" and "punishments," nor the amount of rewards over punishments required to maintain the oyabun-kobun relationships can be stated in the abstract, often it is possible to allude qualitatively to these aspects in concrete cases. It is in the sense of rewards and punishments, then, the "meaning" of oyabun-kobun relationships will be discussed here.[1]

These aspects may be considered first from the standpoint of the kobun, then from the standpoint of the oyabun. Since in the cases examined here, the important linkage of a given ritual kin group took place between these two parties and not between one ritual "son" and another, the rewards

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[1] Less psychologically-oriented terms like "assets" and "liabilities" or "gains" and "costs" may be substituted. The "cost" concept has been used by Professor Kluckhohn in his well-known Navaho Witchcraft (1944:66).

and punishments latent in a kobun-to-kobun relationship will not be specifically examined.

The advantages or rewards gained by the kobun in establishing a ritual kin relationship may begin this discussion. In all three case studies examined, several dominant themes persist in the social personalities of the kobun. Virtually all of them, in contrast with their oyabun, were considerably poorer, had less experience, lower social standing, and fewer personal "connections." Thus, the kobun laborers in the construction enterprise, the kobun streetstall merchants, and the kobun tenants, all had considerably less "bargaining power" with respect to their superiors. Sometimes the oyabun deliberately sought ritual "sons" of this type, as in the case of the tekiya, and at other times, it was an inherent part of the larger "system" which brought "father" and "sons" together in the first place, as in the case of the farm-tenancy system. Whatever the conditions bringing the kobun and oyabun together, the fact seems to be that the former was always at a strategic disadvantage and had considerably less bargaining power in determining the terms of the exchange relationship.

To make this concrete, in the case of the construction crew it was Sano who had control over the placement of the kobun and other workers to the jobs in his kumi: in the tekiya, the oyabun monopolized the sales territory without which no kobun could sell his goods, and still be assured of his personal safety; and in the tenancy case, the oyabun owned the land that was necessary for the nago tenant's livelihood. With the possible exception of "hereditary" nago tenants, all kobun in these cases were

competing, so to speak, with any other person who might be given the permission to take the job, the sales territory, or the tenant land. If the person whom the oyabun was considering as a kobun did not like the terms of the exchange relationship, the oyabun could "always find another person." The kobun had little choice. The kobun, if he accepted these terms, would feel obliged to his oyabun for having been given the privilege of having the job, the sales territory, or the farm land. In terms of Japanese ethical concepts, the kobun felt giri ("obligation") to his oyabun.

But the amount of giri felt by the kobun, broadly speaking, seemed to be different in the three cases. The kobun in the construction crew seemed to have the least feeling of obligation, while in the tenancy case, the kobun felt the greatest; with the tekiya kobun somewhere in between. These differences can be inferred from the "amount" of economic or instrumental rewards each type of oyabun provided his kobun. Thus, the construction crew oyabun provided housing for the kobun, gave special perquisites and more pocket money than to non-kobun, but the underlying fact was that he could not guarantee all his kobun a job on a long-term basis. The tekiya's local boss was in a more favorable circumstance with regard to tenure; moreover, he usually provided his kobun with a considerable part of the latter's medical, clothing, and housing expenses. In the farm case, the privilege of renting land was a lifetime arrangement for the kobun and his family; hence the obligation was profound.

Aside from consideration of the immediate gains, at least in two cases there was some hope for the kobun for future advancement. The kobun

of the construction crew and that of the tokiya felt that if they successfully passed their apprenticeship, and if they possessed some ability, they might one day become oyabun. No such hope, of course, could be realistically held in the case of the nago tenants. In the former two cases, then, the ritual kinship system provided an alternative channel of social mobility within the narrow confines of the oyabun-kobun society.

But the elements in the exchange relationships with the oyabun were not limited to these economic or instrumental considerations. Here, again, the giri obligations can be inferred as being "heavier" in the case of landlord-tenants than in either of the other two cases. The ceremonial observances at times of birth, marriage, and death, the special parties, the entertainments--the costs of which were largely borne by the landlord--added to the "rewards" received by the kobun. In the two other cases, these "expressive" observances were less frequent and less institutionalized.

To gain these "rewards," the kobun recognized that certain very demeaning types of behavior were expected of him. For instance, when a kobun met an oyabun walking down the street, he took off his hat and greeted him properly; when he consulted with his master, he was expected to sit stiffly and respectfully. He was also required to do many menial tasks, run personal errands for his oyabun, and act as a personal servant. In our eyes these acts indicate lack of respect for human dignity; they represent an authoritarian and hierachical relationship of the worst kind.

