63-65

1963

This case has all the features of a drama. The reader should be presented with the central plot and should be fed increments of the basic information until the climax is reached. Then perhaps the "moral" of the story can be presented — i.e. the analysis so that this experience can be generalized.

Leave this report as is, however, + move on to something else.

Kay Typing

Identification No. _____

Source: _____

Date of Receipt: _____

Subject: _____

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1. Take immediate action _____

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An excellent
first draft.
Now think of
ways in which
it might be
sharpened up.
(See my ideas —
other side).

The Local Autonomy Law of 1954 made it necessary for Japanese villages to amalgamate into administrative units of not less than 8,000 inhabitants to qualify for government subsidy for improvement. Following this law, in 1956, the government instituted the New Rural Communities Development Program which covered a total of 5,000 districts, of about 600,000 hectares. Special subsidities were to be given for encouragement of new crops suitable for the particular land, communal facilities for development projects, establishment of farming or home-making training centers and other community improvements.

At the time of the Local Autonomy Law, Aioi village was composed of a little more than 4,000 people and consequently found it necessary to amalgamate with surrounding areas to qualify for government improvement subsidies. Aioi was located close to the line separating Kawaga and Tokushima prefectures. Thus, two alternatives seemed open to the villagers. The first was to amalgamate with Kitanada village in Tokushima prefecture to the West. The second alternative was to join with Omi village and Hiketa town to the East in Kawaga prefecture.

The residents in the Western part of Aioi, though geographically closer to Kitanada, were economically closer to Hiketa-Omi. It was also decided, after a number of meetings, that the complications which would result from amalgamating across prefectural boundaries would probably prove insurmountable. Consequently, the plan to merge with Hiketa-Omi was deemed most feasible and approved by local leaders.

Amalgamation, however, did not prove such a simple matter. Local leaders were avidly in favor of the move, but strong resistance was experienced on two levels. In the first place, Aioi residents were not entirely convinced that the amalgamation was the best thing. Then too, there were also conflicts between leaders of Aioi, Hiketa and Omi over a number of things, such as 1) the name the new town would have, 2) the number of representatives each village would send to the new town assembly, 3) the number of assistant mayor positions in the governmental structure, and 4) the priorities for development for which the new town would request governmental subsidy.

The name of the new unit proved to be the biggest obstacle. Those from Hiketa stated they would not gappei unless the name of the town were to be Hiketa. Aioi residents definitely did not want the name to be Hiketa and felt further that a new name, such as Little Tokyo, should be invented. Omi took a stand similar to Aioi's, but thought that Omi should be used rather than inventing a new name. Both Aioi and Omi felt that if Hiketa were to be the name of the new unit, that it would be as though they were absorbed into Hiketa, rather than a true amalgamation occurring. Furthermore, the people of Aioi argued, the Chinese characters for Hiketa mean "open paddy field," and this is not a desireable name for a newly amalgamated town. In this light, it was stated, Aioi would be a much better name because the Chinese characters mean "rejoicing together."

If the name of the new town had been put to a vote, Hiketa would have won because the combined population of Omi and Aioi is less than that of Hiketa alone. The people of Aioi and Omi bitterly learned what it meant to minority in dealing with Hiketa. The problem of naming the new town grew larger and larger and almost caused the dissolution of the amalgamation committee in the seventh conference.

The secon dproblem, that of the number of representatives each village would send to the new town assembly, had to be mediated by officials from the prefectural offices. Originally it was decided to have a total of 26 representatives. This figure was computed according to population. Of the 26, Hiketa would be alloted 14.5; Aioi 8.9; and Omi 2.6. Omi, however, did not agree with these totals. The Omi representatives suggested that Hiketa have 15, Aioi 9 and that Omi be given 6, increasing the total number to 30. Omi wanted to have 12 because there were 12 village councilers and they wanted half of them to be on the new town assembly. Aioi did not have too much stake in the haggling which occurred over the number of representatives.

The number of assistant mayors, joyaku, was the third problem which had to be resolved, for it was evident that Hiketa would most certainly provide the mayor for the new unit because of its larger population. Therefore, the question of the number of assistant mayors was extremely important.

Omi wanted two assistant mayors because it was the smallest village and was certain that Aioi would get the assistant mayor elected if only one were provided for. This would handicap Omi, it was felt. Aioi, on the other hand, argued that if two assistant mayors were provided, they would constantly be pitted against one another and as a consequence, nothing would be accomplished. Hiketa was not particularly concerned with this problem because they were virtually assured of having the mayor.

The final problem had to do with the priorities for establishing an economic development plan which would be subsidized by the government. Hiketa was in favor of concentrating on industrial and commercial development. This was primarily because Hiketa was the commercial and industrial center of the area with little forestry or agriculture. Aioi was mainly concerned with the development of agriculture and the building of a dam on the (Umayado River)? in Kawamata buraku. Omi, on the other hand, wanted a dam in its village and was most interested in forestry development. Hiketa tended to favor the dam for Aioi, but Omi was adamantly against it. Omi insisted that its dam should be built before the one in Aioi. It seemed that everytime Aioi asked for something, Omi never failed to ask for the same thing and to the same degree. They did not like to think of Aioi being ahead of them in anything. For example, when Aioi asked to have a branch office, Omi immediately said; they would have to have one in their village also. Chart 1 shows the positions taken by the three villages concerning the above mentioned problem areas.

These problems had to be resolved by the Amalgamation Promoting Conference committee which was composed of seven members from each of the three parties involved. The mayor, clerk, chairman, and four assemblymen were sent from each village to serve on the committee. In all, it took nine meetings, from August 1954 to March 1955 to arrive at workable compromises. The mayor Hiketa, Mr. Yamamoto, was chairman of the committee. Aioi's mayor, Mr. Bando, acted as chairman in the absence of Yamamoto. The committee disposed of the easiest problems first, saving discussion of the seemingly unresolvable problems for last.

Chart 1

INITIAL POSITIONS

ISSUES	HIKETA	AIOI	OMI
Name of New Unit	HIKETA	New Name	OMI
Number of Representatives	15	9	6
Number of Assistant Mayors Plan	1	1	2
Number Economic Development Plan	Industrial and Commercial	Agriculture and Dam	Dam and Forestry

As indicated earlier, it was necessary for the committee to appeal to higher authority to solve the problem of representation to the new town committee. Hiketa, instead of getting 15 representatives, ended up with 13; Aioi kept the 9 it was entitled to according to population; and Omi finished with a comprise of 4 members, which was 2 less than it wanted, and 2 more than it was entitled to according to populationproportions.

The wishes of both Omi and Aioi were catered to regarding the number of assistant mayors and priorities for economic development. Aioi got the assistant mayor it was decided that the first dam would be constructed in Omi village.

The name for the new unit was the most difficult problem to solve. When the amalgamation committee was discussing the possibility of using Hiketa as the new name, a group of merchants in Aioi who were not satisfied with the name rioted and marched on the Hiketa town office and tried to take over the radio station to broadcast anti-amalgamation information. The riot was quelled, but as it turned out, had little affect on the decision of the committee -- the new name becoming Hiketa. See Chart II for a summary of the final positions reached by the committee.

The second major problem faced by Aioi officials was that of obtaining approval for the amalgamation from the villagers. It was necessary to convince villagers of the merits of the merger. AAnumber of criticisms were levelled at the amalgamation by Aioi residents.

The most repeated criticism was that the new village office was too far from Aioi which made it inconvenient; villagers considered it to be practically inaccessible. This criticism was especially prevalent among those living in Kawamata, Sakamoto and Kureha hamlets, which were some distance from Hiketa. The villagers also objected that the money for constructing the new village office was to come from money borrowed from the government and from the sale of Aioi-owned forests. The loan from the government was to be repaid from taxes upon the citizenry. A number of villagers felt the new village office was too fancy for a town the size of Hiketa. "A town like Hiketa does not need need such a fancy Yakuba (town office)," informants said.

Chart II

Resolved Positions

ISSUES	HIKETA	AIOI	OMI
Name of Unit	Hiketa		
Number of ~~Representatives~~ Representatives	13	9	4
Number of Assistant Mayors		1	
Economic Development Plan			Dam

There was also a general feeling among those who resisted the amalgamation that the problems of Aioi would not be given the same consideration as those of Hiketa. "Big problems to us will be just small problems to the officials in Hiketa and they will probably be more concerned with their own problems than with ours."

Villagers also complained about the increased amount of funds being spent for entertaining at the town level. Hiketa officials were finding it necessary to give parties for prefectural visitors more frequently because of negotiations for funds for development projects. "They are throwing twice as many parties and spending twice as much of our tax money for sake (rice wine) and food than ever before. The officials are drinking up our tax money," informants related.

Aioi officials met considerable resistance in their attempts to gain approval for the amalgamation. The arguments were reasonable from the villagers' viewpoint, but not from the viewpoint of the officials. A number of devices for gaining approval were resorted to by local officials. A series of about 29 meetings were held with the six buraku in an attempt to educate the villagers to the advantages of the merger. In the case of Kawamata hamlet, officials played on a split between two forests interests which had existed over a long period of time. Influential leaders in the village were called to throw their support behind the movement. Officials appealed to the rationality of the villagers, stating that the merger would result in the construction of new schools, health facilities, and other facilities which were needed in the village. These were things that Aioi would not be capable of providing, but which could be provided for with the increased tax base of the new unit.

It was planned that a vote would be taken in Aioi to determine the wishes of the villagers. However, officials, by taking informal polls of the buraku leaders, discovered that only about half of the villagers were in fact in favor of the amalgamation. Fearing that a vote would defeat the whole issue, officials decided to take matters into their own hands. They went to the final meeting with Oni and Hiketa and told the

committee that Aioi was unanimously in favor of the merger. This was a
face-saving method as far as the officials were concerned. It looked to the
other villages that Aioi opinion was not divided and this made the final
decision of the committee easier.

A number of problems became evident following the completion of the
amalgamation. One of these was that the local cooperatives were not
amalgamated, but remained organized on a local level. Thus we find that the
governmental structure is oriented toward the new town unit, but the organi-
zations, which carry out many of the daily functions of the villagers, was
still village and buraku centered. Officials indicated that a movement
would be initiated in the near future to bring about a reorganization of
the cooperatives.

Though administratively, the center of the government was in Hiketa,
villagers tended to identify with their former unit, Aioi village. Villagers
thought of themselves as being members of Aioi, not Hiketa. Local interests
were put first, and town interests were given a secondary position.
Villagers also complained that they did not like to visit the new town
office because of the impersonality they found there. "Before when we went
to the yakuba (village office) we knew everyone and could sit around and
have friendly discussions. But at Hiketa, we knew no one and they don't
treat us the same," informants complained.

Tax collection was another problem which the new unit would have to
face. Before the merger, taxes were collected by local collectors and
villagers felt an obligation to pay their taxes because of friendship.
However, with the closing of the Aioi village office, taxes would have to
be collected by the new town office. This would probably mean a new corps of
tax collectors, many of whom might be unknown by the villagers. This could
result in difficulties in tax collection. It has been traditionally
difficult to collect taxes in Japanese villages, and the only solution
has been the use of local, well-known and well-liked persons. It remains
to be seen what difficulties the merger would bring about.

On the positive side, a new river wall and bottom was constructed on the Umayado River as a result of the amalgamation. This will decidely improve the irrigation and cut down on the amount of seepage of salt water and flooding of the paddy fields. A new dam was constructed upstream on the river thereby facilitating a greater control and making irrigation possible during the dry season in the downstream buraku.

A new road, which is intended to link Takamatsu and Tokushima is presently under construction as a result of the amalgamation. The new town office is an asset to the village and provides a symbol of unity for those living in the new unit. A new school and new recreation facility have been constructed. In general, there seems to be an air of expectancy among officials of the new town that the amalgamation will have a far-reaching positive effect on the area.

THETA CULTURE: THE EMERGENCE OF A CROSS_NATIONAL CULTURE

(Talk given before the Central States Anthropological
Society Meeting, Detroit, Michigan, May 16, 1963)

A. Intrdduction

  1. In June, 1962, Donoghue and I attended the 114th Communications
      Seminar in Berkeley Springs, West Virginia.

      = sponsored by the Agency for International Development
      = Seminar is a week-long.
      = Purpose: to provide the "participants" with some insights
                    into communicating what they learned in the U.S.

  2. Composition of the participant group:

      = 80 members from 30 countries
      = Not high government officials, nor diplomats.
        But various technical and professional people.
      = Common language of discourse: English.

      = Some illustrations:

            Mechanical engineer from India
            Accountant from Turkey
            Cooperative specialist from Kenya
            ~~Dairy specialist from~~ Community development specialist from the Philippines
            Specialist in Cheese production from Iraq
            Radio technician from Colombia
            Science teacher from Afghanistan
            Public health officer from Thailand
            Police officer from Viet Nam
            Statistician from Yugoslavia
            Forester from Taiwan
            Farmer from Tanganyika
            Advertising executive from Japan
      3.   Physician from Indonesia
            Mathematician from Israel
            Teacher of vocational skills from Surinam

  3. What was this polyglot assembly doing here in the underdeveloped
      state of West Virginia, just 80 miles out of Washiggton, D.C.?

      = Cooped up for a week with no place to go--not even to enjoy a
          cocktail.
      = Representatives from different continents of the world.
      = Representatives from countries who are unfriendly with each other
          (e.g., Iraq and Israel)
      = Representatives of different religions with different dietary patterns.
      = Representatives of the Communist, the so-called Free World, and the
          and "uncommitted neutralist" nations.

4. The central theme of the seminar was to discuss how culture and
   social change might be brought about in their country--at least
   in the sphere of the society where they are technically or
   professionally proficient and competent.

   = But what could two anthropologists contribute to such a gathering?

   = We were asked by the sponsors of the seminar to say something about
     the process of social change.

5. But we avoided this issue. Instead:

   = We stressed the theme of unity, the commonness of man in the modern world.

   = We did this by:

                                              of subject matter
     a) Tracing human evolution -- a brief rundown/in introductory anthropology.
        & racial history
     b) Argued for the point of view that there was emerging a ~~universalkx~~
        common set ~~mx~~ of values (around which all educated men might rally).

        = the desire to eliminate sickness
        = the desire to eliminate hunger
        = the desire to eliminate wanton human killing
        ~~=xthexdesirextoximprovexthexstandardxofxlivingx~~
        = the desire to eliminate illiteracy and ignorance

        All these add up to a positive goal of improving the standard
              of living of the common man in each country.

B. The Beginning of ~~the~~ our Concern for Theta Culture.

    1. This idea struck the interest of the local resident director of the
       Communications Seminar. A few weeks later, he, Donoghue and I got
       together to plan to write something about this idea of an emerging
       common culture thań transcends national and societal boundaries.

    2. Alpha culture, we said, refers to all aboriginal cultures with a
       basic paelolithic type of simplicity.

    3. Beta culture, we speculated, referred to neolithic and higher (e.g., Bronze Age)
       cultures wherein some intermixing of ~~ap~~ alpha cultures took place.

    4. Higher order hybrids, then, could be represented by Greek letters
       between Beta and Theta. Omega culture was left for posterity to cover
       that culture that was the resultant of cultureś-mixing taking place
       among several different planets, or galaxies.

    5. Aside from this, we began to look at the existing literatuęe to
       search for what had already been written about this emergent type
       of culture ~~knownxasxfh~~ we tentatively described as Theta Culture.

       = What did we find?

C. We found many references to the same idea!

    1. Marshall Sahlins and Elman Service: Worldwide acculturation process.

    2. Richard Adams: International culture.

    3. Wilbert E. Moore: Common culture.

    4. Richard L. Meier: World culture.

    5. Edwin Reischauer and John Fairbanks: Common World Culture.

    6. Useem, Donoghue and Useem: Third Culture.

    7. Alvin W. Wolfe: Supranational Integrative Systems.

    8. Alfred Kreober: Oikumene

    9. Gordon W. Hewes: Ecumene

  10. Marshall Hodgson: Supra-national society.

       (Read some typical examples)

D. What is this thing called Theta Culture?

    1. Tentative definition: Theta culture (after Richard Adams) refers to the emergence of the new, broadly similar patterns of relationships and understandings resulting from the contact and interaction of peoples different nation-states. These interactions are taking place in many sectors on several levels: the participation of peasants in a world economy; the internationalization of science; the widespread diffusion political, religious and educational ideologies; the worldwide distribution of movies, TV programs, books, and periodicals; the high acceptance of modern medicine, machinery, gadgets/coca-cola and other material artifacts in all parts of the world.

2. Theta Culture--<u>distinguishing criteria</u>.

    a) Theta culture is not limited to a single nation-state.
       = It is something shared by ~~members of several~~ selected
          members of several nation-states.

    b) Theta culture is normally transmitted from one population
       by adult carriers--not ordinarly from parent to children.

        = Where it is passed from one generation to another in the
          same nation-state, this is done usually through formally
          established schools or educational institutions.

    c) The diffusion of Theta culture is dependent upon modern
       modes of transportation and communication.

        = It is dependent upon ~~this~~ international business relationships,
          technical aid missions; international scientific meetings;
          internationally distributed journals and periodicals;
          etc.

E. <u>The Problem Before the Panel</u>

    1. The foregoing are some of my opinions regarding this concept.

    2. I would like the panel to respond to some of these questions:

        (1) Is this thing ~~worht~~ worth pursuing as a subject-matter of
            concern to anthropologists?

        (2) If so, what should be call it?

        (3) How do we go about studying it? What kinds of data need to
            be collected and analyzed?

           = What categories of primary data should be collected?

[handwritten notes:]

1. Need new concepts for culture
2. not merely a mixture
3. culture patterns are not homogeneous -
    full of strains - stresses

industrialization, regardless of
    Communication ,

latent culture = Bert Byinsky

Sahlins - Hegelian development
    not Darwinian
    (Dar. is a dialogue betw society & environ.
    ment) ,

[right column handwritten:]
: industrial
= Communication
= Consumer culture
= international
  snob culture
= urbanization
: political
  centralization
= ecological
  masses
= political planning
= economic aid

CENTRAL STATES ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOCIETY

The 44th annual meeting will be held May 16-18 in the Park-Shelton Hotel in Detroit, Michigan at the invitation of Wayne State University.

