Ishino, Iwao. Papers,
1854-1963

Folder 34
Box 5384
Coll VA 17.348


1950's

Reprinted from THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY ENGINEERING EXPERIMENT STATION NEWS, VOL. XXVI, NO. 1, FEBRUARY, 1954

PATTERNS OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS*

By IWAO ISHINO
Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology
The Ohio State University

Not all of social science as it is known today is concerned with studies of human behavior under controlled laboratory conditions. Much of what occupies the attention of some groups of behavioral scientists is the careful recording of human events and activities which take place in their natural setting free from the manipulation of the scientific observer.

FACT GATHERING

Much energy is spent in tedious fact-gathering activity not completely different from those of a botanist who spends months and even years in foreign countries looking for specimens of flora.

Group Relations

It is due to those scientists who, by the dint of their intellectual curiosity, bring back important facts about diverse peoples that we have today a fair knowledge about the range of variation in human behavior and how different societies solve certain universal human problems.

We have, for instance, a fairly complete knowledge of the different ways in which families are organized and how variations in family structures are related to the socio-economic organization of the society, to the psychology of its people, and to the cultural traditions these people follow. We have a considerable amount of information about the ways in which children are trained in different societies, how relatives are reckoned, and how religious beliefs are conceptualized. But such studies are not ends in themselves. They provide social scientists with comparative materials not otherwise available. They provide the "stuff" which a comprehensive knowledge of human behavior must take into account.

Interpersonal Relations

One specific area within the general framework of comparative studies of human behavior that has been relatively neglected, however, is the examination of the different modes of interpersonal relations. By this we mean the different processes by which face-to-face associations are established outside of the family or kinship context, and of the rules, premises, and symbols underlying such relationships.

If we are able to accumulate more knowledge about these matters, it seems reasonable that we can understand better than we do today how "grass roots" social movements are begun, how "behind-the-scenes deals" between politicians are made, how informal trade regulations and price agreements are informally maintained, how racketeering and other extra-legal organizations come into being, and how fanatic cults gain adherents. While the human relations involved in these matters are fairly well understood by the experts for the situation in the United States, we cannot assume that these American patterns apply to social movements, political deals, business combines, and the like which take place in other societies with a different cultural tradition. Much more information concerning "social relational" patterns needs to be systematically collected.

Study Made During Allied Occupation of Japan

It is with respect to these patterns of social relations, particularly those

* This is a brief report of one aspect of the social science project, "Research in Japanese Social Relations," at Ohio State University. The project is directed by Professor John W. Bennett of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology.

manifested in a certain non-Western society, that the project, "Research in Japanese Social Relations," has been devoting the past two years. The original materials used for this project were collected during the recent Allied Occupation of Japan and they constitute a good portion of the corpus of research of the Occupation's Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division.†

RITUAL KINSHIP, A SYSTEM OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP

As an illustration of the kind of problems pursued by this Project this paper will describe briefly a widespread and complex pattern of inter-personal relations found in Japan.

This pattern-complex, known most commonly as the *oyabun-kobun* system, is one in which unrelated persons enter into a compact and assume obligations, privileges, and rights of a familial nature. An employer, for instance, may enter into such a compact with some of his workers and maintain certain traditional, paternalistic, and "personalized" relations with these workers, but not with reference to other workers. Whether or not he manifests economically "rational" and self-interested orientation toward a given worker, then, depends in large part on the existence or absence of *oyabun-kobun* patterns in the relationship.

Not Unique to Japan

At the time field investigations were being carried out in Japan, it was believed that such a social relational system was unique to Japan.

Subsequent documentary investigation for comparative materials has revealed that such was not the case and that many societies throughout the world have similar patterns of relationship as, for example, in some European countries like Spain where industrialization has not been complete. Indeed, such a system of social relationships is so common that anthropologists have recently designated it by the technical term, "ritual kinship system."

How the System Works in Japan

Briefly, the ritual kinship system works like this in Japan:

Let us suppose that several unrelated people wish either to promote or to maintain against outsiders some vested interest which is not amply protected under the existing legal system. Thus, a group of street-stall merchants who want to protect their squatter's right on a section of the public sidewalk, a collection of casual laborers who want to keep the available sources of employment open to themselves, a gang of racketeers who want to prevent other gangs from encroaching upon their territory, a union of traditional artists who want to restrict and control their field of specialization, and a coalition of unaffiliated politicians interested in promoting certain political ends (e.g., a neo-fascist one) are all examples of individuals who lack legal and statutory protection of their interests in Japan. Typically, people in such circumstances, by mutual agreement and sometimes by intimidation, enter into a compact to assume obligations of a diffuse nature which are aimed to protect the interests of the group. The relationship is formally established by means of a ritual *sake* drinking ceremony involving some of the expressive symbolisms of kinship and marriage. The *sake*, or rice-wine, for example, is said to symbolize blood. Supernatural, rather than legal, sanctions are implied by taking the vow in the presence of a deity relevant to the group. Both the terms of address and the designation of roles within the group are patterned on the Japanese family system: the leader becomes a ritual parent (*oyabun*) and his followers, ritual children (*kobun*). These followers in turn are ranked in status designating "elder brother" and "younger brother" roles. A specific group of ritual parent and his followers, thus formed, constitutes a symbolic family group, and often assumes a "family" name. Some groups even have genealogies of ancestors traced through this ritual family line for five or six generations.

† This division has a staff of some 50 Japanese social scientists and five American social analysts. The large staff and the complete logistic support provided by the Occupation permitted the collection of data of a magnitude and depth difficult to duplicate under ordinary conditions of research support. The supervisor of the present project and the author were, respectively, Division Chief and research analyst of the Occupation's research division.

"Family" Coalitions

Not only is this nuclear group formed but several distinct "families" in turn may form combines or coalitions by one or both of these two methods:

One way is for the several leaders of these unitary families to enter into a brotherhood compact (solemnized by *sake* drinking), thus uniting at the same time the membership, wealth, facilities, and political influence controlled by their respective families. The other method is for the ritual parent (*oyabun*) of a given family to encourage his followers to recruit and establish dependent "families" of their own. When this is done, the original ritual parent becomes a "great parent" (*o-oyabun*) to the newest recruits and the recruits, in turn, become ritually related not only to their immediate leader but also to the original leader. Thus, by extending the relationships by means of these principles of brotherhood and of descent, a given group may enclose a number of interlocking "family" units and organize the manpower, economic resources, and political power of even several hundred individuals.

The above version is admittedly an idealized picture of this pattern of social relationships, and particular details in each empirical case, of course, will vary according to the kinds of vested interests that are at stake and the specific nature of the traditions of the particular group. This pattern—not completely understood by the staff at the time the data were gathered in Japan—is a generalization made from a close examination of dozens of cases during the past two years.

MESHING OF KINSHIP AND BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEMS

One more complication of this pattern of social relationship, however, needs to be discussed. And that is, how this ritual kinship system of relations is, so to speak, "meshed" in a more formalized and more "bureaucratic" system of relationships.

Formal and Informal Organizations

American sociologists typically describe large-scale systems (e.g., a factory) of human relations in terms of "formal" and "informal" organizations.

The first refers to a consciously planned table of organization which purports to serve the manifest purposes of the social group. Being of such nature, formal organizations are symbolized by personnel charts to indicate lines of communication, the system of authority, and the interrelated processes of decision-making, leadership, and control. The informal organization, on the other hand, is seen by these sociologists as a more or less unpremeditated and non-rational form of organization of people working within the framework of the formal organization. Specific aspects of such spontaneous organizations are known by such terms as "cliques," "friendship groups," and "natural groups."

In most Japanese social groupings examined by the Project staff, these "formal" and "informal" aspects of organizations were clearly discernible—which supports the thesis that these aspects are quite universal. But over and above these aspects of organization there were many social groupings in Japan which had a third aspect, namely the ritual kinship structure.

In such formally organized associations as the Kanagawa Labor Supply Association which recruited and placed some 100,000 laborers in various government projects in 1945–1946, and the Tokyo Street-stall Owners' Association which had in 1947 a membership of at least 25,000 small-scale merchants, *oyabun-kobun* relationships were found to be operating at various levels of the organizational hierarchy. The officers at each level of the formal organization—the local "boss," the branch chief, the president of the association—had established not only ritual parenthood (*oyabun-kobun*) relationships with their key subordinates, but also ritual brotherhood (*kyodaibun*) relationships with leaders of comparable rank in the formal organization.

SIGNIFICANCE OF KINSHIP SYSTEM SURVIVAL

It is not possible here to go into the details of the significance of this aspect—

ritual kinship—in the total organization, but those readers who are trained in the social sciences will see from what has been already stated how it might serve some very basic human needs, e.g., "personalizing" social relations in a potentially impersonal and bureaucratic organization. But since, in these large-scale organizations, ritual kinship compacts are entered into by select members of the group, "informal" organization—as the term is used by American sociologists—is found among those individuals not affiliated by ritual kin ties. These findings should prove to be of interest to students of comparative institutions.

Obviously not all large-scale organizations in modern Japan utilize ritual kinship relations as part of their organizational structure. Most large business enterprises, for example, which are strictly modelled after comparable Western systems, seem to lack this feature. Why, then, do some organizations have this feature and others do not? A preliminary and cursory answer was found in examining the Project's case materials. In every case we examined, ritual kinship structures were found in situations where the vested interest of the group concerned was not fully protected by the existing laws.

The obvious case is the racketeers whose interests are extralegal. But similar interpretations can be made for labor recruiting agencies, neo-fascist movements, religious cults, and other organizations utilizing ritual kinship patterns. This finding led to our generalization, which was stated earlier in this paper, viz., that *oyabun-kobun* are found where the people concerned are interested in protecting a "right," a "property," or a "privilege" which is extralegal.

Though the Project lacks detailed case materials, the author believes that these ritual kin patterns of social relations are also utilized by the major political parties in Japan to control and to organize their respective political machines, especially those in the rural areas. It is also suspected that some of the big industrial and financial combines (e.g., the former *zaibatsu*) have formerly utilized some of these patterns. The teaching profession, especially at the University level, might also be included in this generalization.

In summary, then, we have presented here a bare outline of a system of social relationship found in certain segments of contemporary Japanese society. As was stated at the beginning of this report, it is our belief that such fact-gathering activity as is illustrated by the present study is not only important in contributing to knowledge about the range of variation in human relations, but also to provide a comparative point of view for examining our own society, culture, and institutions.

Reprinted from THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY ENGINEERING EXPERIMENT STATION NEWS, VOL. XXVI, NO. 1, FEBRUARY, 1954

PATTERNS OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS*

By IWAO ISHINO
Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology
The Ohio State University

Not all of social science as it is known today is concerned with studies of human behavior under controlled laboratory conditions. Much of what occupies the attention of some groups of behavioral scientists is the careful recording of human events and activities which take place in their natural setting free from the manipulation of the scientific observer.

FACT GATHERING

Much energy is spent in tedious fact-gathering activity not completely different from those of a botanist who spends months and even years in foreign countries looking for specimens of flora.

Group Relations

It is due to those scientists who, by the dint of their intellectual curiosity, bring back important facts about diverse peoples that we have today a fair knowledge about the range of variation in human behavior and how different societies solve certain universal human problems.

We have, for instance, a fairly complete knowledge of the different ways in which families are organized and how variations in family structures are related to the socio-economic organization of the society, to the psychology of its people, and to the cultural traditions these people follow. We have a considerable amount of information about the ways in which children are trained in different societies, how relatives are reckoned, and how religious beliefs are conceptualized. But such studies are not ends in themselves. They provide social scientists with comparative materials not otherwise available. They provide the "stuff" which a comprehensive knowledge of human behavior must take into account.

Interpersonal Relations

One specific area within the general framework of comparative studies of human behavior that has been relatively neglected, however, is the examination of the different modes of interpersonal relations. By this we mean the different processes by which face-to-face associations are established outside of the family or kinship context, and of the rules, premises, and symbols underlying such relationships.

If we are able to accumulate more knowledge about these matters, it seems reasonable that we can understand better than we do today how "grass roots" social movements are begun, how "behind-the-scenes deals" between politicians are made, how informal trade regulations and price agreements are informally maintained, how racketeering and other extra-legal organizations come into being, and how fanatic cults gain adherents. While the human relations involved in these matters are fairly well understood by the experts for the situation in the United States, we cannot assume that these American patterns apply to social movements, political deals, business combines, and the like which take place in other societies with a different cultural tradition. Much more information concerning "social relational" patterns needs to be systematically collected.

Study Made During Allied Occupation of Japan

It is with respect to these patterns of social relations, particularly those

* This is a brief report of one aspect of the social science project, "Research in Japanese Social Relations," at Ohio State University. The project is directed by Professor John W. Bennett of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology.

manifested in a certain non-Western society, that the project, "Research in Japanese Social Relations," has been devoting the past two years. The original materials used for this project were collected during the recent Allied Occupation of Japan and they constitute a good portion of the corpus of research of the Occupation's Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division.†

RITUAL KINSHIP, A SYSTEM OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP

As an illustration of the kind of problems pursued by this Project this paper will describe briefly a widespread and complex pattern of inter-personal relations found in Japan.

This pattern-complex, known most commonly as the *oyabun-kobun* system, is one in which unrelated persons enter into a compact and assume obligations, privileges, and rights of a familial nature. An employer, for instance, may enter into such a compact with some of his workers and maintain certain traditional, paternalistic, and "personalized" relations with these workers, but not with reference to other workers. Whether or not he manifests economically "rational" and self-interested orientation toward a given worker, then, depends in large part on the existence or absence of *oyabun-kobun* patterns in the relationship.

Not Unique to Japan

At the time field investigations were being carried out in Japan, it was believed that such a social relational system was unique to Japan.

Subsequent documentary investigation for comparative materials has revealed that such was not the case and that many societies throughout the world have similar patterns of relationship as, for example, in some European countries like Spain where industrialization has not been complete. Indeed, such a system of social relationships is so common that anthropologists have recently designated it by the technical term, "ritual kinship system."