Yet, there were not only the usual institutional checks against an abuse of authority, but also certain arts of "gamesmanship" which the kobun practiced. For instance, in the construction crew study, it was noted that the team leader had to go to the reluctant worker's dormitory to get him out of bed. While the worker might show respect to the team leader by immediately arising and hurrying out to work, one wonders whether or not this is one type of subtle and deliberate insubordination. Or another illustration might be given: the dissatisfied tenant, when requested to put in a day's work for the landlord, may either report to work very late or send his son instead of himself: the excuse given by the tenant will be humbly and respectfully phrased but would be lacking in "sincerity." This kind of insorbordination, apparently widespread in Japan, is frequently noted by Japanese writers. One of these authors, after describing what he calls "socially sanctioned insubordination" in the army, business, and governmental offices, asserts:

> . . . The same situation exists in the relation of the master of the household to his servants. The master will give orders and directions in a most imperious manner. The maid or the gardener or the carpenter who has been hired to make some repairs will bow most meekly and readily vow to obey the master's slightest bidding. Then the maid or the gardener or the carpenter will blandly proceed to carry out the work in accord with his or her own ideas to how the work should be done. Which may be entirely different from the way the master had ordered.
>
> It is an inexcusable discourtesy and insolence to disagree with the master to his face or to protest against his orders. But so long as the correct answers of complete obedience are given, it is perfectly permissable to act quite to the contrary. Such action is not considered insubordination, except only technically. For in obedience to a superior professional conscience, the worker is, in his mind, rendering better service than the master had sense enough to order. [Anonymous 1948:28-29]

The kobun, then, is a person who is usually a socially marginal personality and who is in poor economic circumstances. He becomes a subservient retainer to an oyabun who guarantees certain things to him in exchange for certain services. Though the rewards vary according to the occupational group, in general a certain degree of social security is provided him. The kobun is inducted into a group having a set of traditions and some recognition within the oyabun-kobun society. He serves his master at considerable expense to his freedom, self-respect, and dignity, but there are also some checks against the more gross abuses. In time, there is hope for certain kobun to become oyabun themselves and to train and boss other recruits.

So far the meaning of the oyabun-kobun relationship have been examined from the standpoint of the subordinate person. The ritual father's rewards or benefits accrued from the relationship can now be viewed. One of the basic rewards that an experienced oyabun receives is that he is given considerable power to manipulate and control the destiny of his subordinates. This is particularly important when one considers that the use of these powers ~~are~~ is not carefully restricted by legal sanctions. A foreman in a strictly bureaucratic organization directs and controls his subordinates while they are at work, but in his official capacity, he does not expect to influence them in their non-occupational and personal affairs. The oyabun, on the other hand, may not only directly control his kobun in an occupational context, but also demand from them many kinds of services and benefits which are usually considered "personal" and non-obligatory in other contractual

types of relationships. To put this in Japanese ethical concepts, the kobun has giri to his oyabun. Giri obligations, as was stated before, covers a wide range non-official and personal obligations.

Related to this type of reward is another which might be designated as "prestige." The amount of prestige or esteem than an oyabun gains, of course, is variable according to the situation, but some general observations may be made. An oyabun in such occupational fields as the streetstall business, mining industry, and construction works may be considered by the Japanese public as men of dubious character, but within the society of their associates, they are respected as men who have achieved status and who have "arrived." Sometimes, as in the case of the tekiya, a number of oyabun feel that they have reached enough stature even in the outside community to run for public office and to hold other recognized positions. This suggests, incidentally, that such attainments define an alternative channel of social mobility for these groups. Japanese who have no particular job training, no education to speak of, and no personal""connections" to facilitate entrance into a company's position--in short, people who lack access to the normal channels of mobility--often enter this kind of oyabun-kobun system and, no doubt, aspire to become an influential oyabun and even to become recognized beyond the confines of the ritual kin society.

The case of the landlord, however, is quite different than those of the types oyabun just discussed. The landlord is a figure who inherits his position and almost by that fact enjoys universal recognition, social standing, and respect in his village and community. Often, if he is a

large landlord like Zensuke Saito, he would hold office in the village government and perhaps exert influence in prefectural political affairs.

Perhaps more basic to these considerations is the reward that results from the fact that an oyabun's occupation or job is aided by the utilization of ritual kin ties. For instance all oyabun discussed were primarily incumbents of an occupational or productive role, that is, they had a business or particular job to do. And to do this job, they used ritual kin mechanisms as part of their "personnel" policy. This is in sharp contrast to some of the compadrazgo systems in Latin America, where the relationship is non-occupational, and, in principle, an affiliation established for religious purposes.

The Japanese ritual father seems to establish oyabun-kobun relationships in order to augment his occupational role. A labor recruiter who establishes ritual kin relationship with casual laborers does so as a means of signifying that he holds prior rights over these laborers. The construction company superintendent who establishes ritual kin relationships with his favorite labor recruiter follows the same strategy.

The solution of common human problems. Another way in which certain features of the oyabun-kobun system may be approached is to focus attention around certain problems that it seems to solve. In this section four of these so-called human problems are delineated.