A copy of the preliminary program is included, but we would like to invite other papers on these or unrelated topics. Your attention is especially called to the Student Prize Paper award of $50. This award is to be made annually to the best paper presented at the meetings by a student. You should, therefore, encourage students under your supervision or with whom you are acquainted to submit papers. Abstracts of 150 words of papers to be read should be submitted by April 15 to:

Dr. Stephen F. Borhegyi, Director
Milwaukee Public Museum
818 W. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee 3, Wisconsin

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR C.S.A.S. PANEL SESSIONS

May 16th - Thursday - A.M.

Title: Religion and Social Class in European and Mediterranean Peasant
Societies - Stephen C. Cappannari (2 hrs.)

Panelists:
Robert T. Anderson (Mills College)
Stephen Borhegyi (Milwaukee Public Museum)
Michael Kenny (Catholic University)
Leonard W. Moss (Wayne State University)
Thomas Voorhees (Vanderbilt University)

Title: Folklore Among Immigrants to America - Milla R. Ayoub (2 hrs.)

Panelists:
Robert A. Georges, "The Folklore of the Greeks of Tarpon Springs,
Florida"
Elli K. Kongas, "Finnish-Americans and Their Folklore"
Mary Walsh Sengstock, "Economic Customs and Beliefs of the
Chaldeans in Detroit" (Social Science Institute)
Frank Paulsen, "Collecting Immigrant Folklore in the United
States" (University of Detroit)

May 16th - Thursday - P.M.

Title: Theta Culture: The Emergence of Cross-National Cultures -
Iwao Ishino

Panelists: (list is incomplete)
John Bennett (Washington University)
Eric Wolf (University of Michigan)
John Useem (Michigan State University)
John Donoghue (Michigan State University)

Title: Recent and Current Research in Chiapas, Mexico - John C. Hotchkiss
(4 hrs. w/projector for slides)

Panelists:
Nicolas Hopkins, University of Chicago, "The Languages of
Highland Chiapas"
Harvey Sarles (University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine)
Donald McVicker (Bowling Green State University)
Arthur Rubel, Public Health Service, "Three Folktales from
San Bartolome, Chiapas"
Michael Salovesh, Wright Junior College, "San Bartolome:
Contrasts and Generalities"
Frank Cancian (Harvard University)
June Nash, Chicago Teachers College, "Social Participation
Analysis in Amatenango, Chiapas"
Eva Verbitsky Hunt (Northwestern University
Esther Hermitte, University of Chicago, "The Concept of the
Soul Among the Tzeltal Indians of Pinola, Chiapas"
Julian A. Pitt-Rivers (University of Chicago)

May 17th - Friday - A.M.

Title: Salvage Ethnology: Why, Where, and When - Gabriel De Cicco
(2½ hrs. w/tape recorder)

Panelists:
Carroll Burroughs (National Park Service)
Stanley Diamond (National Institute of Mental Health)
Kenneth Hale (University of Illinois)
Carroll Riley (Southern Illinois University
D.P. Sinha (Washington University, St. Louis)

Title: General Anthropology and Health Problems - Nancy O. Lurie
(2½ hrs. to 3 hrs.)

Panelists:
Frank Livingstone, University of Michigan, "Health and Human
Evolution"
Bruce Powell, Regional Archaeologist, National Park Service,
"American Archaeology and Paleohygenics"
Oswald Werner, Indiana University, "Toward an Ethnomedical
Domain Dictionary"
Ethel Nurge, CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY, "Organization, Classification,
and Data Retrieval"
Ruth Cumings (University of Michigan)
James Roney, Jr., M.D. (Discussant)

May 17th - Friday - P.M.

Title: Primitive Art - Philip J. Dark (2½ hrs. w/projector and tape
recorder)

Panelists:
Dr. S.F. Borhegyi (Milwaukee Public Museum)
Dr. Justine Cordwell, Chicago
Dr. Philip Dark (Southern Illinois University)
Dr. Douglas Fraser (Department of Fine Arts and Archaeology,
Columbia)
Mr. Jay C. Leff (Uniontown, Pennsylvania)
Mr. Phillip Lewis (Chicago Natural History Museum)
Dr. Roy Sieber (Indiana University)
Dr. Wm. C. Sturtevant (Smithsonian Institution)
Mr. Allen Wardwell (Art Institute of Chicago)

Title: Early Archaeological Horizons in the Upper Great Lakes Area -
Olaf Prufer (3 hrs. w/projector and blackboard)

Panelists:
James E. Fitting, University of Michigan, "The Hi-Lo Site:
A Late Palaeo-Indian Site in Western Michigan"
Don W. Dragoo, Carnegie Museum, "Early Lithic Cultures of
the Upper Ohio Valley"
Wm. B. Roosa, Miami University, Ohio "Some Michigan Fluted
Point Sites"

ANNUAL BANQUET - A. Spaulding

The Course of Anthropological Research as Viewed From the N.S.F.

May 18th - Saturday - A.M.

Title: Current Anthropological Research in Japan - Richard Beardsley
(projector for slides)

Panelists:
Robin A. Drews, Michigan State University, Chairman
Richard K. Beardsley, University of Michigan, "Japan's Newly
Revealed Lower Paleolithic"
Frank Mayer-Oakes, Wayne State University, "The Kingensetsu
Controversy: Historian vs. Archaeologist"
Erwin H. Johnson, State University of New York at Buffalo,
"Ancient Japan: A Counter-Case Against the 'Oriental
State' "
Wm. J. Schull, The University of Michigan, "Is Social
Deterioration a Correlate of Consanguineous Marriages?"
Iwao Ishino and John D. Donaghue, Michigan State University,
"A Policy Dilemma: Small vs. Large-Scale Farming in
Japan"

Title: Chippewa Culture and Personality - Robert E. Ritzenthaler

Panelists:
A. Irving Hallowell, Chairman
Ernestine Levy
Bernard James
Victor Barnouw
Harold Hickerson
James Clifton

1963

THETA CULTURE

The following represents sundry notes that Iwao Ishino has taken from a tape recorded session held by ~~the undersigned~~ *him*, Dan Wozniak and John Donoghue. The notes ~~represent my~~ *include his* interpretations of the first meeting held at ~~my~~ *his* house on July 9.

Dan set the framework for the evening's discussion--said that if we want to write this book--we want to consider three things. First, what have we to say? Second, how can we say it? Third, to whom do we say it? And perhaps the early part of this resume might organize the topics according to these three basic questions. First, under the general rubric of what have we to say. The general discussion seemed to focus on this notion--that we are living in this age of space, but more important this is the age of theta culture. Theta will be the central focus of this book. It was also suggested that we could specify earlier phases of *evolution, namely,* ~~The other earlier phases were~~ alpha and beta cultures. Jack suggested that this notion of theta culture might be tied in nicely with the notions of President Kennedy's declaration of interdependence. It was suggested that ~~instead of~~ *the* traditional ways of organizing the development of culture (that is, from paleolithic *and* ~~to~~ neolithic ages ~~of~~ *to ages of* civili- zation ~~to the~~ *and* industrial ~~ization, etc.~~ *'zation*) we might ~~take the traditional data and revise~~ *recast into a sequence* ~~it and shape it into the formulation or model~~ of alpha, beta, and theta culture*S*. Roughly speaking, alpha culture prevailed during the paleolithic and neolithic period. The beta culture probably comes in at the time of the civilizations. Theta culture ~~we suggest~~, perhaps begins around 1900. Following some discussion around these points, Jack suggested that we take a synchronic look rather than a historical look at the development of theta culture, and ask ourselves what are the dimensions of theta culture? Out of this question then came a formulation

that we must specify the dimensions of theta culture, *first* in terms of ~~these~~ values
or ideology; second, in terms of roles and statuses; and third, in terms of
organizations and associations.   As an example of the values representing
theta culture, we suggested the universal declaration of human rights that
UNESCO has formulated. As an example of roles involved in theta culture, we
suggested that there are a number of doctors, professionals, professors, scientists
people in
categories of this kind, whose basic knowledge and information are shared and
transmitted among themselves. But these people, to the extent that they parti-
cipate in their professional activities, are not necessarily tied down to their
own local cultures, but are tied in to an international culture, namely, the
theta culture. Thus, a medical doctor in Indonesia could participate as a
scientific doctor in the theta culture, but with respect to his religious
he participates as a member
orientations, his family life, his kinship relationships, ~~these could be~~
that
~~designated as a parts~~ of the beta culture, and perhaps even of the alpha culture.
Finally
~~Third~~, as an example of social organization, we suggest that there are numerous
international scientific organizations--world bank, UNESCO, etc., that repre-
sents this third dimension of theta culture.

Now, according to our major outline, we should be ~~saying~~ discussing the
question," How to say it?," but we skipped to the third question that Dan suggested.
Namely, "To whom do we say it?," for we thought this was an easier problem to tackle.
Iwao, then, listed a number of current periodicals to operationalize the kind
of target that we should have in mind in writing this book.. We had a continuum
running from the Reader's Digest to professional journals, as an example of the
range of readership that might be held in mind as we wrote this book.   It was
generally agreed ~~upon~~ that somewhere in the middle of this continuum would be
the appropriate audience for this book, and to operationalize this, we suggested

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say? Second, how can we say it? Third, to whom do we say it? And perhaps
the early part of this resume might organize the topics according to these
three basic questions. First, under the general rubric of what have we to say.
The general discussion seemed to focus on this notion--that we are living in
this age of space, but more important this is the age of theta culture.
Theta will be the central focus of this book. It was also suggested that
we could specify earlier phases of evolution, namely, alpha and beta cultures.
Jack suggested that this notion of theta culture might be tied in nicely with
the notions of President Kennedy's declaration of interdependence. It was
suggested that the traditional ways of organizing the development of culture
(that is, from paleolithic and neolithic ages to ages of civilization and
industrialization) might recast into a sequence of alpha, beta, and theta
cultures. Roughly speaking, alpha culture prevailed during the paleolithic
and neolithic period. The beta culture probably comes in at the time of the
civilizations. Theta culture perhaps begins around 1900. Following some
discussion around these points, Jack suggested that we take a synchronic
look rather than a historical look at the development of theta culture, and
ask ourselves what are the dimensions of theta culture? Out of this question
then came a formulation that we must specify the dimensions of theta culture

first in terms of values or ideology; second, in terms of roles and statuses;
and third, in terms of organizations and associations. As an example of the
values representing theta culture we suggested the universal declaration of
human rights that UNESCO has formulated. As an example of roles involved in
theta culture, we suggested that there are a number of doctors, professionals,
professors, scientists--people in categories of this kind--whose basic
knowledge and information are shared and transmitted among themselves. But
these people, to the extent that they participate in their professional
activities, are not necessarily tied down to their own local cultures, but
are tied in to an international culture, namely, the theta culture. Thus,
a medical doctor in Indonesia could participate as a scientific doctor in
the theta culture, but with respect to his religious orientations, his family
life, his kinship relationships, he participates as a member of the beta
culture, and perhaps even that of the alpha culture. Finally, as an example
of social organization, we suggest that there are numerous international
scientific organizations--work bank, UNESCO, etc., that represents this
third dimension of theta culture.

Now, according to our major outline, we should be discussing the question,
"How to say it?" , but we skipped to the third question that Dan suggested,
Namely, "To whom do we say it?", for we thought this was an easier problem
to tackle. Iwao, then, listed a number of current periodicals to operationalize
the kind of target that we should have in mind in writing this book. We
had a continuum running from the Reader's Digest to professional journals,
as an example of the range of readership that might be held in mind as we
wrote this book. It wasgenerally agreed that somewhere in the middle of this
continuum would be the appropriate audience for this book, and to operationalize
this, we suggested

trajectory and stream of history. Unless ~~the people~~ *we* have this cultural

~~perspective~~ history, the world will continue to be a buzzing, bewildering,

confusing, set of events. If this history is a vital part in the understanding

of the culture changes taking place now, then this means that for this book,

we must present data of rather detailed sort. I submit ~~now~~ that anthropologists

have been able to pull together information and data from various disciplines--

paleontology, archeology, linguistics, etc., to make a rather meaningful story

of the development of culture or the history of man from its very beginnings.

Unfortunately, much of the story of cultural history is wrapped up in the par-

ticular jargon of the subdisciplines. Terms like paleolithic, neanderthal,

neolithic, ,etc., are examples of these jargons

that make communication difficult. I think ~~that~~ we can ~~do in this book is~~

~~to~~ tell this story of cultural history without the jargon, and thereby communi-

cating a story, a message , that would be understandable to the layman.
Speaking of communication difficulties, I believe

~~In addition to the lack of information concerning the events of history~~

~~mentioned here~~ . there are *some others that can be mentioned here.* ~~some real obstacles to~~

~~understanding and communication.~~ One ~~set of~~ these barriers to understanding,

Another
~~cultural history~~ is the *ethnocentric* ~~basic specialize~~ cosmology ~~different~~ people**s** have,

for example, religious cosmologies that interfer with scientific findings.

the
~~There~~ is a tendency for each people to believe its contribution to world

history has been greater than other peoples. People still speak of Adam and

(the natural)
Eve and the Garden of Eden. In any event, I don!t think ~~any~~ cosmology of any *race,*

tribe, or nation
~~people~~ has pulled together all the relevant information with respect to accurate

time spans, space distributions of all peoples on the earth, into a coherent

story. To repeat ~~, or to summarize,~~ we wish to present a comprehensive story

of the development of human culture without the unnecessary baggage of jargon

that is currently available in scientific literature.

trajectory and stream of history. Unless we have this cultural history, the world will continue to be a buzzing, bewildering, confusing, set of events. If this history is a vital part in the understanding of the culture changes taking place now, then this means that for this book, we must present data of rather detailed sort. I submit that anthropologists have been able to pull together information and data from various disciplines—paleontology, archeology, linguistics etc., to make a rather meaningful story of the development of culture or the history of man from its very beginnings. Unfortunately, much of the story of cultural history is wrapped up in the particular jargon of the subdisciplines. Terms like paleolithic, neanderthal, neolithic, etc., are examples of these jargons that make communication difficult. I think we can tell this story of cultural history without the jargon, and thereby communicating a story, a message, that would be understandable to the layman.

Speaking of communication difficulties, I believe there are some others' that can be mentioned here. One of these barriers to understanding is the tendency for each people to believe its contribution to world history has been greater than other peoples. Another is the ethnocentric cosmology people have, for example, religious cosmologies that interfere with scientific findings. People still speak of Adam and Eve and the Garden of Eden. In any event, I don't think the natural cosmology of any race, tribe, or nation has pulled together all the relevant information with respect to accurate time spans, space distributions of all peoples on the earth into a coherent story. To repeat, we wish to present a comprehensive story of the development of human culture without the unnecessary baggage of jargon that is currently available in scientific literature.

this kind of intelligent being, then another, the second information channel,

appears. And, this is the cultural dimension. Now, on the cultural level,

we know that man began at ~~the very low level,~~ an extremely primitive, forms of

culture. The earliest man just had fire, language, and ~~perhaps religion.~~ simple tools.

And, as he improved and developed his culture, he has ~~now~~ been able to manipulate

his enviroment ~~and now~~ in ever increasing ways till finally man is going into outer space. The question is, how did

this process take place? ~~This information process on the cultural level.~~ Well,

here again it seems to me that we could use four basic processes which explains

this change and this evolution. These ~~They~~ are comparable ~~ones~~ to mutation, genetic

drift, gene flow, and on selection [that are found in the biological sphere.] ~~From a~~ For cultural ~~level,~~ analysis, the first is usually

called, invention or discovery; the second, the same thing, drift, ~~cultural drift;~~

the third, diffusion or (ac)culturation; and four, selection, the same thing as on

the genetic level.

Now let's ~~go in and~~ bring in the time dimension ~~a little bit~~. Roughly,

around a million years ago, very small-brained primates ~~mammates~~ appeared on earth.