How the System Works in Japan

Briefly, the ritual kinship system works like this in Japan:

Let us suppose that several unrelated people wish either to promote or to maintain against outsiders some vested interest which is not amply protected under the existing legal system. Thus, a group of street-stall merchants who want to protect their squatter's right on a section of the public sidewalk, a collection of casual laborers who want to keep the available sources of employment open to themselves, a gang of racketeers who want to prevent other gangs from encroaching upon their territory, a union of traditional artists who want to restrict and control their field of specialization, and a coalition of unaffiliated politicians interested in promoting certain political ends (e.g., a neo-fascist one) are all examples of individuals who lack legal and statutory protection of their interests in Japan. Typically, people in such circumstances, by mutual agreement and sometimes by intimidation, enter into a compact to assume obligations of a diffuse nature which are aimed to protect the interests of the group. The relationship is formally established by means of a ritual *sake* drinking ceremony involving some of the expressive symbolisms of kinship and marriage. The *sake*, or rice-wine, for example, is said to symbolize blood. Supernatural, rather than legal, sanctions are implied by taking the vow in the presence of a deity relevant to the group. Both the terms of address and the designation of roles within the group are patterned on the Japanese family system: the leader becomes a ritual parent (*oyabun*) and his followers, ritual children (*kobun*). These followers in turn are ranked in status designating "elder brother" and "younger brother" roles. A specific group of ritual parent and his followers, thus formed, constitutes a symbolic family group, and often assumes a "family" name. Some groups even have genealogies of ancestors traced through this ritual family line for five or six generations.

† This division has a staff of some 50 Japanese social scientists and five American social analysts. The large staff and the complete logistic support provided by the Occupation permitted the collection of data of a magnitude and depth difficult to duplicate under ordinary conditions of research support. The supervisor of the present project and the author were, respectively, Division Chief and research analyst of the Occupation's research division.

"Family" Coalitions

Not only is this nuclear group formed but several distinct "families" in turn may form combines or coalitions by one or both of these two methods:

One way is for the several leaders of these unitary families to enter into a brotherhood compact (solemnized by *sake* drinking), thus uniting at the same time the membership, wealth, facilities, and political influence controlled by their respective families. The other method is for the ritual parent (*oyabun*) of a given family to encourage his followers to recruit and establish dependent "families" of their own. When this is done, the original ritual parent becomes a "great parent" (*o-oyabun*) to the newest recruits and the recruits, in turn, become ritually related not only to their immediate leader but also to the original leader. Thus, by extending the relationships by means of these principles of brotherhood and of descent, a given group may enclose a number of interlocking "family" units and organize the manpower, economic resources, and political power of even several hundred individuals.

The above version is admittedly an idealized picture of this pattern of social relationships, and particular details in each empirical case, of course, will vary according to the kinds of vested interests that are at stake and the specific nature of the traditions of the particular group. This pattern—not completely understood by the staff at the time the data were gathered in Japan—is a generalization made from a close examination of dozens of cases during the past two years.

MESHING OF KINSHIP AND BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEMS

One more complication of this pattern of social relationship, however, needs to be discussed. And that is, how this ritual kinship system of relations is, so to speak, "meshed" in a more formalized and more "bureaucratic" system of relationships.

Formal and Informal Organizations

American sociologists typically describe large-scale systems (e.g., a factory) of human relations in terms of "formal" and "informal" organizations.

The first refers to a consciously planned table of organization which purports to serve the manifest purposes of the social group. Being of such nature, formal organizations are symbolized by personnel charts to indicate lines of communication, the system of authority, and the interrelated processes of decision-making, leadership, and control. The informal organization, on the other hand, is seen by these sociologists as a more or less unpremeditated and non-rational form of organization of people working within the framework of the formal organization. Specific aspects of such spontaneous organizations are known by such terms as "cliques," "friendship groups," and "natural groups."

In most Japanese social groupings examined by the Project staff, these "formal" and "informal" aspects of organizations were clearly discernible—which supports the thesis that these aspects are quite universal. But over and above these aspects of organization there were many social groupings in Japan which had a third aspect, namely the ritual kinship structure.

In such formally organized associations as the Kanagawa Labor Supply Association which recruited and placed some 100,000 laborers in various government projects in 1945–1946, and the Tokyo Street-stall Owners' Association which had in 1947 a membership of at least 25,000 small-scale merchants, *oyabun-kobun* relationships were found to be operating at various levels of the organizational hierarchy. The officers at each level of the formal organization—the local "boss," the branch chief, the president of the association—had established not only ritual parenthood (*oyabun-kobun*) relationships with their key subordinates, but also ritual brotherhood (*kyodaibun*) relationships with leaders of comparable rank in the formal organization.

SIGNIFICANCE OF KINSHIP SYSTEM SURVIVAL

It is not possible here to go into the details of the significance of this aspect—

ritual kinship—in the total organization, but those readers who are trained in the social sciences will see from what has been already stated how it might serve some very basic human needs, e.g., "personalizing" social relations in a potentially impersonal and bureaucratic organization. But since, in these large-scale organizations, ritual kinship compacts are entered into by select members of the group, "informal" organization—as the term is used by American sociologists—is found among those individuals not affiliated by ritual kin ties. These findings should prove to be of interest to students of comparative institutions.

Obviously not all large-scale organizations in modern Japan utilize ritual kinship relations as part of their organizational structure. Most large business enterprises, for example, which are strictly modelled after comparable Western systems, seem to lack this feature. Why, then, do some organizations have this feature and others do not? A preliminary and cursory answer was found in examining the Project's case materials. In every case we examined, ritual kinship structures were found in situations where the vested interest of the group concerned was not fully protected by the existing laws.

The obvious case is the racketeers whose interests are extralegal. But similar interpretations can be made for labor recruiting agencies, neo-fascist movements, religious cults, and other organizations utilizing ritual kinship patterns. This finding led to our generalization, which was stated earlier in this paper, viz., that *oyabun-kobun* are found where the people concerned are interested in protecting a "right," a "property," or a "privilege" which is extralegal.

Though the Project lacks detailed case materials, the author believes that these ritual kin patterns of social relations are also utilized by the major political parties in Japan to control and to organize their respective political machines, especially those in the rural areas. It is also suspected that some of the big industrial and financial combines (e.g., the former *zaibatsu*) have formerly utilized some of these patterns. The teaching profession, especially at the University level, might also be included in this generalization.

In summary, then, we have presented here a bare outline of a system of social relationship found in certain segments of contemporary Japanese society. As was stated at the beginning of this report, it is our belief that such fact-gathering activity as is illustrated by the present study is not only important in contributing to knowledge about the range of variation in human relations, but also to provide a comparative point of view for examining our own society, culture, and institutions.

1954

Original copy Submitted

THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The objective of this dissertation is modest. It aims to introduce to social anthropologists a case of "fictitious" or "ritual" kinship system found in contemporary Japan. In recent years anthropologists are discovering in widely dispersed areas of the world culturally patterned forms of social relations in which unrelated persons enter into a compact and imitate familial or kinship ties. The celebrated blood-brotherhood systems of aboriginal Africa and the godparental complex (compadrazgo) of Latin America are two of the best known examples. Because this pattern of imitating kinship bonds seems to result not primarily from any simple diffusion of cultural traits but from some combination of basic psychological needs and sociological requirements, students who make comparative studies of pseudo kinship institutions tend to view it as a unitary phenomenon. The most common designation they apply to it is "ritual kinship." The present study, then, attempts to analyze this type of institution for a society on which considerable sociological and anthropological literature but no systematic description of ritual kinship exists in English.

While the name for this Japanese institution varies somewhat from district to district, the term oyabun-kobun ("parent role" -- "child role") is most common and is the designation used in this study. Typically the relationship is formally established by means of a drinking ceremony which symbolizes the bonds of kinship. For instance, the sake or rice-wine used in this ritual is said to represent blood.

Supernatural, rather than legal, sanctions are implied by taking the oath in the presence of a diety relevant to the group. Both the terms of address and the designation of roles within the group are patterned on the Japanese family system: the leader becomes a ritual parent and his followers, ritual children. Such a group constitutes a symbolic family and sometimes even assume a "family" name. In certain circumstances, some groups recognise genealogies of their ritual ancestors and in such cases a ritual kin group that is homologous to a clan results. There can be no doubt that this institution imitates kinship relations.

THE DATA

A practical problem first aroused the author's interest in this subject. While employed as a researcher in a sociological survey unit in the Headquarters of the Occupation of Japan, he conducted a preliminary study of a union of dockworkers reputed to be organized along oyabun-kobun lines. The Occupation's Labor Division experts considered such traditional associations as "feudalistic" and inimical to democratic reforms; hence they undertook measures to liquidate these ritual compacts in the field of labor.

For purposes of this dissertation, however, the pilot study failed to provide concrete information about the oyabun-kobun system because the reform measures and other intervening circumstances were successful in destroying this union. Nevertheless it was the dockworker study which stimulated

ance of these invented kinship relationships.

The investigation led to the examination of scores of economic and sociological literature for descriptions of these oyabun-kobun relations. While most of them provided only cursory descriptions, a few exceptions were found and these have been exploited in the present study. Perhaps more valuable were various field reports and memoranda written by occupation officials who encountered this institution in their day-to-day activities. These documents emanated from such agencies as the Government Section, Public Safety Branch, Labor Division, Military Government, and several others. Interviews arranged with a number of these report writers were also helpful. But the most valuable sources of information were discussions held with Japanese who were either affiliated in one or another kind of oyabun-kobun groups or had studied such affiliations at first-hand.

THE DESCRIPTION AND THE ANALYSIS

The substance of this dissertation

parts: the first lays the theoretical or conceptual grounds for the study; the second describes the structural or formal aspects of the Japanese case of ritual kinship and the cultural factors which support it; and the third illustrates by means of case studies the operation of the system in three typical situations. A brief description of each of these parts follows:

(1) Evidence for the widespread extent of ritual kinship institutions, both in time and space, is cited, and a proposition,

first advanced by Professor Benjamin D. Paul, agreed to: namely, that ritual kinship be treated separately from kinship proper, on the one hand, and "associations" or sodalities, on the other. Systems of ritual kinship, it is argued, have characteristics basically different from either of these traditional anthropological categories for describing social structure. With respect to kinship structure, ritual kinship differs in that there are no biological or consanguineal underpinnings; it is entirely independent of blood ties. However, with respect to the residual category of associations, ritual kinship lacks the complex embellishments familiar in these "non-kinship" groupings—a lack created by the very restrictive principles of organization borrowed from the true kinship system.

(2) Following this definition of the concept of ritual kinship, background information on the oyabun-kobun institution is presented. Three main points are stressed: The first concerns the relationship of this institution to other cultural features of contemporary Japanese society. Despite a high degree of industrialization, it is noted that the Japanese still cling to a moral and ideological outlook developed in the feudal period and deliberately fostered by the state and schools in the period of modernization. The keynote of this traditionalism is found in the widely held ethical code of familism. Within the kinship structure of the society, the cherishing of such values can be understood, but the maintenance of familial ideology among unrelated persons seems more difficult of comprehension. The study suggests that it is in this latter area that oyabun-kobun principles find their function. Pseudo-kin ties could be invented; ritual families could be constructed;

and even clan-like descent lines could be reckoned by proper utilization of oyabun-kobun principles.

The second point concerns the extent to which ritual kinship customs are practiced in modern Japan. Five conspicuous sectors of the society are regarded as being significantly organized on these principles. These are: extreme rightists groups; gangster and racketeering syndicates; traditional crafts guilds; day-workers and casual laborers; and landlord-tenant groups. Of these, the last three are seen as the most numerous and qualitatively the most important.

Finally, comparative technical details on the structure of the oyabun-kobun system and the true kinship system are offered. This analysis was prefaced by a statement suggesting that a serious anthropological study of either system is yet to be published.

(3) The third analytical aspect of the dissertation demonstrates by the case method how the oyabun-kobun system works in concrete situations. One case study of a construction company examines the formation of these ritual kin compacts between an employer and his recruiter-foremen, on the one hand, and between these foremen and their temporary workers, on the other. The second case treats the system in the context of a street-stall merchants' association, a guild-like ~~play in that guild-like organization. The human problem featured here concerns the utilization of~~ How facilitates ritual kinship mechanisms ~~for facilitating~~ is the human problem that features here the formation of business coalitions and the protection of vested interests. The final case portrays the very extensive and diffused nature of landlord-tenant relations in a village in northern Japan. Here, the case is used to illustrate the role ~~of~~ these mechanisms play not only ~~in the organization of~~ the economics of tenancy practices but also in the structuring of social and religious life of these farmers. Thus, each of the three cases

are designed to particularize one or two functions or facets of the oyabun-kobun institution.

In sum, then, the three substantive sections of the dissertation provide a conceptual groundwork for the study, a set of structural principles of the Japanese system of ritual kinship and the system's cultural "support," and a description of the functions of the system by means of case studies. Consequently, this dissertation does not claim to analyze the historical development of the institution. Neither does it aim to make systematic comparisons with analogous institutions of other societies. This it leaves to future studies. However, as an explanatory device, comparative materials often provide important perspective and, accordingly, a few of such materials are introduced from time to time. Since these are widely dispersed in the dissertation, some comparative notes may be summarized here by way of concluding this abstract.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The oyabun-kobun system has several distinguishing characteristics, if it is examined against the background of the compadrazgo system of Catholic communities in Latin America and in medieval Europe. Some of these are:

(1) The "survival" in the modern period. While ritual kinship patterns of godparent type have virtually disappeared at the onset of industrialization in Europe, this type of institution seems to persist in modern Japan to a remarkable extent.

(2) The secular outlook. The whole complex of oyabun-kobun relationships is divorced from direct control by and affilia-

tion with an organized religious body. Only local dieties are significant. This contrasts sharply with ritual kinship patterns found in pre-industrial countries in Europe (e.g. Spain) and in Middle and South America where the Catholic church plays a vital role. The general secular outlook of the Japanese case may also help to explain its persistence in the modern society.

(3) "Group consciousness." Another characteristic of the Japanese case differs from the godparental system. Ritual kinship relations result in the formation of groups with definite boundaries and with collective interests. That is, oyabun establish ritual kin relationships with the intent of forming a small or primary group. They go sofar as to designate their groups with a special "family" name. In the compadrazgo system, so far as this writer knows, relations are kept on a person-to-person basis and "group consciousness," if present at all, seems to be weak.

1957 ?

Motivational Factors in a Japanese Labor Supply Organization

Iwao Ishino

Reprinted from *Human Organization,* Volume 15, No. 2

Motivational Factors in a Japanese Labor Supply Organization

*Iwao Ishino**

In late 1949, while working as a member of the Japan Occupation's sociological research unit, the writer was assigned the task of investigating the motivational factors that blocked the Occupation's attempts to eliminate the so-called "labor boss system." The Occupation's Labor Division, insistent upon a more rational and more democratic labor program for Japan, claimed that between two and three million workers were controlled by an anachronistic "boss" system. These officials charged that the labor boss required "kickbacks" of from 10 to 50 percent of the workers' wages; that he prohibited them from changing their jobs at will; and that he blocked any attempt by workers to exercise their rights. The problem of the Division, then, was how to free this sizable bloc of Japan's labor force from the yokes of the bosses.