The first is a matter of facilitating interaction with strangers. This common human problem has been essayed by George Simmel (1950) and others, but it has particular relevance to understanding of one crucial expediency provided for people who have in their tradition a ritual kinship

system. The situations in which ritual kinship compacts are formed in Japan often require the close and intimate cooperation between persons who have been previously unacquainted. The labor recruiter, the gang leader, and the streetstall boss are examples of people who must make friends with individuals and groups that are in some manner or degree "strange" to them. That fact that such leaders systematically utilize ritual kin mechanisms must mean that these social techniques serve a purpose in reducing the threat of initial "strangeness" between the parties and in assigning a fairly explicit role to the social participants.

Societies probably vary according to the degree to which their people feel awkward and uneasy in interacting with strangers, but according to some, Japan represents one of the extreme cases where such types of interactions are considered psychologically threatening. The typical Japanese behavior of excessive politeness, jerky bows, and hissing speech during introductions to strangers may represent a basic uneasiness and a culturally approved method of lowering tension with regard to this situation of embarrassment, threat, or insecurity. It is not too difficult to understand, then, how the ceremonial drinking pattern associated with oyabun-kobun customs, the use of kinlike terms, and the transferance of familial norms--all of which are associated with oyabun-kobun patterns--function in a way which facilitate social interaction with strangers.

This characteristic does not seem to be limited to the Japanese case. It is common knowledge among anthropologists, especially those who work in Latin American communities, that an important technique of establishing good rapport is to become a ritual kinsmen to selected members of

the community. The almost legendary missionary and explorer, David Livingstone, was appointed a ritual brother to many Africans and this, no doubt, contributed to his success. By having a custom of ritual kin relationships, people can readily assign a stranger to a position and a role in their existing social structure.

The second widespread human problem that the oyabun-kobun system appears to help solve concerns what has been called here "expressive" orientations in an organized group. This term, borrowed from Professor Parsons (1951:76-83), has been used in the description of the case studies to differentiate it from the "formal" or "instrumental" organization. The latter referred to the consciously planned organization of action that purports to serve the manifest purposes of the social group. The expressive structure, on the other hand, referred to the organization designed to take care of certain affective "needs" of the group which is instrumentally organized. The case studies gave ample illustrations, it is believed, of the manner in which oyabun-kobun mechanisms were used to organize this expressive aspect of the groups under consideration. The paternalistic acts of the foremen toward certain of his workers were justified in terms of oyabun-kobun ties, the fatherly acts of the street-stall boss who fed, clothed, and protected his apprentices were structured along ritual kin lines and the diffuse responsibilities assumed by the landlord in his socio-economic exchanges with his tenants were modelled on pseudo-kinship relations. In brief, then, ritual kinship mechanisms are frequently utilized to structure the human side of an essentially "bureaucratic" or impersonalized formal organization.

The third sociological problem that is expedited by oyabun-kobun mechanisms lies in the area of contractual relationships. It is interesting to note that in every case examined by the author, the people enter into these ritual kin compacts to exchange some "scarce" elements--services, rights, privileges, goods--which are of vital interest to them. Yet, it is noteworthy that they do not resort to the use of legal documents and other agencies to guarantee protection in case either party defaults in his contracted obligations. The superintendent of the construction company who entrusted valuable equipment and a good part of the management of the project's affairs to his contractor-foremen did not require them to sign legal contracts. Neither were the tenants who rented land, animals, and equipment from the landlord obligated to sign such a contract. It seems, therefore, that the establishment of ritual kin relationships is a sufficient guarantee that the parties to the exchange relationship will attempt to live up to the terms of the compact to the best of their ability. This, in turn, suggests that the oyabun-kobun system has built into its institutional structure a system of sanctions that substitutes for a legal system of sanctions.

A brief review of other ritual kinship systems indicates that this characteristic is not limited to the Japanese case. For example, Harry Tegnaeus (1952:13), who has made an extensive survey of blood-brotherhood institutions, goes so far as to state that "The fundamental basis of blood-brotherhood is a legal contract. The obligations

incurred toward a blood-brother are more directly binding than those a real brother." Mintz and Wolf (1950:342) make the same type of generalization for the compadrazgo complex in Latin America.

Finally, a fourth social function that the Japanese pseudo-kin customs serves is of providing techniques for protecting a group's vested interests. And of these, one of the most significant is the technique for establishing coalitions.

Speaking of the strategy of coalitions, Karl Deutch (1953:183) observes, "Men discover sooner or later that they can advance their interests in the competitive game of politics and economics by forming coalitions, and that they stand to gain the firmer these coalitions can be made, provided only that they have been made with individuals and groups who have to offer in this game the largest amount of assets and the least amount of liabilities.

As was observed in the case studies, each group has a vested interest of one kind or another to protect. In one it was employment opportunities, in another it was sales territories, and in still another, tenancy rights. In each case, the individuals utilized oyabun-kobun techniques to establish a coalition group. These customs provided each group with a more or less ready-made set of symbols, codes and value-orientations that facilitated the grouping of individuals for collective purposes.