Gradually, as ~~this society and~~ their social life changed, their ~~his~~ brain size increased

and their ~~his~~ culture increased appropriately. And, finally, with the selective processes

going on, both at the cultural and biological levels, a rather sophisticated

type of primate emerged. This type we call the Homo Sapiens. Now, Homo Sapiens

emerged roughly around 50 thousand years ago. So to recapitulate it took from about a

million years ago to 50 thousand years ago to develop from primate ~~mammates~~ to Homo

sapiens, the modern man. Now, since 50 thousand years ago, homo sapiens have

not changed significantly ~~drastically.~~ in their biology. The only important modification ~~major variation~~ that we can speak of is ~~the~~

racial variation, the various racial types ~~that~~ developed within ~~particularly in~~ the

last 35 thousand years. ~~All right. Now. Insofar as~~ His brain capacity, his

intelligence, and his tempermental characteristics, ~~we believe that within the last 35 thousand years, man has not changed.~~ have not changed within the last 35,000 years. ¶ But, from a cultural standpoint

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But, from a cultural standpoint

Let's expand this notion of the biological channel of information transfer,
a little bit more. If one thinks of a large population of parents procreating
children and passing on their hereditary traits or genes to their children, we
can think of basically four mechanisms by which some of this transfer takes
place and how the information may be altered in the process. Basically, there
are only four ways in which the offspring's generation, the children's generation,
would have a different kind of genetic makeup from their parents. Before we go
into this however, we must remember that in general, there is a tendency for
"like to produce like." That is to say, dogs reproduce dogs, they don't repro-
duce horses. Or more specifically, collies produce collies, unless of course
~~but we know that in evolution,~~
you interbreed collies with terriers or something else. ~~Well, anyway, coming~~
But we know as a fact that in biological evolution, one species gradually
~~back to the issue of why all the time do you have some systematic changes in~~
                                                            such
change in form and structure. How can we account for ~~these~~ changes, if "like
~~the genetic characteristics of a population.~~ The four mechanisms are as follows.
produces like"? _____ (or "error," "noise.")
First, mutations, which means, in information terms, misinformation, In genetic
                                                        drift
terms, this means random change. The second factor is genetic ~~   ~~, systematic
                                                 The
changes taking place within a system. ∧Third, is gene flow. Gene flow means the
same thing as crossbreeding or hybridization. Finally, fourth, selection. Here
the enviroment in which the population exists exerts certain kinds of "pressures"
favoring the continuation of certain genetic traits and elimination of other
genetic traits. ~~We could give illustrations of this, perhaps they will come~~
~~a little later~~. Now these four mechanisms ~~are~~ operated in such a way that
systematic changes over many millions of years have brought about various kinds
of species of life on earth. These four mechanisms help to explain how man
evolved from apes or ape-like creatures and, in turn, from monkeys and
                                            ¶   we
and more primitive forms of primates. Now, if ~~you~~ understand how ~~these~~ this
biological channel of communication took place and evolved different forms of
life, we get to the point where one species, namely homo Sapiens emerge, with
                                    and a
a large brain, upright posture, ∧very skillful pair of hands. When you get

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a very skillful pair of hands. When you get

The second, the rice complex, developed the high civilizations of China, ~and this in turn gave rise to Korean, Japanese and Viet Namese~ cultures ~and others~. The third, in the new world, the Mayas , the Aztecs, and

the Incas. I might trace the diffusion of these cultural items a little bit

more. The first, the wheat complex, ~of course~ moved throughout the Middle

East, eventually went into Europe, ~and~ The Europeans ~inherited this and with the~ in turn took it with them when they came to the ~arrival of Europeans in North~ America, ~they brought this wheat complex with~

~them~. At that point, they came in to contact with the American ~corn~ Maize complex.

Here the Europeans ~who occupied this territory~ learned to domesticate the

turkey, and plant corn, etc. By the way, there are other things that the

American Indians contributed to the human culture. These include tomatoes,

pineapple, cotton, tobacco, and the so-called Irish potato.

The other complex, the rice complex, had ~divided primarily~ split into two directions.

One flowed ~went out~ over the Pacific Islands as far eastward as Easter Island

and the Hawaiian Islands, and ~was~ spread over the intervening islands, ~such~

~as Somoa, Polonesia, and~ . The other wing of the rice complex

moved northward into China, Korea, Japan, and into the Philippines.

Note that as ~you start to talk about~ we review the ~spread~ flow and the diffusion of these

cultural items, ~such as food, as an example, you~ we begin to understand ~that~ the fact the

typical American diet ~that we have~ today includes material that has been brought

into this society from many parts of the world. Thus we could untangle ~and we could see the contri-~ the various admixture of cultural items. ~butions of various peoples to the contemporary diet of Americans. Conversely,~

You remember the Kenya farmers. ~again in Africa~ I asked the Kenya farmer what

he raised and he said he raised peanuts, cotton, corn, some rice, and wheat, etc.,

~so that you can see that~ Even though the Kenya farmer looks a little bit primitive

from our vantage point, he still has borrowed cultural items from all over the world.

1963

MODERNISM VS. TRADITIONALISM
IN JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS: A FALSE DICHOTOMY*

by Iwao Ishino
Michigan State University

East Lansing, Mich., U.S.A. 4-2-63

There is currently a raging controversy in management circles over
whether or not Japanese industry is dominated by traditional values and
principles of organization.[1] The pro-traditionalists argue that the present
structure of Japanese industry has many "feudal" features which "make sense"
in a modern context. They contend that the so-called traditional practices --
which I shall outline later -- have not really hindered industrial progress.
These "old structures" have implemented, augmented, and, in fact, made
possible recent achievements in industrialization. The pro-traditionalists
see no reason why Japanese why Japanese industrialization should be com-
pletely isomorphic with respect to comparable experiences in the West.
They maintain that one should expect each new industrial society to develop
some unique features in accordance with its prevailing social structure,
value system, and economic resources.

The modernists, on the other hand, stress the logical necessity
for impersonal relations, competitive interaction, rationality, and
industrial "democracy." If Japanese industry is to grow, they argue, it
must follow patterns experienced in the West; (1) Labor must be freed from
the traditional restraints on its use and its transfer; (2) Goods and services
must be allocated on a rational basis; (3) Social and economic mobility must

must be explicitly valued; and (4) Nepotism and other particularistic considerations in industrial management must be avoided.

What is particularly interesting is that American social scientists have been inadvertently brought into this ideological struggle between traditionalists and modernists. Since about 1950, William Lockwood, James G. Abegglen, Solomon B. Levine, Frederick Harbison, Charles A. Myers, Peter F. Drucker and others have investigated Japanese industrial organizations. ~~Their writings have been~~ what they have written is avidly read by the Japanese. The interest shown in these American writers is demonstrated in part by the response to Drucker's book, Practice of Management. It has been reported that this "hidden best seller" has sold over one million copies in Japan.

American studies of Japanese industry is involved in the modernism-traditionalism controversy because their point of view generally coincides with the Japanese traditionalists.

American scholars for example see many "unique" features in Japanese industrial organizations, features which they attribute to age-old tradition. It is not surprising that they make such allegations because their "model" of industrialization is based on western experience. In my own writing, I have also assumed that patterns diverging from the western "model" belong to feudal or archaic traditions.[2]

In view of the apparent vitality of contemporary Japanese industrial organizations, Americans generally conclude that these persisting structures are functional and adaptive.

On the other hand, "modernists" like Professor Odaka strongly object to assessments made by the Americans. He claims, among other things, that Americans tend to exaggerate the continuity of archaic practices and that

they therefore convey a "false impression of the real situation." Moreover,
he feels that conservative management people in Japan have been reluctant
to liberalize their policies as the result of the encouragement given
them by the American "experts." Odaka suspects that Abegglen's and Levine's
books, for example, are selling well in Japan because they tend to validate
the position of conservative managers and administrators. In short, he
believes American scholars are doing a disservice to the growth of modern
administrative policies in Japan.

I have thus far presented an outline of the controversy without specifying its content. In general, its content focuses on the methods for recruiting and utilizing the labor force--including highly trained professional personnel. To Western observers, the following seem to be most significant characteristics because they differ merkedly from their own experience:

1. Shushin koyosei or life time commitment to a firm. Peter Drucker phrases this idea cogently when he writes: "A man does not 'get a job' in Japan. He is, so to speak, adopted into a clan; once on a payroll, always on the payroll." Such a commitment means that labor turnover is infrequent and mobility between firms is rare.

2. Nenko sei or seniority system based primarily on age and length of service rather than performance. Subordinates are sometimes paid a total wage or salary that exceeds those of their supervisors. One recent graduate of Tokyo University, for example, has 75 men reporting to him, each of whom earn twice even three times as much as he does. The reason is that his subordinates have seniority over him in terms of age and length of service.

3. A sense of loyalty toward the employer which is reciprocated by a feeling of diffuse obligations toward employees. The classic statements indicate a diffuse set of mutual obligations at each level of the organizational structure. A good foreman is said to look after his worker as a father does his children. American observers tend to look at the Japanese wage structure in the light of these traditional

obligations. Salaries and wages thus are seen as installments on a life-
time contract for gaining employee loyalty. In fact, some foreign experts
conclude that such payments are peripheral to the employer-employee
relationship, not basic. The general practice of semi-annual bonuses are a
also viewed as part of this picture. In addition to the twelve-month
salaries, Japanese workers receive these bonuses which in money value are
equivalent to three to ten extra monthly payments, depending upon the
earnings of the firm. Thus, the symbol of participation in the firm's
(i.e., family's) earnings is maintained.

Such attributes of contemporary Japanese firms, at least as seen
by American observers and the "traditionalist" school in Japan can be
summed up in the phrase "managerial paternalism." In as much as the
general ideas of industrialism have come from the West, it is natural for
the modernist school to view the attributes of managerial paternalism as
an archaic, perhaps inevitable, carry-over from feudal times. In short,
they conclude that the peculiarly Japanese principles of management are
residues from the past, a persistence of tradition.

But is it? Do these features of Japanese industrial organization
constitute a tradition? In the following paragraphs, I will attempt to
examine the source of these paternalistic elements.

History of Managerial Paternalism

High labor turnover. When Japan began on the road to industrialization
in the final decades of the 19th century, there were few skilled workers to
man the factories, especially in textile and metal works industries. These
workers had to be enticed to leave their ancestral villages and trained to
work under the pace set by the unfamiliar machines. This was no simple task,

and history records the many "growing pains" of absenteism, labor racketeering and worker instability. Plant managers found it extremely difficult to maintain a stable labor force. As late as 1902, according to a comprehensive governmental survey, 44 per cent of all industrial employees had worked with their present companies for one year or less. More than 90 per cent had been employed in their companies for five years or less. To put it positively, only about one of every 10 workers in this national sample had been with his firm more than five years. (Taira, p. 159).

These facts are cited here to indicate that life committment, or shushin kyosei, was not a traditional element of Japanes industrial organization, at least in this early period of growth. These facts also suggest the frantic attempts of factory owners to find some satisfactory solution to this problem. It was obvious to them that the contemporary methods were inadequate to attract the villagers into the city. Recruitment could not be left to hit-or-miss methods. Gradually, therefore, an organized system of recruitment emerged professional recruiters were organized.

With great expense and considerable planning, factory owners developed corps of labor middlemen. These recruiters combed the countryside to find suitable workers. To aid them and to raise the incentives, employers authorized the recruiters to pay transportation costs of the worker, provide for travel sundry expenses, pay advances to the workers' family, and even to find dormitories for the recruits. Recruiters themselves demanded high commission rates from their employers.

The genral labor scarcity also resulted in high degree of labor piracy. Disguised labor recruiters often found work in a competitor's company, ~~In the textile industries, dormitories were established to help~~ became acquainted with his fellow "workers" and then enticed them to leave

their present company en masse to join the labor recruiter's original
company.[11] In the textile industries, dormitories were established to help
keep the workers under their control, even to the extent of locking the
gates at night to prevent "raiding". [12] (Orchard,p.343)

The textile mills were particularly notorious for their high labor
turnover. Three large mills in 1900 had a total of 8,792 workers at the
beginning of the year. During that year, some 12,600 employees separated
from their jobs. This amounts to an average monthly separation rate of
12 per cent. (Taira, p. 162).

Such conditions persisted as late as 1930. Orchard observed at
first hand industrial conditions of this period and he found the labor
turnover so high that he wondered if Japan could become a fully developed
industrial nation: "Though there undoubtedly will be further development,
Japan cannot hope to become a manufacturing nation of major rank. Her
successful industries will necessarily be restricted to a limited number."
(Orchard, p.242).

The growth of paternalism. In addition to the highly developed
programs of labor recruitment by private employers, the national government
as an instrumentality for stabilizing the labor force. It promulgated the
Factory Act of 1916 (later amended in 1923) which stipulated a number of
conditions designed, in part, to make factory work more attractive. Though
the Act covered employers with 15 or more operatives (later 10), it legally
set minimum employment age, maximum working hours, workmen's compensation
for injury, sickness and disability--items recognized in the labor laws of
most industrialized nations. In addition, the Act provided for travel
expense required for work, dismissal allowances and other features which are
currently subsumed in the philosophy of managerial paternalism.

Today, some of the "best" employers provide a wide range of "fringe benefits" which have proliferated since the Factory Act was first promulgated. The rise of unionism before World War II proved an added stimulus in the proliferation of fringe benefits. It is commonplace for large firms to provide their employees with rent subsidies; transportation costs to and from work; reduced prices at the company restaurant; discounts of 10 to 30 per cent for purchases of furniture, household appliances, and food items; negligible interest rates for personal loans; free medical care and hospitalization; vacations at a company-owned resort; and a substantial dismissal or retirement pension.

Permanent vs. Temporary workers. These paternalistic features, steming from the Factory Act, gave rise to another pattern of industrial organization which differs from the western experience. This is the significant demarcation between what is called "permanent" and "temporary" workers.

In the competition to obtain workers, and to stabilize their work force, successful Japanese firms in the 1920's pursued a policy of shushin koyosei, or "life committment." Their "paternalism" was extended to cover the wide range of fringe benefits as a way of validating shushin koyosei. But such a policy was inevitably very onerous, especially in the periods of economic stagnation. Thus, a "gimmick" was invented to handle this problem, namely, the distinction between "permanent" and "temporary" workers. Perquisites and allowances required by the Factory Act and other similar "obligations" were dispensed to the permanent staff. Other employees were defined as "temporary" and as such they fell outside the purview of the"obligation" system.

This "fiction" of "temporary" workers was expanded in the economic revival between 1931-36. (Taira, p. 157). The sudden need for additional workers was handled under temporary labor contracts. When these contracts expired, the operatives were either re-hired under a similar contract, or dismissed without the legal or customary benefits received by "permanent" employees.

It is within this class of "temporary" workers, especially those in construction, mining, and stevedoring, that many oyabun-kobun type labor boss organizations emerged in strength. Such organizations, as I have written elsewhere, were organized on their own paternalistic and simulated kinship patterns.[13] It must be noted, in passing however, that not all "temporary" workers were organized under the oyabun-kobun pattern.

It has been reported that the proportion of "temporary" workers in 1934 ran as high as 30 per cent in the machine industries and 40 per cent in the metals industries. About 22 per cent of the workers in all industries were classified as "temporary."[14]

A further development of the permanent-temporary distinction took place following World War II. The Occupation's policy encouraged the growth of trade unions, the rise of wage levels, and the improvement of working conditions. Unfortunately, however, the deflationary period of 1949-50 challenged these objectives. Under conditions of deflation, it was impossible for the unions to insist upon full employment and at the same time resist wage cuts. Caught in this dilemma, unions agreed to reduce the work force. Management also took this view, as Taira describes it: (p.166)

> Pressed by the economic necessity that labor is a variable factor and the union demand that the employment of the member-workers be guaranteed regardless of economic conditions, management has since worked out a formula known as teiinsei, a kind of tenure system, in which a certain number of workers jointly determined by union and management is guaranteed permanent employment.

Currently, further breakdowns of the "temporary" class of workers are found in many industries, especially among the large firms. These include shagaiko, or "extra workers," and another group known as "casual" workers. Thus, firms can expand or contract their work force without obligating themselves to an ever-increasing permanent staff of employees. The relative cost attendant to the obligations of paternalism apply basically to a firm's "permanent" staff -- additional "casual" and "extra workers" are hired or dismissed without incurring long-term obligations. Furthermore, with expanding business, a firm can also increase its output with additional staff by resorting to the familiar practice of subcontracting some specific aspect of the manufacturing or production process to a smaller firm or a series of firms.

The utilization of temporary workers as "buffers" against fluctuating labor demands varies according to the situation. In general, temporary workers loom important in industries which require heavy productive machinery, such as those engaged in iron and steel production, electrical equipment, and transportation. At present in these industries, 10 to 14 per cent of the work force comes from the temporary ranks. (Taira, p. 166; Economic Planning Agency, p. 184).

But more important for consideration here is the relationship between the size of a firm and the proportion of "temporary" workers in its labor force. The smaller the firm, the greater the proportion of "temporary" workers. This is because the larger firms are in a better position to pursue a policy of managerial paternalism than are the small firms. If one focused his study on large, high-wage firms in Japan, he would likely get the impression that labor immobility and lifetime commitment are predominant.

The foregoing review of the development of <u>managerial</u> <u>paternalism</u> was made with the specific purpose of raising this fundamental question: To what extent are the particular characteristics of contemporary Japanese industry <u>traditional</u>? The principle of <u>shushin koyosei</u>, or life commitment, was nutured in the Factory Act of 1916 in response to a high degree of labor turnover, and amidst the "birth pangs" of absenteeism, labor racketeering, and labor bossism. Wartime mobilization programs, designed to stabilize the labor force under conditions of extreme manpower shortage, further reinforced the principle. Finally, in the postwar period, with the rise of trade unionism and rising wage levels, there emerged the <u>keystone</u> of <u>managerial</u> <u>paternalism</u> -- the "job tenure" principle of <u>teiinsei</u> and the resultant discrimination between "permanent" and "temporary" workers.

Therefore, it seems to me, these so-called "traditional, feudal, or archaic" features have been invented in response to new and changing conditions in the industrial structure of the nation. They do not seem to be something that was "automically" handed down from the past as a part of the cultural heritage. They had to be designed, planned, and operationalized. In short, one could reasonably say that these so-called "traditional" features are really <u>innovations</u>. They are innovations in the sense that anything which combines existing ideas, concepts and principles into a new gestalt is an innovation.

I do not propose to argue that I would use the concept "innovation" in place of "tradition" with respect to Japanese industrial organizations. But I cannot resist the urge to play a little more with this term "traditional."

If we remember that the principle of managerial paternalism goes back only to the early 1900's and if this principle is traditional, then it

seems to me that with equal vigor, I could argue that the borrowing of
ideas and knowledge from other countries is also a part of Japanese
tradition. To make this concrete, let me quote from John E. Orchard,
an economic geographer who made an extensive study of Japanese industries
in the late 1920's. He writes: (p. 249-50)

> . . . most of the equipment in modern Japanese factories is of
> foreign origin or is copied from foreign models. Spindles and looms
> from England, wool washing and drying machinery from the United
> States, woolen cloth finishing machinery from Alsace, paper making
> machinery from Vienna, wire drawing machines from Connecticut, pottery
> machinery from Germany, Czechoslovakia and Austria, the equipment of
> a linen mill from France, England and Ireland, sewing machines in a
> clothing factory from the United States and Sweden and cloth cutters
> and pressers from New York, machinery for brush making from England,
> France and Germany, electrical equipment from the United States,
> mining machinery from the United States and England, heavy dock
> equipment for loading coal from England, a furnace in a zinc smelter
> from Germany and zinc rolling mills from Pittsburgh, machine-shop
> equipment in a locomotive works from the United States and England,
> brewing appartus from Germany, match machinery from Germany and Sweden,
> and the equipment of an iron and steel plant from Germany are some
> of the examples of imported industrialization noted during visits to
> Japanese factories in 1926.