Beginning in 1946, the officials supported legislative measures designed to eradicate the system, but their early attempts did not seem to yield the desired results. They wanted to know if the Research Division could investigate the factors motivating the workers to cling to their traditional ways of labor recruitment and organization. While the subsequent events indicated that efforts at reform were not totally in vain, it took considerable research to reach an understanding as to why the workers in the early part of the program did not take advantage of a less feudalistic labor recruitment plan. To illustrate some of the complex factors that condition the motivation of workers in clinging to their traditional system of labor recruitment, a case in point is given below.[1]

The Matsui Labor Supply Business

In the summer of 1946, the heydey of the labor boss system in Kanagawa, one man by the name of Kaemon Matsui directed a prefecture-wide labor supply organization that was one of the first to dramatize, for the Occupation Forces, the need for reform of the labor recruitment practices. Matsui's organization was known as the Romu Kyodo Kai, which in this discussion, will be abbreviated as the RKK. This organization controlled about 124,000 common laborers and many types of skilled workers, including nearly one-fourth of all laborers supplied to the Occupation Forces. The manifest purpose of the RKK was to furnish employers with laborers such as stevedores, dock maintenance men, warehouse workers, ditch diggers, carpenters, and even cooks. As a rule Matsui's organization concerned itself with the supply of seasonal or casual workers, the permanent types of employment being handled directly between the employers and the job-seekers. The organization's profits came principally from fees charged the employers and from what it could withhold from the wages of the workers that were supplied. In order for his organization to prosper, then, Matsui had to satisfy two basic requirements. One was the need to have a constant flow of specific information about employers seeking large groups of laborers, and the other was to be in a position to supply on demand the workers having the requisite skills.

The problem of gaining access to information about employers was aided by a special relationship the RKK had with the Kanagawa Employment Exchange Office, a governmental agency. It was the practice of private companies and governmental agencies to seek workers through this employment exchange. The Exchange, however, did not serve an individual laborer. Instead, the employers were furnished laborers by means of this special relationship established between the Exchange and the RKK. Thus the latter's problem of procuring business was taken care of by the Exchange.

The other basic requirement—that of being in a position to obtain laborers—involved two subsidiary problems: 1) how to get in touch with such workers, since there was no effective public employment office which might render this service, and 2) how to maintain internal control, since the workers in the labor pool were not employees of the RKK and were nominally free to work or not as they wished. The usual sanction of firing a recalcitrant worker in such a case was obviously not operative here. To understand how this organization met these problems, we need to look into the organization of the RKK.

The Formal Structure. Kaemon Matsui's labor supply empire had its central office conveniently located in front of the prefectural government's office building. As far as buildings go, these headquarters were extremely modest, but from here a line of communications extended down through three

* Dr. Ishino is Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, Michigan State University. Parts of this paper were presented at the Central States Anthropological Society meeting held at Bloomington, Indiana, in 1955. The material for the study was obtained in 1949-51, when the writer was employed by the Japan Occupation's Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division (CIE Section, GHQ, SCAP). The analysis was completed while the author participated in "Research in Japanese Social Relations," a project directed by John W. Bennett and aided by funds from the Office of Naval Research, Rockefeller Foundation, and The Ohio State University.

1. For many basic facts on this case, the author is indebted to Richard Deverall, Edgard C. McVoy, Dudley D. Davis, and Sterling D. Collette, all formerly of SCAP's Labor Division. Deverall's 1946 field reports to the Chief of the Labor Division were most helpful to the present case description.

levels of organization eventually to each of some 124,000 workers. On the second level of organization, 26 district associations were strategically located in various wards of large cities and in several towns of the prefecture. These associations had offices, usually no more than crudely constructed shacks, which employed a dozen clerical workers and one or two "office managers." These offices were essentially coordinating units for the several quasi-independent labor supply companies or *kumi* of the district. The *kumi*—varying in number from 5 to about 25 in each district—constituted the important cog in the RKK machinery. Its leaders made decisions on such questions as the division of labor procurement orders and the allocation of commissions and other income of the association. In brief, they were the "executive council" of the district association. Within a given *kumi,* at least one more status distinction was found. Since it typically had more than 300 casual workers of various qualifications registered with it, the *kumi* had to be divided into smaller administrative units which we designate here as "work teams," each composed of about 10-20 workers, and headed by a foreman or "straw boss." It was the responsibility of the straw boss to know his men: where they lived, how they could be contacted, and what skills they had.

This cursory description of the major elements in the formal structure of the RKK omits the informal relations and other interesting details, but it is a sufficient basis to begin discussion on how this labor supply business was supposed to have worked.

First of all, as already noted, the daily or weekly work orders were sent from the employment exchange office to the nearest district association of the RKK and from there to the local labor supply companies. Each company which received a labor requisition assigned to its foremen the number and qualifications of laborers they were to recruit and supervise. If the work order was routine and specified no experienced workers, the foreman picked his crew from a crowd of laborers waiting in one of several places, usually in front of the district offices of the RKK or at other favorite spots like outside the larger tramway stations. Here, a kind of "shape-up" system operated. There was no system of allocating jobs to workers on an equitable basis; neither did the "first come, first served" principle operate here. The straw boss gave preferential treatment to the men he knew best. However, if special kinds of workers were required, runners were sent ahead of time to laborers' homes requesting them to report to work at the specified time.

The system of wage payments was also rather simple. Slips of paper or chits were given to each worker and these chits could be exchanged at the end of the day for wages, or at the end of the pay period, depending upon the practice of the particular *kumi.* The flow of wages from the employer down to the individual laborer differed only slightly, according to whether the employer was a private company or a government agency. In the case of private companies, the foremen or the *kumi* was paid in lump sum the wages of all workers furnished. The *kumi,* then, after pocketing its "commission," and paying its fees to the RKK treasury (about one or two percent of the gross wages) distributed the remainder to the laborers. The "commission" probably amounted to about 15 percent or more of the gross wages paid to the workers supplied by the *kumi.* Where the client was the Occupation Forces, the system of payment was slightly more complex, but the *kumi* was paid, in addition to the wages of the workers, a flat 15 percent commission and an additional nine percent purportedly for covering the income tax it was to have paid the national government.

Aside from the obvious administrative duties connected with this type of operation, the officers of the RKK, i.e., those of *kumi* chief and above, devoted much time to promoting good relations with the prefectural labor officials and with outside agencies which hired the laborers RKK procured. Potentially, then, this formal structure of the RKK was a bureaucratic organization. Given certain conditions, it can be readily seen that the laborers, the straw bosses, and the rest of the organization could have developed into an impersonal machinery based upon economic self-interestedness and rational standards of organizational efficiency.

Informal Aspects. The foregoing discussion deliberately omitted a critical dimension of the RKK organization. This had to do with the *oyabun-kobun* system, or a fictitious kinship system, which was interwoven into the organizational structure. This system has to do with an aspect which the RKK workers shared in common with a million or more other casual laborers throughout the nation and with other labor groups, including many fishery workers, street-stall merchants, organized gamblers, and even *sumo* wrestlers. The strength of this institutional system was quite evident in the wartime period when tens of thousands of "labor bosses" or *oyabun* became quasi-government officials and served as "patriotic" mobilizers of casual and seasonal workers. The following generalized description of the *oyabun-kobun* system is necessary to the understanding of the discipline and solidarity of Matsui's RKK organization. It should also help to convey some of the non-rational aspects and the so-called human side of the potentially impersonal and bureaucratized structure of the RKK.

The *oyabun-kobun* system is basically a pattern of group relations which is modelled after the Japanese family. The chief of a group is known as *oyabun* or *oyakata,* which, roughly translated, means "a person who takes the role of a parent." By the same token, the follower is designated as a *kobun,* or "one who assumes the role of a child." But this title is not merely a linguistic convention. The Japanese terms are reinforced with many practical considerations.

One old codger and a retired labor boss, told us how he was chosen by a *kumi* chief some forty years previously when he was jobless and had no relatives to turn to for help. This benefactor treated him to a meal, put him up in a boarding house, and told him where to report to work. Soon this man was formally and ceremonially initiated into the *kumi.* As he learned the argot and as he gained experience in the various kinds of dockwork around Yokohama, he was promoted to a "straw boss" position, designated as *anikibun* (or elder brother) status. Eventually he earned the right to establish a *kumi* of his own. He claimed that when he achieved this status, he tried to show the same kindness to other apprentices as his former chief did to him.

This case is not unusual, for many have professed similar experiences. Moreover, other labor bosses made explicit a number of mutual obligations existing between a ritual par-

ent and son. The *kumi* chief's obligation of course was to see that his followers had employment, but in addition they were given "pocket money" in times of unemployment and on special holidays. They were expected to care for their ritual sons when they were sick, to help defray hospital expenses, and to make funeral arrangements in the case of death. The chief even intervened in arranging marriages for his ritual sons. Conversely, the ritual son had diffuse obligations to fulfill, including menial tasks like running errands. In some groups the obligations were so great as to require these sons to engage in such nefarious activities as knifing "unfair" competitors in the labor supply business. One or two such cases were reported in the summer of 1946.

It was this kind of symbolic relationship, augmented by a pseudo-*samurai* code of behavior and a system of obligations that Ruth Benedict discussed,[2] that made for the inner solidarity of the *kumi*. Since, as we have noted, the number of laborers controlled by a *kumi* was as large as 300, not everyone affiliated with a *kumi* was a member of this fictitious family (or *oyabun-kobun*) unit. In general these para-kinship ties existed only between the *kumi* chief and his subordinate staff of foremen and not the ordinary casual laborer. Among the foremen themselves, the relationship was that of a *kyodaibun,* or ritual brotherhood. Status distinctions among these ritual sons of the chief were usually made according to length of service in the *kumi* and designated by terms corresponding to younger-older brother statuses in the true family system. However, the principle of primogeniture of the true family system was absent and the ritual son who showed the most promise succeeded to the *kumi*-headship. Thus, unlike the true kinship structure, the succession system was not ascriptive or "hereditary," but based upon achievement.

And speaking of succession, we should understand that the retirement of the chief meant not only a shuffling of the power structure and human relations in the organization, but also an allocation of business "rights" called *nawabari*. These rights, established by general agreement or by force, gave each labor supplier a priority in supplying his own workers at least to specified employers, if not to all employers of casual laborers in a given district or ward. The retiring head could assign his rights intact to a single successor, divide it among several "heirs" or allow them to fall into the competitor's hand by default. When these assignations were made to his *kobun,* such acts were symbolized by having the successor assume the head's para-kinship name. For instance, if the "boss" used the surname, Sakai, for business purposes, the heir may be designated as "Sakai, II," symbolizing the latter's line of descent and *nawabari* rights in the business.

As for the non-succeeding *kobun,* however, they had a choice of either continuing as followers of the new chief or quitting the group. In the latter case, such persons might attempt to establish their own labor supply business with the loyalties and followings they could muster from their former associates. Such jockeyings for position gave rise to quarrels and some would be forced to leave the labor supply business altogether, perhaps to join some gangster outfit.

2. Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword,* Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1946.

It should be obvious that a change in command and the reshuffling of the membership of a group would be of some interest to other labor supply companies as well as to the general community of casual laborers. Indeed, to solemnize and make public these changes in command, a special ceremony was usually held in which the ritual of *sake*-drinking and gift giving were the central features. Where a large company was involved, representatives of many *kumi,* even from distant prefectures, were invited to witness the ceremony and to participate in the drinking party that followed. Other functions of such a get-together, of course, included the exchange of gossip and news among the *oyabun-kobun* society.

This process of reshuffling the members of the company and the reallocation of proprietary rights should help us to understand the many personal ties existing between nominally independent labor supply companies. The significance of these previous associations and personal ties was particularly evident in 1946, when several construction firms from Tokyo had contracted for the building of some 500 large housing units in Yokohama for the Occupation Forces' personnel. What puzzled some Occupation officials was that the carpenters, plumbers, roofers, and similar workers were being recruited from such distant places as Nagano, Yamanashi, and Toyama prefectures. In other words, the RKK labor supply companies had personal and particularistic ties with *kumi* people in those districts.

As for the *oyabun-kobun* relations at the higher levels of the RKK, the data are much more scanty. However, there is evidence to suggest that the *kumi* chiefs in any given district association entered into a *kyodaibun* or brotherhood compact and they symbolized this by the usual ritual exchange of *sake*-drinks and gifts. At the very top level, we may presume that Kaemon Matsui's followers who were placed in the various district offices were also his *kobun* or ritual sons. Furthermore, with respect to some of the *kumi* chiefs, Matsui, no doubt, had established pseudo grandfather-grandchild (*o-oyabun-magobun*) relations. This implied something more than mere business association.

To summarize, the *oyabun-kobun* system contributed to the total RKK organization by making the human relations in this situation more personal and particularistic than it would have been otherwise. It linked the members of the organization closely together, particularly the individuals within the *kumi* groups, by promoting a set of familial obligations which defined a meaningful existence. At the same time the system sacrificed certain values of "fair play" and often led to personal abuses, nepotism and favoritism.

The Implications of the Study

We may now return to the general problem with which this paper began: the motivational factors that prevented the workers in the labor boss system from shifting to a more democratic and less traditional method of labor recruitment. The foregoing description of the RKK organization will be used to illustrate some of the general features of the incentive system considered here. But first a broader perspective on the problems of incentives needs to be considered.

While there seems to be consensus among most behavioral scientists that motivational factors in concrete human situa-

tions are ***relative*** to the prevailing cultural and social conditions, administrators and practical men in human affairs often assume a more uniform and monistic conception of motives, particularly economic. For instance, industrial sociologists find that American management personnel often assume a relatively simple, almost universal, structure of human motivations. Such people believe that their conception of "human nature" applies universally and therefore that the Japanese dockworker, the Mexican farm hand, and the American engineer are driven by the same basic incentives as high wages, profit motive, and self-interestedness. But, as the yet incomplete cross-cultural datum suggests, such incentives are not universal.[3] They seem to be a function of the specific institutional and cultural systems in which they are found. Where high wages and the profit motive seem to be an adequate incentive, such as in the "rationalized" sectors of American economy, specific institutional devices support such an incentive system. Where these supports are lacking, other types of concrete motives are found to be operative.