III SOME POINTS OF REFERENCE FOR A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RITUAL KINSHIP

To achieve a broader perspective for the analysis of the oyabun-kobun system, the author examined the current literature, especially those which described the institution found in medieval Europe and in Middle and South America. From this review of the literature came a number of suggestions for defining reference points from which to compare the structure and function of the Japanese case with other cases of ritual kinship. Here, then, are a few of these reference points which may be of value to future studies of ritual kinship.

Fraternal vs. filial. As mentioned at the beginning of this study, each ritual kinship institution seems to stress one of two basic paired relationships found in the nuclear family: fraternal and filial relations. The blood brotherhood relationships found in Africa and among some American Indian tribes are excellent examples of the first type, while the compadrazgo in Latin American is a classic illustration of the second. It would seem that if nothing else were known about a particular ritual kinship institution, the knowledge that it was either of a fraternal or filial type would immediately suggest a number of things important in the particular custom. If it were a fraternal type, one can expect a congenial give-and-take relationships between its participants; whereas if it were a filial type, a more patronizing and hierarchial arrangement between the parties can be expected.

The oyabun-kobun case, as the very name itself suggests, is a filial type. It is basically a hierarchical arrangement and, in one or

two instances noted in the case studies, is quite authoritarian. The fraternal type of arrangement was noted in only one instance in the case studies, namely, in the tekiya case where several oyabun joined forces to establish a ~~kyodaibun~~ coalition group.

Group-oriented vs. persons-oriented. Another basic difference between ritual kinship structures is only indirectly suggested by the literature. This structural characteristic, also previously mentioned, has to do with whether or not the group of individuals related by ritual kin ties recognize themselves as being members of a unitary group and organize their activities in a coordinated manner. This characteristic is clearly represented in the case of the guild-like cofradia ritual kinship system found in Spain (see Foster 1953). The associated compadre-comadre systems in Spain and in the New World, however, seems to lack this conception of "group-mindedness." That is, individuals related by ritual kin ties of this second type tend to structure their relations with respect to particular individuals, and not to a collectivity of ritual kinsmen. The former type can be designated as the "group-oriented" and the latter as the "persons-oriented" types.

Like the first characteristic (fraternal vs. filial), this second characteristic seems to provide another clue as to the nature and functions of the ritual kinship system under consideration. If, for instance, in a society where ritual brotherhood customs was practiced, one found that at the same time these ritual brothers were affiliated in a secret or a military society, this is one thing, but if they were only affiliated on a person-to-person basis with no overall

group unity, this is another thing. How, then, can the oyabun-kobun case be classified under this scheme?

In each of the three cases examined in this study, the oyabun-kobun relationship were of a group-oriented type, rather than of a persons-oriented type. The persons affiliated by oyabun-kobun ties held a vested interest in common and organized their relationships in terms of the group. It was not merely a man-to-man affiliation.

Inclusive vs. exclusive. A third point of reference has to do with the relationship of ritual kinsmen to true kinsmen. Foster (1949) observes, for example, that compadrazgo institutions in the New World often "blanketed in" the close relatives of the individuals who established ritual kin relations. Spicer (1940) makes a similar observation for the Yaqui. On the other hand, such automatic extension of ritual kin obligations to the principal's true relatives were not frequently made in Spain, according to Foster (1949). The difference as to whether relatives were "included" in the network of ritual kinsmen or were "excluded" would seem to be important. Not only would the resulting size of the ritual kin group be affected, but also other customs, marriage rules, may be affected. For instance, if relatives were customarily included, then a man may not only be prevented from marrying his ritual brother's sister--assuming that he wished to do so--but also be obliged to observe courtesies and proper behavior toward his ritual brother's close kin as if they were his own.

In the oyabun-kobun cases examined, two--the construction crew and the streetstall guild--definitely excluded relatives from the

obligations of ritual kinship. In the case of the landlord-tenant group, however, the true relatives were included. This would suggest that the difference in the two types is not inherent to the ritual kinship system *per se*, but variable according to the purposes for which the ritual kin relations were established in the first place. For instance, the landlord's wife played a very important role in the ritual kinship relationship between the landlord and his tenants. She was required to care for the ritual children who were brought into her household as "servants" and to manage marriage ceremonies held at the tenant's houses. Of all the wives of *oyabun*, considered in this study, she was the only one called "mother" by the *kobun*.

"*Extensification*" *vs.* "*intensification*." Professor Paul pointed to another valuable characteristic useful in distinguishing the manifest purpose for which a given ritual kinship compact is formed. He observed that some compacts were organized for "intensifying" previous relationships, while others for "extending" relationships to strangers and mere acquaintances. In his studies of ritual kinship in four Guatemalan communities, Redfield (1941) found that in the "folk" type of communities the fictitious kin relationships were used to formalize pre-existing relationships; whereas in the "urban" community of Merida, these relationships were made to establish entirely new social bonds. Whether or not a given ritual kinship group extends or intensifies relationships, then, indicates somethings about the functions of the system. Information concerning this characteristic may provide the observer with certain clues as to the nature of the group as well as with tentative generalization about the duration of the compact. The "intensification" type, it

may be presumed, is a more enduring type of relationship.