Writing in 1930, Orchard also mentioned the poor administrative
ability of the Japanese. He writes:

> Japanese factories are for the most part poorly organized, and
> little attention has been given to the latest developments in
> factory management. (p.254).

Even though the events following Orchard's report tend to believe
his point, especially in light of the great industrial expansion in the
immediate prewar and postwar period, the Japanese appear sensitive to the
need for improving their managerial and administrative skills. Today, as
I have indicated earlier, the Japanese are eager to learn about American
management practices and principles. Between June 1961 and May 1962,
590 books were published in Japan on "modern" business administration
principles, techniques, and methods, an average of 50 books per month.

In addition, there are about 30 journals and magazines primarily concerned with the business field. There are some 50 schools training managerial talent. These books, periodicals, and schools have borrowed heavily from American writers. American business consultants and experts are frequent visitors and lecturers in Japan. The upshot is a plethora of new words reflecting the "modern" trend: kigyo shindan, or enterprise diagnosis; keiei senryaku, or managerial strategy; gijutsu kakushin, technological innovation; jigyo hombu sei, or functional product division. Here again I see the Japanese heritage of a basic willingness to borrow from outsiders, a veritable "tradition." (Kasuga)

Insert 13a

For many years, the anthropologist has been foremost in framing the problem of socioeconomic development as being fundamentally one of a conflict between the traditional or feudal values and the rational-legal values of the modern world. A recent book entitled, Traditional Cultures: and the Impact of Technology Change (by George Foster), is an example of this view.[1] It assumes a built-in series of stabilizing factors most of which are related to the traditional culture. These older elements are perceived as "barriers" to change and development. Hence the strategy to stimulate economic growth and industrial development--from this viewpoint--seems to be to find ways of upsetting the equilibrium enforced by tradition. But posing the problem of development, in my opinion, leads us nowhere. The dichotomy of traditional vs. modern values provide us with no perceptual gain in understanding the process of national growth.

---

[1] George Foster

Conclusion

I began this paper with a note on the present controversy as to whether or not Japanese industrial organization was "traditional." I have traced through the history of this so-called traditional pattern of managerial paternalism, and have shown that the pattern is no more traditional than pizza in the United States.

My principle objective in this exercise is to urge that the term "traditionalism" be dropped from our language, especially in the context of culture change and economic development studies.

I agree with Melford Spiro when he wrote:

> "Modern science is the heir of a time-honored intellectual tradition
> which has taken great delight in the elaboration of dichotomies.
> These dichotomies are, in many instances, part of warp-and-woof of
> modern thought. They include such concepts as real-ideal, ends-means,
> theory-practice, mind-body, matter-spirit, and many others. The
> physical sciences have had considerable success in eliminating
> from their fields those false dichotomies that apply to their areas
> of research. The social sciences have been more tardy in this regard
> and, as a result, are still attempting to deal with problems generated
> by the false dichotomy of individual-society."

To his list, I would like to add "traditionalism vs. modernism" as another

false dichotomy.

There are of course, many reasons for using the dichotomy as a

shorthand method for designating ideas and values which are new to the

society and those which have part of the social fabric for many generations.

But the continuous use of the dichotomy in social science research, without

serious questioning of the underlying assumptions may lead to a serious

consequence. One of the obvious consequences is that researchers often

fail to acknowledge that each generation must learn its values afresh,

whether such orientations are "new" or "old." There is no automatic trans-

mission of viewpoints and there is no mechanical replication of cultural

traits from one generation to another.

I suppose the anthropologists have been most responsible for

thrusting this dichotomy upon their colleagues in social science. Some

anthropologists have been so identified with far-away cultures of backward

peoples. Just as it takes some being other than a fish to recognize the

presence of water, so social scientists, other than anthropologists, are

pointing out how anthropologists have been blind to their own theoretical

shortcomings. The sociologist, Wilber E. Moore, for example notes:

> Strangely, the social anthropologists, who perhaps best understand
> the functional relations among even remote segments of social

systems, allow their nostalgia for primeval patterns and their
ethical repugnance for cultura imperialism to lend spurious aid and
comfort to the innovators. They give solace to the governors who
hope to educate natives and not destroy their traditional values,
and to the employers who hope to hire labor cheaply without facing
the growing demand for whatever goods and services a market system
has to offer.

All this is not to say that the traditionalism-modernism contrast
is not useful for other than social scientific purposes. It may, for
instance, help to align political ideology in a way meaningful for the
electorate-at-large. ~~But I would be happy if it were dropped from the
technical language of social science.~~

April 16, 1963

John Useem, Michigan State University, East Lansing
John Bennett, Washington University, St. Louis
Eric Wolf, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
John D. Donoghue, Michigan State University, East Lansing
Iwao Ishino, Michigan State University, East Lansing
Alvin W. Wolfe, Washington University, St. Louis

Gentlemen:

In regards to the symposium on "Theta" culture, I am enclosing some
reading materials. I hope there is enough "meat" in them to provide
each of you with some relevant comments on some or all of the following
points:

(1) Do all anthropologists now have enough data and perspective to
designate this concept with a single word or phrase (be it "World
culture", Third culture", "Common culture", "World Ecumene")?

(2) If so, what do we call it? If not, why not?

(3) Assuming there is such a phenomenon, what are some of its chief
distinguishing criteria?
        (a) The fact that it is not identified completely with any single
        nation state?
        (b) The fact that its transmission and diffusion is dependent
        upon modern modes of transportation, communication, and
        education?

(4) Assuming that it is desirable to gather more primary data on this
matter. How should we proceed? What categories of data should be
collected? Would the use of electronic computers help, as Gordon
Hewes suggests?

I would be happy to get your reactions to these questions.

Sincerely yours,

Iwao Ishino
Professor of Sociology and Anthropology

Enclosures: Excerpts from
   1. Useem and Donoghue
        2. Richard L. Meier
        3. E. O. Reischauer and J. K. Fairbank
        4. Gordon W. Hewes
        5. Wilbert E. Moore
        6. Sahlins and Service
        7. Alvin W. Wolfe
        8. Hodgson

1964

At University Drive

Small Versus Large-Scale Agriculture

Iwao Ishino and John Donoghue *

Introduction

The promulgation of the Japanese land reform program in 1948 established several important policy decisions which, according to different viewpoints, are hindering or aiding the growth of Japanese agriculture. One of these decisions is related to the size of farm operations. In its attempt to provide the landless peasant with a more tangible stake in his future, the government, in effect, leveled the size of farm plots down to an essential minimum size. According to this law, owners of land having more than a given number of acres were required to sell their "surplus" land, preferably to tenants who were actually operating the land. This acreage restriction varied according to region, but for the most of Japan, it was limited to about three acres per farm household. Among the reasons for establishing such a restriction on farm size was the belief that the Japanese method of cultivation, derived from a long tradition, was highly efficient and labor intensive. Many Japanese were rather proud of the comparatively high yields they achieved from a small, almost garden-sized plot. Indeed, their production ranks among the highest in the world when measured in terms of rice production.

Ever since the land reform law was passed, however, numerous sectors of the Japanese population have questioned this reasoning. Some criticisms of this belief in the efficacy of small-scale farming were motivated by the

* Iwao Ishino and John Donoghue are in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Michigan State University, East Lansing, Mich.

self-interested, ex-landlord groups who wished to recoup land they were forced to give up. But there were many others who desired a change in the policy of small-scale farming for more objective reasons. Some, for example, argue that the present scale of operations prevents the farmer from utilizing the available labor force efficiently and hinders the rational use of farm machinery and other technological improvements. Others argue that the small productive capacity of the farmer weakens his position in the total economy, and therefore tends to demoralize him. Such a farmer, they say, is at a distinct disadvantage when it comes to obtaining agricultural credit, marketing his small harvest, and making rational marketing decisions. Still others argue that the present policy of small-scale farming exerts a drag on the national economy, especially in the light of the accelerated industrial development of the last decade, because it encourages inefficient methods of production and distribution.

In this article, we would like to consider the ramifications of this debate. To reiterate, the controversy pivots on this question: Should Japan continue its policy of small-scale farm production, or should she shift to a policy of large-scale, mechanized farming?

We believe this question is important not only because it may have long-run consequences in the social development of rural life, but also because it has bearing on the problems of economic development in Asia and elsewhere.

In the current literature on economic development, one finds a great deal of discussion on the need for land reform and what this might mean for increasing agricultural productivity in food-deficient countries. At the same time, there is the thesis which claims collectivization and nationalization of farms will yield greater productivity. Communist China, for example is moving toward the collectivization of agriculture. The reasoning is

that collectivization permits large-scale farm operations and therefore leads to more rational utilization of scarce resources and greater productivity.

In the controversies taking place in Japan over the small-scale vs. large-scale issue, one finds a tendency for this debate to polarize toward one extreme or the other. We find that those who favor small-scale farming in Japan do so because they believe rice production and other forms of Japanese agriculture are peculiarly suited for intensive hand labor. On the other hand, those who favor increasing the scale of farm operations argue that the current policy is out-moded, even archaic, and economically untenable. The present authors believe there is a third position. It is the explication of this third position to which this article is devoted.

However, before we explain this alternative, we would first like to provide a more detailed explanation of the position held by the proponents of the large-scale agriculture.

A village agricultural expert we interviewed in December, 1959 described his conception of the future of Japanese farming as follows:

> For the average farmer, the ideal is to continue running his farm in the traditional way, not as a business enterprise. But my idea is just the opposite. Agriculture should be seen as a business and run accordingly, not as a way of life. Factories and merchants are both using corporation techniques now, and next it will be the farmers who will form corporations. But for the individual farmer, this is impossible. It will require several farm households joining together to form a single corporation. In a place like this, all farmers in the village should work, live and harvest together and get a salary for their labor. A big apartment building should be constructed and it, as well as the farm land, should belong to the corporation—for example the village agricultural association. Farmers would go to the fields in the morning and return to the apartment building in the evening. They would get a salary at the end of each month. This would enable the corporation to buy more agricultural machinery. As it is now, the average farmer cannot afford a single machine because it costs more than 300,000 Yen. The land and machines they have now would form the capital to organize the corporation. This will probably take about 50 years, but it will eventually be realized.[1]

Here is a person deeply committed to the idea that the Japanese method of farming should be rationalized. His recommendations for rationalization include: 1) a need to change from the philosophy of farming as a way of life to farming as a business; 2) that farmers should pool their resources—including land, labor, and capital—by establishing themselves as a formal corporation; and 3) that such an agricultural corporation would be capable of implementing economies which would result from large-scale operations and more efficient use of farm machinery.

That such ideas were not original with our informant is indicated by a story in the *Japan Times* of March 31, 1959. A family in Tottori prefecture had formed a joint stock company in 1952 to keep its land from being fractionated, and to take advantage of tax benefits which could be secured if they were defined as a corporation rather than as a farmer. The government's Tax Administration agency heard of this and carried out an investigation to see how many others were enjoying reduced tax payments as a result of such maneuvers. The investigators found 628 farmers were organized as corporations in 1958. The *Japan Times* article also quotes Professor Tohata of Tokyo University as favoring the formation of such joint stock companies. His reasons were that the small amount of land cultivated by the Japanese farmer and the associated low per-capita productivity is

a major stumbling block to the modernization of the nation's agriculture.

A recent study by Professor Iichiro Takahashi of Kyushu University tends to affirm Professor Tohata's hypothesis if we use labor input and farm income as a measure of efficiency. Professor Takahashi sampled 144 farm families dividing them according to the size of their farm holdings: below 0.5 cho, 0.5 to 0.9 cho, 1.0 to 1.4 cho and 1.5 cho and over. (See chart). Professor Takahashi concludes that the larger the farm size, the greater the farm income per unit of labor input.

Put more concretely, for every 5,000 hours of family labor, the farm income increased from 212,000 yen to 344,000 yen as the size of the farm plot increased from less than 0.5 cho to 1.5 cho or more. This increase in efficiency is explained by the better utilization of farm machinery on the large holdings. The extent to which the Japanese must be mechanized can be indicated by these statistics. According to a U.S. government report, it takes 72 man-days to produce an acre of rice in Japan as opposed to only 2 man-days per acre in the United States.

Based on such reasoning as this, Ishino[2] argued for the point of view that the Japanese government should change its present agricultural policy:

> The solution to increasing the farmer's share of national income is to reduce the number of farm households and to increase the size of farm acreage per farming unit. It is the solution toward which American farmers are moving. Some suggestions in this direction were made by our informants in

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1. Unpublished field notes.

2. I. Ishino, "Ten Years After the Land Reform," in Richard K. Beardsley and Robert J. Smith (eds.), *Japanese Culture: Its Development and Change*, Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, 1962.

Farm Income

(Thous. Yen)

Input of Family Labor*

(Thous. Hours)

Farm income: Cash receipts, plus receipts in kind, plus products of the farm inventory, minus cash expenditures, minus payments in kind, minus board for hired workers, minus depreciation of fixed assets. Farm income is what is left to pay for the labor of the farmer and his family, and for the use of invested land and capital.

Family farm labor input: Total farm labor input, minus hired labor input.

* Iichiro Takahashi, "Principles of Farm Labor Input on Family Farms in the Kyushu District, Japan," *The Council on Economic and Cultural Affairs, Inc.,* n.d., p. 3.

Japan. One agricultural consultant in Iwate prefecture suggested the move toward farm corporations. Another even suggested "vertical integration." Whatever the special directions taken toward solving this problem, the principal decision involves something more than economics. It involves a question of values, and as such it has implications for Japanese politics, economy and society. It also means that the Japanese farm family system will have to socialize its children for urban types of occupation. The idea that the Japanese farm is an ideal "seedbed" for tomorrow's generation needs to be given up because such an idea is simply not true. Japanese urban families are providing a more alert and realistic approach than are farm families to problems the next generation will face as adults.

The Case for Reticulated Organizational Structure

The foregoing discussion is intended to state the case for those who believe large-scale operation is not only desirable for Japan, but also feasible. It must be noted that this movement toward large-scale operations is not directed at collectivization and nationalization, but generally toward consolidation of private holdings.

But the problem does not rest here. Those who favor large-scale production units in Japanese agriculture believe production will be improved. The fact is, however, Japanese agriculture has been transformed progressively despite the maintenance of small-scale agriculture brought about by the land reform program. Rice yields have increased steadily, and despite the fact that only about 16 percent of the land is arable, Japan produces more than 80 percent of her total food requirements. Dairying and livestock enterprises have flourished; new seed strains have readily diffused; scientific agriculture has been learned and accepted. New techniques, such as the use of vinyl covering in nursery seed beds to hasten growth rate of small seedlings, have been eagerly adopted by Japanese farmers. A wide variety of farm machinery has been absorbed in farm operations reducing some of the tedious and enervating features of farm work. Farmers have been sensitive to market conditions and their decisions to plant crops have shifted with the shifting markets in more or less rational directions. These and other features of the current business-like posture of the Japanese farmer have been described elsewhere by the present authors and others.

These remarks are not meant to substantiate either the position that small-scale farming is practiced with optimum efficiency in Japan, nor that it could not become more efficient. Rather, we repeat these facts in order to establish the hypothesis that there is something more to the issue at hand than the simple small vs. large-scale problem.

One answer to this apparent dilemma is what we call *reticulated organizational structure.* We came at this notion of reticulated structure, or organizational network in a roundabout way. Our initial hypothesis was somewhat as follows:

Based on readings in general economics, we came upon the hypothesis that larger scale enterprises are generally more efficient than comparable small-scale enterprises. This is sometimes referred to as "economy of scale." That is, because large enterprises have access to greater resources, both capital and human resources, they tend to be more rational in the utilization and allocation of scarce commodities. The generalizing of this principle to the case of farm operations in Japan led Ishino to advocate a policy of increasing the average size of holding for the Japanese farmer. Farm operators in the United States are generally more efficient and more scientific in their management practices than are their brethren operating smaller farms.

However, faced with the fact that Japanese farmers increased their efficiency and productivity *without* increasing the scale of their operations, we questioned the hypothesis that larger-scale operations are more rational.

Accordingly, we searched for an explanation for this improved efficiency which came about without an increase in the scale of operations.

We concluded that there were at least two dimensions to this "economy of scale" notion. One, the scale of the basic factor of production—in the case of farming-land; the other, the size of managerial groups—the social structure. Our understanding of the increasing efficiency was that, although the Japanese farmers maintained ownership of small parcels of land, they at the same time formed social and communication linkages which no longer left them "small-scale" farmers. Each Japanese farm household was inextricably linked into a vast information-disseminating network. This, in effect, made it one with hundreds of other farm households in obtaining consensus and in making decisions concerning farm technology, farm management, and marketing.

Thus, when an agricultural experiment station discovered a new seed strain or found a new technique to increase crop yields, this information was easily diffused through the *reticulated* organization. The agricultural extension agents understood this organization and readily "plugged into" this network. In Japan, this reticulation facilitates the rapid flow of technical information to the common farmer much more so than in underdeveloped rural communities where each farm household is not linked to such an inter-organizational structure. In Japan, diffusion of new ideas generally takes place in a year or two. In the United States, by contrast, diffusion may take many years. For example, the diffusion of alfalfa took eleven years in Michigan alone.