Typically in peasant and folk societies non-economic incentives are as important as purely economic motives. Moreover, as Malinowski and other anthropologists have shown, in primitive societies economic relations cannot be simply and arbitrarily divorced from the total network of social relations in which these economic relations take place. Only when we approach the highly industrialized society with its ideology of capitalism, monetary exchange system and universalistic, functionally specific role definitions, do we find a more "rationalized" monetary system of incentives prevailing. But even here, as the case of Japan illustrates, not all sectors of the labor force operate under such an incentive system.

In the opinion of this writer, Occupation officials generally failed to appreciate the complexity of the motivations of boss-controlled workers and by the same token tended to overemphasize the role of wages.[4] These officials did not seem to take into account the fact that the institutionalization of industrial development was not uniform thoughout the economy and that some segments of the labor force still had one foot in the tradition-bound folk society. Some Occupation administrators took cognizance of this fact in academic discussions, but when faced with the practical problem of trying to pull the workers away from the domination of the "bosses," they seemed to focus their attention on such "rational" appeals as "higher take home pay," "no more kickbacks to the bosses," and "greater freedom to move from job to job."

The idea that motives are relative to the institutional setting is important to an understanding of the workers in the labor boss system like the RKK. Let us, therefore, consider some relevant aspects of the social and cultural background that affect these workers.

In sharp contrast to what is found in the United States the Japanese government, both at the local and national levels, has traditionally played a minor part in the development of general welfare and social security programs. Until the time of the Occupation-sponsored national welfare programs, much of the unemployment, disability and old age problems were assumed by the members of the extended family, by individual employers sensitive to such obligations, and, to a more limited degree, by the Japanese labor unions. But of course the welfare measures of the industrial enterprises and trade unions applied only to permanent or "inner group" members of the respective organizations.

A number of writers have noted the primary group orientations and general paternalism of Japanese industrial management so we need not go into detail here. But in a recent article, Levine suggests the importance of this paternalism—or patriarchalism, as he calls it—for the development of employee morale and motivation. Levine notes that Japanese management:

> ". . . established a wide variety of welfare programs and especially structured management to carry them out. Thus one administrative approach was to maintain close personal contact with employees on a face-to-face, day-by-day basis. Another was to increase communication channels through the use of loyal staff assistants and routinize welfare activities by assigning specific responsibilities to these assistants. In some instances, it was desirable for the workers to form their own organizations . . . primarily to facilitate communication. If there were elements of protest in these organizations, they were directed not at the patriarchal system *per se,* but at management failures to serve all the welfare needs for which the employer was held responsible."[5]

It should be obvious that such kinds of management-labor relations would be feasible only so long as business and industrial organizations are essentially small-scale enterprises.[6] But as some of these organizations grew with the industrial development, it became increasingly difficult to maintain face-to-face relationships and patriarchal organization. Other than to reject the traditional ideology altogether, one of the common techniques worked out by the management of a growing enterprise was to limit further growth in the internal structure by several alternative methods of sub-contracting. One example found among manufacturing enterprises was the Japanese putting-out system which utilized home craftsmanship both in the city and in the country. In other kinds of enterprises where laborers were the basic ingredients in the expanison program, such as in building and construction works, the bulk of a company's labor requirements was placed in the hands of labor contractors. Such contractors developed the pattern of organization that we referred to previously as the labor boss system. The

3. Wilbert E. Moore, *Industrialization and Labor,* Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1951.

4. *Cf.* the case study of labor procurement in Hiroshima as described by John D. Montgomery in "Administration of Occupied Japan: First Year," *Human Organization,* Vol. VIII, No. 3, pp. 11-13.

5. Solomon B. Levine, "Management and Industrial Relations in Postwar Japan." *The Far Eastern Quarterly,* Vol. XV, No. 1, November 1955, p. 63.

6. Pelzel notes: "As late as 1937, when the country had already been converted to heavy industry, 90 percent of all industrial establishments employed 100 workers or fewer and 70 percent of all industrial laborers were at work in these plants." See John C. Pelzel, "Some Social Factors Bearing Upon Japanese Population," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. XV, No. 1, Feb. 1950, p. 21.

labor bosses not only functioned as recruiters but assumed responsibility to train and supervise their workers and to provide a modicum of welfare measures such as those described in the RKK case.[7] Thus, from the employer's standpoint, it was no longer necessary to maintain for these workers the expensive welfare program and other traditional perquisites established for the "inner core" of the company's membership; neither was it necessary to support a special staff organization to facilitate face-to-face communications. The management worked through the labor bosses on a contractual basis.

Thus, the handling of welfare problems by kin groups and employers and the particular growth pattern of Japanese industrial enterprises are two of the basic institutional factors against which the motivation of such laborers as those found in the RKK organization must be evaluated. More specifically, such factors explain why money income *per se* was only one concrete motive among many. Although for many sections of the Japanese labor force good wages served as important incentives and as symbols of prestige, they did not function in this manner for the millions of common and semi-skilled laborers. The income of those outside the family of a well-established trade union or of a company was uniformly low as judged by the standards of almost any industrial nation because institutionalized means for attaining high wages and social security were indeed rare. Among the few available, the labor boss type of organization was the principal recognized means for attaining at least a token measure of employment security, group recognition, social solidarity and even occupational mobility within the system. It is this rigidity—or lack of alternative means to satisfy such needs in the institutional structure of Japan as a whole—that needs to be taken into account for an understanding of the motives of boss-controlled workers.[8]

With this rough sketch of the motivational structure before us, we can now examine briefly the results obtained by the reform program. Was the attempt to eliminate the boss system successful?

Evaluation of the Reform Program

Completely reliable statistics on the number of workers freed from boss-domination were difficult to obtain because the system was outlawed. But the Japanese Government, basing its statistics on the labor inspectors' field reports, stated that approximately 42,000 labor bosses terminated their operations by July 1950 and, as a consequence, 1,113,000 laborers disassociated themselves from the boss system.[9] The best informed sources in the Labor Division did not independently collect a comparable set of statistics, but they acknowledged that "notable progress" had been made in manufacturing industries as well as in service industries, the various trades, and stevedore companies. These industries, incidentally, held the bulk of boss controlled workers in 1946-47 before the laws prohibiting the system were promulgated.

The information given above is not entirely satisfactory, but no one can deny that some noteworthy developments took place in the labor boss institution. What, then, accounts for these changes?

It is the writer's opinion that the Occupation's attempt to eradicate the labor boss system was successful to the extent it was, not because it understood the incentives which kept the laborers attached to their bosses, but primarily because the Occupation achieved greater flexibility in the Japanese institutional structure through the successful promulgation of many of its general reform programs. It was able to initiate certain institutional changes which directly or indirectly affected the motivational system of boss-controlled workers. Aside from the punitive measures that "purged" leaders in the labor boss movement and outlawed the practice of labor supply business of this type,[10] the Occupation sponsored measures that established public employment centers in all major cities and towns, instituted a national unemployment insurance program, extended the facilities and services of public welfare agencies, and developed a farsighted social security system.

Though perhaps more indirect than other measures just cited, the influence of the institutional changes attempted outside the field of labor supply business must be acknowledged. Some of these new developments or at least new orientations might be mentioned: The closed system of many industrial enterprises was being gradually opened up and the employer's traditional notions about patriarchal obligations to his employees were changing. The trade union movement was being strengthened numerically and politically and it was demanding that social benefits be provided more uniformly and systematically throughout the labor force. Educational reforms were fostering not only a more liberal ideology, but bode well for the opening up of new channels of

7. It is interesting to note that American foremen and craftsmen in the building trades act as hiring bosses for large contractors not unlike those of the Japanese boss system, as has been suggested to me by Dr. Leonard Sayles. Richard R. Myers ("Inter-personal Relations in the Building Industry," *Applied Anthropology,* Vol. 5, No. 2, 1946, pp. 1-7) notes: "The technologcial and organizational requirements of building produce highly individualized employment patterns. As a result, interpersonal relations in the industry are for the most part informal and unstandardized. . . . The opportunity for personal choice, particularly on the part of the foreman, in terms of the factors of religion, race, ethnic identification and the more subtle but nevertheless highly significant criteria of 'sociability,' 'good judgment,' and 'initiative,' creates primary group situations which possess considerable internal stability" (p. 7). One important trait which seems to distinguish this case from the Japanese case is that in the latter the primary group relations are typically patterned on the *oyabun-kobun* or family system. Hence, to this extent, the primary groups in Japan are standardized and formalized. For an elaboration of this point, see the author's "The *Oyabun-Kobun:* A Japanese Ritual Kinship Institution," *American Anthropologist,* Vol. 55, No. 5, 1953, pp. 695-707.

8. The general institutional rigidity of Japan has been outlined by a number of writers, but some of the contributing factors are the limited mineral resources, land shortage, rapid population growth, and late entry into the field of colonial expansion.

9. Personal communication from Mr. Dudley Davis in 1951 when he was a member of the Manpower Branch, Labor Division, GHQ, SCAP.

10. The ineffectiveness of these punitive measures was suggested early in the program by the skill or trickery of the labor bosses and their "employers" in circumventing the intent of the law. For example, "labor bosses" carried on their supply business by becoming nominal employees of the companies that utilized their laborers.

social mobility and broadening the base of older ones.[11]

While few of these measures were intentionally directed at the elimination of the boss system *per se,* they nevertheless had their effect in the replacing of some of the basic functions provided the workers by that system.[12] In other words, the Occupation-sponsored social legislation and its outcome changed a boss-controlled worker's scale of values and motivations by providing alternative means by which he might satisfy his occupational and personal needs.

This interpretation of the workers' incentive system is essentially the same as that given in the SCAP research unit's report to the Labor Division. That this analysis was accepted by the Labor Division is suggested by this paragraph from a late 1950 progress report on the reform program:[13]

> "Although many bosses remain in business, their power of exploitation and control is being slowly whittled down, as much by general circumstances as by prohibitory legislation and enforcement measures aimed specifically against them. The sentiment of loyalty of workers to their boss is declining. In some instances workers in the boss-dominated fields have organized unions. Even a few of the boss-controlled workers have unions not all controlled by the bosses. An increasing number of workers and employers are finding that they can dispense with bosses and depend on a free referral service offered by the Public Employment Exchange. Unemployment insurance has been extended to casual workers, offering them as a public right some of the protection which they formerly obtained only from bosses. Newspaper and radio articles against bosses are helping arouse a new sense of resistance among some workers against boss exploitation."

Cursory as this examination of the reform program during the Occupation period is, it seems sufficient to suggest that the more flexible[14] the general institutional structure is with regard to the attainment of employment opportunities, social security, and social mobility, the more likely the incentive system of workers will focus on wages and the "profit motive." Conversely, given a more rigid institutional structure, the more likely the labor force will consider factors other than wages *per se* as incentive to work.

Summary

In the foregoing presentation of a case study of Japanese labor organization and the interpretations that followed, the attempt was made to illustrate the relativity of worker motivation to the institutional and cultural setting in which the workers are involved. The analysis suggested that the motivations of boss-controlled workers reflected the perceived and/or actual modifications established in the Japanese institutional structure. These changes in motivations were not demonstrated by reciting a representative sample of opinions, but were suggested by alluding to the decline of boss-controlled laborers in the latter part of the Occupation period. Finally, it was hypothesized that a more flexible institutional structure with multiple channels for social security and social mobility would provide the kind of cultural setting necessary for the creation of an incentive system that approximates "rationality" and approaches the classical "wage theory" of motivations.

11. Some observers have felt that such SCAP-sponsored reforms did not penetrate deeply into the roots of the society, while at the same time others were fearful that the Japanese were changing too much and too fast. It is too soon to evaluate the net effect of these broad reforms. In any case, the fact that such institutional changes were attempted with considerable vigor suggests that workers in a labor boss system could not help but compare their own plight against the cultural background of a former period with that of the contemporary one. The latter offered more promise.

12. Merton's statement is apropos here ". . . any attempt to eliminate an existing social structure without providing adequate alternative structures for fulfilling the functions previously fulfilled by the abolished organization is doomed to failure." Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure,* Glencoe Free Press, 1949, p. 79.

13. GHQ, SCAP, ESS, Labor Division memorandum from D. D. Davis to E. C. McVoy, dated 22 August 1950, p. 5.

14. The term "flexible" is interpreted to mean that there are several alternative channels by which an individual may achieve certain ends as occupational satisfaction, personal advancement, social recognition, and economic security.

Coming to MSU — 1965

Recd Oct 9, 1957

Preliminary Notes

Regional Integrative Patterns in Asian Societies (RIPIAS)

(session for American Anthropological Association meeting December, 1957.)

1. The focus of attention will not be on a comparison of urban and folk (or peasant) society. We are interested in demonstrating how the countryside, in each area discussed, is related to the city and to higher levels of organization (regional, national, etc.), rather than drawing contrasts between the two.

2. We have elicited the interest and cooperation of persons with substantial field experience in diverse parts of Asia on the premise that comparison between various Asian regions is likely to reveal homologies or parallels, in the traditional situation, some of them in clear contrast to the urban-hinterland relations of industrial Europe.

3. Whatever distinctions may exist between urban and rural ways of life, in various parts of Asia, the city and the countryside are linked together interdependently (or symbiotically) in various sectors of their cultures: e.g. economically (marketing, landownership, capital formation and manipulation, etc.); politically (security mechanisms, etc.); socially (occupational and kinship groupings, patterns of mobility, etc.); ceremonially (religious orientations and institutions, etc.).

In some cases, of course, the city stands in contrast to the countryside, but in other cases patterns or institutions common to city and country integrate them into recognizable regional and national wholes, overriding or muting the contrasts.

4. For each area considered, what are the primary reciprocal (or coercive) relationships that lead persons to identify themselves with a kin unit, a community, a region, a nation? How many, of what kinds, and how strong are the bases for regional or national identification?

5. Personnel:

Arab Middle East - V. Ayoub (Antioch College)

Iran-Pakistan - - H. H. Vreeland (HAMRAF)

India - B. Cohen and M. Marriott (Univ. of Chicago)

Southeast Asia - L. P. Gosling (University of Michigan)

Japan - I. Ishino

Moderators - R. K. Beardsley and W. D. Scherger (University of Michigan)

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN
COLLEGE OF LITERATURE, SCIENCE, AND THE ARTS

DEPT. OF ANTHROPOLOGY
221 ANGELL HALL

December 20, 1957

MEMORANDUM

Subject: A.A.A. Chicago meeting(1957) session on "Regional Integration in Asian Societies."

From: Richard K. Beardsley

1. I enclose synopses for three of our five major areas. Beardsley has stupidly misplaced a fourth, on India, before it could be copied, and apologizes humbly (expecting it to turn up as soon as the ones here are in the mail).