These distinctions of "extensification" and "intensification" are found among the oyabun-kobun cases. Like the Guatemalan "folk" community, the nuro system in Iwate Prefecture utilized ritual kinship ties to "intensify" and to solemnize previously existing relationships. But in both the streetstall guild and the construction crews, the oyabun most often established ritual kin compacts with strangers. Thus, in these cases, the system was used to extend relationships.

Sacred vs. secular. The final characteristic is concerned with the degree to which sacred or religious symbolisms are involved in defining and structuring the relationships under consideration. Though, almost by definition, any fictitious kin institution suggests the use and manipulation of sacred symbols, a distinction may be made as to whether the manifest purpose of establishing the relationship is religious or secular. Again, the contrast given by the compadrazgo and the cofradia-gremio types of ritual kinships practiced in Spain illustrates this. The compadrazgo or the sacred type is described by Foster (1953: 4-5):

> Godparental obligations are fairly standardized, and include providing the white baptismal garments for the child, paying church fees, and providing refreshments or a meal for the family following the ceremony. Godparents often present a child with its first fitted clothing when it casts off swaddling clothes, and periodically throughout its childhood make it small presents. As spiritual parents they are expected to care for the child in case of death of parents. Godchildren are expected to show great respect to godparents, and to help them in any way.

This description of a sacred type may be contrasted with a secular type, the cofradia, taken from the same country. The cofradia

built hospitals, provided loans to members, visited members in jail, took care of their sick, aided indigent widows of cofrades, and "quickly developed beyond mere welfare of the soul."

While these differences between the two types of ritual kinship institutions were distinct, comparable differences were not found in the oyabun-kobun cases. However, of the three cases, the landlord-tenant case had stressed religious values and practices the most. The general impression one receives from these Japanese cases of ritual kinship is that they are more secular in outlook than those found in the Catholic communities of Latin America and in Spain.

These five dichotomous dimensions--fraternal vs. filial, group-oriented vs. persons-oriented, inclusive vs. exclusive, extensive vs. intensive, sacred vs. secular--were points of reference which served the present author in organizing his thinking about the Japanese case of ritual kinship. They are listed here because he felt that they might serve equally well other students who are faced with the problem of describing and analyzing a fictitious kin system.

This discussion, in turn, brings the present study to the point where it began, namely, the conceptual grounds for this dissertation. It often has been the rewarding experience of many scholars and students that a new idea or a new concept will suddenly fit into place a number of previously conceived disparate facts and events. Such was the experience of the present author in the present work. He began this study with a relatively new anthropological concept and applied it to the examination of previously known, but dissociated facts, concerning

Japanese society. Viewing these isolated phenonmena through the conceptual glasses of ritual kinship, he was able to see the essential coherence of the behavior of such particularized groups of Japanese as casual laborers, street hawkers and sharecroppers. This dissertation has attempted to report and to record this experience of "serendipity," as Professor Robert Merton might call it.

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Webster, Hutton 1908. Primitive Secret Societies (New York).

Wolf, Eric R. 1951. "The Social Organization of Mecca and the Origins of Islam," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 329-356.

Yanagida, Kunio 1937. "Oyakata Kokata," Kazoku Seido Zenshu (Family System Series), Part II, Vol. 13. (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo).

Yoshisaka, Shunzo 1925, "Labor Recruiting in Japan and Its Control" International Labour Review, October 1925, pp. 484-499.

APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON THE SOURCE USED IN THE FIRST CASE STUDY

Mr. Koichi Bai's field report, upon which the first case study is based, is an exceedingly rich source of information on the oyabun-kobun system in the field of labor organizations. The present author has inspected more than a dozen monographs or books which allude to this institution, but none furnish such detailed information about the nature of the relationship between an oyabun and his kobun as does this field report. One of the reasons for this may be that Bai and his associates have focused their attention on one particular group and have, in the good ethnographic tradition, tried to describe fully within the limits they have placed upon themselves. Bai and his fellow researchers have exercised considerable restraint in generalizing their observations and, as a consequence, in their unpublished report hundreds of detailed and intimate bits of information of the type which is usually omitted in a standard monograph are included. Published monographs, like those of Shizuo Matsushima (1951), may be more acceptable as a scholarly work, but provide little information about the day-to-day activities of ritual kinsmen among laborers.

The Bai report is some 135 pages long, virtually all of which was translated into English by Professor Masao Ikuta of Keio University and the present author. Mr. Ikuta was a colleague of the present writer in SCAP's sociological research unit. The translated version is believed to be reasonably accurate because the difficult passages were discussed with Mr. Bai who was also a member of the SCAP research staff.

While the case materials from Bai's report are excellent, they were not sufficient in themselves for the author to understand the operation of the oyabun-kobun system in the field of labor. The oyabun-kobun system, generally referred to as the "labor boss system" by Occupation officials, has been described in a number of SCAP reports, memoranda, and communications. The following is a selected list of SCAP documents which this author has examined:

Civil Information and Education Section, Analysis and Research Division, "On the Oyabun-Kobun Survey." Intra-section Memorandum, October 7, 1947.