How this reticulated organization was established in Japan seems a worthwhile topic for a paper because one of the aims of technical assistance missions to developing nations should be to establish, if possible, such reticulated organizations suited to local conditions. To explain the development of reticulated organizations in Japan would require a reconstruction of the history of agricultural practices since the Meiji period (1868). In this paper, we can only suggest a few of the important historical events which aided establishment of this organizational network. Among recent events, the most significant was the establishment in 1948-49 of national, prefectural, and local land commissions responsible for carrying out the provisions of the land reform law. These tri-level commissions networked into an active communication system with more than two million farmers benefiting directly from land transfers. In addition, there were 36,000 paid officials from the national and prefectural government, 115,000 paid members of the local land commissions, and more than 225,000 volunteers who aided the program in a wide variety of ways. Behind these statistics lies a reticulated system of close interpersonal relationships and friendships hammered together during the crisis period in which a very difficult governmental program was successfully promulgated. In attenuated form, this particular network continues to function.

Extending over the same period of time was another kind of reticulated organization, the vast agricultural extension system and its associated home demonstration teams. Beyond these were the networks of cooperatives of all kinds, women's associations, youth groups, hobby groups, formal local government units, PTA, various religious organizations, and other such groups which maintained both formal and informal liaison among one another. Most of these groups have developed within the past forty years. The formation and viability of these many associations were facilitated by the development of communications devices, all the way from special bulletins produced by each organization to radio, telephone, TV, popular magazines, and intra-village intercom systems.

Thus, we conclude that while the Japanese farmer did not increase the scale of land holdings in order to become more proficient, he was incorporated into a vast interpersonal and interorganizational communications network. He became part of a huge corporate enterprise devoted to the advancement of farming. In sum, while farm operations were limited to three-acre plots, farmers were organizationally joined into an effective large-scale communication system that transcended neighborhood, village, and even prefectural loyalties. It is our belief that if economic development in the rural areas of India, Viet Nam, Ceylon, and elsewhere is to take place, conscious attention to the establishment of a comparable reticulated organizational structure will pay high dividends.

Idea:

Mason Haire in his discussion on the Growthof Organizations has a general
thesis that the growth of organization is relalx basedon the module of
the responsibilities one man can handle.
As the number of responsibilities increase, the he must delegate some
of these responsibilities, vertically or horizontally.

The notion of large-scale organizations can thus bes seen as an
expansion or proliferationof these basic modules.

For the Japanese case, the basic module is the family unit. However,
by means of extension service, cooperatives, TV, and other communication
channels, the Japanese farming system has maintained its basic module,
but has been able to benefit from the gains ofxlargexx in rational
decision-making process usually associated with large-scale organizations.

For reference to lMason Haire, see Biological lModels and Empirical
Histories of the Growth of Organizations.

Paternalism in the Japanese Economy: Anthropological Studies of Oyabun-Kobun Patterns. John W. Bennett and Iwao Ishino. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963. x, 307 pp., appendices, 3 figures, index, notes, references and selected bibliography, summary of concepts, 2 tables. $6.50.

Reviewed by John D. Donoghue, *Michigan State University*

Ruth Benedict's pioneering work on patterns of Japanese culture was an initial breakthrough for understanding the structural basis of Japanese society. The study under review extends and refines some of her notions via the case study method. Bennett and Ishino, members of the Civil Information and Education Section of the Supreme Command of Allied Powers, were in unique positions to carry out research on various Japanese institutions. This book is the result of these studies. The cases forming the major portion of the work were previously distributed to a limited audience in stenciled form as *Interim Technical Reports* of the Research Program in Japanese Social Relations at Ohio State University.

The major contribution of this volume is the incorporation of their studies about key socioeconomic institutions into a general framework, primarily the oyabun-kobun system. Following a general review of the major aspects of the ritual kinship system and its relations to certain Japanese economic enterprises, the authors present a number of detailed cases of paternalism in construction companies, the mining industry, forestry, and agriculture.

The introductory chapter, "Social Research in a Military Occupation," should prove interesting and instructive to members of the profession who are or have been involved in technical assistance programs. Of special interest is the relation of social science researchers to the American bureaucracy and to host nationals, even under conditions which might be considered "ideal," i.e., where the Americans have absolute control. I refer here particularly to the problem of G-2 military intelligence operations vs. research.

In the concluding chapter the authors set forth a number of cross-cultural generalizations relative to paternalism, economy, and development. Development economists, often mystified by the rapid development of Japan, might benefit considerably by the analysis of the emergence of entrepreneurs, labor leaders, and employer-employee relationships. These, although not based upon the western model, were functional organizations in the development of the Japanese economy. In general, the authors treat paternalism as it manifests itself in the "transitional" institutions of the economy, as a "prologue to bureaucratized or rationalized enterprise." Indeed, paternalism might, they assert, "assist" the transition to rational enterprise "since the worker is sustained by paternalistic relations in the stressful situation of transition."

For the student of the culture and social organization of Japan and the Far East, this book remains timely despite the authors' contention that "considerable change has taken place in the Japanese economy and society" since the data were collected. Their claim that these findings are representative of the "old Japan" and that the "new Japan" differs considerably from the "preindustrial patterns described in the chapters of this book" proposes a dichotomy that, from my understanding of Japan, does not exist. It is unfortunate that the authors did not attempt to relate more fully the patterns of paternalism in contemporary Japan to the general process of cultural change and stability as they so adequately did in their discussion of the way paternalism articulates with the process of social and economic development.

The appendices include previously published, but generally inaccessable papers on SCAP Research, the Japanese family, the concepts of *ninjo* and *giri*, and oyabun-kobun slang terms.

1964

THE GAPPEI: LOCAL REORGANIZATION IN JAPAN*

John D. Donoghue and Daniel D. Whitney
Michigan State University

East Lansing, Mich., 3.25.64

Introduction

Ishino and I have written a number of papers recently on
our restudy of 13 villages in Japan dealing primarily with the land
reform and economic development. In this paper, Dan Whitney and I
shift emphasis from the land reform to another major change in rural
Japan related to development, the village-town amalgamation. Other
students of Japan have referred to this program in passing, but have
not specifically analyzed it or discussed its ramifications in the
development of rural Japan.

When Ishino and I returned to Japan in 1958 to study the
villages described by Raper et al, in the Japanese Village in
Transition, we were frustrated by the simple problem of merely
locating the villages, even though we knew their approximate
location in the prefectures. Older maps did not list all the villages
and new maps carried names that were unfamiliar to us and which did
not correspond with the older maps.

What had happened, of course, was that all but two of the
villages in the sample had amalgamated. The larger villages had

absorbed the smaller surrounding villages, and the smaller villages
in the sample were annexed to or amalgamated with nearby small
villages. From two to 15 former villages had become one. The name
by which the old villages were identified on the map varied depending
upon decisions made during the bargaining and mediation of the ad-
ministrative change. Ultimately, we located the villages of the
previous study by taking a train in the general direction and there
interviewing local people as to its exact place. Needless to say,
more than once we were led astray.

When we arrived at the old village offices we sometimes found
them deserted, in other instances a skeleton crew was maintained as
a mere communication link from the new city office. This complicated
our attempt to acquire statistical data on the former village com-
parable to those collected ten years earlier. Not only was it not
readily available, but the search for the information on one part
of a town or city was contrary to the stated purposes in the new
units of creating the image of a total unified social and political
entity.

The Gappei (amalgamation)

In 1889 the Meiji government instituted a nation-wide
amalgamation of small hamlets, giving rise to over 10,000 admin-
istrative villages and towns.[1] In 1953, in order to improve the
financial and administrative efficiency of local government, another
amalgamation law was promulgated, and by 1956 the number of local

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[1]Fukutake, Tadashi, Man and Society in Japan, Tokyo University
Press, Tokyo, 1962, p. 78.

units was cut nearly one-third to 3,500 as a result of 2,200 mergers.[2]
Since 1956, another 1,000 mergers have been effected. Compliance
with the program was on a voluntary basis, each merger requiring the
approval of the various town and village assemblies. Because of
these voluntary prodecures, amalgamation programs were not fully
completed in rural Japan 10 years after the enabling legislation.
Local disagreement and bickering over the terms of the new units
were numerous, comlicated and tedious.

The arguments used by local officials to gain support for
the gappei centered on the financial benefits that would accrue
the new unit in the form of grants-in-aid for development from the
prefectural and national governments. Any governmental unit con-
taining more than 8,000 people could submit an overall economic
development plan and become eligible for financial and technical
assistance. The aid, in the form of subsidy for new units, was to
be not less than the total sum of the former units over a five-year
period. In addition, new units were to be granted special favors in
purchasing government properties, such as forests. The new units
were allowed to maintain their legislative rights granted under
the Local Autonomy Law. This enticement generally overrode local
conflicts and village assemblies ultimately voted to merger. Thus,
in a period of less than ten years the administrative machinery of
rural Japan underwent revolutionary change. The consequences of this
change are vast and manifold and any attempt at depicting the rural
scene in Japan must take them into account.

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[2]Japan Report, Vol. 11, No. 20, October 31, 1956.

Analysis of events since the beginning of the gappei program points up the dynamic nature of villages in Japan. Unlike recent articles by Cornell (1963) and Johnson (1963) who stress the "stability" and "perserverence" of Japanese villages, our analysis focuses on rapid change and development. The apparent contrast here is based upon unit studied. Whereas, Cornell and Johnson were concerned with the hamlet (buraku) and village (mura), our attention was concentrated on these as parts of a larger legal and administrative unit.

The major changes wrought by the gappei center on power structure, the process of information flow and economic development. The post-War land reform tended to upset the hierarchy of power in rural Japan by reordering the traditional economic relationships between the exlandlords and tenants. However, in many of the more conservative communities, the mere shift of land, as important as it was, could not completely upset the centuries old prestige and power systems. Ex-landlords and their relatives often remained at the top of the power hierarchy. Some were treated with the same deference as before the land reform and many retained their old political power. Thus, new land owners still found themselves governed by the same groups, often conservative, as they had for generations.

The gappei helped complete the process of destroying entrenched power relationships begun by the land reform. It finally destroyed the influence of the old, traditional political groups. The smallest recognized political unit was broadened to include powerful interests from other villages, towns and cities. Village bosses lost their absolute control and became, at most, town or city assemblyman. Their interests might remain local, but were tempered by the

interests of the larger, new political unit. The traditional
vested-interest groups in the smaller village often resisted
certain large-scale change. For example, in one village a road
construction project was contemplated before the amalgamation. This
was not realized until afterwards, however, because some of the land
on which the road was to be built waerice fields belonging to a
powerful political figure. After the amalgamation the interests of
a single, powerful individual could no longer hold sway in the town
council.

With the exception of two villages, all in our sample
amalgamated: in these, the power relations were altered. Although
at the hamlet or village level the traditional political leaders
remained strong, their influence at the smallest legal, political
level, the town or city, had become negligible.

The two villages in our sample which changed the least
during the ten years, politically, socially and materially, were
those yet to amalgamate. Interestingly, in these villages the mayors,
assistant mayors and other people in leadership positions were all
ex-landlords. May of the problems facing these villages were the
same that plagued them ten years earlier, problems which had
genrally been overcome in the other eleven villages.

Information flow from national centers to the rural locale
and from the villages to the nation had been greatly improved as a
result of the gappei. Individual families as well as small hamlets
and villages were more directly linked with the nation through the
enlarged administrative unit. The new units received outside technical
assistance, for example, in drawing up their development plans:

planners, soil specialists, extension agents, engineers, home agents, agricultural economists, and others were sent from prefectural and national agencies with information fro local administrators to help them cope with the complex problems of modernization. All of this was coordinated through the new local government. Because of limited human resources this type of assistance would have been impossible for the 10,000 units in existence before the gappei.

Another problem related to information is that of its handling at the local level. A long-standing problem in Japan had been the out-migration of potential leaders from villages to the cities. The leadership drain is much less apparent in the new units, sometimes centered in market towns or cities, where highly skilled administrators are employed. The mere problem of bookkeeping highlights the need for trained personnel. In most of the villages in our sample, projects were underway on dam and road construction, construction of schools and offices and planning for future development. Each project involved the allocation of more than 100 million yen. The skills necessary for the efficient expenditures of such sums would have been unavailable under pre-gappei conditions. The gappei also meant a more even distribution of information, including skills and assistance, throughout the countryside. Previously isolated villages have been brought into the mainstream of national development through their linkages with the larger units. In fact, some of the most startling changes in the villages of our sample were found in precisely those areas that were most isolated.

We now turn to two case illustrations which demonstrate some of the far reaching social and economic changes affected by the gappei.

A third case will be presented to show the problems faced by a village which did not amalgamate.

The Gappei and Change

A number of physical, economic, and social changes occurred in the villages which had amalgamated. Road and dam construction, new schools, improved communication systems, new town halls and improved recreation and health facilities were some of these. In one village an official explained:

"One of the good results of the gappei was mechanization. Fire equipment was mechanized. This year we began studying counter-measures for mismanaged businesses. Many new roads were constructed. We have running water and about ninety new houses have been built. Two years ago, this town won a prize from the Chief Cabinet Minister because most of the plans we made at the time of the gappei in 1954-55 had been completed. From now on we have to take up a number of small problems."

He pointed out that it would have been impossible for one village alone to carry out this kind of development. His village had joined with eight other villages to form a new town. This meant the combined unit had a much larger budget and was able to expand considerably more on development.

Other changes related to the gappei were: (and I quote)

"Our school system has changed. Before there were nine secondary schools, one in each village, but now we are consolidating them into only three for the new town. There is some difficulty in deciding where to locate the three. Each new school will be

bigger and better-equipped than the older schools. Another
result of the gappei was the construction of new roads. The
roads cost a total of ¥5,000,000. We also put in a new
irrigation system as a result of the gappei. Telephones
were installed following the gappei, and we now have a closed
circuit broadcasting system (yusen hoso) to improve communication."

In another village, on Shikoku Island, the mayor discussed
the changes resulting from the amalgamation. This village was judged
one of the least developed in the 1948 study, but by 1958 was one
of the most rapidly changing. Part of this was attributed to the
gappei. The ex-mayor, for example, said:

"Things have been changing in these ten years, and will keep on
changing until sometime in the future. ... Following the gappei,
it was decided that we should have a new town hall for all three
villages like each had separately before. So we made a new town
office, including a town hall, in the middle of the three
villages -- not the geographical center, because that is in the
mountains, but in the cultural center. We made a harbor for the
fishing boats. The poor land is being aided by the construction
of a new dam. The land at the water's edge is lower than sea
level, and the salt water is not good for crops. Everytime a
typhoon comes, the sea water comes into the fields. The result
of this is no harvest, and this happens several times a year.
To defend against typhoons, we have built a sea wall (bohatei)
to keep the salt water out. A gymnasium was built to improve
the health of the people in the town. It will also be good for
sports, besides, when it rains, and there is no work, the indoor
gymnasium is important. Before, each village had a gymnasium

in the school, but this was for school children, and not intended
to be used by the adults during the daytime. The gymnasium
will also be used for big meetings. A library was also built
in the high school, and in addition, we built a music building."

This village also developed a closed circuit broadcasting
system to facilitate communication between the town office and the
residents of the various villages. The ex-mayor explained:

"The closed circuit broadcasting system was set up because
we were worried about such problems as communication and
transportation. It cost about ¥ 5,000,000. There are nine
branches within the three villages making up the town. One
main station is at the center of town, so there is good means
of communication. For one thing, it is good for fires.
Quick communication means more people can be informed faster."

He then summarized the successes of the gappei as follows:

"At this point, we believe we have succeeded in the gappei.
With the financial aid of three villages, we could succeed in
such big operations. By such improvements, we have improved
the lives and standard of living of the villagers. Last May,
we formed a health insurance cooperative. Before, some of the
farmers lost their land when they got sick due to medical expenses."

The two examples indicate that a number of changes have occurred
as a direct result of the gappei. Officials in both villages, as
well as others in our sample, attributed many of the changes to the
gappei. Indicative of the effect of the gappei and the sophistication
of the new leaders is their outlook for the future.

The Gappei and the Future

An official in one of the villages cited above illustrates the kind of thinking found in the leadership of the new towns. He discussed the future of agriculture as follows:

"Agriculture should be run as a business, not as a way of life. Since factories are run business-like and merchants are starting to run as a corporation, next will be the farmers who will form corporations. But for the individual farmer, this would be impossible. This requires several households to form a single corporation. All farmers with a single village should work, live and harvest together and they should get a salary. We should also build big apartment houses and all the farmland should belong to the corporation. People would all go out to the fields in the morning and return to their apartment in the evening. They would get a salary at the end of the month. This way they could buy more agricultural equipment and machines. This will probably take fifty years, but it will eventually be realized."

In another village, an official discussed the future of his town, emphasizing the role the gappei will play in bringing about changes:

"In the future we plan to improve the land under cultivation, to try to increase the amount of arable land. In 1953, a typhoon deposited a great deal of mud and sand in the river and it developed so many bends it looks like a snake. Lumber and poles were piled up on both sides of the river in order to

change the course of the river, and this has proven successful. Reconstruction of this type and building bridges is only possible as a result of the gappei.

We have two plans for unifying the whole town. First is to unite the cooperatives. The agricultural cooperative is hard to amalgamate because each has its own speciality -- each is localized. But there are two forestry cooperatives and we are planning on unifying these into one big unit. Since 80 per cent of the land is in the mountains, forestry management is a big problem. Well-planned and rational management based on statistics will be the best way to get money from the forests. Besides, we need much money to perform the big undertakings planned since the gappei. Amalgamation of the forestry cooperative is most important.

The second plan is the improvement of the land. As land improvement is one of the basic conditions to increase production, this plan is considered important. We tried to improve the land in all three villages by each doing it individually, but we could not accomplish this with noticeable results. So, this is another post-gappei plans.

Thus, we see that those in leadership positions no longer held a narrow, isolated view of the future, but had enlarged their world view to encompass the ideas of farming as a business; of even changing the direction of rivers in an attempt to improve land; and of generally seeing the future with hope and promise instead of fear and uncertainty.