2. Thank you all for the cooperation-- both as to timing of these synopses and as to their content. You probably will agree with me that a good deal of common ground is apt to show up; at the same time, each region ~~xxxxxx~~ will be presented with some special emphasis appropriate to it, and these special emphases or points of view may stimulate a response from other areas. I look forward to having a bang-up session, and I hope none of you has felt too constrained or bludgeoned into doing what you will be doing.

3. All considered, special handling of this session seems inappropriate and more apt than not to breed trouble. Will you please forget what I said earlier about five-minute presentations. You all will need time on the order of fifteen minutes to lay out your data and views. Some may prefer to read from a script; my personal feeling is that speaking from an outline is effective and-- especially in this case-- not at all out of character with what is expected. Fifteen minutes is about the upper limit if we are to have any sum-up comment (I would hope to have time for each person to make a few observations on other areas in the light of his own, or vice-versa, so that we may underscore any elements of a pan-Asian pattern that emerges.)

4. A get-together, beforehand, would profit us all. I hope it may be possible. May I suggest that we try to save Friday supper-time to gather, drink, eat, and talk briefly before the session. Let us meet near the registration desk before six (6:00 P.M.) and let the Chicago members guide us to an appropriate eatery not too far away.

Cordially,

Richard K. Beardsley

cc. W.D.Schorger
Harold Vreeland — Iran, Pakistan
Victor Ayoub — Arab Mid East
McKim Marriott — India
Bernard Cohn
L.Peter Gosling — Southeast Asia
Iwao Ishino — Japan

Iwao Ishino
December 3, 1957

Outline for a Panel Discussion
to be Presented at the AAA Meetings

"Regional Integrative Patterns in Japan"

A. Introductory Remarks

1. Statement of purpose:

A double-pronged problem: "(1) how national and regional institutions influence or condition the local community organization, and (2) how the local community attempts to maintain integrity and self-identity in the face of these external pressures (regional and national)."

2. Definition of terms: (e.g., "region," " integration," "community.")

3. Japan as a representative Asian society?

B. The Frame of Reference

1. The analogy of biological cells. Each cell is not only dependent upon the larger collectivity for its existence, but the larger entity often determines in large measure the function and nature of its constituent cells. So it is with any single community in a given region of Japan.

While having certain autonomous characteristics, the community nevertheless must make constant adjustments both to its own subsistence requirements as well as to serve certain functions required by the larger society of which it is a part.

2. Some axiomatic statements (read "dogmatic" statements):

(a) that any local community in Japan produces surpluses (manpower, goods, services) which other communities in the larger society may consume.

(b) that the local community exercises only partial control over the distribution of these surpluses; the larger society exercises some influence in determing the distribution. (This can be mediated by laws regulating commerce, by regional and national trade associations, by federated labor unions, by corporations, ~~xxx~~ etc.)

(c) that social groupings and cultural orientations found in the local communities (e.g., family structures, neighborhood associations, social classes, religious bodies, moral codes, local statutes) reflect these economic, political, and social power relations.

(d) that the extensions (people, goods, services, ideas) of the local community which reach out into the larger society are not static, but change in significance over time. The historical dimension is important.

(These four statements paraphrase those of Eric Wolf's (Aspects of Group Relations, AA, vol 58, no. 6)

C. Comparison of Reigional Integrative Patterns of Feudal and Modern Japan.

1. Description of internal organization of local communities for both feudal and modern times.

2. Description of the larger Japanese society for both historical periods.

(See par. D. below for the kind of generalizations that should emerge from the descriptive materials presented here)

D. Some General Observations.

1. The adjustmental patterns of the local community to the "demands" of the larger society.

It may be said that as the local community became increasingly involved (integrated) with the larger society, these conditions tended to prevail:

a) a decline in the intensity of interpersonal relations among the members of the local community.

b) greater individual autonomy from local customs and conventions and at the same time greater subordination to laws and conventions of the larger society (political force, laws, police, national propaganda, values).

c) greater social circulation (mobility) of individuals in different types of associations and groups.

d) increase in the number of connecting links (clubs, associations, communications) with the larger society.

e) decline in local patriotism and increase in identification with the larger society.

f) increase in variant cultural definitions of groups, values, and ideologies.

g) increase in opposition or competition between groups and ideologies.

h) increase in social fragmentation, social mobility, and social circulation.

i) increase in segmental (functionally specific) relationships.

(The above statements taken from Wilson & Wilson, The Analysis of Social Change).

j) changing canons of statu (A is high in one status system and low in another; both systems being localized in the same community.

k) establishing patterned relationships that never existed before (e.g., wealthy out-caste eta with a poor peasant).

l) new types of solidarity groupings emerge (e.g., those with similar educational backgrounds, common hobbies, religious interests)

D. Some General Observations (continued)

(The preceding three statements were borrowed from Redfield's introductory ~~xxxxxxx~~ statements that appeared in Village India, ed. by McKim Marriott)

2. Changes that took place at the national level that made for greater integration of the local community with the larger society:

1. Greater emphasis on private landholdings.
2. Expansion of money economy.
3. Establishment of formalized national institutions:

a. organized religion
b. legal judicial systems.
c. police and military organizations (rational-legal type)
d. ~~bank~~ improved banking and credit systems.
e. parliamentary and political party systems.
f. postal services.

4. Improvements in communication and transportation systems (railroads, newspapers, radio, etc.)
5. Industrial technology and giant corporations.
6. Political strong vested interests and pressure groups.

3. As the above changes took place (see par. D-1 and D-2), these additional patterns of change can be noted:

a) the residents of the local community see themselves as being related less with the entire community and more with special sub-groups within the community (kin, buraku, cooperatives, school ties, occupational groups).

b) the sub-groups within the community played more specialized roles in the larger society (region and nation) than before.

c) but the larger society does not utilize the services of the community as an integral unit; rather it ~~xx~~ relies on the functionally specific services of individuals (professionals artisans, laborers), groups or associations (farmer's associations, ladies clubs), and institutions (schools, banks).

(The above three statements are ideas taken from Smith and Reye's "Community Interrelations with the Outside World" AA, 59: 463-72.)

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY EAST LANSING

COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC SERVICE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

August 11, 1958

Professor Iwao Ishino
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Michigan State University
Campus

Dear Iwao:

I have just read Bellah's "Tokugawa Religion" and Abegglen's "The Japanese Factory." I would like to have you as audience while I think out loud a little about some issues these books raise in my mind. You may regard the following as preparatory to some questions which I hope to address to you at a later date which, I hope, you will be able to keep in mind on my behalf during your stay in Japan. (Remember that, other than these two books, I have read nothing about Japan except a couple of articles sometime in the dim past. Also, I am only beginning to think about the general issues I raise.)

The general issue in my mind is the organization of what Parsons would call the adaptive phase. More particularly I am concerned with how Japan achieves any degree of flexibility and rationality in the conduct of its economic affairs. If the answer were to be that Japan does not have need or want these organizational features, I would pose the additional question: How can she compete with other societies either in war or in trade on a world market if these other societies lay greater emphasis on and have greater success in the management of their adaptive phases? To put this in a personal context, you may remember my interest in alternatives to "Western" economic organization, interest in small-scale industry as part of such an alternative, and interest in the relations between small-scale and large-scale industry. (Already so early in my deliberations about this I begin to suspect that the small-large-scale dimension may turn out to be little more than a red herring, and that an approach to the question in terms of entirely different organizational and cultural concepts may be much more fruitful.)

With the adaptive phase Parsons associates universalism, achievement-performance, functional specificity, and affectivity. Others, and possibly Parsons himself, go beyond this to suggest that these orientations are not only associated with the adaptive phase, but that they are

effective, indeed necessary for the management of the adaptive phase. And some others would add additionally that individualist rather than collective orientation is necessary as well. In the face of this position, the question immediately suggests itself: How in hell can Japan industrialize and run an industrial economy? It seems to me that the two writers named above address themselves to this question; and others do as well. But, (1) they do not offer many answers; (2) their answers differ where they exist; (3) and notably what they see in Japan seems to differ as well. Let me then ramble on to examine in an unorganized fashion Japanese society in terms of some of these concepts.

The reason the question of the last paragraph seems so obvious is because, at least at one glance, one might argue that Japan displays the opposites of all the pattern variables listed above: particularism, quality-ascription, functional diffuseness, neutrality, and collective orientation. Other glances, however (and glances is all I am capable of) would yield a somewhat different list. The claim of particularism rather than universalism seems least open to challenge. Even so, as I recall, one of the main arguments of Marion Leevy in "Contrasting Factors in the Economic Development of China and Japan" was precisely that China was particularist while Japan was universalist. I do not remember the evidence he cited. I will have to look that up. The only support for the Leevy position that occurs to me would be to say that loyalty, filial piety, etc., are important in the orientation of the Japanese. But, if I understand the Parsonian distinctions, this is evidence really for particularism unlike honor, progress, etc., loyalty and piety are oriented to a person for collectivity and are thus particularist. The message, in any case, of Bellah is explicity, and that of Abegglen implicity that particularism is a dominant orientation among Japanese. That is to say the former suggests that it was and the latter that it remains so.

The claim to diffuseness also appears to be strong. The attitude and behavior of one person toward another certainly derives not from expectations entailed by limited and specific roles in a given situation (indeed in my ignorance of the use of the concept "role," I wonder how useful the concept is for the study of societies in which the relation between two individuals is between their entire "persons" in which the distinctions that we are accustomed to drawing between roles in the West lead in a given situation to the simultaneous relevance of many, many overlapping roles between the two individuals). If you suggest that Oyabun-Kobun as found in the organization of occasional type workers in Japan derives from deep-seated traditions in the society and has relevance for other sectors of the

society as well, then you also supply evidence for diffuseness of attitude. Familism, "one job for life" in large factories, arranged marriages at the instance of the owner of small shops, etc., fit the same pattern.

What about the performance-quality for achievement-ascription dimension? It seems to me we can recognize much of both. But to me the picture is at the moment very confusing. There seems little doubt that reward is primarily distributed ascriptively. This appears to be the case for recognition (cognition as well), and for material rewards such as wages and salary. Pay is a function of status, age, education, number of children, etc., but not a function of the value of a man's contribution to the productive process. One might argue to the contrary that age and education are marks of achievement. But age, and even seniority are not are not achievements in the sense that the person has any option in achieving or not achieving the same. By the time that pay is assigned for educational level, the person concerned no longer has the option of increasing his education either. Hence neither of these can be tied into the person's incentive system in the way in which we are familiar in the West. The right to the job itself is, once one has a certain status, ascribed as well--certainly in the factory, apparently even through ritual kinship for occasional work. On the other hand, recruitment into status-role is to some extent by achievement. This appears to be the case for becoming a member of a fictitious kin group. It is the case for getting a job or a position in the first place, be it in large industry, small industry, or elsewhere. It is the case for attaining the particular level of education and admission to a particular school, which leads to the ascription derived from education. There appears, however, to be a reverse trend at least in the field of education: the receipt of education and of education in a particular school, appears increasingly to be determined by ascription as well. On the whole, however, one might say that from one point of view reward is determined by achievement of status and ascription within status. The very opposite might be said from another point of view: in many situations reward is determined by achievement in a particular competition, but eligibility for the competition is determined by status. Looked at through my Western eyes, one would wish the latter in order to provide suitable incentives, and one would wish the former to provide adequate flexibility. The following question comes to mind: Does a strong emphasis on ascription or quality fail to handicap Japan because she has the right kind of combination of the aforementioned circumstances to permit incentives on the one hand and flexibility and rationality on the other hand? If so, what is that combination, or what such combination is necessary?

In opposition to the foregoing discussion Bellah argues that the Japanese are very performance oriented. In so doing he does not, however, refer, I think, to the distribution of reward, nor even to the expectation of reward on the part of the individual. His discussion of religious and filial duty and motivation is reminiscent of the Protestant ethic, and even of the strict Calvinist position. It is one's duty to strive, but one should not expect to be rewarded for striving or for successful striving. Man is sinful (Calvin); he receives On (Japanese religion). He must strive for salvation and must attempt hoon, but not in the expectation of reward. Both salvation and hoon are in large part to be approached through deeds. My conclusion is that motivation derives from a performance orientation and not from the hope of reward. Reward, material and otherwise, derives from an ascriptive orientation, however, and is in no wise related to achievement either of workaday tasks or of hoon. Indeed reward is always greater than dessert. The question still remains in my mind: How do the Japanese achieve the kind of organizational flexibility which can be derived from changing the criteria for reward in an achievement oriented society?

I suppose there would not be much argument with the position that Japanese are primarily collective rather than individual oriented. But I see no reason why collective orientation should be less appropriate to the adaptive phase than individualist orientation (the opposite in fact), nor indeed why it should interfere even with the flexibility necessary for change. As a solution for the incentive problem on which Westerners continue to whop, achievement orientation on behalf of the collectivity, be it the family, the five family group, the factory, the nation, strikes me as a fine solution. (Does the particularist tie to the factory and the shop replace the tie to the han, and even more so to the five family group?)

One of the questions which is in the back of my mind is: How were the relations between the small producer and the large established, and how are they maintained? (I have in mind the subcontracting system between large assembly type factories and small producing type shops on the one hand, and between agricultural producers and urban distributors on the other hand. The same question I suppose arises with respect to the relation among the members of a Zaibatsu.) Particularism, diffuseness, ascription, and collective orientation, all would seem to provide suitable building blocks for the establishment and maintenance of these hierarchical and cooperative arrangements. Yet the range over which one's attitude is diffuse must be limited; not even the Japanese count everyone as his brother in all respects. One's attitude toward an individual in another family or occupational organization is, I presume, specific and not diffuse after all. And

if, as Bellah suggests, people are achievement oriented, they are so on behalf of their collectivity, but then also in competition with members of other collectivities.

Another question occurs: Is there an orientation of individualism, achievement, and specificity underlying the usual conduct which comes out in times of stress? As an example, who bears the brunt of a decline in demand for the product of a vertical combine? My impression is that the cost is passed from the large factory on down through its suppliers to the ultimate suppliers of labor and entrepreneurship who are left holding the bag. Ascription and collective orientation would then appear to be not all-pervasive even within the vertical combine.

Enough for now! As I think more about organization and read more about Japan, I may dream up some more specific questions that might be researchable at low cost in the field.