Civil Information and Education Section, Information Division, "The Enforcement of Employment Security Law and Prohibition of Private Labor Supply Enterprise." (A translation of a speech prepared by Akira Ueyama, Director of Employment Security Bureau, Ministry of Labor). [No date, but probably mid-1947]

_____. "Labor Boss System and Wages," a translation of a speech prepared for radio broadcasting by Yoshio Kaneko. [No date, but probably middle of 1947]

_____. "Manuscript of the Subject Concerning Exclusion of Boss System to be Broadcast by Takao Shioya, Director, Peace Preservation Division, M.P.B." [Metropolitan Police Board--Tokyo] [no date, but probably autumn of 1947].

Civil Information and Education Section, Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division, "Day Laborers and the Labor Boss System in Yokohama: A Summary of Research" Sociological Research Memorandum, September 9, 1950. [A report prepared by the present author]

Civil Intelligence Section, Public Safety Division, "Oyabun Association" Memorandum to Administrator, Group V, Police Branch, May 15, 1947

_____. "Investigation of the Oyabun System." Memorandum to Administrator, May 9, 1947.

Civil Intelligence Section, "KUMI: The Labor System of Japan." Memorandum for Information, October 16, 1946.

Economic and Scientific Section, Labor Division, "Informal Letter on Kanagawa-Ken." Memorandum from Field Liaison Officer, July 6, 1946.

_____. "Report on Kanagawa Ken, Supplement No. 1." Memorandum from Field Liaison Office, July 14, 1946.

_____. "Labor Bosses in Japan." Memorandum for the Head of the Australian Mission in Japan, October 29, 1948.

_____. Memorandum to Mr. E. C. McVoy from Dudley Davis concerning information on which to base reply to UN Questionnaire on Slavery and Involuntary Servitude, August 22, 1950.

Government Section, "Report of the Oyabun-Kobun Sub-Committee" Memorandum for the Controls Coordinating Committee, September 25, 1947.

Government Section, National Government Section, "Interim Report on Oyabun System." Memorandum for the Deputy Chief, Government Section, September 11, 1947.

Government Section, Political Affairs Division, "Political Observations Based on Visit to Hokkaido." Memorandum to the Chief, Government Section, September 24, 1946.

In addition to these SCAP documents, the following works in Japanese were particularly helpful: Hirano (1948), Homoto (1948), Kaneda (1927), Kobayashi and Uchiyama (1949), Kyoto Shiyakusho Shakaika (1927), Matsushima (1951), Miyatake (1948), Odaka (1953), Ogata (1927), Osaka-shi Shakaibu (1924), Rodo Kagaku Kenkyujo (1949), and Tokyo-shi Shakai Kyoku (1923 a and 1923 b).

Works in English language were also valuable sources of background information. These include: Bennett (1953), Cohen (1949), Farley (1950), Harada (1928), Hepler (1949), Moran (1949), Odaka (1950), Orchard (1930), United States Strategic Bombing Survey (1947), and Uyeda (1938). Complete references to these works are given in the bibliography.

APPENDIX B. SCAP DOCUMENTS USED IN THE SECOND CASE STUDY

The following is a list of SCAP documents to which references are made in Chapter IV:

Document 1: Economic and Scientific Section, Controls Cartels Branch, "Tokyo Street Stall Association (Tokyo Rotensho Dogyo Kumiai), Tsukiji Branch of Tokyo Street Stall Association, Ginza Street Stall Association (Ginza Seiboku Kai)" May 26, 1947.

Document 2: Civil Intelligence Section, Public Safety Division, "Investigation of Oyabun (Boss) System." September 15, 1947.

A selected list of other SCAP documents which were consulted is given below:

Government Section, "Oyabun-Kobun System" (Check Sheet to Civil Information and Education Section), September 10, 1947.

Civil Intelligence Section, Public Safety Division, "Existing Activities of Oyabun Organizations in Osaka, Kyoto, and Kobe." July 18, 1947

_____. "Investigation of the Oyabun System." May 9, 1947

_____. "Oyabun Association." May 15, 1947.

_____. "Report of Interview with Stall Keepers." May 16, 1947.

_____. "Further Investigation of the Tekiya." May 19, 1947.

_____. "Police Chief's Opinion Concerning the Settlement of Otsu-gumi Market Case." June 11, 1947.

_____. "Oyabun Organizations in Osaka, Kyoto, and Kobe." June 18, 1947.

SCAPIN 1394, AG 400 (11 Dec 46), "Methods of Control under the Temporary Demand and Supply Adjustment Act," Dec. 11, 1946.

SCAPIN 1860, AG 004 (16 Feb 48), "Interpretation and Implementation of Policy Concerning the Elimination of Control Associations." February 16, 1948.