The Problems of Non-Amalgamation: Suye-mura

In 1936, John Embree studied a village in Japan known as
Suye-mura. Until after World War II, this was the only anthro-
pological study of a Japanese village available in English. To
many students Suye and its' problems were considered typical of
the Japanese countryside. Since the war, more than a dozen
anthropologists have visited this isolated village, located in
an out of the way area of southern Japan. At the time of our restudy,
Suye had not yet amalgamated; it was by far the most economically
underdeveloped village of our sample. No plans had been made to
construct roads for easy market access, nor had the problem of
forest depletion and the declining charcoal business been overcome.
Water was still carried in buckets from nearby streams to the homes
and no new land was being reclaimed. No grants or subsidies had
been sought or utilized.

Ironically, the fact that Suye was the most famous village
in Japan to western anthropologists was one reason for its remaining
one of the few villages left in Japan.

A crucial factor in Suye not reported by Embree is that the
village had been divided, moiety like, into two competing factions.
This was the result of the 1889 amalgamation of two areas the upper
(kami)and lower (shimo), into a single village. The factionalism
continued until 1959 and when the village cooperative office burned
in 1956, the dispute over the location of the new building resulted
in an argument to change the location every three months from the
upper area to the lower area and back again. This was characterstic
of the on-going battles.

When the problem of amalgamation was raised, the upper section contended that the village should gappei with the town to the north, while the lower section held that it should gappei to the south. This problem had not been resolved after negotiating for six years. We suggested a compromise to village officials, one-half annexing north and the other half, south. This solution was immediately rejected because, the officials explained, "Suye is a very famous village. If we were to split, anthropologists and other tourists would have no place to visit; there would be no Suye-mura".

As humorous as this may appear, the consequences for Suye have been considerable. Suye is no longer a typical village, it is one of the few remaining villages in Japan; its problems are those of the "old"rural Japan.

In contrast to the long-range thinking and emphasis on specific developments of the leaders in the two amalgamated villages,, an official of Suye expects the following changes: (and I quote)

"There will be some changes in the aspirations of our people. They will be eating less rice, replacing it with a variety of other food-stuffs. There will be more freedom for the individual and families, regardless of age, sex and occupation. In the next generation, the educational budget may be increased to a greater degree meaning more educational opportunities for young people. Agricultural machinery will become more important and the extension service will become more popular."

Conclusion

The transition from village to town has not been an easy one in many instances. Tensions and conflicts generated by the amalgamation sometimes were serious and the scars may last for a long time to come. In one of the villages, for example, 29 meetings were required to come to agreement. In another, a group of disgruntled farmers stormed the town office, took over the broadcasting station and disseminated information opposing the merger.

In some cases, small, rural villages that were annexed to large towns and cities have not been adequately represented on the new town assemblies. Their needs and interests have been ignored and planning has been for urban expansion, not rural or agricultural development. These and other problems probably abound as a result of the large-scale mergers.

However, our intent in this paper has not been to discuss all the problems involved in the amalgamation, but to suggest that the gappei has had far-reaching affects on leadership patterns, information linkages, and social and economic development. Further research on Japanese villages and village life should take into account the ramifications of these sweeping political changes in the "new" Japan, rather than focusing only on the static, unchanging aspects of "old" Japan.

1965

February 7, 1967

Memo to: The Hawaii Group

Subject: What I learned from the Hawaii Meeting, Jan 30-Feb. 3.

Ishino

A. Purpose:

As I understood it, the purpose of this January meeting was to do the following:
1) Plan for the summer seminar.
2) Work toward a draft proposal for research in Cross-Cultural Education.
3) Generate an interest in a new field of knowledge, tentatively identified as Cross-Cultural Education.

B. Summary of the Major Decisions of the January Meeting.

1) On the research proposal, we ran into a major problem concerning the general plan. That is, should the proposal be stated in such general terms that many disparate and unconnected pieces of research can be brought under this research "umbrella"? Or, should it be a coordinated research program of the type George Guthrie proposed? No resolution of this problem was attempted.

2) Summer Seminar: While at one point in the time, we discussed the theme and possible participants for this seminar, this matter seemed to be tabled as the group moved into a more basic area of concern, namely, the problem of identifying a new field of knowledge.

3) New Field of knowledge: It occurred to me in the process of our discussion that we did not all agree on what "this new field of knowledge" was, and that before working on such problems as the design of the research program and the plans for the summer seminar, we need to reach some agreement as to what the broad parameters of this new field of knowledge ± are.

C. My Ideas on this New Field of Knowledge.

1) What a need for this field exists:

a) The discussions at Hawaii indicated to me that, however one defines this field, no one discipline nor profession has all the qualifications, competence, and experience to develop it.

b) The necessary empirical knowledge for this new field is not being gathered under existing systems of gathering educational data.

c) A "data bank" type of approach to spelling out this new field is premature because: 1) the right kind of data are not yet being collected; 2) we don't know what the relevant categories and principles are for classifying whatdata the data that ± might be already published.

2) <u>What needs to be done before a new field can be identified.</u>

    a) Many conferences between different types of schoars must be held before a new field can be idenfied sufficiently to establish a long-range research program. A single conference is simply not ~~xxx~~ sufficient.

    b) Potential contributors to this new field, or at least a substantial proportion of them, must have done some empirical work in one or more developing contry.

    c) Such contributors must publish their observations and findings.

    d) Such materials must be read by ~~xthxrxxxkxxxgxxxxx~~ a wide range of research scholars and criticized from a wide range of cultural and disciplinary viewpoints.

3) <u>Conclusions:</u>

    a) The conferees at Hawaii did not feel that the above-stated "spade-work" had been done and it needs to be done if this field is to reach the "take-off" stage.

    b) It is recommended therefore that the coming summer seminar be explicitly recognized as a general seminar which will attempt the first of a series of conferences that would work toward defining this new field.

    c) At some future point in time, after the field has been sufficiently identified, a research proposal of a long-range nature be drafted.

"Cultural Factors in Educational Change"
August 16 to September 3, 1965

List of Participants

COLE S. BREMBECK (Seminar Director)
Director, Institute for International
    Studies in Education
Michigan State University
513 Erickson Hall
East Lansing, Michigan 48823

A. H. ALAWI
Senior Specialist, 1965-1966
Institute of Advanced Projects
East-West Center
University of Hawaii
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822

LINO ARQUIZA
Dean, College of Education
Silliman University
Dumaguete, Negros Orientale, Philippines

TSUNEO AYABE
Research Institute of Comparative
    Education and Culture
Kyushu University
Fukuoka, Japan

RAVINDRA DAVE
Deputy Director
Directorate of Extension Programmes
    for Secondary Education
Delhi, India

IWAO ISHINO
Professor, Department of Anthropology
Michigan State University
12 A Center for International Programs
East Lansing, Michigan 48823

FRANK MARZOCCO
Professor of Education and Psychology
Director, Human Learning Research
    Institute
Michigan State University
419 Erickson Hall
East Lansing, Michigan 48823

ALFREDO MORALES
Vice President and Dean of the
    Graduate School of Education
University of the Philippines
Quezon City, Philippines

KENNETH L. NEFF
Senior Specialist, 1965-1966
Institute of Advanced Projects
East-West Center
University of Hawaii
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822

THOMAS F. PETTIGREW
Associate Professor of Social Psychology
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02238

RALPH STUEBER
Assistant Professor
Department of History and Philosophy
    and Education
University of Hawaii
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822

N. VYAS THIRTHA
Professor of Education
Osmania University
Hyderabad, India

LAWRENCE G. THOMAS
Professor of Education
School of Education
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305

CHAROON VONGSAYANHA
Director General
Department of Educational Techniques
Ministry of Education
Bangkok, Thailand

JOHN E. WATSON
Assistant Director, New Zealand Council
    for Educational Research
Wellington, New Zealand

HOWARD WILSON
Dean, School of Education
University of California at Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California 90024

FRANK LYNCH (Visiting Specialist)
Ateneo de Manila
Institute of Philippine Culture
Manila, Philippines

March 7, 1966

Dr. Alfredo Morales, Dean
Graduate School of Education
University of the Philippines
Quezon City, The Philippines

Dear Fred:

In connection with your own paper on education and the development of
national culture, I thought you might like to see a synopsis of Dr. Ishino's
paper on education and "world culture." I think your paper and his will
make ✗ nice companion pieces. He will have considerable to say about how
the national culture links to the world culture through education and you
will be suggesting that local cultures link to national culture through
education.

I have given considerable thought to the absolute deadline for the papers.
The publisher would like to bring the book out on January 1, 1967, and
needs at least eight months lead time for this purpose. If I get your
paper by Mary 15, I think I am still all right. After that date, however,
I think we would be in real trouble. I hope sincerely that you can have
your paper in my hands by that time so that I can make sure that it will
appear in the book. As I indicated before, don't worry about final typing
if that is a problem. We can get that done here. Is there any other way
in which we can help?

Cordially yours,

Cole S. Brembeck, Director
Institute for International Studies
  in Education

CSB:rk

cc: Dr. Iwao Ishino

COLLEGE OF EDUCATION Institute for International Studies

June 24, 1965

Dear Iwao:

You'll be glad to know that John Singleton and the East-West Center have concurred
in my desire to extend an invitation to Mr. Ayabe at Kyushu University, in case
Professor Yoshida is unable to attend. We haven't yet had a chance to have a response
from Ayabe but I hope it is favorable.

Did I have a chance to mention that we have extended an invitation to Patya Saihoo, the
cultural anthropologist at Chulalongkorn University in Thailand. He will attend and
present a paper. We have also extended an invitation to Father Frank Lynch, a
cultural anthropologist at Ateneo de Manila in the Philippines. We have been given
very favorable comments about his work and hope sincerely that he will attend, though
this is not confirmed at this writing. N. Vyas Thirtha, the cultural anthropologist at
Osmania University in India, will attend. I believe that the seminar is goind to bring
together a real solid group of people, and I hope that the product can be similarly
described.

You asked me to comment further about the focus of the seminar. In the thought that
they might be helpful, I am enclosing a copy of our prospectus, which describes in
general terms the purposes of the seminar, as well as a list of topics which John Watson
of New Zealand organized under separate headings. And I hope that you have received
all of the preliminary statements sent in by other participants.

I hope that the enclosed material suggests that we are very much interested in focusing
on the cultural dimension in human learning, especially in classroom and school learning.
Among other things, I would personally hope that the papers, taken together, will help
to identify cultural variables which bear upon the learning act, analyse the mechanisms
at work in the interaction of culture and learning, delineate some of the conflicts which
enter the learning situation in cross-cultural climates, and point to fruitful areas for
future research. We decided at the outset not to have a rigid outline into which the
paper had to fit. We took the view, rather, that we would provide the overall umbrella
which is found in the theme of "Cultural Factors in Educational Change" and then encourage
each participant to make his own judgment about how he could best carve out a paper within
this general theme.

We have attempted to make clear that we are not talking about the impact of culture upon
socialization generally, but that we are attempting to focus on institutionalized socialization
within the framework of the schools.

I do not know what particular tack you will wish to take in this matter, but I am recalling our discussions during my visit to Okinawa and I would hope that your own paper would at least include some of your deliberations growing out of your own contact with the schools on Okinawa.

I think you will be interested in knowing that two publishers have already indicated an interest in publishing the papers in book form. The East-West Center Press had indicated an interest earlier. Two weeks ago I was in New York and talked with John Wiley about the matter and they are definitely interested in publishing the papers, and indicate that the subject with which we are dealing now is one of very high priority on their list. They feel that if we can get the kind of substantial papers which are indicated, and can edit them well, the book would have a very respectable sale.

We certainly look forward to your own participation in the seminar and if I can provide any additional information, please let me know.

Cordially yours,

Cole

Cole S. Brembeck, Director
Institute for International Studies in Education
Campus Administrator, Thailand Project

CSB:mj

cc: Mr. John Singleton
    Mr. Miller O. Perry

Enclosures

July 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: Joint Seminar Participants

FROM: Cole S. Brembeck

SUBJECT: Final Seminar Papers

Several persons have asked questions regarding the length of the final seminar papers and I am using this memorandum to suggest some guidelines.

In view of our interest in publishing our seminar papers in book form your final, edited manuscript should not exceed thirty (30) typewritten, double-spaced pages. In printed form this will reduce to about twenty-five (25) pages.

The paper which you present to the seminar, however, need not necessarily be limited to thirty-five manuscript, double-spaced pages, as long as you are prepared to edit it down for publishing purposes. We intend that each participant should have an opportunity to edit his paper and put it in final form after the seminar discussion of it.

The real limitation on the length of the paper, I suppose, is the patience and endurance of our colleagues who will be expected to read the paper prior to the session in which it is discussed. We shall not take valuable seminar time to have the papers read.

Several participants have written that they have been unable, to date, to put the paper in final form. (I wrote a similar letter to myself.) The crucial matter is that we arrive at the seminar with a completed paper and at least two-dozen (24) copies.

If you find that you cannot produce copies of your paper, I shall be glad to do so in East Lansing if you send me the original relatively soon. I shall then air mail the copies of your paper to Hawaii.

Our first session for the seminar will be Monday morning, August 16, at the East-West Center.

CSB:mj

COLLEGE OF EDUCATION   Institute for International Studies

May 28, 1965

Dr. Iwao Ishino
Chief of Party
MSU Group, USCAR, APO
San Francisco, California 96248

Dear Iwao:

I cabled you asking you for your opinion regarding Mr. Tsuneo Ayabe, who is proposed by Teigo Yoshida as a replacement for him at the seminar.

I suspect that I will have your reply before you receive this letter, but I did want you to see a copy of Yoshida's letter which I enclose.   If you think Ayabe would make a good participant, I shall ask the East-West Center if we can extend an invitation to him.

In your letter of May 18 you suggest that both Sofue and Yoshida might have responded favorably to the invitation had they been fully cognizant of the significance of anthropology in the program. Did you get a feeling from them that they would be responsive to a second invitation? Perhaps not, but I thought I should ask you.

I will appreciate your reaction either by cable or by air mail to Ayabe as a possible participant.

Cordially yours,

Cole

Cole S. Brembeck, Director
Institute for International Studies
        in Education

CSB:mj

Enclosure

cc: Mr. John Singleton

Your cable reply received — thanks much. Have asked E. W. to approve Ayabe. Will write shortly about focus of seminar

c

KYUSHU UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF EDUCATION
The Research Institute of Comparative Education and Culture
FUKUOKA, JAPAN

TELEPHONE (8) 841
EXT 819

May 21, 1965

Dr. Cole S. Brembeck
Director
Institute for International Studies in Education
Michigan State University,
East Lansing, Michigan, U. S. A.

Dear Dr. Brembeck:

Thank you very much for your prompt reply of April 29. The National
Institute of Mental Health award of which I mentioned in my previous letter
was made after all, and I regret to say that I cannot attend the August
Seminar in Hawaii. However, if it is acceptable, I would like to recom-
mend my colleague Mr. Teigo Arahu, senior lecturer of anthropology,
Dept. of Education, Kyushu University, in my place as representative of
our institute. He undertook his anthropological field work in Southeast
Asia from 1957 to 1958, was research fellow of Dept. of Anthropology and
Sociology at UCLA, and was also working with Unesco as programme specialist
(educational studies) during 1963-65 and returned from the Office in
Bangkok four months ago. He also partly participated in our research on
a fishing village at Iki island.

If you consider him eligible he will, upon your reply, send a short
statement concerning the above-mentioned research, and the final paper
afterwards.

I am sorry my answer has been much delayed because of the NIMH matter.
I appreciate very much your going into extra troubles for me.

Awaiting for your reply,

Sincerely yours,

Teigo Yoshida
Associate Professor of
Cultural Anthropology

Institute for International Studies

May 28, 1965

Assistant Professor Takao Sofue
Assistant Professor of Anthropology
Meiji University
Room 619, Seikei-gakubu
Kanda-Surugadai, Chiyoda-Ku
Tokyo, Japan

Dear Professor Sofue:

Thank you for your letter of April 27. I appreciate your thoughtfulness in first cabling me and then following-up with your courteous letter.

We sincerely regret that you are apparently unable to participate in our seminar on Cultural Factors and Educational Change at the East-West Center in Honolulu. My friend, Professor Iwao Ishino, informs me that he had an opportunity to talk with you about the seminar in Japan. We anticipate that this will be a significant meeting of scholars, and we regret that circumstances do not permit you to attend.

If your situation regarding summer commitments should change, I should be very happy to investigate with the officials at the East-West Center to see whether or not room could be made for you at the seminar.

Cordially yours,

Cole S. Brembeck, Director
Institute for International Studies
        in Education

CSB:mj

cc: Mr. John Singleton
    Dr. Iwao Ishino

COLLEGE OF EDUCATION   Institute for International Studies

May 28, 1965

Professor Teigo Yoshida
Associate Professor of Cultural Anthropology
Kyushu University
Faculty of Education
Fukuoka, JAPAN

Dear Professor Yoshida:

I regret very much that you shall be unable to accept our invitation to the seminar
in Hawaii. My friend, Professor Iwao Ishino, indicates that he had the pleasure of
visiting with you about the seminar when he saw you recently in Japan.

We are glad to have your recommendation of Mr. Tsuneo Ayabe as a replacement
for yourself. I have cabled the East-West Center to find out whether or not this
position remains open, and if it does, I shall be in touch shortly with both you and
Mr. Ayabe.

Again, thank you for the courtesy of your letter of May 21.

Cordially yours,

Cole S. Brembeck, Director
Institute for International Studies
   in Education

CSB:mj

cc: Mr. John Singleton

March 9, 1966   DRAFT

MEMORANDUM TO: Chancellor Howard P. Jones

FROM: Dean John E. Ivey

SUBJECT: East-West Center--Michigan State University
                     Joint Research Project in Cross-Cultural Learning

This memorandum follows up the discussion of March 6 in East Lansing and attempts to summarize the main topics touched upon. It also suggests for discussion further steps which may be taken in order to move the project along.