In the meantime, send me a note about the progress of your recovery from the operation and give my regard to Mary and the kids, especially, of course, Susie. Also return to me please the book by Myrdal

Sincerely yours,

Gunder

Andrew Gunder Frank

AGF:cs

1. ~~Invitations~~ They don't know who's coming

2. Invitations not sent out

3. They don't know or care about what we talk about. (They're not interested in the subject — They want a group of speakers — That is all).

April 17, 1963

Dr. Gordon Bowles
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Syracuse University
Syracuse 10, New York

Dear Gordon:

Im deeply troubled with the paper I proposed to send you. From my point of view, the paper which I presented at the recent Asian Studies Association meeting is a satisfactory one. But I've had some second thoughts.

These "second thoughts" have to do with Professor Haring. You see, the central point of my paper attempts to "ridicule" the idea of "traditionalism" as a technical term. Inasmuch as some of Haring's early writings use this concept implicitly or explicitly, I wonder if the reader would not construe it as a direct attack on him. In reality, I have in my previous writings used the notion of traditionalism, but this does not excuse the fact that readers may interpret the inclusion of this paper as uncomplimentary to Doug.

Given this dei dilemma, I am passing the buck to you. I am enclosing a copy of the paer and would like you to read and it and judge whether or not it would be affensive and in poor taste if it were included in the festschrift. If you decide to omit, I would not feel hurt--so please don't take my feelings into consideration here.

I await your answer.

Sincerely yours,

Iwao Ishino

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY SYRACUSE 10, NEW YORK

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

April 9 '63

Dear Iwao,

How is the article for the Festschrift coming along?

I raise the question only because it would seem that the MSS has to be ready for the printers within a matter of two weeks or so. The other articles are being processed through the preparatory stages- retype etc. and so there will be no holdup, once everything is in order.

When I saw youthe other day your indicated that you would be submitteing a single author title. I presume this means that the title and contents in general would be different from the subject you originally submitted a few weeks ago as a jointly authored article.

In preparing the total MSS for the publisher, a number of adjustments have been made both in rearrangement of articles and in overall purpose of the Festschrift.

As conceived now, the Festschrift would have as its main theme "Fact, Theory and Social Science". The article would be grouped under three headings:-

I) Social Thought: History and Theory
   a) Sociological and Cultural-anthropological elements in the Writings of Johann Gottfiried von Herder (Lehmann)
   b) Dimensions of Fact in Anthropology (Count)
   c) Myth, Theory, and Value in Cultural Anthropology: Questions and Comments (Bennett)
   d) Some Issues of Relevance of Data for Behavioral Science (Faris)

II) Social Organization (or Institutions and and Social Order)
   a) Order and the value or Disorder (Friedrich)
   b) Societal Complexity and Limited Alternatives (Manfrdei)
   c) Social Fiction versus Scientific Fact in Psychiatry (Becker)
   d) Some Considerations on the Theory of Social Change (Parsons)

III) Cultural Relativity
   a) Facts and their Recognition among the Bella Coola (McIlwraith)
   b) Active Vulcanism in Ka'u, Hawaii, as an Ecological Factor affecting Native Life and Culture (Handy)
   c) Culture and Charisma (Singer)
   d) Cultural Context and Population Control Programs in Village India (Opler)

Does your proposed article fit into the last category? I hope it does. If not, could you let me know on receipte of this letter so we can consider possibilities.

We are undergoing major surgery preparatory to divorse from Sociology as I told you a few days ago. The pressures are getting pretty terrible!

Best Wishes,

Sincerely,

Gordon

Prepared for the Annual Meetings of
the Central States Anthropological
Society, Madison, Wisconsin, May 1959.

THE LOSS OF PEASANT HERITAGE IN JAPAN

by Iwao Ishino
Michigan State University

John D. Donoghue
University of Texas

The two gentlemen who organized this symposium in their initial call for papers made reference to the imperative need for re-thinking the nature of peasant cultures. The present authors have been doing the same since they begun the field work on which this paper is based. Since October they have visited nine of the thirteen villages surveyed a decade ago by a team of Japanese and American social scientists, and examined three of these nine more intensively with the aid of 15 students from the University of Tokyo. These three villages are located in Shimane, Kagawa, and Nara prefectures and they exemplify respectively an isolated mountain village, a marginal coastal community, and a lowland plains village.

The authors arrived in the field with certain pre-conceptions and beliefs about the nature of Japanese peasantry. Some of these beliefs were implicit, of course, but most of them were explicit because they had been reiterated in the literature by both American and Japanese scholars. The writers wish to take this opportunity to re-examine these preconceptions in the light of new evidence they are gathering. The purpose of this paper, then, is to state these early assumptions and to summarize their present views.

Our Pre-Conceptions

We knew that Japan was an over-populated country and poorly endowed with natural resources. The amount of arable land--only 16 percent of the total area--had reached its upper limits long ago. Further reclamation and conversion of the hillsides into arable land was deemed impossible. We also knew that a land reform program had been carried out several years before in which tenancy

was drastically reduced. We had figures which told us that the average farm household operated a strip of land of only two-and-a-half acres or, more accurately, 5.9 separate strips of land totalling only 2.5 acres. We read that this rural population of 36 million represented 40 percent of the nation's population, and/it was able to produce up to 80 percent of the nation's food requirements by laborious and intensive methods of agricultural production.

Yet in some curious ways in which an economic system operates, this 40 percent earned only 17 percent of the total national income. These figures were sufficient to suggest that the farmers of Japan were living at a standard considerably below that of the city workers and that they indeed were peasants. What else could they do but to live frugally and to cherish the classic peasant values that hard work is a virtue in itself and that farming is not a money-making business but a way of life? How else could they maintain their self-respect if they did not maintain a closely integrated natural community which insulated itself from the impersonal, competitive, and frivolous life of the urbanite?

Such were our thoughts and impressions about the Japanese peasantry before we began our studies last October. But this rather simple picture did not hold its shape for long. As we visited one village after another the image began to fade away. The "peasant" image gave way to an image of an hard-headed commercial "farmer." The reasons for the change in image ran somewhat as follows:

Are Japanese Agriculturalists "Peasants"?

While we did not quite expect the Japanese "peasant" to be following the same cultivation methods his great grandfather used, we thought the technical advances would be limited. We were surprised, however, at the refinements that had developed. We came to the conclusion that the Japanese farms may be small, but that it was no gardening activity, as some writers have suggested facetiously.

The successful farmer must not only work with his hands, but also with his head in order to make his 2.5 acre farm produce as efficiently as it does. He works on a small margin and so he must be careful that each decision he makes is the best one. But in these days, the Japanese peasant is confronted with many kinds of decisions his grandfather never had to make. Dozens of basic

innovations about farming have been placed before him in recent years. The information about them come to him from many directions: from the farmer in the next hamlet, the local agricultural agent, the technical advisor for the cooperative, the salesman of fertilizers and farm equipment, the canning company looking for raw materials, the popular farm journal issued by the cooperatives, and his wife who might have learned about the new idea at the local Women's Club lecture meeting.

The officers in agricultural cooperatives have told us that farm families most resistent to new ideas are "holiday" farmers who work in a nearby factory or office while their women folk and children operate the farm. Perhaps these represent the small, but significant, number of farmers who are leaving the farms, after they get their sons educated and placed into a town occupation. On the other hand there are the eager farmers who actively seek technological improvements. These progressive farmers, by their example, encourage other less imaginative farmers to follow suit. They are the ones who are first to use farm machinery. Those whose role is to advance the new farm technology--like the farm extension agent and the technical advisors of the cooperatives--introduce the innovations through these action-oriented farmers.

The kinds of changes taken over by the peasants can be readily observed in the villages. The use of plastic covering to hasten the maturation of rice seedlings and to protect other kinds of crops has become a familiar part of the landscape. The characteristic odor from "night soil" fertilizers is absent even though they are still used in large quantities. The rhythmic coughing sounds of small cultivators can be heard. Technical progress can also be indicated by statistics. For instance in five years from 1948 to 1952, the rice yields per hectare increased 64 percent.

The Japanese peasant must use his head not only for increasing his yields but also in other ways, for example in marketing. Like farmers elsewhere he is concerned with locating the best marketing for his crops. Except for rice which is usually handled through the agricultural cooperatives, other commodities require personal attention and sometimes long term planning. In one of our sample villages, for

example, the farmers lobbyed for the construction of a highway that would lead into the city of Hiroshima. If such a road were built, this would enable them to double their income from the vegetables which they already raise and to raise such "quality" items as late season tomatoes. Where the locality has many producers of a single crop--such as silk, madarin oranges, milk, and tea--marketing cooperatives are available. Peasants located near large cities often transport their products by their own three-wheeled trucks or contract someone to do it.

Financial problems are also matters of great concern to the Japanese peasant, particularly for obtaining farm credit. Interest rates are high and so are taxes. It is interesting to note that some farm families which have incorporated themselves as a business and thereby claim certain tax deductions not given to farmers. Court decision on this is pending. The government has put in a crop insurance system which provides a kind of protection the farmer never had before. Farm credit, interest rates, taxes, and crop insurance are financial problems that rarely concerned the grandfather of today's peasant.

As we said before, then, the management of a two-and-a-half acre farm is a complicated business. The Japanese "peasant" is learning to adapt himself to the modern world and, incidentally, to the Great Traditions. We conclude therefore that the Japanese peasant is being rapidly transformed into something else, a hard-headed, and a hard-working commercial farmer.

But this peasant-turned-farmer is still caught in the inexorable vise between too many people on the one hand and not enough land on the other. Seen in the large perspective, however, he is not retreating to the security of his traditional ways nor escaping into the world of mysticism and supernaturalism. Neither is he a revolutionist wishing to upset the existing political order. We think some of the reasons for this lies in the nature of his local community to which we turn now.

The Hamlet

The face-to-face, natural community of the Japanese rural population is the hamlet. Other than the family or household there is probably no other social

grouping that exerts so much influence upon the peasant's daily activities and his social outlook. Its members operate farm plots in adjoining areas, manage the communally owned pastureland and forest reserves, share the water from the same irrigation system, repair and maintain their common roads; pay their respects at the common tutelary shrine; and celebrate their annual festivals.

In this kind of tightly knit community of several dozen families, then, the Japanese farmer can and does find a certain degree of security, in spite of whatever inequities there might be between him and the city dweller. Interestingly enough certain events have taken place in the postwar period to increase the solidarity of the hamlet. The prime motive for this was the land reform program which removed the economic dependence of the tenants upon the landlords. Social distance between the top families and those lower has decreased; overt deference patterns are diminishing; and some cases of inter-marriage between classes have been noted. Numerous members of the former tenant class have been elected to the village assembly and hold other positions of influence in the hamlet. Most of these position were not formerly open to the tenant class. We can also say that in general the prestige of the individual has come to be based less on his family background and more on his personality and accomplishments. In this sense the hamlet has become more democratic. Here, then, is one partial answer to the question of why demoralization has not set in among the rural population.

Another reason for the generally healthy outlook of the Japanese farmer is that the gap in the living standards between him and his city cousin is being closed. This is not only reflected in the national statistics on income and nutrition, but can be directly observed in the villages. The range and quality of merchandise carried in the village stores are good and cannot easily be distinguished from that found in suburban shops in Tokyo. New roads have been constructed, telephone lines put in, temples rennovated, and thatch roofs replaced with tile. In every village we visited, we saw hundreds of bicycles, and dozens of motorcycles, trucks, and busses. We have noted five to ten television sets in eight of the nine villages visited. The ninth village was not within the existing television telecast zone. Washing machines were becoming popular

the farmer's wives were buying ready-made work clothes at the Cooperative store. They said it was cheaper to buy than to sew them at home.

Some Difference between Villages

The foregoing, we hope, is sufficient to suggest how the Japanese peasant is adjusting to his ever-present economic situation of too ~~much~~ many people and not enough land. Scientific and technological advances have come into the peasant's way of life and as a result he is becoming less a peasant and more a commercial farmer. We/the see hamlet and the favorable conditions in it, playing a vital role in helping him make this transition.

But, to look more closely at the facts, we see a basic difference among the communities in which the Japanese peasant lives--a difference which is important for understanding his adjustment to modern conditions.

Japanese rural communities have to be classified in many ways--by size, by kinship structure, by crops raised, etc. But for our purposes the most significant classification is in terms of degrees of isolation from major urban centers. For convenience, let us call those which are located near the large cities or close to the major railroad lines as "hinterland" villages; while those located in remote regions such as those in the mountain areas as "isolated" communities.

With regard to these two types of villages, we note a very interesting difference. Paradoxically, the isolated villages seem to be further advanced and more progressive than hinterland communities in taking over innovations in agricultural techniques, in home improvements, in family relations (e.g. mother-in-law and daughter-in-law adjustments) and in birth control measures. The "backwardness" of these isolated villages is no longer so apparent as it was before. The reason for this, we think, is that the social solidarity is greater in the isolated communities and local pride in making it a shining example gains wider appeal. Furthermore the capable persons and potential leaders do not leave these villages to the same extent as they do in the other type. The temptations to be drawn away into the town and city are not as strong nor as real. This is to say, then, that compensating factors are operating here. The isolated villages help the Japanese peasant make a better adjustment to life by providing him with

a comparatively active and progressive social environment. In the case of the peasant in the hinterland communities, his opportunities to move into the urban centers are greater and his dependence upon fellow villagers for recreation, part-time employment, and friendship is less.

These differences between village types, however, can be over-stressed. We reiterate the original statement that the opportunities of the Japanese peasant to participate in the Great Tradition have increased immeasurably. His stake in the economy is larger and his status in the society is higher. The confining pressures of too ~~much~~ many people and not enough land is still there, but what has been accomplished within this framework is remarkable.

(In this paper we have not emphasized the traditional side of peasantry--inter-family relations, kinship structure, folk beliefs, and ceremonial observances of the Little Tradition--because another paper is being given which presumably will stress these aspects. We do not believe that these elements in the Little Tradition are necessarily dysfunctional or that they obstruct the process of transforming the peasant. But we do believe that their meaning and their significance in the contemporary peasant society is changing. The rite of rice cultivation, for example, is performed these days because "it is something to do" and not because it will affect the size of the rice harvest.)

Nov 8, 1956

AAA meeting

Purpose of Discussion:

Boundary version

1. What are the primary reciprocal (or coercive) relationships that lead ~~to~~ persons to identify themselves with a kin unit, a community, a region, a nation?
2. ~~What~~ How many, of what kinds, and how strong are the bases for regional or national identification?

Revision

1. What are the ties that relate the rural community to
   - urban & metropolitan district
   - regional & prefectural unit
   - national level
   - international level?

2.