While the following two references are not SCAP documents, they constitute valuable studies which supplement the present case. The first is found in an article written by Professor Kawashima of the Faculty of Law of Tokyo University. This article (Kawashima 1953) entitled, "Iemoto Seido," describes the role of ritual kinship practices in the organization of various artistic schools in Japan. The other study (Shimazaki 1953), "A Study of Classical Arts and the 'Iemoto' Institution--with Special Reference to the Relationship Between Master and Apprentice," is a more detailed analysis of Noh actors and their social organization.

APPENDIX C. NOTES ON SOURCE MATERIAL FOR THE THIRD CASE STUDY

As stated in Chapter V, the materials for the third case study are taken from Kizaemon Ariga's Daikazoku Seido to Nago Seido. A few comments about Ariga's study may help the reader to orient himself to the materials selected for the present study. This study is a 414-page ethnographic study and collection of facts relating to dozoku ("clan") and landlord-tenant relations in Ishigami hamlet of Iwate Prefecture. There is a mine of information on such diverse topics as land ownership, family ancestry, religious practices, house plans, and kitchen utensils. But even more valuable for the present purposes is the general sociological approach that Professor Ariga took to evaluate his materials. Often he stops in his description and addresses himself to such a question as this: why was it necessary for the landlord to bring into his household so many servants? He then proceeds systematically to list the reasons and makes some kind of tenative conclusion, usually based upon a sound sociological interpretation.

Ariga did his principal work in Ishigami from July to August in 1935. Later he returned in January 1936, but he continued to correspond with his informants for some time thereafter. It is quite apparent that he established good rapport with his informants. His study was particularly benefited by the presence of Gempachi Saito, a local historian, who was then engaged in the study of the same community. From him, Ariga obtained many historical facts that have contributed substantially to his ethnographic work.

The present author's understanding of the mechanics of the nago or "name-child" tenancy system of this village was greatly enhanced by a perusal of the materials relating to the system found in another village (Ekari), but in the same prefecture. The Ekari village study was conducted by the members of SCAP's sociological research unit in 1949. Conceivably, these Ekari materials might have been used for the present case study rather than Ariga's data. However, the Ariga case was preferred largely because the Ekari study was conducted after the SCAP land reform program was put into motion. Hence, Ariga's study presented a more "classic" case.

Oyabun-Kobun in Tokugawa Period

James
from/Murdoch, A History of Japan,
London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1926,
vol III.

p. 41: *** Yedo was the great resort of the Ronin, who were then abnormally numerous. Many of these from stern necessity laid aside their swords, and addressed themselves to mercantile or other civilian pursuits. The merging of a considerable proportion of these desparate and daring men in the general community did much to stiffen its back and heighten its courage.

All this duly considered, it furnished but scant matter for surprise to find the outrageous truculence of the Hatamoto bands speedily confronted by similar counter-organizations among the commoners

(p 42) whom the Shogun's men so rashly affected to regard as mere canaille destitute of every spark of manhood, spirit, and human feeling. Able and dearless leaders soon appeared among the wardsmen. Under these the more mettlesome of the townsmen mustered in imposing numbers, and the just quarrel of one became the concern of great fraternities whose resentment was not lightly to be incurred. The men in the escorts of the Daimyo to protect the lords from sudden Hatamoto attack were already known as yakko (*Yakko, a low subject or a servant. J.H.L.); and these new anti-hatamoto organizations among the townsmen were presently termed machi-yakko.

Yakko and Machi-yakko had to reckon with a common foe; and the sympathy between the men of the yashiki /lords who spent time in Yedo at the beckoning of the Shogun--II/ and the stalwarts of the wards led to a sort of mutual understanding between them. When a Daimyo needed an army of porters to carry his baggage on the return journey to his fief, or extra labour for any special emeregency, it became customary for him to communicate with one or other of the chiefs of the machi-yakko, who promptly furnished the needed men from among his followers. This provided the machi-yakko heads with the sinews of war, and put them into a position to provide for an increasing body of immediate dependents. Hence the quarters of these oyakata, as the machi-yakko captains were termed, became a sort of Cave of Adullan, "for every one that was in distress, for everyone that was in debt, for every one that was discontented." With most oyakata the rule was that no applicants should be rejected, and that no questions about one's past should be asked. On the other hand, however. the tacit understanding was that the recruit's future conduct was to be, if not above all reproach, at all events in conformity with the spirit of the cardinal aritcles in the rough and rude with withal chivalrous unwritten code in vogue among the otokodata. The chief obligations to be lived up to were to stand manfully by his comrades in weal or woe, regardless of all risks of life, to regard the oppressor as a deadly enemy and to succour the feeble as a father does his child. "If they had money they had to give to those that had none, and their ears were never to be deaf to the appeal of charity." The head of the society, as has just been said, was called the "Father"; such of his proteges as were homeless were housed under his roof and served him, paying him

(p. 43) a small fee, in consideration of which they were tended when sick, and assisted when overtaken by misfortune. (II. a footnote is given here: "Otoko-date" was a gallant or chivalrous person who was walways ready to take the cause of the oppressed weak against the strong opporessor. The description of the city fraternity, who were in some ways not unlike the city apprentices of the times of James I, appears to be founded

on Lord Eadesdale's story of the "Otokodate of Yedo" and their chief Chobee of X Bandzuin, in the ever charming Tales of Old Japan. The chief of Otoko-date also appears in others of his Tales.--JHL.