The Joint Nature of the Project

The deep interest in Asia of both the East-West Center and Michigan State University converge in the field of education. The Center, with its heavy involvement in Asian student exchange and technical assistance, and the University, with its programs of technical assistance and consultation, have deep and natural mutual interests in the educational enterprise in Asia. This joint research undertaking will attempt to pool the resources of each institution in such a manner that both maximum efforts and results can be achieved for the mutual benefit of both institutions. Later on it may be advantageous to spell out more precisely the working relationship between our institutions. Such an agreement, however, can emerge from the developing program and can be written at such time as it may seem mutually desirable.

Objectives of the Project

Recent scholarship and programs concerned with the role of education in

development have directed attention largely to factors outside the school. The economic returns of education, the proper "mix" of the student population, the allocation of resources among types of educational institutions, and the harmonizing of educational and national goals and plans are a few topics which have received, and should continue to receive, the close attention of economic and education planners.

Worthy of far more attention than it is getting is the role of the school as the institution where teaching and learning actually take place. The school ultimately must be the vortex of all educational planning. Unless investment in educational planning makes a difference in human behavior in the classroom and afterwards the value of the investment may properly be questioned.

The purpose of this joint project is to develop a program of research aimed at studying human learning in formal education in selected Asian settings with the ultimate view of improving its efficiency and quality. This research looks at the problems of educational planning from the inside-out, rather than from the outside-in.

Here are a/broad illustrative questions which may receive attention in this program of research:

1. What are the psychological and sociological factors influencing academic motivation?

2. What social and educational factors seem to be related to achievement in schools?

3. What factors condition the development of educational aspirations?

4. What is the nature of the school learning process?

5.   What types of learning "models" do teachers present to students?

6.   What kinds of adjustments are required of students who learn in cross-cultural environments?

7.   What are the "life styles" of the teachers? How are they projected into the learning situations?

8.   What can be learned about learning efficiency in respect to the investment of educational resources?

9.   What do patterns of classroom learning suggest for the improvement of teacher education?

10.   What do patterns of classroom learning suggest for the improvement of educational planning and administration?

11.   How can educational technology be applied in developing areas in order to improve the quality and efficiency of learning in the schools?

Research Sites

Both the Center and the University have contacts and programs in selected countries of Asia which are potentially excellent sites for the proposed research program. It is suggested that these be explored for possible use in the joint project. The University currently has programs of different types in Okinawa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Pakistan.

Sources of Support

Broadly, two kinds of support will be needed for the joint project: planning support and program support. Planning support should be on a relatively modest

scale, but the program will call for major funding. It is suggested that the Center and the University attempt to handle the planning costs which will likely be limited to travel and living expenses.

Regarding major program costs it is suggested that both institutions work closely with the Ford Foundation as the program develops and at an appropriate point invite Ford representatives to join the discussions.

Timing

With current and growing interest in international education there is good reason to move the proposal along as rapidly as possible. It is suggested that we give consideration to taking the following steps:

1. That we exchange at an early date reactions to this draft memorandum.

2. That we seek to revise the draft in such a manner that it will serve as a mutually agreeable statement of objectives, procedures, involvements and timing. The revised document can then serve as a mutual working guide for both the Center and the University.

3. That the University take steps now to develop an expanded draft document on the substantive aspects of the project which, when revised with the Center, may serve as the framework for a Foundation proposal.

4. That a small conference be convened in Hawaii in late May or June for the purpose of discussing the University draft document and to deal with other questions vital to the development of the joint

program. This particular time is suggested since it is quite likely

that Michigan State University representatives will be traveling

through Honolulu during this period. The exact dates are not yet

firm.

5 - 9   19 6 6

Memorandum to _Dr. Fokuno_

Re attached material: *10 Center for*
____ Please handle *International*
____ For your information, do not return *Program*
____ Please note contents and return
____ Please give your opinion and return
____ Please answer
____ Needs your approval

Dear Iwao
     Here's the draft
I promised.
     See you
Monday, 16th,
9:30 in 507
Erickson

       Cole

____ed _____

O-4542

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES OF JAPANESE RURAL SOCIETY

by

Iwao Ishino
Professor of Anthropology
Michigan State University

I sense that ~~the reason for this~~ the symposium today is ~~that at least~~ being called because ~~as~~ the number of studies of Japanese ~~the planners of this symposium have felt this kind of anxiety~~, that perhaps Japanese studies ~~up to the present~~ are not yielding results as rapidly or as fully as they hoped. For example in Professor Newell's opening remarks at a committee meeting of March 18 asks this question: Is the approach used by Japanese the same as that used by foreigners? Will the present approach serve us well for future studies?

Here is a proposal for a new approach--perhaps you will judge this new approach as a "technique" or as "gadget". But please bear with me until I explain what it is. First let me provide a label. I call it the "alternative futures" approach. This approach no doubt has been used in the past to some extent, but I propose to use this method less haphazardly than in the past.

Essentially this approach advises us to sketch a paradigm and "then construct a number of explicitly 'alternative futures' which might come into being under stated conditions. Thus the alternative futures become guides to us researchers in making interpretations about what is currently happening in the villages. It must be emphasized here the alternerative futures are not explicitly formulated for the purpose of making predictions of what the villages will be like at some future date. Rather it is of "explication of possiblilites." Or to re-state the matter, it is

an attempt to construct a limited number of plausible futures and to ex-
plicate the assumptions which underlie each of these alternatives.

For example we might consider that there are three alternative futures,
called Alpha, Beta and Gamma.

Let us think of Alpha as a future where agriculture approaches urban
industrial patterns. Farming here is considered as a rational business and
costs of labor is closely computed; market conditions are carefully examined
to take advantage of the best crops to be planted; modern scientific chemical
and biological technology is utilized consistently; laborsaving machinery
are efficiently operated. There are some varient sub-types that might be
explicated here. Alpha-1 is the case where the typical farm is no longer
operated by a single family, but are large enterprises owned by joint stock
companies. Alpha-2 may also be the case where the single family typically
does not run the farms. But here the farms are 'collectivized' and owned
by the state..

Beta alternative future is characterized by ~~farming by single family~~ a pattern
~~units still continues but~~ where the number of families ~~for Japan as a whole~~ farm
~~being~~ decreased and where the average-size of farm land holdings increased. have been to where were one-half of what used to be found have been over the present.
Extensive development of farm machinery and scientific agriculture has
taken place, but always limited by the amount of capital the indivudual
family units can accumulate. Extensive development consumer and producer
cooperatives are founded to tie together the famers in various communities;
government subsidies also to protect the price of the crops the farmer
cells and to minimize the educational, social and cultural disadvantages
of the village peoples (as compared with those in the cities). Moreover,
since the total number of farm families have decreased by fifty per cent,
in this Beta world, it means that farm families are giving up rural existence
and becoming urbanities.

2

The Gamma world of the future is even more complex. It is a situation in which the contemporary types of villages co-exist with villages co-exist with villages of the types visualized under Beta and Alpha conditions. The special circumstances of regional, climatic, and traditional factors may have intervened to permit some villages to maintain a traditional way of life while in other villages such circumstances forced radical changes as illustrated in the previous paragraphs. In any event, we can look upon this Gamma world as one of extensive variations in the styles of rural life.

Now what do we do with respect to these alternative futures? Assuming that these futures are plausible, then what can they do to help us in ordering and structuring our research? Let me begin to illustrate this by discussing not the anthropological aspect of rural society, but the economic. In June 1961, the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture made an analysis of the economic outlook of Japanese agriculture. It came to certain conculsions which, no doubt, is similar or close to the views of the Japanese government officials in agriculture. These forecasts are:

1. Agriculture's share in the gross national product will continue to decline for some years to come.

2. With the rise in the gross national product, the consumption of high protein foods will increase, while the consumption of strarchy foods will decline.

3. As the level of living rises, emphasis will shift from increased yields per acre to higher productivity per farm worker.

3

4. As the higher productivity of the farm worker increases, fewer people on the pland will be required and many, uneconomically small, farm units will be consolidated.

5. Similarly, land reform legislation which limits the size of farms will likely be revised. (The ultimate economic goals of the Japanese land reform program has been reached--to increase per capita production of farmers beyond farm consumption to permit enlargement of farming units and accelerate mechanization).

6. The accelerated application of agricultural technology will also continue to raise yields and per capita productivity.

Alternative Futures
for Japanese Rural
Society

by

Iwao Ishino
Profess
Department of Anthropology
Michigan State University

Very rough

April 30, 1965

Rural Society in Modern Japan Symposium

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES for OF JAPANESE RURAL SOCIETY

Probably no subject matter of cultural science activity in Japan
has received as much attention as has the rural village. This subject
matter is associated with the earliest attempts of Japanese scholarship
in ethnology, sociology folklore, linguistics and still continues today
as the object as well as the location of emprical field research.
(UNESCO, 1958; Kuroda 1964).

Yet, perhaps because there are too many reports, analyses and ex-
perts ~~that~~ we do not have comprehensive and integrated view of village
life and organization. / I believe an anxiety of this sort has led the
planners of this symposium to choose today's subject: rural society
in modern Japan. Is there any method or conceptual approach that might
help us visualize the ɐuderlying structure and process of modern Japanese
rural villages? Is there any consistent pattern to be derived from
studies which indicate that the dozoku system is declining, that ko-gumi
type villages are to be found in southwest Japan, that the primogeniture
system is weakening, that traditional customs and festivals survive in
some villages but not in others, that miai kekkon is still strong but
rennai
~~miai~~-kekkon is increasing, that due to the rising numbers dekaseginin
the pattern of family division of labor is changing?

Today, I would like to introduce the idea of "alternative futures"
as perhaps one technique for "making sense" of this enormous informa-
tion and data we now have about the changing nature of Japanese villages.

This idea is really quite simple. It proposes that we hypothesize a limited number of alternative ways in which the present Japanese village system might develop, given the present known conditions. These alternative ways are technically called "alternative futures."

To provide an example of a set of "alternative futures" we take the work of a political scientist, Herman Kahn, (1964) who worked out three alternative futures for international relations for the 1970s. He carefully summarized the important indicators of world power, and analyzed trends in the build-up and decline of power. The result was three world futures, one of which was a future world where the basic conditions was characterized by high stability and peace resulting directly from arms control agreements between all major world powers. The second alternative future was a world in which there were structured strains. Here was visualized the decline of Soviet Russia's dominance over world communism, the European Common Market pursuing exclusionist trade policies with respect to the rest of the world, and Communist China, France, Germany developing independent nuclear deterrents. The third alternative future was one where the old strong alliances developed in the 1950s no longer prevail and where many smaller nations develop and use atomic power extensively because an inexpensive process has been found. Here the European Countries fail to develop into a viable political community and the smaller nations gain in power relative to the big powers of the 1950s.

Such conscious statement of alternative futures for international relations, the author claims, helps us (1) to clarify kinds of moral choices the nations of the world have before them, (2) to anticipate

certain likely occurence in a more systematic fashion, and (3) to
reduce uncertainty about the nature of indicators of change—in this
case, political change—now presently available. In essence, then,
Herman Kahn's alternative futures does not make predictions for us.
(The listing of alternatives is no prediction). Instead they help us
mere ∧

interpret the meaning of currently available trends, statistics, and
they help us "see"

facts and the consequences such factors may have for the future state
∧

of affairs.

Borrowing the technique, then, I have attempted to put down three
alternative futures as I saw them for rural Japan. These alternatives
are called, alpha, beta and gamma. They are described as follows:

Alpha:

Assumes that the Japanese village social organization and culture has
achieved some kind of equilibrium and further development or change is
well nigh impossible to achieve—unless some drastic revolution takes
place in Japanese society as a whole. Such a revolution would imply
the ∧

such startling changes as the overthrow of the emperor institution and
the abolishment of the parliamentary system.

Beta:

Assumes the conditions where the number of farm families will decline
sharply and where part-time farming will increase. It also assumes
that the average size of land-holding will increase and that with this
increase will come greater input of agricultural machinery and other
labor-saving devices. Simultaneously the size of the farm labor popula-
tion will decrease as this labor force moves to urban areas or, if it
remains in the rural areas, it will take up nonfarm occupations.

Thus the education of farm youths will be increasingly directed toward nonfarm occupations. The government will play an important role in both subsidizing education, making farm credit more accessible, and help to protect the price of farm products through certain controls.

Gamma:

Assumes that agricultural pursuits will rest largely in the hands of a managerial class that would operate the farm system as efficiently and cost-consciously as do industrialists in other productive enterprises. The labor costs will be closely calculated according to the best cost accounting principles; market conditions will be carefully followed to insure the greatest returns on the crops raised; modern scientific chemical and biological technology will be utilized; research will be carried out to cover all phases of the farming operations. These farm enterprises may also be corporately integrated with other manufacturing companies such that the farm products can be efficiently marketed as raw materials for the manufacturers.

These farm enterprises may be operated under two different types, as joint stock companies and as state-operated collectivized farms. Where joint stock company type of industrial farms prevail, this system will be identified as Gamma 1. Such company farms may be associated with food processing concerns or with companies that rely on agricultural products, such as cotton, oil, soybeans, tallow, hides and skins. Where collectivized farming system prevails, this pattern may be designated here as Gamma 2 type.

4

To restate the three alternatives, we have the Alpha future in which we imagine ~~there being~~ an equilibrium stage. In the Beta future, we see a an increase in the average size of farm holidings and a marked decrease in farm families. ~~and~~ In the Gamma future farming is taken out of the hands of individual family units and put into the control of a managerial class.

If we have in mind these three alternative futures for Japanese rural society, then, we can return to our original porposition. At the beginning of this paper I tried to suggest that the vast amount of studies on the Japanese villages make it difficult for us to assess or to interpret what is going on here. Of the hundreds of indicators of social and cultural change that researchers have brought to our attention, which of these indicators are significant? Which indicators of change are superficial and ephemeral? Furthermore we all know competent scholars who have come to ~~hold~~ different conclusions about one or another aspect of modern village life and who have become involved in intellectural argument about who is right and who is wrong. Most of these arguments arise because the standpoint or frame of reference for making the evaluation is not clearly understood. (Many such arguments are just as silly as arguing whether a given cup of coffee is half-full or half-empty). In short, then, to understand any analysis or evaluation one has to identify the standpoint from which it is made.

This clarification of standpoint, or frame of reference, is the main purpose for introducing the alpha, beta and gamma alternative futures. Each alternative future I believe is an explicit standpoint from which to look at indicators of cultural change. Let us assume for the moment

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at least that we all agree that this is so. How, then, can we use the alternative futures to help us understand the present status of village life and conditions?

Let us begin with this bit of information which appeared on March 10 in the Japan Times newspaper. It reported that Japanese farm wives complain of overwork. /The reason for this complaint, it turns out, is that farmers are leaving for cities in search of better paying jobs, leaving the farm in the care of of their wives. Additional facts are given: in 1963, the population movement away from the farms was 930,000 or 5.1 per cent of the rural population. Furthermore it noted that fewer graduates of junior high schools are seeking work on the farms (Last year the total was only 6,800. Ten years ago this population was four times larger).

Such bits of information suggest that trends if continued would necessarily lead toward a Beta Alternative Future, and possibly toward Gamma, but not toward Alpha.

Along similar lines, we come across information like the following: This from early Meiji to the present day, there has been a consistent decline in the proportion of the number employed in agriculture. (Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1960). In 1878-82, some 64 per cent of the total labor force was employed in agriculture. By 1938-42 it was reduced to 44 percent. Presently it is slightly less than one-third of the total labor force. Furthermore the present agricultural labor force depend upon nonfarm sources for nearly 40 percent of their income. This strongly suggests support for a Beta alternative future.

6

Kuroda, Yasumas, reports that out-migrants from rural areas is reaching such proportions that government sponsored research is not being undertaken by sociologists in four regions of Japan. This research comes under the rubric of "New Life Movement Association." This is another odd piece of information that can be classified under Beta alternative future.

There are other kinds of informations available in the literature which suggests that Alpha alternative future is likely to be maintained. The reports of Takashi Koyama, Seiichi Kitano and others who have worked on the family system, marriage patterns, and primogeniture system indicates in a general way that the present pattern of adjustment to the modern world is proceeding smoothly and that these institutional patterns are still viable. Reports by Fukutake, Gamo, Izumi and others indicate that there are widely divergent patterns of kinship structure, ceremonial activities and religious orientations throughout Japan. Yet each of these divergent and polymorphic patterns in itself seem to be relatively stable over time. Hence, their data indicates a tendency toward Alpha altnerative future.

Contributing toward an Alpha alternative future are the present institutional supports for agriculture, especially those supports which are provided by the national government. Farmer cooperatives, research experiment stations and agricultural extension services are designed to maintain the status quo. The specialized and multipurpose cooperatives enable Japanese farmers to effectively pool their resources and their efforts. The large staff of more than 6,000 scientists and technicians developing better seeds and better chemicals is another example of how the farmer can maintain himself under the situation of land shortage.

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Not all bits of information, however, suggests a stronger belief in either Alpha or Beta alternatives. Gamma type of alternative is already on the horizon. This excerpt from the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture contains this remark:

"[Japanese] government planners expect the gross national product to double during the next decade. During this period, population is expected to increase only about 10 percent, thus making it possible for per capita incomes to almost double as well. This rise in income will be reflected in the food consumption pattern -- the consumption of high protein foods will increase, while the consumption of starchy foods will decline.

"Incomes in the agricultural sector are expected to rise but not as as rapidly as in the non-agricultural sector. As the level of living rises, emphasis will shift from increased yields per acre to higher productivity per farm worker. This will require fewer people on the land and a consolidation of many, uneconomically small, farm units. Land reform legislation limiting the size of farms will likely be revised. The ultimate goal of the Japanese land reform program will have been reached -- per capita production of farmers will have increased sufficiently beyond farm consumption to permit the enlargement of farming units and the acceleration of mechanization. The accelerated application of agricultural technology will also continue to raise yields and per capita productivity."