The "ties" that bind

a. Economic
   1. Trade – sales etc
   2. Occupation – Jobs
   3. Goods flow in & out

~~b. Social~~

3.

b. Political
   1. Admin. (govt'al)
   2. Police
   3. Educational

c. Social
   1. Voluntary associations
   2. Patterns of social & geog. mobility
   3. Kinship groups.
   4. migrations.

~~AAA meeting~~ Nov. 6 — 2

D. Ceremonial
1. Religion bureaucracies
2. Pilgrimages
3. Festivals
4. Radio, TV, newspaper, Periodical

General principles suggested by Wilson & Wilson

" The total degree of dependence upon others (i.e. the intensity of relations) is the same in all societies, but that it may be more or less spread out. Intensity in the narrower circles of relation necessarily diminishes as intensity in the wider circle increases."

Corollary

(1) "Local patriotism declines as wider loyalties develop ... " p. 41.

(2) greater individual autonomy in the local (primary group) relations increases and greater subordination to the larger society increases in scale. p. 41.

(3) As social relations with the larger societies increase (increase in scale), there is an increase in mutual interdependence (econ., polit., social)

~~(4)~~

(more)

AAA meeting

Nov. 6 - 3

As a small community gets involved (integrated) with a larger community, these conditions will tend to become manifest:

(1) The decline in the intensity of interpersonal relations.

(2) Greater individual autonomy from local customs & conventions & at some time greater subordination to laws & conventions of larger society (political, national & regional forces, laws, police, propaganda & values)

(3) Greater social circulation of individuals in different types of associations & groups.

(4) Increase in the number of connecting links (clubs, associations, communications) with the larger society.

(5) Decline in local patriotism & increase in larger chauvinisms.

(6) Increase in variant cultural definitions of groups, values, & ideologies.

(7) Increase in opposition & or competition between groups & ideologies, & ~~loyalties to~~

(8) Increase in social fragmentation, social mobility, social circulation,

(9) Increase in segmental (functional specific relationships)

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN
COLLEGE OF LITERATURE, SCIENCE, AND THE ARTS

DEPT. OF ANTHROPOLOGY
221 ANGELL HALL

December 19, 1957

Memorandum: Synopsis of papers planned for delivery in AAA session: "Regional Integrative Patterns in Asian Societies."

I. A. Pakistan (Herbert Vreeland) (informal review of topics of concern)

The area I know best is the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, but from general reading on Afghanistan and Iran, I believe that much the same situation applies in those countries. I shall build my thesis around Pakistan and present such qualifications for the other two countries as seem to appear on further examination.

The outline which you presented on page 2 of your letter suits me fine. My own is attached. Out of this I have pulled what to me are the essential characteristics of the town-hinterland relation in this area and I have summarized them as follows:

1. Government, law, defense, higher education and orthodox religious institutions are highly centralized in the towns.

   Government periodically "invades" the villages in the form of the police or the tax collector, the "technical aid" representative, or the government engineer. For the rest the villager must go to town.

2. Economically there are important mutual dependencies:
   The village needs manufactured items, special foodstuffs, medicines and medical service. Employment in town is also an important outlet for men crowded off the land or inept at farming.

   The town needs food, manpower and revenue.

3. In my estimation, there are different slopes in each respect:
   Economically, I think the villages have the edge - they could go on existing on a subsistence level for a lot longer than the towns could survive, without their support.

   But politically, the town has the edge, primarily because the villages are terribly dependent on town based government for law and order and for the organization and control of the complex land tenure and water systems. This to me is a critical point - the inability of the villages in this type of society to effectively organize themselves for communal effort either developmental or governmental.

4. Somewhat the same situation, but in reverse, applies between the administered areas and the tribal areas. The tribal area is very dependent on the settled areas in an economic sense, but politically seems to prefer to manage its own affairs and to remain politically independent. In this connection I have a hypothesis - that a tribal takeover of power at the center of the administered areas is not so much the bald desire to fill a political power vacuum, but rather an effort to prevent further breakdown in economic structures normally channeled through urban centers.

5. Out of this two questions stick in my mind:

   a) What actually would happen to law and order and to the control of land and water in the villages if the town based government folded? On the surface, I would expect decay and depopulation, but I suspect that there are latent institutions and control which have been rendered inoperative by a centralized administrative authority and which might reappear.

   b) Has tribal society in these areas ever really been a "complete system of action" even in theory, as is so often maintained? My own hunch is that the balance of power within and between tribes, as well as ultimate sanctions, may in large part depend on centralized, urbanbased government.

6. As you can see much of this is wild conjecture, but I think it focuses on conditions and problems which are peculiar to the Iranian-Afghan plateau. The conditions involve the particular form of agriculture and pastorlism and the relation between the two, and the particular form of social organization based largely on a segmentary lineage system with weak communal and associational structures.

   The problems involve settled villages which are economically self-sufficient but governmentally apathetic and dependent, and tribal groups which are politically self-sufficient but economically overspecialized or marginal and hence dependent on settled and administered areas.

I. B. Pakistan (outline)

A. Between Settled Towns and Villages in the Administered Areas

Government
- Elections and Representation
- Policing System
- Law
- Revenue System
- Technical Aid
- Water Control System and other Public Works
- Cooperatives

Economics
- Trade
- Employment

Communication

Education
Government public schools in tribal area
Tribal boys attending schools in settled areas

Religion

Social Intercourse
Weddings, funerals, etc.
Feuds

II. Japan (Iwao Ishino)

Japan, like other Asian countries has a variety of regional types which reflects her long history and variable topography and geogrpphy. This diversity in regional cultures, in turn, makes difficult any simple statement of village-city integrative patterns that run true for all regions in the nation. For the purposes at hand, however, these integrative patterns that run true for all regions in the nation. For the purposes at hand, however, these integrative patterns may be seen to fall into two broad types: "confederation" and "corporation." The former is based upon the association of relatively autonomous villages which are similar in social structure. In these communities, the population is stable, the family organization strong, and the basic industries limited in size and number. By contrast, the other is one in which each of the component communities show marked contrast with the others in social structure and provide highly specialized services to the region. In this type its constituent communities are functionally interdependent and sensitive to the economic and political changes that take place at the national and international levels. In other words, the communities of a corporate type constitute an organic whole, while those of a confederated type form a loose coalition or association.

This typology is idealistic and no single region in Japan is marked entirely by either of these broad integrative patterns. However, it is my impression that regions of northern Japan (particularly Hokkaido and Tohoku) tend to be of the confederated type, while the more industrialized regions to the south and west approach the corporate type.

The remainder of this paper is then devoted to describing the more specific forms of regional integrative patterns, such as those suggested by the Beardsley and Schorger letter, namely, economic, administrative, religious, and familial patterns. Where the data are available, I suggest some differences in specific patterns as they occur between the confederate and corporate regions. For instance, in regions of the confederate type, the family is the basis for membership in various village and inter-village associations, while in the corporate regions the individual is the basis of association.

In concluding this paper, I note that regional integration in Japan has been shifting from a confederate pattern to a corporate type in the last one hundred years. It might well be that Asian societies now in the process of change are also undergoing a comparable shift in regional integrative patterns.

III. Malaya (L. Peter Gosling)

I. Malayan patterns as typical and as atypical of Southeast Asia as a whole.

II. The duality of urban development in Malaya.
A. Traditional "royal cities" and trade centers, and their relation to rural areas.

B. Modern, (Western) colonial commercial cities, their foundation and the reorientation of some rural-urban relationships.

These two urban types exist in Malaya, side by side, with a separation of function and of relationship with rural areas based on location, hinterland, ethnic composition, growth patterns etc. This duality is typical of most of the ex-colonial areas in Southeast Asia, and is a major factor in limiting rural-urban contact and interchange.

III. UUrban-rural links in Malaya:
A. Physical: Roads, R.R., etc.; frequency and volume of physical contact; ease of contact

Nature of the hinterland; the nature and amount of contact conditioned by hinterland characteristics. (plantation areas have different relationships with urban areas than does a subsistance rice producing area etc.)

B. Administrative:
Revenue and taxation
Government
Law and law enforcement
Military

C. Communications and public service:
Newspapers, radio etc.
Education
Govt. services: medicine, Coop dvlp., Agri. extension, etc.

D. Economic:
Marketing and distribution
Finance and rural credit
Land ownership and tenure
Labor supply - rural-urban labor transfer.

E. Political:
Party formation and activity
Campaigns and elections

F. Religion:
Administration, education etc.

G. Marital and familial relationships:
Urban employment, temporary and permanent
"Retirement" to rural areas
Marriage

Summary of the present urban-rural relationships and dependencies:

modern urban depends on rural for,.....
traditional urban depends on rural for.....
rural depends on the above for.....

IV. Transfer of urban (rural) values etc. to rural (urban) areas:

A. The principal channels of contact and the effectivness of each channel. (Contact through intermediate steps such as agents and brokers in the case of marketing and rural credit, or the stratified hierarchy that exists in administration and government service, are not as effective in the transfer of values etc. from urban to rural areas (and from rural to urban) as are the more direct familial contact and to a lesser extent the intense political development which is taking place in many of these countries.)

B. The effect of rapid "urbanization" and the change in large urban centers of Southeast Asia.
(Much of the recent spectacular growth of large cities of Southeast Asia has resulted in changes: in some a breakdown of Western patterns and an imposition of village characteristics in some aspects: marketing, social and political organization etc.)

CHANGING JAPANESE PEASANTRY

BY
IWAO ISHINO, PHD.
AND
JOHN D. DONOGHUE, BUREAU OF MINES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION: 1) Background, 2) Problems, 3) Method
(Expansion and revision of enclosed paper)

II. THE THIRTEEN VILLAGES: 1) Names, 2) Sizes, 3) map, 4) regional differences (Hokkaido vs. Kyushu vs. Tohoku) 5) Geographical and occupational types, and which fit into these (lowland, coastal, mt., fishing, vegetables, nearness to cities, etc)

III. GENERALLY DISTINCTIVE PROBLEMS IN RURAL JAPAN:
(with illustrations from the thirteen villages)
1. Population, 2) land scarcity, 3) Underemployment, 4) Jisan nan Mondai, 5) Decreasing fertilness of soil, 6) Economic gap between cities and villages, 7) The salaryman and the pull of the cities, 8) Roads, transportation and communication, 9) Water: either too little or too much, 10) Women and the kitchen, 11) Fertilizer and fuel, 12) Amelioration projects, 13) No grazing land.
(In this section we can fuse time or we can say this was a problem...the point is that all of these are still problems somewhere.)

IV. CHANGE: ATTEMPTS AT SOLVING THE PROBLEMS:
(with illustrations from the thirteen villages)
1) Agricultural research services, 2) Extensions services, 3) Gappei, 4) Roads and dams, 5) new crops, 6) Early planting (sokisaibai), veneer, and weed-killers, 6) Machinery, 7) Deep plowing and fertilizers, 8) Outside employment and village & home industries, 9) Birth Control and abortion, 10) 4-H and Nojikenkyu kai, 11) Sun heated baths and fuel, 12) Water drainage projects, 13) Fruit trees and animal husbandry

V. SOCIAL CHANGE: THE LAND REFORM, GAPPEI AND EXTENSION SERVICES:
(The village-nation problem--examples from the thirteen)
1) Land changed hands
2) Power relations were altered by a change in 1) Land ownership; 2) Political structure thru gappei.
3) Constant research and extension work Maintains ever improving techniques and materials (Machinery, Engei, Kitchens) in order to maintain high production and no serious "reversion."

VI. CHANGE AGENTS: THEIR ROLES AND PROBLEMS.

(In this section we briefly outline the expected role of these agents, giving example from the villages. After each one we give some of the problems they face in bringing about change in their particular areas, such as (natural) frustrations, and (social) resistence. Heavy on quotes and local color.)

1) Nogyo Kairyo Fukyuin
2) Nokyo Gijitsu
3) Seikatsu Ext. Agent
4) Principal of the school
5) The soncho
6) Joyaku
7) Assemblyman, or buraku-cho, or kumi-cho
8) Seinendan-cho
9) Fujinkai cho
10) Nurse or midwife

VII. CHANGE AGENTS: THEIR PERSONALITIES, THEIR VILLAGES, AND CHANGE.

1) Aioi:
   a) Outline of Village organization
   b) Personality sketch of Bando-san (Problem of real name)
   c) The Gappei and how he did it.

2) Yoshida:
   a) Outline of Village organization
   b) Personality sketch of Tanabe's Wife
   c) Voting and how she organized it.

3) Mizuwake:
   a) Outline of village organization
   b) Personality sketch of Yachi-san
   c) Land reclamation, roads, and water problems and how he did it.

4) Suye:
   a) Outline of village organization
   xb) Personality sketch of mayor, joyaku, and joyaku's father.
   c) The gappei and how they are and are not handling it.

5) Others: (theseare shorter with less on personality)
   a) Honami and the changing Tanko-Noson relations
   b) Futomi and population and out-migration
   c) Yokogoshi and the problems of gappei and water
   d) Nikaido and the salaryman and leadership
   e) Nobuta and the problem of keeping the boys on the farm

(It is plain here that all the problems are not solved. The fact is that they are at least making attempts in the direction of change, even though they may not be accomplished facts yet.)

VIII. CONCLUSIONS:

1. Theory of change
2. Ramifications for Applied anthropology
3. Ramifications for conceptions of technological change in underdeveloped countries

July 23, 1959

CHANGING JAPANESE PEASANTRY

I. Introduction

Since the end of World War II, the Japanese nation has undergone immense social, economic and political changes. Industries have been revived, the gross national product far exceeds pre-War production. At the War's end Japan found herself deprived of the land and resources of her old Empire. The population problem was further aggravated by the five million repatriates from the former colonies. The wartime development of synthetic fabrics seriously curtailed the importance of silk as a source of revenue and, in 1956 both raw silk output and silk production were less than half their prewar peaks.[1] Furthermore, bitterness caused by the War, plus increased competition from expanding European industries and from the new nations of South and Southeast Asia seriously threatened the availability of markets for Japanese produce. In the face of these and other problems, such as the lack of natural resources, Japanese industries successfully launched into world competition in steel manufacturing, shipbuilding, new and expanded electronics industries, the production of synthetic fabrics and automobiles, to name but a few. The success in these fields has kept employment high, has increased consumer spending and income, and generally raised the standard of living in Japan. The economy has realized a complete recovery, and, generally, the people of the nation are sharing in this economic upsurge. For example, TV sets are to be found everywhere, even in some of the most remote mountain villages, as are electric household equipment, automobiles and fine clothing. This solid economic base has resulted in a rather stable political atomosphere and a feeling of optimism toward future change and development.