For two or three generations the machi-yakko with his peculiar style of dress, of queue and of wearing his swords, was a gallant figure in the variegated and pictureque life of the Shougn's capital. But with lapse of time the institution sadly degenerated, in connexion with it vice only too soon began to pay its wonted tribute to virtue, and hypocrites and worthless scoundrels became plentiful enough in the otokodate bands. By the date of the death of Iyemitsu, the authorities had succeeded in curbing theinsolence and rperessing the truculence of the Hatamoto swashbucklers, and in the tranquil times of established civil peace under the third and fourth Shougans, Bancho became comparatively orderly and law-abiding. Although the main raison d'être of the machi-yakko had thus disappeared, the machi-yakko fraternities still continued to exist. But long before the end of the century they had as often as not degenerated into confraternities of gamblers, loafers, and unprincipled rowdies.

Part One

I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND THE APPROACH

Problem:

perhaps most striking social change of our time is development of industrial-capitalist economies in portions of Asia and Africa which up to only a generation ago were definitely "precapitalist" - feudal and or even primitive-tribal in social organiz. the rapidity of this change has in many instances outstripped knowledge of the process of industrialization and the social forces and changes accompanying it. knowledge of the development of european capitalism, etc. has not proved adequate for the understanding of industrial development in other societies.

some of the problems raised by these other cases: effect of industrialism and correlated social changes upon a society with great density and relative size of population. particular nature of patterns of economic organization in societies with a feudal basis of social structure. organization of an industrial economy upon values and beliefs differing from the famed "puritan ethic" of the West.

apparent that in the Asian societies affected by industrialism all these problems have been important. India - case of population continually outrunning productive capacity; need for continued "mercantile" subsidy of these Oriental capitalisms; patterns of social relations and attitudes in Jpse economy based on feudal ties rather than "individualism", etc., etc. (spell out)

thus the fundamental purpose of book is to document, at the "grass roots" level, the particular configuration of attitudes, values, and social relationships characteristic of an industrial-type economy and its peripheries, which developed in a society with largely non-Western characteristics. And not only non-Western cultural traits, but also certain peculiar socio-demographic problems, like high population. The kind of society had to meet a series of problems not encountered appreciably in development of Western centralized economy: need to spread products over large no. of people; need to develop fast, without much capital; need to do the job with a human resource with the attitudes of feudal peasants, lords, etc. while we cannot answer all the questions, or give all the methods of solution of these problems, we can focus on some important ones.

Approach:

combination of a strictly ethnographic with an analytic-interpretive. Case studies and then analysis. this is essentially the Ishino scheme in the last chapter, generalized and summarized for this Introduction.

II. ASPECTS OF JAPAN'S MODERN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

This will be a chapter which summarizes all the relevant aspects of the modernization of Japan - that is, relevant to the problem of the book. much already in your chapter on "traditionalism", but handled more broadly, and with a general history backing it up. My chapter 1 for the student book can serve as model. included also must be what historical information we have on the O-k system. the chapter might take this general form:

1. brief recounting of basic historical facts of "opening" - internal explosion helped along by Perry.

2. account of social upheavals in Japan in early period - how social org. was already changing toward a more "Western" type, but how this was incomplete and had not affected large masses of popul. - peasants (who formed basis of labor force) still traditional; authority in top power circles still that of feudal society, etc., etc.

3. nature of tasks of early Meiji. defend against colonialism; need to construct defense forces fast; need for capital. how all these met, and what there was to work with. Oyabun-kobun system and how developed.

4. hence - a general definition of the social organization and human relations pattern of Japanese industrialism and centralized economic-social development, xxxxxx

III. THE OYABUN-KOBUN SYSTEM: A PRELIMINARY DESCRIPTION

This may not be needed - it could be the windup of II - but I doubt it. I think we should go back to the older style of the Interim Technical Report. This chapter would give a detailed description of the system, and in particular, introduce the "quasi kinship" business. the chapter should not be long, and will serve as a blueprint for the reading of the case studies.

Part Two

The case studies, as is, only edited somewhat. Probably a little too long.

Part Three

Conclusions, expressed on one or at most two chapters. One of these to be pretty much as is in your last chapter, the other probably to refer back the very general problem of the Introduction: the emergence of centralized economies in socalled "precapitalist" societies.

Must make a more convincing case for economic necessity of OK or its functional appropriateness in the Ifse economy.

Must make a more detailed historical review of Ifse social response to modernization — + role of OK in it.

Need a theory chapter, giving rationale for case studies — problems solved in them, etc. — don't they show how OK was utilized for solving var. of probs.) then how derive the probs.?

Must keep ritual kin business, but subordinate to historical-social theme. Make it a tool of analysis.