To summarize, then, I have suggested that we are approaching the point of information-overload with respect to the study of rural society in modern Japan. The dynamic forces that push and pull the Japanese farmer and his cultural institutions in several directions at once is extremely difficult to comprehend unless we devise some method for simplifying our image and our concept. The thousands of learned papers written on one or another aspect of Japanese rural life do not easily form a comprehensive and integrated picture. Yet something of this kind is necessary, if we scholars are to come to agreement as to what is happending in the countryside. I have suggested the notion of "alternative futures" as a possible method for viewing the dynamic changes now in process in rural Japan.

Joint Seminar

East-West Center

and

Institute for International Studies in Education

"Cultural Factors in Educational Change"

Honolulu

August 16 - September 3, 1965

I. Cultural Challenges to Education

    A. Education for An Emerging World Culture
        + Institute of Community Development
        Iwao Ishino, Professor, Department of Anthropology, Michigan State
        University

    B. Education and National Identity

        Alfredo Morales, Vice President and Dean of the Graduate School of
        Education, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, Philippines

    C. Community Values in Education

        Lino Arquiza, Dean, College of Education, Silliman University,
        Dumaguete, Negros Orientale, Philippines

    D. The Changing Role of Authority in Education

        A. H. Alawi, Senior Specialist, 1965-1966, Institute of Advanced
        Projects, East-West Center, University of Hawaii

    E. National Character and Education

        Howard Wilson, Dean, School of Education, University of California
        at Los Angeles

    F. Rising Aspirations and the Conditions of School Learning

        Cole S. Brembeck, Director, Institute for International Studies in
        Education, Michigan State University

II. The Response of the Schools

A. Types of Schooling for Developing Nations

Lawrence G. Thomas, Professor of Education School of Education, Stanford University

B. The Cultural Dynamics of Examination Systems

Ravindra Dave, Deputy Director, Directorate of Extension Programmes for Secondary Education, Delhi, India

C. Schooling for Socially Marginal Children

John E. Watson, Assistant Director, New Zealand Council for Educational Research, Wellington, New Zealand

D. Schools and Cultural Assimilation

Ralph Stueber, Assistant Professor, Department of History and Philosophy and Education, University of Hawaii

E. The Social Psychology of Heterogeneous Schools

Thomas F. Pettigrew, Associate Professor of Social Psychology, Harvard University

III. Cultural Values in Educational Change

A. Education as an Agent of Social Change

N. Vyas Thirtha, Professor of Education, Osmania University, Hyderabad, India

B. Cultural Barriers to Educational Change

Tsuneo Ayabe, Research Institute of Comparative Education and Culture, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

C. Cross-Cultural Adaptability of Modern Mathematics Programs

Frank Marzocco, Professor of Education and Psychology, Director, Human Learning Research Institute, Michigan State University

D. The Choice of Educational Means in a Developing Country

Charoon Vongsayanha, Director General, Department of Educational Techniques, Ministry of Education, Bangkok, Thailand

E. Toward a Culturally Dynamic Educational Planning

Kenneth L. Neff, Senior Specialist, 1965-1966, Institute of Advanced Projects, East-West Center, University of Hawaii

CULTURAL FACTORS IN HUMAN LEARNING AND EDUCATIONAL PLANNING

An Invitational Seminar

Co-Sponsors:	East-West Center, University of Hawaii and The Institute for International Studies in Education, Michigan State University
Place:	East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii
Time:	August 16 - September 3, 1965
Subject:	Some Suggested Problem Areas for Seminar Papers.

The major theme of the Seminar deals with a critical problem in development and social change, that of the influence of cultural factors on human learning. The plan for the Seminar is to look at the matter from an interdisciplinary point of view and from the viewpoint of both theory and practice. Participants in the Seminar will include both those interested in educational planning and those interested in the cultural variables which influence human learning. The following list of topics is suggestive only. Our aim is to have invited participants deal with matters of special interest to them rather than to bend their contributions to meet the requirements of any particular set of topics. We feel that the need for unity will be satisfied if the subjects cluster within the framework of the major theme. For this reason we invite you to suggest additional topics which may occur to you.

The plan is to have the papers prepared in advance of the Seminar. They will provide the substance of the discussions during the Seminar. The authors will then have a chance to revise their manuscripts if they wish, after which selected manuscripts may be published in book form.

There has been no attempt to organize the following possible topics around any particular set of main headings.

I wish to thank Professors George Spindler of Stanford University, Jules Henry of Washington University, Gordon Allport of Harvard University, and Harold Anderson of Michigan State University for suggesting topics which are included in the list below.

1. The social context of education and child learning.

2. Educational forces in cross-cultural environments.

3. The impact on education of continuity - discontinuity patterns in child rearing.

4. Learning and cultural transmission.

5. School sub-cultures and learning.

6. Influence of socialization and informal learning upon formal education.

7. Cultural factors in the administration of education.

8. Cultural blocks to social change through education.

9. Cultural factors in perception, cognition, and motivation.

10. Cultural differences in socialization and their impact on human learning.

11. Cultural factors in teacher-child relationships and their influence on learning.

12. Cultural values, human learning, and planning for educational change.

13. Cultural factors in the organization of learning.

14. Learning and the theories of culture change.

15. The role of human models in learning, and the cultural factors which bear upon the kinds of models available to learners.

16. Cultural variables in teacher-pupil communication.

17. Economic determinants in human learning.

18. Impact of rising aspirations on learning behavior.

19. Cultural factors in testing and evaluation.

20. Role of the school in the local community and the nation.

As I indicated, the above list of topics is presented for discussion purposes only, and we invite you to react and suggest other topics if you wish to do so.

Cole S. Brembeck, Director
Institute for International Studies
in Education

NUMBER OF TRAINED AND UNTRAINED PRIMARY TEACHERS IN SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES, 1960

From UNESCO: The Needs of Asia in ~~Ordinary~~ Primary Education, Educ. Studies and Document No. 41

(Based on UNESCO Questionairre 1960)

| Country	Year	Total Number of Teachers	Total Number of Trained Teachers	Percent of Trained Teachers
Afghanistan	58-59	3,220	2,254	70
Burma	59-60	34,431	23,946	70
Cambodia	58-59	13,247	4,636	35
Ceylon	58-59 58-59	59,000* 59,000	17,700 38,350	30 65 65
India	56-57	710,139	442,417	62
Indonesia	58-59	176,653	137,789	78
Iran	58-59	37,638	10,162	27
Korea, Rep. of	58-59	61,045	61,045	100
Malaya	59	36,509	19,095	52
Nepal	58-59	4,500	900	20
Pakastan	59	111,900	80,424	72
Phillippines	59	99,256	91,633	96
Thailand	58-59	93,602	40,249	43
Viet-Nam, Rep. of	58-59	15,183	638	4.2
Region as a whole		1,456,323	953,538	65

NOTE *Seems to include both ordinary and secondary teachers.

PHASES IN THE GROWTH OF A SYSTEM OF MASS ELEMENTARY SCHOOLING

	Phase	Quality of Teachers	Characteristics of Schools
Stage 1	Dame School Period.	Ill-educated and untrained, usually either predominantly men or women.	Very narrow subject content - 3 R's. High failure rate and numerous repeaters. Very low skimpy standards. Memorizing all important. Much relatively meaningless learning. Uneven provision for schooling and somewhat haphazard administration.
Stage 2	Formalism	Ill-educated but trained.	Rigid syllabus. Emphasis on 3 R's. Rigid methods -"One best" way. One textbook approach. External examinations. Inspection stressed. Discipline tight and external. Memorizing stressed. Highly organized. Individual life of child largely ignored.
Stage 3	Meaning	Educated and Trained	Wider syllabus. Variety of content and methods. Individual differences catered for. Internal evaluation. Relaxed and positive discipline. Recognition of individual and aesthetic life as well as intellectual. Closer concern with community relationships. More functional buildings and equipment. Understanding and meaning stressed in methods. Teachers more involved in curriculum revision.

Cole,

Has Charoar been
introduced.

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR JAPANESE RURAL SOCIETY

by
Iwao Ishino
Department of Anthropology
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan

Rural Society in Modern Japan Symposium

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR JAPANESE RURAL SOCIETY

Probably no subject matter of cultural science activity in Japan has received as much attention as has the rural village. This subject matter is associated with the earliest attempts of Japanese scholarship in ethnology, sociology folklore, linguistics and still continues today as the object as well as the location of empirical field research. (UNESCO, 1958; Kuroda 1964).

Yet, perhaps because there are too many reports, analyses and experts we do not have comprehensive and integrated view of village life and organization. I believe an anxiety of this sort has led the planners of this symposium to choose today's subject: rural society in modern Japan. Is there any method or conceptual approach that might help us visualize the underlying structure and process of modern Japanese rural villages? Is there any consistent pattern to be derived from studies which indicate that the dozoku system is declining, that ko-gumi type villages are to be found in southwest Japan, that the primogeniture system is weakening, that traditional customs and festivals survive in some villages but not in others, that miai kekkon is still strong but rennai-kekkon is increasing, that due to the rising numbers dekaseginin the pattern of family division of labor is changing?

Today, I would like to introduce the idea of "alternative futures" as perhaps one technique for "making sense" of this enormous information and data we now have about the changing nature of Japanese villages. This idea is really quite simple. It proposes that we hypothesize a limited number of alternative ways in which the present Japanese village system might develop, given the present known conditions. These alternative ways are technically called "alternative futures."

To provide an example of a set of "alternative futures" we take the work of a political scientist, Herman Kahn, (1964) who worked out three alternative futures for international relations for the 1970s. He carefully summarized the important indicators of world power, and analyzed trends in the build-up and decline of power. The result was three world futures, one of which was a world where the basic condition was characterized by high stability and peace resulting directly from arms control agreements between all major world powers. The second alternative future was a world in which there were structured strains. Here was visualized the decline of Soviet Russia's dominance over world communism, the European Common Market pursuing exclusionist trade policies with respect to the rest of the world, and Communist China, France, Germany developing independent nuclear deterrents. The third alternative future was one where the old strong alliances developed in the 1950s no longer prevail and where many smaller nations develop and use atomic power extensively because an inexpensive process has been found. Here the European countries fail to develop into a viable political community and the smaller nations gain in power relative to the big powers of the 1950s.

Such conscious statement of alternative futures for international relations, the author claims, helps us (1) to clarify kinds of moral

choices the nations of the world have before them, (2) to anticipate certain likely occurence in a more systematic fashion, and (3) to reduce uncertainty about the nature of indicators of change--in this case, political change--now presently available. In essence, then, Herman Kahn's alternative futures does not make predictions for us. (The mere listing of alternatives is no prediction). Instead they help us interpret the meaning of currently available trends, statistics, and facts and they help us "see" the consequences such factors may have for the future state of affairs.

Borrowing the technique, then, I have attempted to put down three alternative futures as I saw them for rural Japan. These alternatives are called, alpha, beta and gamma. They are described as follows:

Alpha:

Assumes that the Japanese village social organization and culture has achieved some kind of equilibrium and further development or change is well nigh impossible to achieve--unless some drastic revolution takes place in the Japanese society as a whole. Such a revolution would imply such startling changes as the overthrow of the emperor institution and the abolishment of the parliamentary system.

Beta:

Assumes the conditions where the number of farm families will decline sharply and where part-time farming will increase. It also assumes that the average size of land-holding will increase and that with this increase will come greater input of agricultural machinery and other labor-saving devices. Simultaneously the size of the farm labor population will decrease as this labor force moves to urban areas or, if it remains in the rural areas, it will take up nonfarm occupations.

Thus the education of farm youths will be increasingly directed toward nonfarm occupations. The government will play an important role in both subsidizing education, making farm credit more accessible, and help to protect the price of farm products through certain controls.

Gamma:

Assumes that agricultural pursuits will rest largely in the hands of a managerial class that would operate the farm system as efficiently and cost-consciously as do industrialists in other productive enterprises. The labor costs will be closely calculated according to the best cost accounting principles; market conditions will be carefully followed to insure the greatest returns on the crops raised; modern scientific chemical and biological technology will be utilized; research will be carried out to cover all phases of the farming operations. These farm enterprises may also be corporately integrated with other manufacturing companies such that the farm products can be efficiently marketed as raw materials for the manufacturers.

These farm enterprises may be operated under two different types, as joint stock companies and as state-operated collectivized farms. Where joint stock company type of industrial farms prevail, this system will be identified as Gamma 1. Such company farms may be associated with food processing concerns or with companies that rely on agricultural products, as cotton, oil, soybeans, tallow, hides and skins. Where collectivized farming system prevails, this pattern may be designated here as Gamma 2 type.

To restate the three alternatives, we have the Alpha future in which we imagine an equilibrium stage. In the Beta future, we see an

increase in the average size of farm holdings and a marked decrease in farm families. In the Gamma future farming is taken out of the hands of individual family units and put into the control of a managerial class.

If we have in mind these three alternative futures for Japanese rural society, then, we can return to our original proposition. At the beginning of this paper I tried to suggest that the vast amount of studies on the Japanese villages make it difficult for us to assess or to interpret what is going on here. Of the hundreds of indicators of social and cultural change that researchers have brought to our attention, which of these indicators are significant? Which indicators of change are superficial and ephemeral? Furthermore we all know competent scholars who have come to different conclusions about one or another aspect of modern village life and who have become involved in intellectual argument about who is right and who is wrong. Most of these arguments arise because the standpoint or frame of reference for making the eva- luation is not clearly understood. (Many such arguments are just as silly as arguing whether a given cup of coffee is half-full or half- empty). In short, then, to understand any analysis or evaluation one has to identify the standpoint from which it is made.

This clarification of standpoint, or frame of reference, is the main purpose for introducing the alpha, beta and gamma alternative futures. Each alternative future I believe is an explicit standpoint from which to look at indicators of cultural change. Let us assume for the moment at least that we all agree that this is so. Now, then, can we use the alter- native futures to help us understand the present status of village life and conditions?

Let us begin with this bit of information which appeared on March 10,1965 in the Japan Times newspaper. It reported that Japanese farm wives complain of overwork. The reason for this complaint, it turns out, is that farmers are leaving for cities in search of better paying jobs, leaving the farm in the care of their wives. Additional facts are given: in 1963, the population movement away from the farms was 930,000 or 5.1 per cent of the rural population. Furthermore it noted that fewer graduates of junior high schools are seeking work on the farms (Last year the total was only 6,800. Ten years ago this population was four times larger).

Such bits of information suggest that trends if continued would necessarily lead toward a Beta Alternative Future, and possibly toward Gamma, but not toward Alpha.

Along similar lines, we come across information like the following: This from early Meiji to the present day, there has been a consistent decline in the proportion of the number employed in agriculture. (Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1960). In 1878-82, some 64 per cent of the total labor force was employed in agriculture. By 1938-42 it was reduced to 44 per cent. Presently it is slightly less than one-third of the total labor force. Furthermore the present agricultural labor force depend upon non-farm sources for nearly 40 per cent of their income. This strongly suggests support for a Beta alternative future.

Yasumas Kuroda, reports that out-migrants from rural areas is reaching such proportions that government sponsored research is being undertaken by sociologists in four regions of Japan. This research comes under the rubric of "New Life Movement Association." This is another odd piece of information that can be classified under Beta Alternative Future.

There are other kinds of informations available in the literature which suggests that Alpha alternative future is likely to be maintained. The reports of Takashi Koyama, Seiichi Kitano and others who have worked on the family system, marriage patterns, and primogeniture system indicate in a general way that the present pattern of adjustment to the modern world is proceeding smoothly and that these institutional patterns are still viable. Reports by Fukutake, Gamo, Izumi and others indicate that there are widely divergent patterns of kinship structure, ceremonial activities and religious orientations throughout Japan. Yet each of these divergent polymorphic patterns in itself seem to be relatively stable over time. Hence, their data indicates a tendency toward Alpha alternative future.

Contributing toward an Alpha alternative future are the present institutional supports for agriculture, especially those supports which are provided by the national government. Farmer cooperatives, research experiment stations and agricultural extension services are designed to maintain the status quo. The specialized and multipurpose cooperatives enable Japanese farmers to effectively pool their resources and their efforts. The large staff of more than 6,000 scientists and technicians developing better seeds and better chemicals is another example of how the farmer can maintain himself under the situation of land shortage.

Not all bits of information, however, suggests a stronger belief in either Alpha or Beta alternatives. Gamma type of alternative is already on the horizon. This excerpt from the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture contains this remark:

"/Japanese/ government planners expect the gross national product to double during the next decade. During this period, population is expected to increase only about 10 per cent, thus making it possible for per capita incomes to almost double as well. This rise in income will be

reflected in the food consumption pattern -- the consumption of high
protein foods will increase, while the consumption of starchy foods
will decline.

"Income in the agricultural sector are expected to rise but not
as rapidly as in the non-agricultural sector. As the level of living
rises, emphasis will shift from increased yields per acre to higher
productivity per farm worker. This will require fewer people on the land
and a consolidation of many, uneconomically small, farm units. Land
reform legislation limiting the size of farms will likely be revised.
The ultimate goal of the Japanese land reform program will have been
reached -- per capita production of farmers will have increased sufficiently
beyond farm consumption to permit the enlargement of farming units and
the acceleration of mechanization. The accelerated application of
agricultural technology will also continue to raise yields and per
capita productivity."

To summarize, then, I have suggested that we are approaching the
point of "information-overload" with respect to the study of rural society
in modern Japan. The dynamic forces that push and pull the Japanese
farmer and his cultural institutions in several directions at one is
extremely difficult to comprehend unless we devise some method for
simplifying our image and our concept. The thousands of learned papers
written on one or another aspect of Japanese rural life do not easily
form a comprehensive and integrated picture. Yet something of this
kind is necessary, if we scholars are to come to agreement as to what is
happening in the countryside. I have suggested the notion of "alter-
native futures" as a possible method for viewing the dynamic changes now
in process in rural Japan.