---

1. J.R. Cohen, Japan's Postwar Economy, Indiana U. Press, 1958. P 62.

In order to support such an expanding economy, the Japanese farmers have had to produce. To keep production expanding high, the farmers have had to continually work at overcoming numerous natural, economic and social obstacles. They have had to mechanize and modernize, and, in the process, they have come to moderate their traditional ideas, values, and aspirations, traditions.

In a sense the Japanese farmer has always been a rather "progressive peasant." We read throughout Japanese history of the many rice riots, movements for a better share of the results of their labor. We know also that the Japanese farmers and fishermen were able to increase Japan's food supply thru the periods after the Meiji Restoration to support the population boom of Japan's industrialization (from 33 million to 93 million). But throughout this time, the organization of labor, the methods of production, and the ordering of political and human relations around the hamlet changed relatively little. There were few structural changes in these areas. These remained peasant-like.

To a large extent the farmer in Japan today, much like his counterpart in India, China, or Brazil, is still a peasant. His "state of mind", his values, his personal relations are localized, for the most part around his village. But his ways are being challenged by important modifications are taking place as science, technology and modernization sweep across the nation. Slowly the villagers are beginning to see the need for new roads, dams and seawalls, less complicated irrigation controls, more efficient marketing methods, mechanized and rationalized farm methods, and, gradually, to view the land and agriculture and the sea and fishing, not as a goal or a way of life, but as a means to security and a richer, fuller life. In short the Japanese farmer is in the process of "shedding his peasantry."

Occupation

The U.S. sponsored land reform and the changes in the civil code and education system contibuted directly to the recent trend toward rapid change and modernization. These had the effect of altering the traditional structures. Once the structure was changed, certain traditional power structures were altered; latent and sometimes progressive forces were unleashed. The whole relationship of men to their land changed. ~~New sources were tapped for leadership~~ leadership came from new sectors of the community; new ~~xxx~~ methods and new organization of the work force had to be found for the exploitation of the natural resources, whether land or sea; new and more efficient means of government, especially at the local level, had to be devised, and these, in turn, further altered the traditional forms of social and political relationships. The newly formed national government, more than ever, felt its responsibility to the people, including the villagers. The villages were thus brought into a closer contact with the nation, so that the structure of the village-nation relationship was changed.

This study was conceived in the attempt to explore the nature of the processes underlying these recent social and ~~xxxxxx~~ cultural changes. We see one aspect of our research as a study of the applicability of key American (or Western) values and institutional patterns to an Asian society. In the role of a social experimenter, the Occupation had the generalized objective to "democratize" Japanese society. Specifically, the Occupation sought to modify those institutions concerning the citizens relation to his society as a whole; to develop a sense of individual participation and self-determination by breaking down traditional structures; and to further social and economic conditions permitting the freer expansion of the individual personality.

In these and other areas of inquiry, we may view Japan in part as a unique experiment in social change, carried out under known historical circumstances by contemporary Americans.

On theother hand we viewed our research primarily as a study of of the dynamics of socio-cultural change and modernization. Specifically, our research centered on the social and cultural milieu in which certain kinds of changes took place and the change agents who were directly involved in these changes. We attempted to gain an understanding of the kinds of people who are agents of change, their social roles, and the kinds of problems they faced, and the social structure and cultural understandings through which they operated in attempting to solve these problems. As such we see this research as a case history of the process of social and technological change which might suggest certain universal principles applicable to other nations that have recently begun to undergo rapid changes in these areas.

II.

Any study which purports to broadly examine "changes in rural Japan," must necessarily employ some type of village sample. Japan, a modern urban and industrial society, is scarcely similar to the types of societies with which cultural anthropologists generally concern themselves. As a result of a long history, early introduction of rural electrification, a tradition of compulsory education and a high literacy rate, it is true that Japan exhibits a degree of cultural uniformity. Japanese culture is clearly distinguished from any other culture in Asia. Moreover, with the exception of a numberof regional dialects, all Japanese people speak the same language. Both the seclusion policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the military period prior to World War II, further predisposed the Japanese nation toward a kind of uniformity.

Nevertheless, it must be clearly understood that there exist significant differeces and variations among Japanese villages. These differences especially manifest themselves in the realm of economic activity and organization, local organization, leadership patterns, religious beliefs and practices, historical development, and rate of change. That is, the variations are found in exactly those areas toward which this study is directed. For a study of Japanese national economy, political history, international relations, or even a village ethnography, these variations might not create a problem. But for our purposes, we could not assume village uniformity and study a single village intensively as if it represented a wide segment of the Japanese rural scene.

Our attention was turned, instead, to a rather large number of villages, a sample of the universe of Japanese rural villages. We found that the study of any one or two of the sample would have seriously distorted our understanding of our main problems. We do not claim to have exhausted the possibilities in our sample. Undoubtedly there are still other villages which may have influenced our modified our major findings. However this may be, certain patterns and variations on these patterns began to emerge near the end of our research which we hold to be generally valid for Japanese rural society. Our experiences in studying numerous types of villages in various regions of Japan strongly reaffirmed our belief in the necessity of carrying out research in a wide range of communities when dealing with rather broad problems in modern societies, even one like Japan which is supposedly highly homogenious.

The sample chosen for our research were the thirteen villages surveyed in 1947-1948 by the Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division of SCAP with the collaboration of Dr. Arthur Raper of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.[1] The original study, carried out by a number of Japanese sociologists and anthropologists, was concerned with the impact of the land reform and other changes in rural economy and society. Following the completion of PO &SR's research mission in 1951, most of the sociological data were transferred to Ohio State University where in 1952 John W. Bennett and Iwao Ishino, ex-members of PO & SR, organized the Research Program in Japanese Social Relations. Under the aegis of this program a series of seven Interim Technical Reports were issued by the Ohio State University Research Foundation, most of which were based upon the research operations of the PO & SR Division. In addition a number of articles based upon this research have appeared in professional periodicals. During the Ohio State phase of this research, Donogime was informally related to the Research program, so that both authors share some knowledge of the published and unpublished data of the earlier study.

The thirteen villages were selected for restudy because with a baseline study at the time of the Occupation, we would be permitted the opportunity of a longitudinal approach to the problem of change. Moreover, the thirteen villages were originally selected as representative samples of various types of communities, such as lowland-rice producing, coastal-fishing and farming, and they are located in all the major geographic and economic regions from the northern island of Hokkaido to the Island of Kyushu in the south. Then, too, the problems set by the Occupation research groups do not differ greatly from our own problems in that they were interested in the problem of change. Thus in all thirteen communities comparable data, where feasable were collected in order to provide gross statistical comparisons for the ten year period between studies.

1. RAPER; JJT TOKYO 1950

both of whom had done field work in Japan previously. The authors visited all of the thirteen villages together between October 1958 and August 1959. Three of the villages were studied more intensly than the others with the aid of Prof. Izumi of Tokyo University and thirteen graduate students in that same institution. In the villages interviews were held in Japanese and recorded on a belt recorder. Statistics and pictures comparable to those of ten years ago, were gathered. The content of the interviews centered around the problem of change in the preceding ten years, village social and economic organization, and local politics and personalities. One of the authors remained in Japan an additional year to gather further information on personal histories and personality backgrounds of the major leaders of the thirteen communities.

Since we were not interested primarily in sampling village populations, nor were we interested in traditional ethnographies or community studies, per se, but rather in a limited number of specific problems, the "key informant technique" was generally employed. The key informants were those most intimately involved in change, both from within and without the community. These change agents included, among others, the village mayor, the assistant mayor, the Agricultural extension agents, the presidents of the various Co-operatives, nurses and mid-wives, leaders of the Youth Associations and the 4-H clubs. In every village we also interviewed a limited number of ordinary farmers, fishermen, and tradesmen.

In addition to the field work in the villages, we also did extensive research on a number of national institutions which cross-cut the villages. Particularly important here are the Agricultural and Home Improvement Divisions of the Extension Service, the 4-H club, National Agricultural Experiment Stations, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, as well as National policy concerning Agriculture, Foretry and Fishing. The programs and policies of all these intimately affect the changing conditions in the villages,

and forms the links between the villages and the nation.

The materials that follow are organized so as to emphasize the dynamics of change. Thus many statistics and the abundant material on many of the ten year period changes are to be found in the appendix. In the text we have attempted to descibe and analyze the kinds of people in the villages and their roles in the change process, the relations between the change agents and the kinds of social and cultural milieu in which they are operating, and the role of the various national institutions play in fostering planned change. All of these are seen against the backdrop of the Occupation and some of its ramifications.

We have chosen as our focus of interest, or as the point around which our story revolves, a number of problems. Problems with which the villagers were faced. We have attempted to demonstrate the manner in which the members of the various communities defined these problems and then attempted to solve them. Generally, these problems were present at the time of the Raper study ten years ago. Some of them seemed unsurmountable; many of them still seem so. But as we traveled from village to village, we were constantly aware of the great changes that had taken place in the ten year interim. We were fascinated by the types of people who played leading roles in solving some of the village problems and who, therefore, were at least partially responsible for initiating and carry through the vast changes in Japanese villages...leaders in the movement of "peasantry shedding."

May 9, 1959

List of Assumptions About The Nature of Japanese Peasantry

For convience, we list here the assumptions which have been arranged into three categories: Those concerning the general subsistence pattern of peasant, those concerning views on social relations and organization, and finally those concerning ideas on the "good life."

A. Assumptions concerning the subsistence patterns of peasants. We believed that the Japanese peasants:

1. held an intimate and strong attachment to the land he cultivates.
2. do not look upon farming as a business adventure, but as a way of life.
3. are exceeding conservative with regard to attempting new kinds of crops to plant, to accepting advice on scientific farming methods, and ~~xx~~ to the use of agricultural machinery.
4. are reluctant to push for their rights and therefore have been unduely exploited by aggressive commercial and political interests.
5. recognize the inevitability of their grinding poverty because of Japan's excessive population and scarcity of land.

May 9 1959

B. Assumptions concerning peasnat's view on social relations and social organization.

We believed that the Japanese peasants:

1. live in an integrated village or local community.
2. resist changes in social orgnization and have established techniques for keeping the impersonal world of the market distinct from their own world of gemeinsbhaft relations.
3. produce large families and therefore oppose birth control methods. Children are welcomed because they provide more hands for work.
4. choose brides for qualities of industriousness more than beauty or personality.
5. have a weak voice in the political affairs of the village or of the nation.
6. are united in the class consciousness of their group.

May 9, 1959

C. Assumptions concerning peasant's view on the "good life."

We believed that the Japanese peasants:

1. hold frugality as a positive value and avoid scrupulously any attempts to display conspicious consumption.
2. have a distaste for violence and excessive show of aggression.
3. avoid open conflict and argumentation even at the expense of personal sacrifice and embarrassment.
4. dislike ambitious and aggressive people--especially those who are socially movile.
5. take their own traditions for granted and do not seek improvements or refinements in this tradition.
6. Criticize the ways of the city as morally degrading.

carried out several years before in which the tenancy rate had been reduced to ten percent of the total farming population. We also had figures which told us that the average farm household operated a strip of land of only two-and-a-half acres, or more accurately 5.9 separate strips of land totalling only 2.5 acres. We read that this rural population of 36 million represented 40 percent of the nation's population, and through laborious and intensive methods of agricultural production, it was able to produce up to 80 percent of the nation's food requirements.

Yet through some curious ~~mysterious~~ ways in which an economic system operates, this 40 percent earned only 17 percent of the total national income. These figures alone were sufficient to suggest that the farmers of Japan were living at a standard below that of the city workers and that indeed they were peasants. What else could they do but to live frugally and to cherish the classic peasant values that hard work is a virtue in itself and that farming is not a money-making business but a way of life? How else could they maintain their self-respect if they did not maintain a closely integrated natural community which insulated itself from the impersonal, competitive and frivolous life of the urbanite?

Such were our thoughts and impressions about the Japanese peasantry before we began our studies last October. But this rather simple picture did not hold its shape for long. As we visited one village after another the picture began to crumble.

Cracks begin to appear at various places: on the ~~issue of the attitude toward the inflexibility of~~ peasant's arable land, on the frugality, ~~of the peasants~~, on their

LIST OF ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF JAPANESE PEASANTRY

For convenience, we list here the assumptions which have been arranged into three categories: those concerning the general subsistence pattern of peasant, those concerning ~~the~~ views on ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ social relations and organization, and finally those concerning ideas on the "good life."

A. Assumptions concerning the subsistence patterns of peasants. We believed that the Japanese peasants:

1. hold an intimate and strong attachment to the land he cultivates.

~~2. place agricultural work above those of business and commerce;~~

2. do not look upon farming as a business adventure, but as a way of life.

3. are exceeding conservative with regard to ~~changing~~ attempting new kinds of crops to plant, to accepting advice on scientific farming methods, and to the use of agricultural machinery.

~~They are a class of people whose have been unduly exploited because of their naivete in matters of politics and business.~~

4. ~~group of people who have~~ are reluctant to push for their rights and therefore have been unduely exploited by aggressive commerical and political interests.

5. recognize the ~~fact~~ inevitability of their grinding poverty ~~due~~ because of ~~to~~ excessive population and scarcity of land.

MAY 8 1959

B. Assumptions concerning peasant's view on social relations and social organization.

We believed that the Japanese peasants:

1. ~~have a strong attachment to~~ live in an integrated village or local community.
2. resist changes in social organization and have established techniques for keeping the impersonal world of the market distinct from their own world of gemeinschaft relations.
3. ~~strass the desirability of~~ produce large families and therefore oppose birth control methods. Children are welcomed because they provide more hands for work.
4. choose brides for qualities of industriousness more than beauty or personality.
5. ~~are tend to be satisfied with the status quo and~~ ~~hold no aspirations for social mobility~~. have a weak voice in the political affairs of the village or of the nation.
6. ~~are disinterested in~~ are united in the class consciousness of their group.

C. Assumptions concerning peasant's view on the "good life."

We believed that the Japanese peasants:

1. hold frugality as a positive value and avoid scupulously any attempts to display conspicuous consumption.
2. have a distaste for violence and excessive show of aggression.
3. avoid open conflict and argumentation even at the expense of personal sacrifice and embarrassment.
5. ~~believe it is best to~~ take their own traditions for granted and do not ~~subject it to close scrutiny for moving~~ seek improvements or refinements in this tradition. ~~improvements~~.
4. dislike ambitious and aggressive people — especially those who are socially mobile.
6. Criticize the ways of the city as morally degrading.